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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL  NO.   695               OF 2014 (Arising Out of SLP (Crl.) No.1953 of 2013)

DR. SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY & ORS.        ...    APPELLANT (S)

VERSUS

RAJU THR. MEMBER JUVENILE        ...  RESPONDENT (S)  JUSTICE BOARD & ANR.

With W.P. (Crl.) No.204 of 2013

J U D G M E N T

RANJAN GOGOI, J.

SLP (Crl.) No.1953 of 2013

1. On 16th December, 2012 a young lady (23 years in age)  

and her friend were returning home after watching a movie  

in a multiplex located in one of the glittering malls of Delhi.  

They boarded a bus to undertake a part of the journey back  

home.   While  the  bus  was  moving,  5  persons  brutally  

assaulted the young lady, sexually and physically, and also  1

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her friend.  Both of them were thrown out of the bus.  The  

young lady succumbed to her injuries on 29.12.2012.

2. Five persons were apprehended in connection with the  

crime.  One of them, identified for the purpose of the present  

case  as  Raju,  was below 18 years  of  age on the  date  of  

commission of the crime.  Accordingly,  in compliance with  

the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 ( as amended  

and  hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘the  Act’)  his  case  was  

referred for inquiry to the Juvenile Justice Board.  The other  

accused  were  tried  in  a  regular  sessions  court  and  have  

been found guilty, inter alia, of the offences under Section  

376 (2)(g) and Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860  

(for short “the Penal Code”).  They have been sentenced to  

death by the learned trial court.  Their appeal against the  

aforesaid  conviction  and  the  sentence  imposed  has  since  

been dismissed and the death penalty has been confirmed  

by the High Court of Delhi.   

3. Before the Juvenile Justice Board to whom the case of  

Raju  was  referred  for  inquiry,  the  petitioners  had  filed  

applications  for  their  impleadment  to  enable  them  to  

‘prosecute’ the juvenile alongside the public prosecutor.  The  2

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petitioners also claimed that, on a proper interpretation of  

the Act, the juvenile was not entitled to the benefits under  

the Act but was liable to be tried under the penal law of the  

land in a regular criminal court alongwith the other accused.

4. According to the petitioners, after an elaborate hearing,  

the  Board  had  fixed  the  case  on  25.01.2013  for  

pronouncement of order on the question of maintainability of  

the  application  filed  by  the  petitioners  and  also  on  their  

prayer  for  impleadment.   However,  insofar  as  the  

interpretation of the provisions of the Act for determination  

of the question whether the offence(s) allegedly committed  

by the juvenile is to be inquired into by the Board or the  

juvenile is required to be tried in a regular criminal court is  

concerned, the Board had expressed its inability to decide  

the  same  and  had  directed  the  petitioners  to  seek  a  

authoritative pronouncement on the said issue(s) from the  

High Court.

5. Accordingly, the  petitioners  had  instituted  a  writ  

proceeding  before  the  High  Court  of  Delhi,  which  was  

registered as Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 124 of 2013, seeking the  

following reliefs :- 3

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“i.  Laying  down an  authoritative  interpretation   of Sections 2(I) and 2(k) of the Act that the   criterion of 18 years set out therein does not   comprehend cases grave offences in general   and  of  heinous  crimes  against  women  in   particular that shakes the root of humanity in   general.

ii. That the definition of offences under Section   2(p)  of  the  Act  be  categorized  as  per   grievousness  of  the  crime  committed  and  the threat of public safety and order.

iii. That Section 28 of the Act be interpreted in   terms  of  its  definition,  i.e.,  alternative   punishment  and  serious  offences  having   minimum  punishment  of  seven  years   imprisonment and above be brought outside  its purview and the same should be tried by   an ordinary criminal court.

iv. Incorporating  in  the  Act,  the  International   concept of age of criminal responsibility and   diluting  the  blanket  immunity  provided  to   the juvenile offender on the basis of age.

v. That  the  instant  Act  be  read  down  in   consonance  with  the  rights  of  victim  as   protected  by  various  fundamental  rights   including  Article  14  and  21  of  the  Constitution of India.” (sic)

“

6.   The High Court by its order dated 23.01.2013 dismissed  

the writ petition holding that against the order of the Juvenile  

Justice Board the alternative remedies available under the  

Act  should  be  exhausted  in  the  first  instance  and  in  the  4

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course  thereof  the  question  of  interpretation  of  the  

provisions of the Act can well be considered.

