REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No. 7037 of 2004

Ethiopian Airlines …Appellant

Versus

Ganesh Narain Saboo …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dalveer Bhandari, J.

1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of  

the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New  

Delhi, dated 7.1.2004 passed in First Appeal No. 190 of 1996.

2. A  two-Judge  bench  of  this  Court  by  its  order  dated  

10.11.2009 referred this matter to a larger Bench.  The said  

order reads as under:

“The  questions  in  this  case  is  whether  proceedings before the Consumer Forum are suits.  It appears that there are two conflicting judgments  on  this  point  –  E.I.C.M.  Exports  Ltd.  v. South

Indian Corporation (Agencies) Ltd. and Another  2009 (10) SCALE 22 and Patel Roadways Limited  v.  Birla Yamaha Limited (2000) 4 SCC 91.  Hence  we  are  referring  the  matter  to  a  larger  Bench  to  resolve this conflict, to be constituted by Hon’ble the  Chief Justice of India.”

BRIEF FACTS:  

3. The respondent booked a consignment of Reactive Dyes  

with the appellant Ethiopian Airlines to be delivered at the Dar  

Es.  Salaam, Tanzania  on 30.9.1992.  The airway bills  were  

duly issued by the appellant from its office in Bombay at the  

Taj Mahal Hotel for the said consignment.  According to the  

respondent there was gross delay in arrival of the consignment  

at the destination, which led to deterioration of the goods.

 4. The respondent filed a complaint on 11.5.1993 before the  

Maharashtra State Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission  

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the State Commission’).  Pursuant  

to the notice issued by the State Commission, the appellant  

filed  a  written  statement  in  which  the  appellant  raised  a  

preliminary  objection  regarding  maintainability  of  the  

complaint.  

5. On  17.1.1996,  the  State  Commission  held  that  the  

complaint filed by the respondent was not maintainable. The  

2

respondent aggrieved by the  said order preferred an appeal  

before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission  

(hereinafter  referred to  as  ‘the  National  Commission’).   The  

National Commission categorically observed in the impugned  

judgment that Section 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for  

short ‘C.P.C.’) was not applicable since the case in dispute is  

covered under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act,  

1986 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’).   

6. The National Commission further held that Section 13(4)  

of  the  Act  makes  the  CPC  applicable  only  for  the  limited  

purpose.   As  such,  the  National  Commission took the  view  

that the judgment of the High Court of Delhi delivered in the  

case of  Deepak Wadhwa  v.  Aeroflot  24 (1983) Delhi Law  

Times  1  had no  bearing  and  application  in  deciding  the  

complaint filed by the respondent.

7. The National Commission set aside the order passed by  

the State Commission and remitted it to the State Commission  

so  that  the  State  Commission  could  decide  it  afresh  in  

accordance with law.

3

8. The appellant, aggrieved by the said order, has preferred  

this  appeal  on  the  ground  that  a  foreign  State  or  its  

instrumentality  cannot  be  proceeded  against  under  the  Act  

without  obtaining  prior  permission  from  the  Central  

Government.  The appellant contends that a foreign State or  

its instrumentality can legitimately claim sovereign immunity  

from being proceeded against under the Act in respect of  a  

civil claim.  

9. It  is  submitted that,  in  India,  it  is  clear  that  there  is  

presumption that sovereign immunity is absolute, but that a  

foreign  sovereign  can  still  be  sued  in  India  under  certain  

circumstances  with  the  permission  of  the  Government  of  

India.  The Central Government may give consent for such a  

suit if:

(a) the foreign State has instituted a suit in the  Court against the person desiring to sue it; or

(b) the foreign State trades within the legal limits  of the jurisdiction of the Court or;

(c) the foreign State is in possession of immovable  property situated within those limits and is to  be sued with reference to such property or for  money charged thereon or;

(d) the  foreign  State  has  expressly  or  impliedly  waived the privilege of immunity.

4

Relevant case law and submissions

10. Reliance was placed on a judgment of the Constitution  

Bench delivered in the case of  Mirza Ali Akbar Kashani  v.  

The United Arab Republic and Another  AIR 1966 SC 230.  

This Court in para 30 of the said judgment observed as under:

“The effect of the provisions of section 86(1) appears  to be that it makes a statutory provision covering a  field  which  would  otherwise  be  covered  by  the  doctrine of immunity under International Law. It is  not disputed that every sovereign State is competent  to make its own laws in relation to the rights and  liabilities of foreign States to be sued within its own  municipal Courts. Just as an independent sovereign  State may statutorily provide for its own rights and  liabilities to sue and be sued, so can it provide for  the rights and liabilities of foreign States to sue and  be sued in its municipal Courts. That being so, it  would be legitimate to hold that the effect of section  86(1) is to modify to a certain extent the doctrine of  immunity  recognised  by  International  Law.  This  section  provides  that  foreign  States  can  be  sued  within  the  municipal  Courts  of  India  with  the  consent of the Central Government and when such  consent is granted as required by section 86(1), it  would not be open to a foreign State to rely on the  doctrine  of  immunity  under  International  Law,  because  the  municipal  Courts  in  India  would  be  bound by the  statutory  provisions,  such as those  contained  in  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure.  In  substance, section 86(1) is not merely procedural; it  is in a sense a counter-part of section 84. Whereas  section 84 confers a right on a foreign State to sue,  section  86(1)  in  substance  imposes  a  liability  on  foreign States  to  be  sued,  though this  liability  is  

5

circumscribed  and  safeguarded  by  the  limitations  prescribed by it. … … …”

11. Reliance  was  also  placed on another  judgment  of  this  

Court  in the  case of  Veb Deutfracht Seereederei  Rostock  

(D.S.R.  Lines)  a  Department  of  the  German Democratic   

Republic v.  New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd. and Another  

(1994) 1 SCC 282.   In para 5 of the judgment this Court held  

that:

“One of the principles of International Law is that  sovereign State respects the independence of every  other foreign State. This absolute independence and  the international comity underlines the relationship  between sovereign States.  

The object of Section 86 of the Code is to give effect  to the principles of International Law. But, in India  it is only a qualified privilege because a suit can be  brought with the consent of the Central Government  in certain circumstances.  Just  as an independent  sovereign State may statutorily provide for its own  rights and liabilities to sue and be sued so can it  provide rights and liabilities of foreign States to sue  and be sued in its Courts. It can be said that effect  of Section 86 thus is to modify the extent of doctrine  of immunity recognised by the International Law. If  a suit is filed in Indian Courts with the consent of  the Central Government as required by Section 86,  it shall not be open to any foreign State to rely on  the doctrine of immunity. Sub-section (1) of Section  86 says in clear and unambiguous terms that no  foreign State may be sued in any court, except with  the consent of the Central Government certified in  writing by the Secretary to that Government. Sub- section (2) prescribes that such consent shall not be  

6

given unless it appears to the Central Government  that the case falls within any of the clauses (a) to (d)  of  sub-section  (2)  of  Section  86.  Sub-section  (6)  enjoins that where a request is made to the Central  Government for the grant of any consent referred to  in  sub-section  (1),  the  Central  Government  shall  before refusing to accede to the request in whole or  in  part,  give  to  the  person making the  request  a  reasonable opportunity of being heard.  

