DULCINA FERNANDES Vs JOAQUIM XAVIER CRUZ
Bench: P SATHASIVAM,RANJAN GOGOI
Case number: C.A. No.-009094-009094 / 2013
Diary number: 5706 / 2009
Advocates: V. N. RAGHUPATHY Vs
M. K. DUA
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.9094 OF 2013 (Arising Out of SLP (C) No.13239 of 2009)
Dulcina Fernandes & Ors. ...Appellant (s)
VS.
Joaquim Xavier Cruz & Anr. ...Respondent (s)
J U D G M E N T
RANJAN GOGOI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The claimants-appellants are the wife and daughters of
one Nicolau Fernandes who died in a motor vehicle accident
that had occurred on 29.06.1997 at Santimol, Raia while
going from Margao to his village in Ilha, De Rachol. The
deceased was driving a scooter and one Rosario Antao was
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riding Pillion. As the deceased reached Santimol Junction,
one pick-up van driven by the first respondent came from the
opposite direction; though the deceased tried to avoid the
pick-up van which was being driven in a rash and negligent
manner, the rear mudguard of the pick-up van hit the
scooter as a result of which the deceased and the pillion rider
fell off and suffered injuries. Due to the injuries sustained
Nicolau Fernandes died on 01.07.1997.
In the aforesaid facts, the appellants, as claimants, had
lodged a Claim Petition under Section 166 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter for short ‘the Act’) before the
Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at Margao, Goa. In addition
to the first respondent, the New India Assurance Company
with whom the pick-up van was insured was also impleaded
as a respondent in the proceeding before the Claims
Tribunal.
3. Before the Tribunal, the first respondent, in the written
statement filed, took the stand that the accident had not
occurred on account of any fault or negligence on his part.
On the contrary, according to the first respondent, the 2
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accident had occurred as the deceased was driving the
scooter under the influence of liquor. It was specifically
pleaded by the first respondent that the deceased had come
on the wrong side of the road and had dashed against the
pick-up van of the respondent which was standing parked on
the extreme left of the road.
4. On the pleadings of the parties the learned Tribunal
framed four issues for trial in the case. Though under issue
No.3 the learned Tribunal assessed the compensation
payable to the claimants at Rs.6,66,041.78, in view of the
findings recorded against issues 1 and 4 (whether the
deceased or the first respondent was negligent and
responsible for the accident), the learned Tribunal came to
the conclusion that the appellants (claimants) are not
entitled to any compensation. The High Court of Bombay
having affirmed the findings and the conclusion of the
learned Tribunal, the present appeal has been filed.
5. A reading of the award passed by the learned Tribunal
and the order of the High Court shows that the claim of the
appellants has been rejected on three principal grounds. 3
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According to the learned Tribunal and the High Court the
most acceptable evidence in the case would have been the
version of the pillion rider, Rosario Antio, who however, had
not been examined by the claimants. Neither any
explanation had been offered by the claimants for not
examining the aforesaid person. In these circumstances an
adverse inference against the claimants was felt justified.
The evidence of CW-3 Benito Vaz, who was examined by the
claimants as an eye witness, was discarded by the learned
Tribunal in as much as this witness had stated, contrary to
the case of the claimants, that the deceased was riding
pillion and it was Rosario Antio who was driving the scooter.
The evidence of CW-5, who was also examined by the
claimants as an eye witness was rejected by the learned
Tribunal on the ground that in the circumstances narrated by
CW-5 the said witness could not have possibly seen the
actual mishap. Having rejected the evidence of CW-3 and
CW-5 on the aforesaid grounds, the learned Tribunal
considered the evidence tendered by the first respondent
who examined himself as RW-1. In his deposition the first
respondent had stated that at the time of the accident the 4
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pick-up van was parked on the extreme left side of the road
and the scooter driven by the deceased came at a high
speed and dashed against the pick-up van. The first
respondent has also deposed that the deceased as well as
the pillion rider were both drunk and after the accident both
of them had vomited and were smelling of liquor. The
learned Tribunal, upon consideration of the deposition of the
first respondent and taking into account the answers given
by him in cross-examination, came to the conclusion that
there is no reason to doubt the testimony of the said witness.
Accordingly, the learned Tribunal came to its impugned
findings on issue Nos. 1 and 4, namely that the accident had
occurred on account of the negligence of the deceased. On
the basis of the said finding the learned Tribunal thought it
proper to reject the claim of the appellants. On appeal, the
High Court has reiterated the findings and the conclusion of
the learned Tribunal on grounds substantially similar to those
recorded by the learned Tribunal.
6. We have heard Mr.Arun R. Pednekar, learned counsel
appearing for the appellant and Mr. Kishore Rawat, learned
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counsel appearing for the respondent No.2. We have
considered the submissions advanced by the learned
counsels for the respective parties. We have also perused the
orders passed by the learned Tribunal as well as by the High
Court and have carefully considered the evidence led by the
parties which had been included in the SLP paper book.