7.     On the very next day, the Board by an elaborate order  

dated 24.01.2013 rejected the prayer of the petitioners for  

impleadment in the proceeding against the delinquent and  

seeking  participation  therein.   In  the  aforesaid  

circumstances, on 19.02.2013, Special Leave Petition (Crl.)  

No.1953 of 2013 was lodged before this Court challenging  

the aforesaid order of the High Court of Delhi.  

8.  The  maintainability  of  the  Special  Leave  Petition  was  

seriously disputed by the respondent No.1 i.e. juvenile Raju  

as well as the Union of India.  In support, it was, inter alia,  

contended that the administration of criminal justice in India  

does  not  envisage  the  role  of  a  third  party/stranger.  

Primarily, it is the State which is entrusted with the duty of  

prosecution in the discharge of which a limited role so far as  

the complainant/first informant of an offence is  concerned  

and that too in specified situations, is contemplated by the  

provisions  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure.  The  

preliminary  objection  of  the  respondents  to  the  5

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maintainability  of  the Special  Leave Petition was heard at  

length by this Court and by order dated 22.08.2013 it was  

held as follows:

  “All that the petitioners seek is an authoritative   pronouncement of the true purport and effect of   the different provisions of the JJ Act so as to take a   juvenile out of the purview of the said Act in case   he had committed an offence, which, according to   the petitioners, on a true interpretation of Section   2(p)  of  the Act,  is  required to be identified and   distinguished  to  justify  a  separate  course  of   action, namely, trial in a regular Court of law as a   specific  offence  under  the  Penal  Code  and  in   accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Code  of   Criminal  Procedure.   The  adjudication  that  the   petitioners  seek  clearly  has  implications  beyond  the  case  of  the  first  respondent  and  the   proceedings in which he is or may be involved.  In   fact,  interpretation  of  the  relevant  provisions  of   the JJ Act in any manner by this Court, if made, will   not be confined to the first respondent alone but   will have an effect on all juveniles who may come  into conflict with law both in the immediate and  distant  future.   If  we  are  to  view  the  issue  of   maintainability of the present proceeding from the  aforesaid perspective reference to the case of the   first  respondent  in  the  pleadings  must  be  understood to be illustrative.   If  this  Court is  to   interpret the provisions of the Act in the manner   sought  by  the  petitioners,  the  possible  effect   thereof  in  so  far  as  the  first  Respondent  is   concerned  will  pale  into  insignificance  in  the  backdrop of  the far  reaching consequences that   such  an  interpretation  may  have  on  an  indeterminate  number  of  persons  not  presently   before the Court.  We are, therefore, of the view  that it would be appropriate for us) hold that the   

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special leave petition does not suffer from the vice   of absence of locus on the part of the petitioners   so as to render the same not maintainable in law.   We,  therefore,  will  proceed  to  hear  the  special   leave petition on merits and attempt to provide an   answer  to  the  several  questions  raised  by  the   petitioners before us.” (sic)

9.    Notice in the special  leave petition was accordingly  

issued in  response to which detailed counter  affidavit  has  

been filed on behalf of the Union as well as the respondent-

juvenile Raju.  In addition, Crl. Misc. Petition No.22586/2013  

(by Smt. June Chaudhari, Senior Advocate), Crl. Misc. Petition  

No.25075/2013 (on behalf of Centre for Child and the Law,  

National Law School of India University and Ors.), Crl. Misc.  

Petition  No.15792/2013  (on  behalf  of  Prayas  Juvenile  Aid  

Centre, Tughlakabad, Institutional Area, New Delhi) and Crl.  

Misc. Petition No.23226/2013 (by Dr. Madhuker Sharma) for  

interventions  have  been  filed,  all  of  which  have  been  

allowed.   The  matter  was  elaborately  heard  on  different  

dates by this Court in the course of which written notes and  

arguments as well as documents relevant to the issues have  

been placed before the Court by the contesting parties.  In  

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view  of  the  elaborate  consideration  on  the  basis  of  the  

arguments advanced and the materials placed we deem it  

proper to grant leave to appeal and to decide the case on  

merits upon full consideration of the rival contentions.