On  a  plain  reading  of  different  sub-sections  of  Section 86, it is apparent that no foreign State may  be  sued  in  any  court  in  India,  except  with  the  consent of the Central Government which has to be  certified  in  writing  by  the  Secretary  to  that  Government.  In  view  of  the  provisions  aforesaid,  before  any  action  is  launched  or  a  suit  is  filed  against  a  foreign  State,  person  concerned  has  to  make a request to the Central Government for grant  of the necessary consent as required by sub-section  (1) of Section 86 and the Central Government has to  accede to the said request or refuse the same after  taking  into  consideration  all  the  facts  and  circumstances of the case. … … …”

 12. It  was  submitted  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellant, Mr. K.G. Presswala, that when interpreting Section  

86 of the CPC, it should always be kept in view that the said  

Section gives effect to the principles of international law.

13. The learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on  

the judgment of this court delivered in the case of   H.H. The  

Maharana  Sahib  Shri  Bhagwat  Singh  Bahadur  of  

Udaipur  v. State of  Rajasthan and Others  AIR 1964 SC  

7

444, where an ex-ruler contended that under section 86 of the  

CPC,  a  reference  made  by  the  Government  under  the  

Industrial Disputes Act in respect of employees’ wages was not  

maintainable  without  the  prior  consent  of  the  Central  

Government.  This Court in para 5 of the said judgment held:

“The appellant is recognised under Article 363(22) of  the Constitution as a Ruler of an Indian State, but  Section  86  in  terms  protects  a  Ruler  from  being  “sued” and not against the institution of any other  proceeding which is not in the nature of a suit. A  proceeding which does not commence with a plaint  or  petition  in  the  nature  of  plaint,  or  where  the  claim is not in respect of a dispute ordinarily triable  in a civil court, would prima facie not be regarded  as falling within Section 86 Code of Civil Procedure.  … … …”  

14. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the  

Act specifically states in Section 3 that “the provisions of this  

Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation to any other  

law for the time being in force.”  The learned counsel for the  

appellant also submitted that this Court in the case of  State  

of  Karnataka  v. Vishwabharathi  House  Building  Co-

operative  Society  and  Others  (2003)  2  SCC  412 in  

paragraphs 46 and 47 observed as under:

“46. By reason of the provisions of Section 3 of the  Act, it is evident that remedies provided thereunder  are not in derogation of those provided under other  

8

laws. The said Act supplements and not supplants  the jurisdiction of the civil courts or other statutory  authorities.

47. The said Act provides for a further safeguard to  the  effect  that  in  the  event  a  complaint  involves  complicated issues requiring recording of  evidence  of  experts,  the complainant would be at liberty to  approach the civil court for appropriate relief. The  right of the consumer to approach the civil court for  necessary relief has, therefore, been provided under  the Act itself.”

15. The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted  

that a claim which is ordinarily triable in a Civil  Court can  

also be tried in the Consumer Court if:

(i) an Unfair Trade Practice or a restrictive trade  practice  has  been  adopted  by  any  trader  or  service provider;

(ii) the goods bought by a person or agreed to be  bought by him suffer from one or more defects;

(iii) the services hired or availed of or agreed to be  hired  or  availed  of  by  him  suffer  from  deficiency in any respect;

(iv) a Trader or a Service Provider as the case may  be has charged for the goods or the services a  price in excess of the price:

(a) fixed  by  or  under  any  law for  the  time  being in force;

(b) displayed  on  the  goods  or  any  package  containing such goods;

9

(c) displayed  on  the  price  list  exhibited  by  him or under any law for the time being  in force;

(d) agreed between the parties

(v) goods which would be hazardous to life  and  safety when used are being offered for sale to  the public

(a) in  contravention  of  any  standards  relating  to  safety  of  such  goods  as  required to be complied with by or under  any law for the time being in force;

(b) if the trader could have known with due  diligence  that  the  goods  so  offered  are  unsafe to the public.

(vi) services  which are  hazardous  or  likely  to  be  hazardous to the life and safety of the public  when  used  are  being  offered  by  the  Service  Provider could have known with due diligence  injurious to life and safety.  

16. Mr.  Presswala  also  submitted that  a  Complaint  and a  

Plaint  is  one  and  the  same  thing  and  a  proceeding  in  the  

Consumer Court, though not a suit under the Civil Procedure  

Code, is still a proceeding which is in the nature of a suit and  

is commenced by a proceeding in the nature of a Plaint (i.e. a  

Complaint  and  is  in  respect  of  a  claim which  is  ordinarily  

triable by a Civil Court).  It is submitted by Mr. Presswala that  

10

Section 86 of  the  CPC would  be  squarely  applicable  to  the  

proceedings under the Act.   

17. The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted  

that  the  provisions  of  the  CPC  are  not  applicable  to  the  

proceedings under the Act.  Mr. Presswala also submitted that  

the District Forums, the State Commission and the National  

Commission  have  all  the  trappings  of  a  Civil  Court.  

Consequently,  the  proceedings  before  these  fora  are  legal  

proceedings.    

18. According  to  the  appellant,  the  interpretation  given by  

the National Commission is totally untenable and cannot be  

sustained.  

19. Mr. Rakesh Kumar Khanna, the learned senior counsel  

for  the  respondent  submitted  that  this  appeal  not  only  

involves the applicability of section 86 of the CPC and the Act,  

but also raises the following questions:

(a) Whether the Consumer Protection Act being a  later and a Special Statute will have overriding  effect  over  the  provisions  of  general  and  previous Statute (i.e. the Civil Procedure Code,  1908?)

11

(b) Whether  in  view  of  the  provisions  of  the  Carriage by Air Act, 1972, specially, Section 7  read  with  Rules  1,  2,  18,  19  &  28  of  First  Schedule  framed under  Section 3 of  the  Act  thereof,  the  Appellant  Ethiopian  Airlines  will  be  deemed  to  have  submitted  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Indian  Courts  for  the  purpose of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?

(c) Whether the provisions of Carriage by Air Act,  1972 will  be  read  into  the  provisions  of  the  Consumer Protection Act, 1986?

20. Learned  senior  advocate  for  the  respondent  also  

submitted that the Act is  a complete code in itself.   It  sets  

forth the procedure to be followed in dealing with complaints  

filed before the fora provided for in the Act as well as with the  

Appeals arising from the orders of those fora.  Section 13 of  

this Act provides for the procedure to be followed by the fora  

on receipt of the complaint.  Sub-sections 4, 5 and 6 of section  

13,  which are relevant for  the purpose of  the present case,  

read as under:

“13. Procedure on admission of complaint: (1) The  District  Forum  shall,  on  admission  of  a  complaint, if it relates to any goods,

xx xx xx

xx xx xx

12

(4) For  the  purposes  of  this  section,  the  District  Forum  shall  have  the  same  powers  as  are  vested  in  a  Civil  Court  under Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of  1908) while trying a suit in respect of the  following matters, namely:

(i) the  summoning  and  enforcing  the  attendance  of  any  defendant  or  witness and examining the witness  on oath;

(ii) the discovery and production of any  document  or  other  material  object  producible as evidence;

(iii) the  reception  of  evidence  on  affidavits;

(iv) the  requisitioning  of  the  report  of  the concerned analysis or test from  the  appropriate  laboratory  or  from  any other relevant source;

(v) issuing  of  any  commission  for  the  examination of any witness; and

(vi) any  other  matter  which  may  be  prescribed.

(5) Every  proceeding  before  the  District  Forum shall  be deemed to be a judicial  proceeding  within  the  meaning  of  sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal  Code (45 of 1860), and the District Forum  shall be deemed to be a civil court for the  purposes  of  Section  195  and  chapter  XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure,  1973 (2 of 1974).

