http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 8  

PETITIONER: FAQIR CHAND

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHRI RAM RATTAN BHANOT

DATE OF JUDGMENT30/01/1973

BENCH: ALAGIRISWAMI, A. BENCH: ALAGIRISWAMI, A. DUA, I.D. VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.

CITATION:  1973 AIR  921            1973 SCR  (3) 454  1973 SCC  (1) 572  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1991 SC 744  (10)

ACT: The  Delhi  Rent Control Act, 1952, s. 14-Lease of  land  by Improvement  Trust to landlord prohibiting use of  land  for commercial  purposes-Landlord nevertheless leasing out  part of  building  on land for commercial purposes-Lease  is  not void-Landlord   is  not  estopped  from  suing  tenant   for eviction-No   estoppel   against   statute-Controller   must exercise  one or the other of the two alternatives given  to him,  under s. 14(1)-Clause (c) and (k) of the proviso to s. 14(1), applicability of.

HEADNOTE: The  respondents were landlords of two houses in  the  Karol Bagh area of Delhi.  The houses were built on lands given on long  lease  by the Delhi Improvement Trust to  the  rights, liabilities  and  assets.  of which  the  Delhi  Development Authority  subsequently succeeded.  Under-the terms  of  the leases  the buildings erected on the lands were to  be  used for  residential purposes only.  If they were used  for  any other purpose without the approval of the lessor the  leases would  become void.  Portions of the buildings  in  question were  however let out for commercial purposes-viz. a  barber shop  and a scooter repair shop.   The  Delhi  Development Authority  gave  notice  to the  landlords  that  since  the buildings had been permitted to be used for commercial  pur- poses  the leases were liable to be determined.   They  were called  upon  to  discontinue  the  use  of  the  land   for commercial  purposes failing which they were asked  to  show cause why their leases should not be determined and the land together  with the buildings thereon be not  reentered  upon without compensation.  Thereupon the landlords issued notice to the tenants asking them to stop the commercial use of the buildings.   The landlords later on  instituted  proceedings against  the tenants under the Delhi Rent Control Act,  1958 but the Controller ,dismissed the petitions.  Their  appeals were  dismissed.   The  Division Bench  of  the  High  Court decided in favour of the landlords.  In appeal to this Court by special leave the question for consideration was  whether the  landlords  were estopped or otherwise  prohibited  from

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 8  

getting possession of the property from the tenants because they themselves had let it out for commercial purposes.  The Court  had  to  consider the question in the  light  of  the provisions of s. 14 of the Act. HELD : (i) If it is a case where the tenant has contrary  to the terms of his tenancy used the buildings for a commercial purpose  the landlord could take action under clause (c)  of the proviso to s. 14(1).  He need not depend upon clause (k) at  all.  The only situation in which clause (k)  can  take effect is when the lease is for a commercial purpose  agreed upon  both  by  the landlord ,and the tenant  but,  that  is ,Contrary to the terms of the lease of the land in favour of the landlord. [459E-G] (ii)The  policy of the legislatures seems to be to  put  an end  to  unauthorised use of the leased  lands  rather  than merely  to enable the authorities to get back possession  of the leased lands.  This conclusion is further fortified by a reference to sub-section 11 of section 14.  The lease is not forfeited  merely because the building put upon  the  leased land  is  put to unauthorised use.  The tenant is  given  an opportunity 455 to comply with the, condition imposed on the landlord by any of the authorities referred to in clause (k) of the  proviso to  sub-section  (1).  As long as the condition  imposed  is complied with there is no forfeiture.  It even enables the, controller to direct compensation to be paid to the authority for a breach of the conditions, which must  be done in the presence of the authority. [459H; 460A-D] (iii)The  anxiety  of  the legislature  is  to  prevent unauthorised  user rather than protection of the  tenant  or strengthening  the  hands of the  Development  Authority  in effecting forfeiture.  The Development authority can  always resort to the terms of the least, [460F-G] There is no estoppel here because both the landlord and  the tenant knew that the tenancy was not one permitted under the terms ofthe lease of the land. In any case there can be no estoppel againstthe  statute. It would not  benefit  the tenant even if it is held thatthe   landlord    cannot, under the circumstances evict him. The landlordwill  lose his property and the tenant will also lose.  He cannot after the Development Authority takes over the building use it for a commercial purpose. [460G-H] Therefore  the  conclusion  must be that the  lease  in  its inception  was  not void not is the landlord  estopped  from claiming  possession because he himself was a party  to  the breach of the conditions under which the land was leased  to him.   Neither  the  clear  words  of  the  section  nor   a consideration  of  the  policy of the Act  lead  us  to  the conclusion  that the lease was void in its inception  if  it was for an unauthorised user. [461A] Smt.   Uma Kumari v. Jaswant Rai Chopra, P.L.R.  (1960)  460 and  S. P. Arora v. Ajit Singh, I.L.R. (1970) 11 Delhi  120, disapproved. Waman  Shriniwas  Kini v. Rati Lal Bhagwandas,  A.I.R.  1959 S.C. 689, referred to. [The Court found that s. 14 of the Delhi Development Act was inapplicable  to the case.  The matter was sent back to  the Controller for deciding the question under sub-section  (11) of  Section  14 whether he should exercise the  one  or  the other of two alternatives mentioned therein.]