Writ Petition (Crl.) No.204 of 2013

10.   This writ petition has been filed by the parents of the  

victim  of  the  incident  that  had  occurred  on  16.12.2012  

seeking the following reliefs :

“(i)    a Direction striking down as unconstitutional   and void the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection   of Children) Act 2000 (Act No.56 of 2000) to the   extent it puts a blanket ban on the power of the   criminal  courts  to  try  a  juvenile  offender  for   offences committed under the Indian Penal Code,   1860; and

(ii)      a Direction that the Respondent No.2 be   tried forthwith by the competent criminal court for   the  offences  against  the  daughter  of  the  petitioners in F.I.R. No.413/12, P.S. Vasant Vihar,   New  Delhi  under  sections  302/365/376(2)G/377/307/  394/395/397/396/412/201/ 120B/34 IPC.”

11.   The  issues  raised  being  similar  to  those  arising  in  

Special  Leave  Petition  (Crl.)  No.1953  of  2013,  both  cases  

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were heard together and are being disposed of by means of  

this common order.

12.   We  have  heard  Dr.  Subramanian  Swamy,  the  first  

appellant  appearing  in  person  and  also  representing  the  

other  appellants  as  well  as  Dr.  Aman  Hingorani,  learned  

counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in W.P. (Crl.)  

No.204 of 2013. We have also heard Shri Sidharth Luthra,  

learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the Union  

of India and Shri A.J. Bhambhani, learned counsel appearing  

for  the  juvenile  respondent  No.1–Raju  apart  from  the  

intervenors appearing in person or through their respective  

counsels.

13.    Dr.  Subramanian Swamy has, at the outset, clarified  

that he is neither challenging the provisions of Section 2(k)  

and 2(l) of the Act nor is he invoking the jurisdiction of the  

Court to strike down any other provision of the Act or for  

interference  of  the  Court  to  reduce  the  minimum age  of  

juveniles fixed under the Act as 18 years.  What Dr. Swamy  

has contended is that having regard to the object behind the  

enactment, the Act has to be read down to understand that  9

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the true test of “juvenility” is not in the age but in the level  

of  mental  maturity of the offender.   This,  it  is  contended,  

would save the Act from unconstitutionality and also further  

its purpose.  The Act is not intended to apply to serious or  

heinous crimes committed by a juvenile.  The provisions of  

Sections  82  and  83  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  have  been  

placed to contend that while a child below 7 cannot be held  

to be criminally liable, the criminality of those between 7 and  

12  years  has  to  be  judged  by  the  level  of  their  mental  

maturity.   The  same principle  would  apply  to  all  children  

beyond 12 and upto 18 years also, it is contended.  This is  

how the two statutes i.e. Indian Penal Code and the Act has  

to be harmoniously understood.  The provisions of Section  

1(4)  of  the  Act  which  makes  the  provisions  of  the  Act  

applicable  to  all  cases  of  detention,  prosecution  and  

punishment of juveniles in conflict with law, to the exclusion  

of all other laws, would be unconstitutional if the Act is not  

read down.  Specifically,     Dr. Swamy contends that in that  

event the Act will offend Article 14 of the Constitution as all  

offenders  below  the  age  of  18  years  irrespective  of  the  

degree/level  of  mental  maturity  and  irrespective  of  the  1

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gravity  of  the  crime  committed  would  be  treated  at  par.  

Such a blanket treatment of all offenders below the age of  

18  committing  any  offence,  regardless  of  the  seriousness  

and  depravity,  is  wholly  impermissible  under  our  

constitutional  scheme.   The  non-obstante  provisions  

contained  in  Section  1(4)  of  the  Act  as  well  as  the  bar  

imposed by Section 7 on the jurisdiction of the criminal court  

to try juvenile offenders cannot apply to serious and heinous  

crime  committed  by  juveniles  who  have  reached  the  

requisite degree of mental maturity, if the Act is to maintain  

its  constitutionality.   Reliance  is  also  placed  on  Essa  @  

Anjum Abdul Razak Memon vs.  State of Maharashtra1  

to contend that the purport and effect of Section 1(4) of the  

Act must be understood in a limited manner.   