(6) Where  the  complainant  is  a  consumer  referred to in sub-clause (iv) of clause (b)  

13

of  sub-section  (1)  of  Section  2,  the  provisions of rule 8 of Order 1 of the first  Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure,  1908 (5  of  1908)  shall  apply  subject  to  the  modification  that  every  reference  therein  to  a  suit  or  decree  shall  be  construed as a reference to a complaint  or  the  order  of  the  District  Forum  thereon.”

21. This Court in Savita Garg v. Director, National Heart  

Institute (2004) 8 SCC 56 para 7 has observed that:

“… … …Therefore, as far as the Commission is  concerned,  the  provisions  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure are applicable to a limited extent and not  all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are  made applicable to the proceedings of the National  Forum…. … …”

22. In  para  10  of  the  said  judgment  the  Court  further  

observed as under:

“The Consumer Forum is primarily  meant to  provide  better  protection  in  the  interest  of  the  consumers and not to short-circuit the matter or to  defeat the claim on technical grounds. … … …”

23. The respondent contends that a bare perusal of Section  

13(4), (5) and (6) clearly demonstrate that as far as the fora  

created under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for deciding  

consumer disputes are concerned, the provisions of the CPC  

14

are applicable to a limited extent only and not all provisions of  

CPC are made applicable thereto.  

24. In exercise  of  powers  conferred by  Section  30A of  the  

Consumer  Protection  Act,  1986,  the  Consumer  Protection  

Regulations, 2005 have been framed.  Regulation 26 of these  

Regulations  specifically  provides  that  in  all  the  proceedings  

before the consumer forum endeavour shall be made by the  

parties and their counsel to avoid the use of provisions of CPC.  

Regulation 26 of these Regulations reads as under:

“26. Miscellaneous: (1) In all proceedings before the  Consumer Forum, endeavour shall be made by the  parties  and  their  counsel  to  avoid  the  use  of  provisions  of  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  1908  (5  of  1908).

Provided  that  the  provisions  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure, 1908 may be applied which have been  referred  to  in  the  Act  or  in  the  rules  made  thereunder.”

25. The aforesaid view of  the specific  provisions of  Section  

13(4) of the Consumer Protection Act read with Regulation 26,  

makes it clear that the provisions of the CPC in general are not  

applicable in the proceedings under the Consumer Protection  

Act, except to the extent provided for under Section 13 of the  

Act.

15

26. Mr. Khanna also submitted that the controversy involved  

in this case is no longer res integra, as evidenced by  Savita  

Garg (supra).  

27. Mr. Khanna further submitted that the provisions of the  

CPC  are  not  applicable  to  the  proceedings  under  the  

Consumer  Protection  Act,  1986  and  consequently,  the  bar  

under Section 86 of the CPC likewise does not apply to the  

proceedings  initiated  under  the  Consumer  Protection  Act,  

1986.  

28. Mr. Khanna contended that the impugned order passed  

by the National Commission is in consonance with the legal  

position crystallized in a series of judgments of this Court and  

calls for no interference.   

29. Mr.  Khanna  gave  the  historical  background  of  the  

enactment  of  the  Consumer  Protection  Act,  1986.   He  

submitted that the interests of  consumers around the world  

had drawn the attention of the United Nations for a long time  

and that after long deliberations and continued consultations,  

the  United  Nations  in  its  General  Assembly   adopted  

16

guidelines for consumer protection.   The relevant portion of  

the guidelines is given as under:

“1. Taking into account the interests and needs of  consumers  in  all  countries,  particularly  in  developing  countries,  recognize  that  consumers often face imbalances in economic  terms,  educational  levels,  and  bargaining  power;  and bearing  in  mind that  consumers  should  have  the  right  of  access  to  non- hazardous  products,  as  well  as  the  right  to  promote  just,  equitable  and  sustainable  economic  and  social  development.   These  guidelines  for  consumer  protection  have  the  following objectives: (a) To  assist  countries  in  achieving  or  

maintaining adequate protection for their  population as consumers;

(b) To facilitate  production and distribution  patterns  responsive  to  the  needs  and  desires of consumers;

(c) To  encourage  high  levels  of  ethical  conduct  for  those  engaged  in  the  production and distribution of goods and  services to consumers;

(d) To  assist  countries  in  curbing  abusive  business  practices  by  all  enterprises  at  the  national  and  international  levels  which adversely affect consumers;

(e) To  facilitate  the  development  of  independent consumer groups;

(f) To  further  international  cooperation  in  the field of consumer protection;

(g) To encourage the development of market  conditions which provide consumers with  greater choices at lower prices.

17

5. All  enterprises should obey the relevant laws  and regulations of the countries in which they  do business.  They should also conform to the  appropriate  provisions  of  international  standards  for  consumer  protection  to  which  the  competent  authorities  of  the  country  in  question have agreed.  (hereinafter references  to  international  standards  in  the  guidelines  should  be  viewed  in  the  context  of  this  paragraph).

28. Governments  should  establish  or  maintain  legal  and/or  administrative  measures  to  enable consumers or, as appropriate, relevant  organizations to obtain redress through formal  or  informal  procedures  that  are  expeditious,  fair,  inexpensive  and  accessible.   Such  procedures should take particular account of  the needs of low income consumers.”

30. Mr.  Khanna  submitted  that  these  guidelines  were  

considered by this Court in the case of  Vishwabharti House  

Building Cooperative Society and others (supra).

31. Mr. Khanna also submitted that the framework for the  

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 was provided by a resolution  

dated 9.4.1985 of (the General Assembly of the United Nations  

Organisation)  which  is  commonly  known  as  “Consumer  

Protection Resolution No. 39/248”.  India is a signatory to the  

said  resolution.   The  Act  was  enacted  in  view  of  the  

aforementioned resolution of General Assembly of the United  

Nations.  

18

32. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that  

the  Act  was  enacted  to  provide  better  protection  for  the  

consumers and their  interests.   By this  Act,  the  legislature  

sought to constitute quasi judicial Tribunals/Commissions as  

an alternative system of adjudicating consumer disputes via  

summary proceedings. That is the whole purpose of providing  

for  a  separate  three  tiered  system  comprised  of  a  District  

Forum,  State  Commission  and  the  National  Commission  

which  would  provide  inexpensive  and  speedy  remedies  to  

consumers.  In creating those fora, the legislature required the  

fora to arrive at conclusions based on reasons following the  

rules of natural justice.  He also submitted that while enacting  

the Consumer Protection Act, Parliament was fully aware that  

the provisions of the CPC were available for the trial of a claim  

of a consumer dispute, yet, in its wisdom, Parliament decided  

not  to  apply  the  procedure  provided  in  the  CPC  to  the  

proceedings under the Act.  Instead, Parliament chose to apply  

only limited provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to the  

complaints to be entertained under the Act.  Specifically, in  

Sections  13  (4),  (5)  and  (6),  the  Act  explicitly  provided  for  

19

limited  applicability  of  the  provisions  of  Code  of  Civil  

Procedure.  

33. Mr. Khanna further submitted that the Act is a special  

statute  enacted  to  provide  remedies  to  a  special  class  of  

litigants,  namely  the  consumers,  by  a  special  procedure  

provided for under the statute, instead of the usual procedure  

set forth under the Code of Civil Procedure.

34. The learned counsel for the respondent also submitted  

that the general legal principle of  statutory interpretation of  

generalia  specialibus  non-derogant  and  generalibus  specialia   

derogant applied.  That is, if a special provision is made on a  

certain  matter,  that  matter  is  excluded  from  the  general  

provision.  Mr. Khanna also stated that these principles have  

been applied by this Court in resolving the disputes between  

two Acts as well as in the construction of statutory rules and  

statutory orders.  Mr. Khanna referred this Court’s decision in  

the case of  Ghaziabad Zila Sahkari Bank Ltd.  v.  Addl.  