7. It would hardly need a mention that the plea of
negligence on the part of the first respondent who was
driving the pick-up van as set up by the claimants was
required to be decided by the learned Tribunal on the
touchstone of preponderance of probability and certainly not
on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt. [Bimla Devi
& Ors. Vs. Himachal RTC (2009) 13 SCC 530]. In
United India Insurance Company Limited Vs. Shila
Datta & Ors. (2011) 10 SCC 509 while considering the
nature of a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
a three-judge-bench of this Court has culled out certain
propositions of which propositions (ii), (v) and (vi) would be
relevant to the facts of the present case and, therefore, may
be extracted hereinbelow:
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“(ii) The rules of the pleadings do not strictly apply as the claimant is required to make an application in a form prescribed under the Act. In fact, there is no pleading where the proceedings are suo motu initiated by the Tribunal.
(v) Though the Tribunal adjudicates on a claim and determines the compensation, it does not do so as in an adversarial litigation.
(vi) The Tribunal is required to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. It may choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matters relevant to inquiry, to assist it in holding the enquiry.”
The following further observation available in paragraph
10 of the report would require specific note:
“We have referred to the aforesaid provisions to show that an award by the Tribunal cannot be seen as an adversarial adjudication between the litigating parties to a dispute, but a statutory determination of compensation on the occurrence of an accident, after due enquiry, in accordance with the statute."
8. The cases of the parties before us will have to be
examined from the perspective of the principles and
propositions laid down in Bimla Devi case (supra) and Shila
Datta (supra). While it is correct that the pillion rider could
have best unfolded the details of the accident what cannot
be lost sight of is the fact that while the accident occurred on
29.06.1997 the evidence before the Tribunal was recorded
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after seven years i.e. in the year 2004. Keeping in view the
nature of the jurisdiction that is exercised by a Claims
Tribunal under the Act we do not think it was correct on the
part of the learned Tribunal to hold against the claimants for
their failure or inability to examine the pillion rider Rosario
Antao as a witness in the case. Taking into account the
hapless condition in which the claimants must have been
placed after the death of their sole breadwinner and the
sufficiently long period of time that has elapsed in the
meantime, the learned Tribunal should not have treated the
non-examination of the pillion rider as a fatal and
fundamental law to the claim made before it by the
appellant. As this Court while hearing an appeal instituted
upon grant of special leave under Article 136 of the
Constitution would not normally re-appreciate the evidence
led before Trial Court, we refrain from doing so in the present
case though we may observe that the learned Tribunal was
not entirely correct in rejecting the evidence of the CW-3 and
5 on the grounds assigned. Similar is the position with
regard to the findings of the learned Tribunal in accepting
the evidence tendered by the first respondent. However, 8
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there are certain other features of the case which are more
fundamental and, therefore, have to be specifically noticed.
CW-2, who was at the relevant time working as the Head
Constable of Main Eurtorim, Police Station, had deposed that
a criminal case was registered against the first respondent in
connection with the accident and that after investigation he
was chargesheeted and sent up for trial. Though it is
submitted at the Bar that the first respondent was acquitted
in the said case what cannot be overlooked is the fact that
upon investigation of the case registered against the first
respondent, prime facie, materials showing negligence were
found to put him on trial. From the evidence of CW-2 it also
transpired that the deceased was not medically examined to
ascertain whether he had consumed alcohol and was,
therefore, driving the scooter under the influence of liquor.
In fact, according to CW-2, he had reached the spot within 15
minutes of the incident. In his cross-examination CW-2 had
specifically denied that the scooter driven by the deceased
had dashed the pick-up van which was stationary i.e. parked
on the road. The statements made by CW-2 in the course of
his deposition has considerable significance to the issues 9
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arising in the case, namely, whether the deceased was
driving the scooter under the influence of alcohol and
whether there was any negligence on his part leading to the
accident. The said aspects of the evidence of CW-2 do not
appear to have been taken note of or to have received any
consideration of the learned Tribunal. At the same time it is
possible to take the view that the evidence of CW-2, properly
read and considered, can lead to a conclusion contrary to
what has been arrived at by the learned Tribunal, namely,
that the accident had occurred on account of the negligence
of the deceased. The High Court having failed to notice the
above lacunae in the award of the learned Tribunal and
correct the same, we are satisfied that the present is a fit
case for our interference. We accordingly set aside the
findings of the learned Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court
in respect of issues 1 and 4 and hold that the accident had
occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the pick-up
van by the first respondent.
9. It has already been noticed that on basis of the
discussions under issue No.3, the learned Tribunal has
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quantified the entitlement of the claimants to compensation
at Rs.6,66,041.78. The said relief was withheld in view of the
findings on issues 1 and 4 which have been now reversed by
us. Consequently, we hold the claimants-appellants to be
entitled to compensation of Rs.6,66,041.78 as quantified by
the learned Tribunal in its order dated 20.07.2004. In so far
as award of interest is concerned, in the facts of the present
case we direct that the amount awarded shall carry interest
at the rate of 6% per annum with effect from the date of the
award of the learned Tribunal i.e. 20.07.2004.
10. Appeal of the claimants is allowed on the above terms.
No order as to costs.
...………………………CJI. [P. SATHASIVAM]
.........……………………J. [RANJAN GOGOI]
New Delhi, October 08, 2013.
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