14.   By referring to the provisions of the United Nations  

Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile  

Justice, 1985 (Beijing Rules);  the Convention of the Rights of  

the Child, 1990 (CRC) and the United Nations Rules for the  

Protection  of  Juveniles  Deprived  of  their  Liberty,  

1990(Havana  Rules),  Dr.  Swamy  has  contended  that  the  1 (2013) 3 SCALE 1

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international commitments entered into by India obliges it to  

set up a particular framework to deal with juvenile offenders  

and such obligations can be more comprehensively met and  

effectuated  by  understanding  the  Act  in  the  aforesaid  

manner.   The  practice  in  vogue  in  several  foreign  

jurisdictions,  particularly,  in  the U.K.,  USA and Canada for  

adjudicating  criminal  liability  of  young  offenders  has  also  

been placed before the Court.  Specifically, it is pointed out  

that the practice of statutory exclusion which ensures that  

perpetrators  of  certain  grave  offences  are  prosecuted  as  

adults;  ‘judicial  waiver’,  granting  discretion  to  special  

juvenile  courts  to  waive  jurisdiction  and  transfer  the  

juvenile’s case to an ordinary court of law and also the policy  

of concurrent jurisdiction of both the ordinary and juvenile  

courts  giving  discretion  to  the  prosecutor  to  initiate  

proceedings in the more suitable court are followed in such  

jurisdictions.  Shri Swamy has also suggested that Section 28  

of the Act be read together with Section 15 to enable the  

alternatively  higher  punishment  under  other  State/Central  

enactments,  such as  the IPC to  be awarded to  a  juvenile  

offender.  It is argued that this would incorporate the policy  1

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of  concurrent  jurisdiction  of  both  ordinary  criminal  courts  

and JJ Boards.

15.  Legislative overreach in enacting the Act is the core  

argument  advanced  on  behalf  of  the  petitioners  in  Writ  

Petition (Crl.) No.204 of 2013.  Dr. Aman Hingorani, learned  

counsel urges that the ban on jurisdiction of criminal courts  

by Section 7 of the Act is  unconstitutional  inasmuch as it  

virtually ousts the criminal justice system from dealing with  

any  offence  committed  by  a  juvenile.   Parliament  cannot  

make a law to oust the judicial function of the courts or even  

judicial  discretion  in  a  matter  which  falls  within  the  

jurisdiction of the courts.  Reliance in this regard is placed on  

the judgments of this Court in the case of Mithu Vs. State  

of Punjab2 and  Dadu  Vs.  State of Maharashtra3.   It  is  

argued that what the Act contemplates in place of a regular  

criminal trial is a non-adversarial inquiry against the juvenile  

where the prime focus is not on the crime committed but on  

the reasons that had led the juvenile to such conduct.  The  

maximum power of ‘punishment’, on proof of guilt, is to send  

2 (1983) 2 SCC 277 3 (2000) 8 SCC 437

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the juvenile to a special home for three years.  The entire  

scheme  under  the  Act  being  substantially  different  from  

what  is  provided  by  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  for  

investigation  of  offences  and  for  trial  and  punishment  of  

offenders,  it  is  submitted  that  the  Act  offends  a  core  

constitutional  value  namely,  the  existence  of  a  criminal  

justice system.  The proceedings against the juvenile Raju  

held by the JJ Board are, therefore, null and void and the said  

juvenile is liable to be tried by a competent criminal court in  

accordance with the procedure prescribed.   In this regard, it  

is also submitted that the concept of double jeopardy under  

Article  20(3)  of  the Constitution and Section 300 of  Penal  

Code will have no application inasmuch as the proceedings  

before  the  JJ  Board  did/does  not  amount  to  a  trial.  

Contentions somewhat similar to what has been advanced  

by  Dr.  Swamy  to  explain  the  degree  of  constitutional  

flexibility that the Act would enjoy has also been urged by  

Dr. Hingorani who however goes a step forward to contend  

that the decision in Salil Bali vs.  Union of India4  will not  

be  an  inhibition  for  the  Court  to  answer  the  question(s)  

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raised as not only the issues arising in Salil Bali (supra) are  

different  but  the  said  decision  is  founded  on  an  entirely  

different legal perspective.   

16. Shri Anoop  G.  Chaudhary,  learned  senior  counsel  

appearing  for  the  intervenor  Smt.  June  Chaudhari  and  

Dr. Madhuker Sharma, intervenor, appearing in person have  

supported the case projected by Dr.  Swamy and Dr.  Aman  

Hingorani, noticed above.  