Labour Commissioner and Others  (2007) 11 SCC 756.  In  

para  61  of  that  judgment,  this  Court  held  that  the  Uttar  

Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, which is a complete code in  

itself  regarding employment in cooperative  societies,  and its  

20

machinery  and provisions  will  have  overriding  effect  on the  

general Act, the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.  

Thus,  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act  was  held  to  have  no  

applicability and to be excluded after enforcement of the Uttar  

Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act,  which was a later and a  

special Act.  Similarly, this Court in the case of Maruti Udyog  

Limited v. Ram Lal and Others (2005) 2 SCC 638 in para 42  

observed as under:

“42. In  Solidaire  India  Ltd.  v.  Fairgrowth  Financial Services Ltd. and Others [(2001) 3 SCC  71], it is stated:   

9.  It  is  clear  that  both  these  Acts  are  special Acts. This Court has laid down in  no uncertain terms that in such an event  it is the later Act which must prevail. The  decisions cited in the above context are  as follows:  Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v.  State Industrial & Investment Corpn.  of Maharashtra Ltd., Sarwan Singh v.   Kasturi  Lal;  Allahabad  Bank  v.  Canara  Bank  and  Ram  Narain  v.  Simla Banking & Industrial Co. Ltd.

10. We may notice that the Special Court  had in another case dealt with a similar  contention.  In  Bhoruka  Steel  Ltd.  v.  Fairgrowth Financial  Services  Ltd. it  had  been  contended  that  recovery  proceedings under the Special Court Act  should be stayed in view of the provisions  of  the  1985  Act.  Rejecting  this  contention,  the  Special  Court had come  to the conclusion that the Special Court  

21

Act  being  a  later  enactment  would  prevail.  The  headnote  which  brings  out  succinctly the ratio of the said decision is  as follows:  

Where there are two special statutes  which contain non obstante clauses  the later  statute shall  prevail.  This  is because at the time of enactment  of  the later statute,  the Legislature  was aware of  the earlier legislation  and its non obstante clause. If  the  Legislature  still  confers  the  later  enactment  with  a  non  obstante  clause it means that the Legislature  wanted that enactment to prevail. If  the  Legislature  does  not  want  the  later  enactment  to  prevail  then  it  could and would provide in the later  enactment that the provisions of the  earlier enactment would continue to  apply."

35. Mr. Khanna also submitted that the Act is a special and  

a later Act which will prevail over the provisions of the CPC,  

which is a general and previous statute.  He submitted that  

the Act is a complete Code in itself as regards the disputes  

covered under it.  As such, the general statute i.e. CPC can  

have no applicability and stands excluded after the enactment  

of the Act.   

36. Mr. Khanna further contended that the Carriage by Air  

Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Air Act’) again is a special  

22

Act regarding international carriage.  The Air Act was enacted  

to give effect to the Convention for unification of Rules relating  

to  international  carriage  by  air  signed  at  Warsaw  on  

12.10.1929, as amended by Hague Protocol dated 28.9.1955  

and the Montreal Convention dated 28.9.1999.  India  enacted  

this Act as it is a signatory to the Warsaw Convention of 1929  

governing the liabilities of air carrier in respect of international  

carriage  of  passengers,  baggage  and  cargo  by  air.   The  

preamble of the Air Act reads as under:

“An  Act  to  give  effect  to  the  convention  for  the  unification of certain rules relating to international  carriage by air signed at Warsaw on the 12th day of  October,  1929  and  to  the  said  Convention  as  amended by the Hague Protocol on the 28th day of  May, 1999 and to make provision for applying the  rules  contained  in  the  said  Convention  in  its  original form and in the amended form (subject to  exceptions, adaptations and modifications) to non- international  carriage  by  air  and  for  matters  connected therewith.”

37. Section 2 (ii) of the Air Act defines “Convention” to mean  

Convention  for  unification  of  certain  rules  relating  to  

international carriage by air signed at Warsaw on 12.10.1929.  

Section 2 (ii) reads as under:

“2  (ii)  Convention  means  the  Convention  for  the  unification of certain rules relating to international  carriage by air signed at Warsaw on the 12th day of  October, 1929.”

23

38. Section 3 of the Air Act provides that the Rules contained  

in the first schedule (the provisions of the Convention relating  

to  the  rights  and  liability  of  the  carriers,  passengers,  

consignors and other persons), shall have the force of law in  

India with respect to any carriage by air to which these rules  

apply, irrespective of the nationality of the air craft performing  

the carriage.  Sub-Section 2 of section 3 provides that the high  

contracting parties to the Convention and date of enforcement  

of the said Convention shall be such as are included in Part-I  

of the Annexure.  Section 3 reads as under:

“3. Application of Convention to India:  

(1) The  rules  contained  in  the  First  Schedule,  being  the  provisions  of  the  Convention  relating  to  the  rights  and  liabilities  of  carriers,  passengers,  consignors,  consignees  and  other  persons  shall,  subject  to  the  provisions of this act, have the force of law in  India  in  relation  to  any  carriage  by  air  to  which those  rules  apply,  irrespective  of  the  nationality  of  the  aircraft  performing  the  carriage.

(2) For  the  purpose  of  this  Act,  the  High  Contracting  Parties  to  the  Convention  and  the  date  of  enforcement  of  the  said  Convention shall be such as are included in  part-I of the Annexure-1.

24

(3) Any  reference  in  the  first  schedule  to  the  territory of any High Contracting Party to the  Convention shall be construed as a reference  to all the territories in respect of which he is  a party.

(4) Any reference in the first schedule to agents  of the carrier shall be construed as including  a reference to servants of the carrier.

(5) The Central Government may, having regard  to the objects of this act, and if it considers  necessary  or  expedient  so  to  do,  by  notification in the official gazette, add to, or,  as the case may be, omit from, Part I of the  Annexure, any High Contracting Party and on  such  addition,  or  as  the  case  may  be,  omission, such High Contracting Party shall  be or shall  cease to be, a High Contracting  Party.”

39. Section  7  of  the  Air  Act  provides  that  every  high  

contracting party to the Convention, shall for the purpose of  

any suit brought in a court in India in accordance with the  

provisions of  rule  28 of  the  first  schedule  or  of  the  second  

schedule as the case may be to enforce a claim in respect of  

the carriage undertaken by him be deemed to have submitted  

to the jurisdiction of that Court and to be a person for purpose  

of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.  Section 7 reads as under:

“7. Provisions  regarding   suits  against  High  Contracting  Parties  who undertake  carriage  by  Air:  (1)  Every  High  Contracting  Party  to  the  Convention or the amended Convention, as the case  

25

may  be,  who  has  not  availed  himself  of  the  provisions of the Additional Protocol thereto shall,  for the purpose of any suit brought in a Court in  India in accordance with the provisions of rule 28 of  the First Schedule, or of the Second Schedule, as  the case may be, to enforce a claim in respect of  carriage  undertaken  by  him,  be  deemed  to  have  submitted to the jurisdiction of that Court and to be  a  person  for  the  purpose  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure, 1908.

(2) The High Court may make rules of procedure  providing for all matters which may be expedient to  enable such suits to be instituted and carried on.

(3) Nothing  in  this  section  shall  authorize  any  Court  to  attach  or  sell  any  property  of  a  High  Contracting  Party  to  the  Convention  or  to  the  amended Convention.”