JUDGMENT:

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 8  

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 846 and  1343 of 1972. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment ’and order  dated November 22, 1971 of the Delhi High Court in S.A.0. No. 83-D of 1965 And Civil Appeal No. 1343 of 1973 Appeal by  Special leave from the judgment and order dated November 22, 1971 of the Delhi High Court in SAO No. 239-D of 1965. V.M.  Tarkunde,  S. S. Shukla and A. P.  Gupta,  for  the appellant (in C. A. No. 846). S.P.  Pandey, Shiv Prakash Pandey and S. S.  Shukla,  for the ,appellant (in C. A. No. 1343). D. N. Mukherjee, for respondent (in C. A. No. 846). Bakshi  Man Singh and Harbans Singh, for the respondent  (in C.A. No. 1343). 456 Sardar  Bahadur  Saharya,  Vishnu Bahadur  Saharaya  and  Y. Khushalani, for the Intervener (in C.A. No. 846). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ALAGIRISWAMI,  J.-These  two appeals by  special  leave  are against the judgment of the High Court of Delhi allowing the ,appeals filed by the two respondents. The  respondents  are landlords of two houses in  the  Karol Bagh area of Delhi.  The houses are built on lands given  on long  lease  by the Delhi Improvement Trust to  the  rights, liabilities  and  assets  ,of which  the  Delhi  Development Authority has since succeeded. Under  the terms of the lease, subject to revision of  rent, the  lessees  were to put up residential  buildings  on  the leased lands. ,and the lessees undertook :               "(vi)  not to use the said land and  buildings               that  may be erected thereon during  the  Said               term  for  any  other  purpose  than  for  the               purpose  of  residential  house  without   the               consent   in  writing  of  the  said   lessor;               provided  that the lease shall become void  if               the land is used for any purpose than that for               which the lease is granted not being a purpose               subsequently approved by the lessor." The present landlords are not the original lessees but their successors  in  interest.  Portions of buildings  have  been leased  for commercial purposes, a barber shop in  C.A.  846 and  a  scooter  repair  shop  in  C.A.  1343.   The   Delhi Development  Authority appears to have given notice to  them drawing  their  attention  to the  provision  of  the  lease extracted above and that as they had permitted the buildings to he used for commercial purposes contrary to the terms  of the  lease deed, the lease was liable to be  determined  and called  upon  them to discontinue the use of  the  land  for commercial  purposes, failing which they were asked to  show cause  why  their lease should not be  determined  ’and  the land,  together with the buildings thereon,  reentered  upon without  any compensation to them.  Thereupon the  landlords issued  notice to the tenants asking them to stop  the  com- mercial  use  of  the buildings  and  later  instituted  the proceedings out of which these appeals arise.  In both these cases  the  buildings had been put to  commercial  use  even before 1957 when the Delhi Development Authority Act of 1957 came into force. The   Controller  dismissed  the  petitions  filed  by   the landlords  and  the appeals filed by  them  were  dismissed. They  thereupon filed appeals to the High Court.  A  learned single Judge of the High Court taking a view contrary to two earlier decisions in 457 Smt.  Uma Kumari v. Jaswant Rai Chopra(1) and S. P. Arora v.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 8  

