ELECTRONICS CORP.OF INDIA LIMITED Vs UNION OF INDIA .
Bench: S.H. KAPADIA,MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA,K.S. PANICKER RADHAKRISHNAN,SWATANTER KUMAR,ANIL R. DAVE
Case number: C.A. No.-001883-001883 / 2011
Diary number: 2669 / 2009
Advocates: RUPESH KUMAR Vs
B. KRISHNA PRASAD
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1883 OF 2011 (arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 2538 of 2009)
Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. … Appellant(s)
versus
Union of India & Ors. …Respondent(s)
with Civil Appeal No. 1903 of 2008
O R D E R S.H. KAPADIA, CJI
Leave granted.
2. Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. (“assessee” for
short) is a Central Government Public Sector Undertaking
(“PSU”). It is registered as a Government Company under the
Companies Act, 1956. It is under the control of Department of
Atomic Energy, Government of India. A dispute had been
raised by the Central Government (Ministry of Finance) by
issuing show cause notices to the assessee alleging that the
Corporation was not entitled to avail/utilize Modvat/Cenvat
Credit in respect of inputs whose values stood written off.
Accordingly it was proposed in the show cause notices that the
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credit taken on inputs was liable to be reversed. Thus, the
short point which arose for determination in the present case
was whether the Central Government was right in insisting on
reversal of credit taken by the assessee on inputs whose
values stood written off.
3. The adjudicating authority held that there was no
substance in the contention of the assessee that the write off
was made in terms of AS-2. The case of the assessee before the
Commissioner of Central Excise (adjudicating authority) was
that it was a financial requirement as prescribed in AS-2; that
an inventory more than three years old had to be written
off/derated in value; that such derating in value did not mean
that the inputs were unfunctionable; that the inputs were still
lying in the factory and they were useful for production and
therefore they were entitled to Modvat/Cenvat credit. As stated
above, this argument was rejected by the adjudicating
authority and the demand against the assessee stood
confirmed. Against the order of the adjudicating authority, the
assessee decided to challenge the same by filing an appeal
before CESTAT. Accordingly, the assessee applied before the
Committee on Disputes (CoD). However, the CoD vide its
decision dated 2.11.2006 refused to grant clearance though in
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an identical case the CoD granted clearance to Bharat Heavy
Electricals Ltd. (“BHEL”). Accordingly, the assessee herein filed
Writ Petition No. 26573 of 2008 in the Andhra Pradesh High
Court. By the impugned decision, the writ petition filed by the
assessee stood dismissed. Against the order of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court the assessee has moved this Court by way
of a special leave petition.
4. In a conjunct matter, Civil Appeal No. 1903 of 2008,
the facts were as follows.
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (“assessee” for
short) cleared the goods for sale at the outlets owned and
operated by themselves known as Company Owned and
Company Operated Outlets. The assessee cleared the goods for
sale at such outlets by determining the value of the goods
cleared during the period February, 2000 to November, 2001
on the basis of the price at which such goods were sold from
their warehouses to independent dealers, instead of
determining it on the basis of the normal price and normal
transaction value as per Section 4(4)(b)(iii) of Central Excise
Act, 1944 (“1944 Act” for short) read with Rule 7 of Central
Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods)
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Rules, 2000. In short, the price adopted by the assessee which
is a PSU in terms of Administered Pricing Mechanism (“APM”)
formulated by Government of India stood rejected. The
Tribunal came to the conclusion that the APM adopted by the
assessee was in terms of the price fixed by the Ministry of
Petroleum and Natural Gas; that it was not possible for the
assessee to adopt the price in terms of Section 4(1)(a) of the
1944 Act; and that it was not possible to arrive at the
transaction value in terms of the said section. Accordingly, the
Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee. Aggrieved by the
decision of the Tribunal, CCE has come to this Court by way of
Civil Appeal No. 1903 of 2008 in which the assessee has
preferred I.A. No. 4 of 2009 requesting the Court to dismiss
the above Civil Appeal No. 1903 of 2008 filed by the
Department on the ground that CoD has declined permission
to the Department to pursue the said appeal.
5. The above two instances are given only to highlight the
fact that the mechanism set up by this Court in its Orders
reported in (i) 1995 Suppl.(4) SCC 541 (ONGC v. CCE) dated
11.10.1991; (ii) 2004 (6) SCC 437 (ONGC v. CCE) dated
7.1.1994; and (iii) 2007 (7) SCC 39 (ONGC v. City &
Industrial Development Corpn.) dated 20.7.2007 needs to be
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revisited.