40. The First Schedule to the Act vide Rule 1 provides that  

the Rules under this Schedule shall apply to all international  

carriage of persons, luggage or goods, performed by aircraft for  

reward.  Sub Rule 2 defines the “High Contracting Party”.  Sub  

Rule 3 defines International Carriage.  The provisions of Rule 1  

read as under:

“Rule1:   (1)  These rules apply  to all  international  carriage of persons, luggage or goods, performed by  aircraft for reward.  They apply also to such carriage  when performed gratuitously  by  an  Air  Transport  undertaking.

(2) In these rules, “High Contracting Party” means  a High Contracting Party to the Convention.

26

(3) For the purposes of these rules the expression,  “international  carriage”  means  any  carriage  in  which  according  to  the  contract  made  by  the  parties,  the  place  of  departure  and  the  place  of  destination, whether or not there be a break in the  carriage  or  a  transshipment,  are  situated  either  within  the  territories  of  two  High  Contracting  Parties,  or  within  the  territory  of  a  single  High  Contracting  Party,  if  there  is  an  agreed  stopping  place within a territory subject to the sovereignty,  suzerainty, mandate or authority of another power,  even  though  that  power  is  not  a  party  to  the  Convention.   A  carriage  without  such  an  agreed  stopping  place  between  territories  subject  to  the  sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of the  same High Contracting Party is not deemed to be  international for the purposes of these Rules.”

41. Rule 2 of these Rules, provides that these rules apply to  

carriage performed by the State or by legally constituted public  

bodies.  Rule 2 reads as under:  

“2. (1) These rules apply to carriage performed  by  the  State  or  by  legally  constituted  public  bodies provided it  falls  within the  conditions  laid down in rule 1.

(2)  These  rules  do  not  apply  to  carriage  performed  under  the  terms  of  any  International Postal Convention.”

42. Rule 18 provides for liability of the carrier for damages  

and Rule 19 provides for liability of the carrier for damages  

occasioned by delay.  Rule 18 and 19 read as under:

27

“18. (1) The carrier is liable for damage sustained in  the event of  the destruction or loss of,  or  of  damage  to,  any  registered  luggage  or  any  goods,  if  the  occurrence  which  caused  the  damage  so  sustained  took  place  during  the  carriage by air.

(2) The carriage by air within the meaning of  sub-rule (1) comprises the period during which  the  luggage  or  goods  are  in  charge  of  the  carrier, whether in any aerodrome or on board  an aircraft, or, in the case of a landing outside  an aerodrome in any place whatsoever.

(3) The period of the carriage by air does not  extend to any carriage by land, by sea or by  river  performed  outside  an  aerodrome.   If,  however,  such  a  carriage  takes  place  in  the  performance of a contract for carriage by air,  for  the  purpose  of  loading,  delivery  or  transshipment,  any  damage  is  presumed,  subject to proof to the contract, to have been  the result of an event which took place during  the carriage by air.

19. The carrier is liable for damage occasioned by  delay  in  the  carriage  by  air  of  passengers,  luggage or goods.”

43. Rule 28 provides for Territorial Jurisdiction for suing for  

damages which reads as under:

“28. An action for damages must be brought at the  option of the plaintiff  either before the Court  having  jurisdiction  where  the  carrier  is  ordinarily resident, or has his principal place  of business, or has an establishment by which  the  contract  has  been  made  or  before  the  Court  having  jurisdiction  at  the  place  of  destination.”

28

44. As per the Annexure to the Air Act under Section 3 sub  

Section 2, Part-I, vide entry 47, Ethiopia is a High Contracting  

Party to the Convention w.e.f. 12.11.1950.

45. A  bare  perusal  of  the  aforesaid  rules  in  the  First  

Schedule, which has the force of law as per Section 3 of the  

Air Act, read with Section 7 leaves no room or doubt that a  

state  carrier  or  legally  constituted  public  body  of  the  

international  carrier  is  deemed  to  have  submitted  to  the  

jurisdiction of the courts in India, including for the purpose of  

the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

46. Mr. Khanna also submitted that even otherwise Section  

86(2)  of  the  CPC  provides  that  the  consent  of  the  Central  

Government can be given with respect to a specified suit or to  

several  specified  suits  or  with  respect  to  all  suits  of  any  

specified class or  classes.   Section 86 of  the  CPC reads as  

under:

“86.  Suits  against  foreign  Rules,  Ambassadors  and Envoys: (1) No foreign state may be sued  in any Court  otherwise competent  to try  the  suit  except  with  the  consent  of  the  Central  Government certified in writing by a Secretary  to that Government:

29

Provided  that  a  person  may,  as  a  tenant  of  immovable property, sue without such consent  as  aforesaid  (a  foreign  State)  from whom he  holds or claims to hold the property.

(2) Such consent may be given with respect  to a specified suit or to several specified suits  or  with  respect  to  all  suits  of  any  specified  class or classes, and may specify, in the case  of any suit or class of suits, the court in which  (the foreign state) may be sued, but it shall not  be  given,  unless  it  appears  to  the  Central  Government that (the foreign State) -

(a)has  instituted a  suit  in  the  Court  against  the person desiring to sue (it), or  

(b)by (itself) or another, trades within the local  limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, or

(c) is  in  possession  of  immovable  property  situated  within  those  limits  and  is  to  be  sued with reference to such property or for  money charged thereon, or  

(d)has  expressly  or  impliedly  waived  the  privilege accorded to (it) by this section.”

47. Thus, the provisions of Section 7 of the Air Act read with  

Rules  in  the  first  schedule  makes  it  clear  that  there  is  a  

consent  deemed  to  be  granted  by  the  central  government  

contemplated under Section 86(1) of Code of Civil Procedure  

for a specified class of suits under the Air Act.  

30

48. Mr.  Khanna  also  referred to  Section  3  of  the  Act  and  

submitted that the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to  

and not in derogation of the provisions of any other laws for  

the time being in force.   

49. This  Court  in  the  case  of  Patel  Roadways  Limited  

(supra) has considered this question and has laid down that  

the  Disputes  Redressal  Agency  provided  for  in  the  Act  will  

have jurisdiction to entertain complaints in which the claim  

for  loss  or  damage  of  goods  entrusted  to  a  carrier  for  

transportation is in dispute.  This Court also noted that the  

term “suit”  in  Section 9  of  the  Carriage  Act  was applicable  

both the  cases filed in the  Civil  Court  and to  proceedings  

before the National Commission that decides the complaints  

by  consumers  following  summary  procedure.   Mr.  Khanna  

further contended that the view taken by this Court in Patel  

Roadways  Limited  (supra)  has  been  affirmed  by  the  

Constitution  Bench of  this  Court  in  the  case  of  Economic  

Transport Organisation, Delhi  v. Charan Spinning Mills  

Private Limited and Another (2010) 4 SCC 114. In paras 53  

to 57 of that case, this Court observed as under:

31

“53.  Section 14(1)(d)  of the Act provides that the  Forum under  the  Act  can  direct  payment  of  compensation awarded by it to the consumer  for any loss or injury suffered by the consumer  due  to  the  negligence  of  the  opposite  party.  This,  according  to  the  appellant,  makes  it  mandatory  for  the  complainant  to  establish  negligence on the part of the opposite party i.e.  the  carrier.  It  is  further  contended  that  presumption of negligence under Section 9 of  the Carriers Act, 1865 (which provides that in  any suit brought against a common carrier for  the loss, damage or non-delivery of the goods  entrusted to him for carriage, it  shall  not be  necessary for the plaintiff  to prove that such  loss,  damage  or  non-delivery  of  goods  was  owing to the negligence or criminal act of the  carrier, his servants and agents) is applicable  only  to  a  civil  suit,  and  not  to  a  complaint  under the Act which specifically contemplates  establishment of negligence by evidence. It is  submitted that in this case the compensation  has  been  awarded  even  though  no  evidence  was led by the complainants about negligence  of the driver of the appellant.