Ajit  Singh (2 ) referred the question that arise  in  these appeals  to a Division Bench which took a view  contrary  to that  taken in the two earlier decisions above referred  to, and decided in favour of the landlords. The question that arises for decision in these cases is this :  Are the landlords estopped or otherwise  prohibited  from getting possession of the property from the tenants  because they themselves had let it out for commercial purposes.   We shall  set  out  the  relevant  portion  of  the   statutory provisions regarding this question.  Section 14 of the Delhi Rent  Control  Act 1958, which deals with  the  question  of protection  to tenants against eviction, in so far as it  is relevant, is as follows :               "14. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the  con-               trary contained in any other law or  contract,               no  order  or  decree  for  the  recovery   of               possession  of any premises shall be  made  by               any  court  or  Controller in  favour  of  the               landlord against a tenant :               Provided  that  the  Controller  may,  on   an               application  made  to him  in  the  prescribed               manner,  make  an order for  the  recovery  of               possession  of the premises on one or more  of               the following grounds only, namely-               (c)   that  the tenant has used  the  premises               for  a purpose other than that for which  they               were let-               (i)   if  the  premises have been  let  on  or               after  the  9th  day of  June,  1952,  without               obtaining  the  consent  in  writing  of   the               landlord; or               (ii)if the premises have been let before the               said date without obtaining his consent.               (k)   that  the  tenant  has,  notwithstanding               previous  notice,  used  or  dealt  with   the               premises in a manner contrary to any condition               imposed on the landlord by the Government  or               the   Delhi  Development  Authority   or   the               Municipal  Corporation of Delhi  while  giving               him a lease, of the land on which the premises               are situate."               Sub-section  11 of the same section, which  is               also relevant, reads                "   (11)  No  order  for  the   recovery   of               possession  of any premises shall be  made  on               the  ground  specified in clause  (k)  of  the               proviso  to  sub-section (1), if  the  tenant,               within such time as may be specified in this (1) P.L.R. (1960) 460. (2) I.L.R. (1970) 11 Delhi 130. 458 .lm15 behalf  by  the  Controller, complies  with  ’the  condition imposed  on the landlord by any of the authorities  referred to  in that clause or pays to that authority such amount  by way of compensation as the Controller may direct." Section 14 of the Delhi Development Act 1957 is as follows "14.  After the coming into operation of any of the plans in a zone no person shall use or permit to be used any land  or building in that zone otherwise than in conformity with such plan : Provided  that  it shall be lawful to continue to  use  upon such terms and condition as may be prescribed by regulations made in this behalf any land or building for the purpose and to,  the extent for and to which it is being used  upon  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 8  