6. Learned Attorney General has submitted that the
above Orders have outlived their utility and in view of the
changed scenario, as indicated hereinafter, the aforestated
Orders are required to be recalled. We find merit in the
submission made by the Attorney General of India on behalf of
the Union of India for the following reasons. By Order dated
11.9.1991, reported in 1992 Supp (2) SCC 432 (ONGC and
Anr. v. CCE), this Court noted that “Public Sector
Undertakings of Central Government and the Union of India
should not fight their litigations in Court”. Consequently, the
Cabinet Secretary, Government of India was “called upon to
handle the matter personally”.
7. This was followed by the order dated 11.10.1991 in
ONGC-II case (supra) where this Court directed the
Government of India “to set up a Committee consisting of
representatives from the Ministry of Industry, Bureau of Public
Enterprises and Ministry of Law, to monitor disputes between
Ministry and Ministry of Government of India, Ministry and
public sector undertakings of the Government of India and
public sector undertakings between themselves, to ensure that
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no litigation comes to Court or to a Tribunal without the
matter having been first examined by the Committee and its
clearance for litigation”.
8. Thereafter, in ONGC-III case (supra), this Court
directed that in the absence of clearance from the “Committee
of Secretaries” (CoS), any legal proceeding will not be
proceeded with. This was subject to the rider that appeals and
petitions filed without such clearance could be filed to save
limitation. It was, however, directed that the needful should
be done within one month from such filing, failing which the
matter would not be proceeded with. By another order dated
20.7.2007 (ONGC-IVth case) this Court extended the concept
of Dispute Resolution by High-Powered Committee to amicably
resolve the disputes involving the State Governments and their
Instrumentalities.
9. The idea behind setting up of this Committee, initially,
called a “High-Powered Committee” (HPC), later on called as
“Committee of Secretaries” (CoS) and finally termed as
“Committee on Disputes” (CoD) was to ensure that resources
of the State are not frittered away in inter se litigations
between entities of the State, which could be best resolved, by
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an empowered CoD. The machinery contemplated was only to
ensure that no litigation comes to Court without the parties
having had an opportunity of conciliation before an in-house
committee. [see : para 3 of the order dated 7.1.1994 (supra)]
Whilst the principle and the object behind the aforestated
Orders is unexceptionable and laudatory, experience has
shown that despite best efforts of the CoD, the mechanism has
not achieved the results for which it was constituted and has
in fact led to delays in litigation. We have already given two
examples hereinabove. They indicate that on same set of
facts, clearance is given in one case and refused in the other.
This has led a PSU to institute a SLP in this Court on the
ground of discrimination. We need not multiply such
illustrations. The mechanism was set up with a laudatory
object. However, the mechanism has led to delay in filing of
civil appeals causing loss of revenue. For example, in many
cases of exemptions, the Industry Department gives
exemption, while the same is denied by the Revenue
Department. Similarly, with the enactment of regulatory laws
in several cases there could be overlapping of jurisdictions
between, let us say, SEBI and insurance regulators. Civil
appeals lie to this Court. Stakes in such cases are huge. One
cannot possibly expect timely clearance by CoD. In such
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cases, grant of clearance to one and not to the other may
result in generation of more and more litigation. The
mechanism has outlived its utility. In the changed scenario
indicated above, we are of the view that time has come under
the above circumstances to recall the directions of this Court
in its various Orders reported as (i) 1995 Supp (4) SCC 541
dated 11.10.1991, (ii) (2004) 6 SCC 437 dated 7.1.1994 and
(iii) (2007) 7 SCC 39 dated 20.7.2007.
10. In the circumstances, we hereby recall the following
Orders reported in :
(i) 1995 Supp (4) SCC 541 dated 11.10.1991 (ii) (2004) 6 SCC 437 dated 7.1.1994 (iii) (2007) 7 SCC 39 dated 20.7.2007
11. For the aforestated reasons, I.A. No. 4 filed by the assessee
in Civil Appeal No. 1903/2008 is dismissed.
…..……………………….CJI (S. H. Kapadia)
……………………………..J. (Mukundakam Sharma)
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……………………………..J. (K.S. Panicker
Radhakrishnan)
……………………………..J. (Swatanter Kumar)
……………………………..J. (Anil R. Dave)
New Delhi; February 17, 2011