54. It is no doubt true that Section 14(1)(d) of the  Act  contemplates  award  of  compensation  to  the  consumer  for  any  loss  suffered  by  the  consumer due to the negligence of the opposite  party (the carrier). Section 9 of the Carriers Act  does not lay down a proposition that a carrier  will be liable even if there was no negligence on  its part. On the other hand, it merely raises a  presumption that when there is loss or damage  or non-delivery of goods entrusted to a carrier,  such loss, damage or non-delivery was due to  the negligence of  the carrier,  its  servant and  agents. Thus where the consignor establishes  loss or damage or non-delivery of goods, it is  deemed  that  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  

32

carrier  is  established.  The  carrier  may avoid  liability if it establishes that the loss, damage  or non-delivery was due to an act of  God or  circumstances  beyond  its  control.  Section  14(1)(d) of the Act does not operate to relieve  the  carrier  against  the  presumption  of  negligence  created  under  Section  9  of  the  Carriers Act.

55. The  contention  of  the  appellant  that  the  presumption under Section 9 of  the  Carriers  Act is available only in suits filed before civil  courts and not in other civil proceedings under  other Acts, is not tenable. This Court in Patel  Roadways  Ltd. (supra) has  observed:  (SCC  pp. 106-07, paras 47, 48 & 49)

The principle regarding the liability  of a carrier contained in Section 9 of the  Carriers Act, namely, that the liability of  a carrier is that of an insurer and that in  a  case  of  loss  or  damage  to  goods  entrusted to the carrier the plaintiff need  not prove negligence, are applicable in a  proceeding before the Consumer Forum.  The term “suit” has not been defined in  the Carriers Act nor is it provided in the  said Act that the term “suit” will have the  same meaning as in the Civil  Procedure  Code. Therefore, the term “suit” has to be  understood  in  its  ordinary  dictionary  meaning. In that sense, term “suit” is a  generic term taking within its  sweep all  proceedings  initiated  by  a  party  for  realisation of a right vested in him under  law.  It  is  true  that  a  proceeding  before  Consumer  Forum  is  ordinarily  a  summary  proceeding  and  in  an  appropriate  case where the  Commission  feels  that  the  issues  raised  are  too  contentious  to  be  decided  in  summary  proceedings it may refer parties to a civil  

33

court. That, however, does not mean that  proceedings before the Consumer Forum  is to be decided by ignoring the express  statutory provisions of the Carriers Act in  a  proceeding  in  which a  claim is  made  against a common carrier.  A proceeding  before  the  Consumer  Forum  comes  within the sweep of term “suit”.

56. Again, in Economic Transport Organization  v.  Dharwad  District  Khadi  Gramudyog  Sangh (2000) 5 SCC 78 this Court reiterated  the  principle  stated in  Patel  Roadways and  added  the  following:  (Economic  Transport  case (supra) SCC p. 79, para 2)

“2. … Even assuming that Section 9  of  the  Carriers  Act,  1865 does not  apply  to  the  cases  before  the  Consumer  Fora  under  the  Consumer  Protection  Act,  the  principle  of  common  law  abovementioned gets attracted to all  these  cases  coming  up  before  the  Consumer Fora.  Section 14(1)(d)  of  the Consumer Protection Act has to  be understood in that light and the  burden of  proof  gets shifted to the  carriers  by  the  application  of  the  legal  presumption  under  the  common law. Section 14(1)(d) has to  be understood in that manner. The  complainant  can  discharge  the  initial onus, even if it is laid on him  under  Section  14(1)(d)  of  the  Consumer Protection Act, by relying  on Section 9 of the Carriers Act. It  will,  therefore, be for the carrier to  prove absence of negligence.”

57. We reiterate the said settled position and reject  the  contention  of  the  appellant  that  the  presumption under Section 9 of  the  Carriers  

34

Act is not available in a proceeding under the  Consumer Protection Act and that therefore, in  the  absence  of  proof  of  negligence,  it  is  not  liable to compensate the respondents for  the  loss.”

50. Mr.  Khanna  further  submitted  that  in  the  case  of  

E.I.C.M.  Exports  Ltd.  v. South  Indian  Corporation  

(Agencies) Ltd. and Another 2009 (10) SCALE 22, this Court  

has held firstly that the cases filed before the consumer forum  

are  not  suits  within  the  meaning  of  Section  9  of  CPC and  

secondly the limitation of two years for filing a case under the  

Act as provided vide Section 24 (A) of the Act will be applicable  

instead of Article III, Clause 6 of the schedule of the Indian  

Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sea  Act,  1925,  which  provides  for  

limitation  of  one  year  extendable  by  three  months  at  the  

discretion of the Court.  According to learned counsel for the  

respondent there is no conflict between the judgments of this  

Court  in  the  cases  of  E.I.C.M.  Exports  (supra)  and  Patel  

Roadways Limited (supra).  According to him the provisions  

of Carriage by Air Act, 1972 have to be read into the provisions  

of the Act.

51. We  have  heard  learned  counsel  for  the  parties  and  

carefully perused relevant cases cited at the Bar.  The Central  

35

Question which requires adjudication is whether the appellant  

Ethiopian  Airlines  is  entitled  to  sovereign immunity  in  this  

case?

52. The  short  question  which  falls  for  our  adjudication  is  

whether  the  proceedings  before  the  Consumer  Forum  are  

suits.  

53. The term “suit” has not been defined in the Carriage by  

Air Act, 1972 nor is it provided in the said Act that the term  

“suit” will  have the same meaning as in the Civil  Procedure  

Code.  Therefore, the term “suit” has to be understood in its  

ordinary dictionary meaning. In that sense, the term “suit” is a  

generic term taking within its sweep all proceedings initiated  

by a party for realisation of the right vested in him in law. In  

this  view  of  the  matter,  we  have  to  look  to  the  dictionary  

meaning of the word “suit”.   

54. According  to  Black's  Law  Dictionary,  the  word  “suit”  

means “any proceeding by a party or parties against another in  

a court of law.”   

55. In common parlance, the term “suit” is taken to include  

all proceedings of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature in which  

36

the  disputes  of  aggrieved  parties  are  adjudicated  before  an  

impartial  forum.  Proceedings  before  the  Consumer  fora  fall  

squarely within that definition.   

56. It has been held in Patel Roadways Limited (supra) that  

proceedings  before  the  Consumer  Forums  come  within  the  

sweep of the term “suit”.  This judgment has been approved by  

a Constitution Bench of this Court in  Economic Transport  

Organization  (supra).  Therefore, the controversy involved in  

this case is finally settled and we are bound by the decision of  

the Constitution Bench and this case has to be ruled in terms  

of  what  has  been  decided  by  the  Constitution  Bench  in  

Economic Transport Organisation (supra).  

57. In the same vein, the U.S. Supreme Court has read the  

term “suit” broadly, finding that a “suit” is “any proceeding in  

a  court  of  justice  by  which  a  person  pursues  therein  that  

remedy which the law affords him,” Upshur County v. Rich,  

135 US 467 (1890). Likewise, “the modes of proceeding may  

be various, but if a right is litigated between parties in a court  

of justice, the proceeding by which the decision of the court is  

sought is a suit.”  Id. The Michigan Supreme Court similarly  

37

found that “the word [“suit”], as applied to legal controversies,  

both  by  the  legal  profession  and  others,  is  now  used  and  

recognized  as  a  generic  term  of  broad  significance,  often  

understood  and  used,  even  by  legislatures  and  courts,  to  

designate  almost  any  proceeding.”  Patterson  v. Standard  

Accident  Insurance  Co., 178  Mich.  288.  The  proceedings  

held before the consumer redressal fora easily fall within the  

aforementioned definitions :  these are proceedings in which  

consumers may pursue the remedies afforded to them by the  

Consumer Protection Act and other laws and where the rights  

of the parties are fully litigated by an organ of justice.