date on which such plan comes into force." Before  this  Act  was  passed  the  United  Provinces  Town Improvement  Act  1919 was in force in Delhi and  the  Delhi Improvement  Trust was constituted thereunder.  It was  this Trust which had leased the lands to the predecessors of  the two landlords in the present appeals.  The Delhi Development Authority  established under the Delhi Development Act  1957 succeeded to the asets, rights and liabilities of the  Delhi Improvement  Trust.  We shall deal first with  the  question that arises under the Delhi Rent Control Act. Clause  (k) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section  14 provides that the Controller may, on an application made  to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground that the  tenant has, notwithstanding previous notice, used or dealt with the premises  in a manner contrary to any condition  imposed  on the  landlord  by the Government or  the  Delhi  Development Authority or the Municipal Corporation of Delhi while giving him  a lease of the land on which the premises are  situate. In  this  case the lease granted by  the  Delhi  Improvement Trust, the predecessors in interest of the Delhi Development Authority, to the predecessors in interest of the  landlords contains a condition that any building to be erected on  the land   shall  not  be  used  for  any  purpose  other   than residential purpose.  There is no dispute that part of  each of the buildings is being used in a manner contrary to  that condition.   The landlord has also given notice  asking  the tenant  to cease using the building for that  purpose.   The two earlier decisions referred to held that  notwithstanding this  provision  the  landlord  was  not  entitled  to   get possession  of  the land because he himself had  leased  the building  for  a  commercial  purpose  and  was,  therefore, estopped from 459 claiming  possession.  The result will be this :  The  Delhi Development  Authority  can enforce the  conditions  of  the lease  and  forfeit  the  leased  land  with  the  buildings thereon.   In  that case both the landlord as  well  as  the tenant  stand  to  lose.   The  landlords  point  but   this situation  and say that they are not interested in  evicting the  tenants  but  are interested only in  seeing  that  the tenants  do not use the buildings for  commercial  purpose with  the consequences that they may have to lose  the  land and the buildings and the tenants also cannot any longer use it for a commercial purpose. It has been argued on behalf of the tenants that this clause will  apply  only where the tenant has used the  land  after previous notice from the landlord, i.e., if the landlord had told him at the ’beginning of the tenancy that the  building was   not   to   be,  used  for   commercial   purpose   and notwithstanding  that  the tenant used it for  a  commercial purpose.  They, therefore, contend that as in this case both the  landlord and the tenant were aware of the use to  which the’  building  was to be put there is no  question  of  any notice  from the landlord asking the tenant not to  use  the building  for commercial purpose and by merely issuing  such notice  the  landlord cannot take advantage of  clause  (k). This is really another way of putting the argument that  the landlord  having granted the lease for a commercial  purpose is  estopped from contending that the tenant should not  use it for commercial purpose.  While the argument appears to be plausible  we are of opinion that there is no  substance  in this  argument.   If  it  is a case  where  the  tenant  has contrary to the terms of his tenancy used the building for a commercial  purpose  the landlord could  take  action  under

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 8  

clause (c). He  need not depend upon clause (k)  at  all. These two clausesare    intended   to   meet    different situations.  There was no need for anadditional provision in  clause (k) to enable a landlord to get possession  where the  tenant has used the building for a  commercial  purpose contrary to the terms of (the tenancy.  An intention to  put in  an useless provision in a statute cannot be  imputed  to the  Legislature.   Some meaning would have to be  given  to that  provision.   The only situation in which it  can  take effect is where the lease is for a commercial purpose agreed upon  by  both  the  landlord and the  tenant  but  that  is contrary to the terms of the lease of the land in favour  of the  landlord.   That clause does not  come  into  operation where  there  is no provision in the lease of  the  land  in favour of the landlord, prohibiting its use for a commercial purpose. The  legislature  has clearly taken note of  the  fact  that enormous  extents  of  land have been leased  by  the  three authorities  mentioned in that clause, and has expressed  by means of this clause its anxiety to see that these lands are used for the purpose for which they were leased.  The policy of the legislature seems to be to put an 14-L79 6Sup-C.I./73, 460 end  to  unauthorised use of the leased  lands  rather  than merely  to enable the authorities to get back possession  of the leased lands. This conclusion is further fortified by  a reference to sub-section 11 of section 14., The lease is not forfeited  merely because the building put upon  the  leased land  is put to an unauthorised use. The tenant is given  an opportunity  to  comply with the conditions imposed  on  the landlord by any of the authorities referred to in clause (k) of the proviso to sub-section (1). As long as the  condition imposed  is  complied with there is no forfeiture.  It  even enables the Controller to direct compensation to be paid  to the authority for a breach of the conditions. Of course, the Controller  cannot award the payment of compensation to  the authority  except  in  the presence of  the  authority.  The authority  may  not be prepared to accept  compensation  but might  insist  upon cessation of the unauthorized  use.  The sub-section   does   not  also  say  who  is  to   pay   the compensation,  whether  it is the landlord  or  the  tenant. Apparently in awarding compensation the Controller will have to  apportion the responsibility for the breach between  the lessor and     the tenant.      The  provision  of clause (k) of the  proviso  to  sub- section (1) of section 14 is something which has to be given effect to whatever  the   original  contract   between   the landlord  and the tenant. The leases were granted  in  1940, and  the  buildings might have been put up even  before  the Delhi  and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952 came into  force.  It was  that Act that for the first time provided the  kind  of remedy which is found in clause (k). The relevant  provision in that Act enabled the landlord to get possession where the tenant  whether before or after the commencement of the  Act used or dealt with the premises in a manner contrary to  any condition  imposed on the landlord by the Government or  the Delhi improvement Trust while giving him a lease of the land on  which the premises are situate notwithstanding  previous notice.  The  anxiety  of  the  legislature  is  to  prevent unauthorized  user rather than protection of the  tenant  or strengthening   the  hands  of  Development   Authority   in effecting  forfeiture. The Development Authority can  always resort to the terms of the lease. There is no estoppel  here because  both  the  landlord and the tenant  know  that  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 8  