17.  The arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants as  

well as the writ petitioners are hotly contested.  Shri Sidharth  

Luthra,  learned  Additional  Solicitor  General  submits  that  

what  is  contemplated  by  the  Act  is  in  furtherance of  the  

country’s  obligations  arising from a series  of  international  

conventions to  which  India  is  a  signatory.   The Act  is  an  

expression of legislative wisdom to treat all persons below  

18 as juveniles and to have an alternate system of dealing  

with such juveniles who come into conflict with law.   Shri  

Luthra has submitted that the constitutional validity of the  

Act has been upheld by a Coordinate Bench in  Salil  Bali  

(supra).     Shri  Luthra  has  also  submitted  that  1

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psychological/mental, intellectual and emotional maturity of  

a person below 18 years cannot be objectively determined  

on an individual or case to case basis and the fixation of the  

Minimum Age of Criminal  Responsibility (MACR) under the  

Act is a policy decision taken to give effect to the country’s  

international  commitments.   In  so  far  as  the  specific  

contentions  advanced  on  behalf  of  the  writ  petitioners  in  

W.P.  (Crl.)  No.204  of  2013  is  concerned,  Shri  Luthra  has  

submitted that the Act does not provide a blanket immunity  

to  juvenile  offenders,  as  contended.   What  the  Act  

contemplates  is  a  different  procedure  to  deal  with  such  

offenders.  If found guilty, they are subjected to a different  

scheme of punishment.  The learned counsel appearing on  

behalf of the juvenile Raju, while supporting the contentions  

advanced by   Shri  Luthra, has further submitted that the  

United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1990  

read with  the  concluding  Resolution of  the Committee  on  

Child Rights (constituted under the UN Convention) of the  

year 2000 qua India and the General Resolution of the year  

2007  clearly  contemplate  the  MACR  as  18  years  and  

mandates  member  States  to  act  accordingly.   Learned  1

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counsel  on  the  strength  of  the  elaborate  academic  and  

research work placed on record has tried to persuade the  

Court to take the view that :-

(1)  Countries  like  U.K.  Canada  and  USA  have  departed  from  the  obligations  under  the  UN  Convention  and  are  in  breach  of  their  international  commitments.   The  incidence  of  crime  by  juveniles  in  those  countries  is  very  high which is  not so in India.   It  is  submitted  that,  of  late,  a  re-thinking  on  the  issue  is  discernible  to  demonstrate  which  reliance  is  placed on some recent pronouncements of the  US  Supreme  Court,  details  of  which  will  be  noticed hereinafter.  

(2) That the level of mental/intellectual maturity in  any given case cannot be determined with any  degree  of  accuracy  and  precision  and  the  results  vary  from  case  to  case  and  from  individual  to  individual.   A  system  which  provides for an option to refer a juvenile to a  regular  court,  therefore,  ought  not  to  be  accepted  as  no  objective  basis  for  such  reference exists.   

18.   Shri  Amod Kanth,  representing Prayas Juveniles Aid  

Centre  and  learned  counsel  for  the  intervener  Centre  for  

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Child and the Law, National Law School of India University  

and others have supported the stand taken by the learned  

Additional Solicitor General.  Elaborate written submissions  

have been filed to substantiate the argument that  having  

regard to expert/psychological/medical opinion available the  

MACR cannot be determined, with any acceptable degree of  

precision,  on the basis  of  a  case to  case study for  which  

reason the legislative wisdom inherent in the Act must be  

accepted  and  respected.   Statistics  of  the  crimes  (Crime  

rate)  committed  by  juvenile  offenders  have  also  been  

brought on record to contend that the beneficial nature of  

the  legislation  does  not  call  for  any  relook,  even  on  the  

touchstone of Constitutional permissibility.

19. At the very outset,  two initial  hurdles to  the present  

adjudication,  set  up  by  the  respondents,  may  be  

conveniently dealt with.  The first is that the constitutional  

validity of the Act has been upheld in Salil Bali (supra) and  

it is not necessary to revisit the said decision even if it be by  

way of a reference to a larger Bench.  The second is with  

regard  to  the  recommendations  of  the  Justice  J.S.  Verma  

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Committee following which recommendations, the Criminal  

Law  Amendment  Act,  2013  has  been  enacted  by  the  

legislature fundamentally altering the jurisprudential norms  

so  far  as  offences  against  women/sexual  offences  are  

concerned.