58. However,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  proceedings  of  

the National Commission are “suits” under the Carriers Act,  

vide the  expressio unius principle,  The Consumer Protection  

Act, 1986 clearly enumerates those provisions of the CPC that  

are applicable to proceedings before the consumer fora. Such  

provisions include 13(4),  in which the Consumer Protection  

Act, 1986 vests those powers vested in a civil court under the  

CPC to the District Forum. However, according to the principle  

of expressio unius, because the legislature expressly made the  

aforementioned  provisions  of  the  CPC  applicable  to  the  

38

consumer proceedings, the legislature is, therefore, deemed to  

have  intentionally  excluded all  other  provisions of  the  CPC  

from applying to the said proceedings. This is particularly true  

since, as explained above, the Consumer Protection Act, 1986  

sets  forth  an  exhaustive  list  of  procedures,  distinguishable  

from  those  required  under  the  CPC,  that  the  consumer  

redressal  fora  must  follow.  Therefore,  since  the  Consumer  

Protection Act does not state that Section 86 applies to the  

consumer fora's proceedings, that Section of the CPC should  

be held to be not applicable.

59. Likewise, the CPC itself does not claim to make Section  

86  applicable  to  proceedings  before  the  consumer  fora.  

Instead, the CPC includes a saving clause, providing that “in  

the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing  

in [the CPC] shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any  

special.... law ... or any special form of procedure prescribed,  

by  or  under  any  other  law...”  In  addition,  Section  86  only  

applies  to  a  “suit  in  any  Court”.   This  term  should  be  

understood differently than the term “court” discussed above  

because  the  CPC  refers  exclusively  to  Civil  Courts.  In  

particular, the CPC specifically refers to the District Courts,  

39

the High Courts, and the Supreme Court and makes little if  

any reference to other, quasi-judicial fora like the consumer  

redressal bodies at issue here.  This interpretation has been  

approved  by  the  Supreme  Court,  in  H.H.  The  Maharana  

Sahib Shri Bhagwat Singh Bahadur of Udaipur (supra). In  

that case, the Apex Court found that the phrase “sued in any  

Court”  must  be  strictly  construed  and  confined  to  “suits  

proper”  and  thus  held  that  Section  86  did  not  bar  

adjudication  of  an  industrial  dispute  in  an  industrial  

Tribunal.   Similarly,  in  Nawab  Usmanali  Khan  v.  

Sagarmal, AIR 1965 SC 1798, this Court found that Section  

87(B) does not apply to proceedings under the Arbitration Act.  

Similarly, Section 86 and 87 should be found inapplicable to  

the consumer redressal fora's proceedings at issue here.

60. Moreover, Section 86 of the CPC is inapplicable because  

the  legislative  intent  is  deem  to  exclude  older  and  more  

general  statute  by  more  recent  and  special  statutes  :  the  

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and the Carriage by Air Act,  

1972. And, under these Acts, Ethiopian Airlines is not entitled  

to sovereign immunity in a suit like that at issue here.  Thus,  

consent of the Central Government is not required to subject  

40

Ethiopian Airline  to  suit  in an Indian court,  let  alone in a  

consumer redressal forum.

61. In Ratan Lal Adukia and Another v. Union of India,   

AIR 1990 SC 104, the Apex Court found that Section 80 of the  

Railways Act, 1890, substituted 1961, was a special provision  

and  self-contained  code  and  that  it  impliedly  repealed  in  

respect  of  suits  covered by  it  the  general  provisions of  the  

CPC. The Railways Act provides for a forum in which a suit for  

compensation  for  loss  of  life  of,  or  personal  injury  to,  a  

passenger for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or non-

delivery of animals or goods against a railway administration  

may be brought.  This is very much akin to the fora created by  

the Consumer Protection Act. Thus, a similar finding should  

be made here :  the Consumer Protection and Carriers Acts  

must be deemed special Acts bypassing Section 86 of the CPC,  

with respect to suits covered by those special Acts.

62. That is,  the Consumer and Carriage Acts, which came  

long after the CPC, are more focused and specific statutes,  

and  therefore  should  be  held  to  exclude  Section  86.  The  

Supreme Court has previously found as such, holding that in  

41

the fora created by the Consumer Act, “the provisions of the  

Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to a limited extent and  

not all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are made  

applicable to the proceedings of the National Forum.”  Rather,  

rules created pursuant to the Consumer Act itself govern the  

procedure to be followed in the consumer fora. Similarly,  a  

Constitutional Bench of this Court, in  Economic Transport  

Organisation  (supra)  found that even though the consumer  

redressal fora utilized summary proceedings, that “does not  

mean that proceedings before the Consumer Forum [are] to be  

decided by  ignoring  the  express  statutory  provisions of  the  

Carriers Act in a proceeding in which a claim is made against  

a common carrier.”  

63. In view of the Constitution Bench judgment in Economic  

Transport  Organisation  (supra) the  view  which  has  been  

taken  by  the  two-Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  in  E.I.C.M.  

Exports (supra) is wholly untenable and unsustainable in law.  

64. Section 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure is inapplicable  

to the present case because the older and more general statute  

has  been excluded  by  more  recent  special  statute,  namely,  

42

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and the Carriage by Air Act,  

1972.  Ethiopian Airlines is not entitled to sovereign immunity  

in the suit at issue in the present case. Therefore, any other  

consent of the Central Government is not required to subject  

the appellant, Ethiopian Airlines, to a suit in an Indian Court.  

65. It  is  settled  principle  of  statutory  interpretation  that  

specific statutes that come later in time trump prior general  

statutes.  Both  the  Consumer  Protection  Act,  1986  and  the  

Carriage by Air Act, 1972, which came long after the Code of  

Civil Procedure, 1908, are more focused and specific statutes  

and therefore should be held to supersede Section 86 of the  

Code.  This Court in Savita Garg (supra) has clearly laid down  

that the principle that in fora created by the Consumer Act,  

the provisions of  the Code of  Civil  Procedure are applicable  

only to a limited extent, therefore, the provisions of the Code of  

Civil  Procedure  have  not  been  made  applicable  to  the  

proceedings of the National Consumer Forum.  

66. This  court  in  Vishwabharathi  House Building Coop.  

Society  and  Others (supra) dealt  with  the  object  of  the  

Consumer  Protection  Act,  1986    :  to  provide  expeditious  

43

adjudication of consumers’ complaints by adopting summary  

procedure.   The  Consumer  Protection  Act,  1986  is  a  

comprehensive and self-contained piece of legislation, and its  

object  is  to  decide  consumers’  complaints  expeditiously,  via  

summary procedure.  The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 also  

permits  authorized  agents  to  appear  on  behalf  of  the  

complainants in order to ensure that they are not burdened  

with the heavy professional fees of lawyers.