tenancy  was not one permitted under the terms of the  lease of  the land. In any- case there can be no estoppel  against the  statute. It would not benefit the tenant even it it  is held  that  the landlord cannot,  under  the  circumstances, evict him. The landlord will lose Ms property and the tenant also  will lose. He cannot, after the Development  Authority takes over the building use it for a commercial purpose.  We thus  reach the conclusion that the leased in its  inception was  not  void nor is the landlord  estopped  from  claiming possession  because he himself was a party to the breach  of the conditions under which the land was leased to him. 461 Neither  the  clear  words  of  the  section,  as  in  Waman Shriniwas   Kini   v.   Rati  Lal   Bhagwandas(1),   nor   a consideration  of  the  policy of the Act  lead  us  to  the conclusion  that the lease was void in its inception  if  it was for an unauthorised user. We  are  also  of the opinion that the High  Court  was  not justified  in  leaving to the Controller no  option  but  to pass.   an  order  for  eviction.   That  would   make   the alternative  provided  in  subsection  (11)  of  section  14 useless.  The High Court is not correct in saying that since the  Authority has no power to legalize the misuser of  land contrary  to the plans by acceptance of  compensation  under the Development Act, the Controller cannot order the payment of  compensation  by  the tenant to  the  Delhi  Development authority.   This  is  in  effect  nullifying  part  of  the provisions contained in sub-section (11) of section 14.  The High  Court has arrived at its conclusion on the basis  that section  14  of the Delhi Development Act  applies  to  this Case.   We  shall presently show that that section  has no relevance to the decision of this case. It  is  under the terms of the lease granted  by  the  Delhi Improvement  Trust  that  the  use  of  this  building   for commercial  purpose  is prohibited and-not under  the  Delhi Development Act. "Furthermore, section 14 applies not only to lands leased by authorities like the Delhi Development Authority  containing conditions  against  unauthorised user as well as  to  lands which  do not belong to that category.  Its  provisions  are not intended to enforce the conditions in those leases.  The proviso  to that section deals with the use to which a  land or  building  may continue to be put after the  coming  into force  of any plan subject to such terms and  conditions  as may be prescribed by regulations, provided that building  or land had been used for that purpose prior to the coming into force   of  the  plan.   The  section  does  not   therefore contemplate  complete  prohibition of the use of a  land  or building for purposes other than that permitted in the plan. Such  uses  can  be  continued  subject  to  the  terms  and conditions  prescribed  by the regulations provided  it  had been  so used even before the plan.  It is admitted that  no such regulations have been framed.  Therefore, if a plan had come  into operation in this area, the previous use  can  be continued  till  the regulations are framed  and  after  the regulations  are framed, they will be subject to  the  terms and  conditions  of those regulations.  We are  of  opinion, therefore,  that  S.  14  of  the  Development  Act  has  no relevance in deciding the question at issue in his case." The  appeals are allowed and the judgment of the High  Court is  set  aside.   The matter will have to  go  back  to  the Controller for (1‘) A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 689. 462 deciding  the question under sub-section ( 1 1 ) of  section

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 8  

14  whether he should exercise the one or the other  of  the two  alternatives mentioned therein.  As already  mentioned, no order awarding compensation under the second  alternative given in that sub-section can be made except in the presence of the Delhi Development Authority.  In the circumstances of this case we direct the parties to bear their own costs. G.C.                                   Appeals allowed. 463