67. Similarly,  the  Carriage  by  Air  Act,  1972  explicitly  

provides that its rules apply to carriage performed by the State  

or  by  legally  constituted  public  bodies  under  Chapter  1,  

Section 2, Sub-section 1.  Thus, it is clear that according to  

the Indian Law, Ethiopian Airlines can be subjected to suit  

under the Carriage Act, 1972.  It may be pertinent to mention  

that  the Carriage by Air Act, 1972 (69 of 1972) is an Act to  

give effect to the Convention for the unification of certain rules  

relating to international carriage by air signed at Warsaw on  

the 12th day of October, 1929 and to the said Convention as  

amended by the Hague Protocol on the 28th day of September,  

1955 and to make provision for applying the rules contained  

in  the  said  Convention  in  its  original  form  and   in  the  

44

amended  form  (subject  to  exceptions,  adaptations  and  

modification)  to  non-international  carriage  by  air  and  for  

matters connected therewith.

68. In  effect,  by  signing  onto  the  Warsaw  Convention,  

Ethiopia  had expressly waived its Airlines’ right to immunity  

in  cases  such  as  that  sub  judice.  Therefore,  the  Central  

Governments  of  both  India  and  Ethiopia  have  waived  that  

right by passing the Carriage by Air Act, 1972 and by signing  

onto the Warsaw Convention.

69. In accordance with the interpretation set forth above, the  

Bombay  High  Court  has  noted  that  Section  86  is  of  only  

limited  applicability  and  can  be  overcome  in  cases  of  even  

implied  waiver.  For  example,  in  The  German  Democratic  

Republic v. The Dynamic Industrial Undertaking Ltd., AIR  

1972 Bombay 27, the Bombay High Court found that Section  

86 does not supplant the relevant doctrine under International  

Law.  Rather,  Section  86  “creates  another exception”  to  

immunity  (emphasis added),  in addition to those exceptions  

recognized  under  International  Law.  Likewise,  in  Kenya  

Airways  v.  Jinibai B. Kheshwala, AIR 1998 Bombay 287,  

45

the Bombay High Court found that, while Kenya Airways was  

a state entity prima facie entitled to immunity under Section  

86, it had nevertheless waived that immunity by, in its written  

statements, failing to raise a plea of sovereign immunity under  

Section 86 of the CPC. Therefore, in that case, the Bombay  

High  Court  found  that  Kenya  Airways  was  not  entitled  to  

sovereign  immunity  and  could  be  subjected  to  suit  in  an  

Indian court.

70. Ethiopian Airlines is not entitled to sovereign immunity  

with  respect  to  a  commercial  transaction is  also  consonant  

with  the  holdings  of  other  countries'  courts  and  with  the  

growing  International  Law  principle  of  restrictive  immunity.  

For  instance,  in  England,  in  Rahimtoola  v. H.E.H.  The  

Nizam of Hyderabad and Others (1957) 3 All E.R. 441, Lord  

Denning  found  that  “there  was  no  reason  why  [a  country]  

should  grant  to  the  departments  or  agencies  of  foreign  

governments an immunity which [the country does] not grant  

[its]  own,  provided always that  the matter  in dispute arises  

within the jurisdiction of [the country's] courts and is properly  

cognizable  by  them.”   Lord  Denning  also  held  that  “if  the  

dispute concerns...  the commercial  transactions of  a foreign  

46

government...  and  it  arises  properly  within  the  territorial  

jurisdiction  of  [a  country's]  courts,  there  is  no  ground  for  

granting immunity,” finding implicitly that it would not “offend  

the dignity of a foreign sovereign to have the merits of such a  

dispute canvassed in the domestic courts of another country.”

71. Likewise,  in  Trendtex  Trading  Corporation  Ltd.  v.  

Central Bank of Nigeria (1977) 1 All E.R. 881, the Court held  

that  the  Central  Bank  of  Nigeria  was  not  entitled  to  plead  

sovereign immunity because,  according to International  Law  

Principle of restrictive immunity, a state-owned entity is not  

entitled to  immunity  for  acts  of  a  commercial  nature,   jure  

gestionis.  The Court noted that “if a government department  

goes into the market places of  the world and buys boots or  

cement  –  as  a  commercial  transaction  –  that  government  

department should be subject to all  the rules of the market  

place.”   The  Court  also  noted  an  “important  practical  

consideration.”  stating  that  foreign  sovereign  immunity,  “in  

protecting  sovereign  bodies  from  the  indignities  and  

disadvantages  of  that  process,  operates  to  deprive  other  

persons of the benefits and advantages of [the judicial] process  

in  relation  to  rights  which  they  posses  and  which  would  

47

otherwise be susceptible to enforcement.”  As the court stated,  

the  principle  of  restrictive  immunity  is  “manifestly  better  in  

accord with practical good sense and with justice.”

72. On careful analysis of the American, English and Indian  

cases,  it  is  abundantly  clear  that  the  appellant  Ethiopian  

Airlines  must  be  held  accountable  for  the  contractual  and  

commercial  activities  and  obligations  that  it  undertakes  in  

India.

73. It may be pertinent to mention that the Parliament has  

recognized  this  fact  while  passing  the  Consumer  Protection  

Act, 1986 and the Carriage by Air Act, 1972.  Section 86 was  

itself, a modification and restriction of the principle of foreign  

sovereign  immunity  and  thus,  by  limiting  Section  86's  

applicability,  the  Parliament  through  these  acts,  further  

narrowed  a  party's  ability  to  successfully  plead  foreign  

sovereign immunity.  In the modern era, where there is close  

interconnection  between different  countries  as  far  as  trade,  

commerce  and  business  are  concerned,  the  principle  of  

sovereign immunity can no longer be absolute in the way that  

it  much  earlier  was.   Countries  who  participate  in  trade,  

48

commerce and business  with different countries ought to be  

subjected  to  normal  rules  of  the  market.   If   State  owned  

entities would be able to operate with impunity, the rule of law  

would  be  degraded  and  international  trade,  commerce  and  

business will come to a grinding halt.  Therefore, we have no  

hesitation  in  coming  to  the  conclusion  that  the  appellant  

cannot claim sovereign immunity.  The preliminary objection  

raised by the appellant before the court is devoid of any merit  

and must be rejected.  

74. The controversy involved in this  case is  no longer  res-

integra.   This  Court  in  Patel  Roadways  Limited  (supra)  

clearly observed that a proceeding before the Consumer Forum  

comes within the  sweep of  term “suit”.  Again this  Court  in  

Economic  Transport  Organization  (supra) reiterated  the  

principle  stated in  Patel Roadways Limited  (supra).   Both  

these  judgments  have  been  specifically  approved  by  the  

Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  in  Economic  Transport  

Organization  (supra).   The  view  which  has  been  taken  in  

E.I.C.M. Exports (supra) is clearly contrary to the view taken  

by the Constitution Bench judgment in Economic Transport  

Organization (supra) and the same cannot be sustained.   

49

75.  We are of the considered view that the impugned order  

passed by the National Commission is untenable so far it held  

that  the  proceeding  before  the  Consumer  Forum  does  not  

come within the sweep of term “suit” because it is contrary to  

the  judgment  of  the  Constitution  Bench  of  this  court  in  

Economic Transport Organization  (supra).  The finding of  

the  National  Commission  is  accordingly  set  aside  to  that  

extent.  However, we agree with the findings of the National  

Commission so far as it has remitted the matter to the State  

Commission for adjudication. In the facts and circumstance of  

this case, we direct the State Commission to dispose of  the  

case as expeditiously as possible.   

76.   This appeal is accordingly disposed of, leaving the parties  

to bear their own costs.   

……….………………………..J.                                           (Dalveer Bhandari)

……….………………………..J.                                                         (Dr. Mukundakam  

Sharma)

……..……….…………………J.

50

                                 (Anil R. Dave)

New Delhi; August 9, 2011

51