20. In  Salil  Bali (supra)  the constitutional  validity  of the  

Act,  particularly,  Section  2(k)  and  2(l)  thereof  was  under  

challenge, inter alia, on the very same grounds as have now  

been advanced before us to contend that the Act had to be  

read down.  In Salil Bali (supra) a coordinate Bench did not  

consider  it  necessary  to  answer  the specific  issues  raised  

before it  and had based its conclusion on the principle of  

judicial  restraint  that  must  be  exercised  while  examining  

conscious decisions that emanate from collective legislative  

wisdom  like  the  age  of  a  juvenile.   Notwithstanding  the  

decision of this Court in Kesho Ram and Others Vs. Union  

of India and Others5 holding that, “the binding effect of a  

decision  of  this  Court  does  not  depend  upon  whether  a  

particular  argument  was  considered  or  not,  provided  the  5 (1989) 3 SCC 151

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point  with  reference  to  which  the  argument  is  advanced  

subsequently was actually decided in the earlier decision…”  

(para 10) the issue of  res judicata  was not even remotely  

raised before us.  In the field of public law and particularly  

when constitutional issues or matters of high public interest  

are involved, the said principle would operate in a somewhat  

limited manner; in any case, the petitioners in the present  

proceeding were not parties to the decision rendered in Salil  

Bali  (supra).  Therefore, we deem it proper to proceed, not  

to determine the correctness of the decision in  Salil  Bali  

(supra) but to consider the arguments raised on the point of  

law arising.  While doing so we shall certainly keep in mind  

the course of action that judicial discipline would require us  

to  adopt,  if  need  be.   Though  expressed  in  a  somewhat  

different  context  we  may  remind  ourselves  of  the  

observations  of  the  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  in  

Natural  Resources  Allocation,  In  Re,  Special   

Reference No.1 of 20126 extracted below:-

“48.2. The second limitation, a self-imposed rule  of  judicial  discipline,  was  that  overruling  the   opinion of  the Court  on a legal  issue does not   

6 (2012) 10 SCC 1 2

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constitute sitting in appeal,  but is done only in   exceptional  circumstances,  such  as  when  the  earlier decision is per incuriam or is delivered in   the absence of relevant or material facts or if it is   manifestly wrong and capable of causing public   mischief.  For  this  proposition,  the  Court  relied   upon the judgment in Bengal Immunity case (AIR  1955  SC  661) wherein  it  was  held  that  when  Article 141 lays down that the law declared by   this Court shall be binding on all courts within the   territory  of  India,  it  quite  obviously  refers  to   courts other than this Court; and that the Court   would normally follow past precedents save and   except where it was necessary to reconsider the   correctness of law laid down in that judgment. In   fact, the overruling of a principle of law is not an   outcome  of  appellate  jurisdiction  but  a   consequence of its inherent power. This inherent   power  can  be exercised as  long as  a  previous   decree vis-à-vis a lis inter partes is not affected.   It  is  the attempt  to  overturn the decision of  a   previous case that is problematic, which is why   the Court observed that: [Cauvery (2) case (1993  Supp (1) SCC 96 (2), SCC p. 145, para 85]

“85.  …  Under  the  Constitution  such  appellate  jurisdiction  does  not  vest  in  this   Court,  nor  can  it  be  vested  in  it  by  the  President under Article 143.”

21. The  issues  arising  and  the  contentions  advanced  

therefore  will  have  to  be  examined  from  the  aforesaid  

limited perspective which we are inclined to do in view of the  

importance of the questions raised.

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22. The  next  issue  that  would  need  a  resolution  at  the  

threshold is the effect of the recommendations of the Justice  

J.S.  Verma  Committee  constituted  by  the  Government  of  

India  by  Notification  dated 24th December,  2012  following  

the very same incident of 16th December 2012 so far as the  

age of a juvenile is concerned.  The terms of reference to the  

Justice  J.S.  Verma  Committee  were  indeed  wide  and  it  is  

correct that the Committee did not recommend reduction of  

the age of juveniles by an amendment of the provisions of  

the Act.  However, the basis on which the Committee had  

come to the above conclusion is  vastly different  from the  

issues  before  this  Court.   The  recommendations  of  the  

Justice J.S.  Verma Committee which included the negative  

covenant so far as any amendment to the JJ Act is concerned  

was, therefore, in a different context though we must hasten  

to add the views expressed would undoubtedly receive our  

deepest consideration while dealing with the matter in hand.

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23. The  stage  is  now appropriate  to  have  a  look  at  the  

international  conventions,  holding the field,  to  which India  

has been a signatory.   

The UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration  

of Juvenile Justice (“the  Beijing Rules”) were adopted by  

the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1985. Rule  

2.2(a)  defines a juvenile as a child  or  young person who,  

under the respective legal system, may be dealt with for an  

offence differently  than an adult.  Rule 4.1 set  out  below  

mandates Member States to refrain from fixing a minimum  

age of criminal responsibility that is too low, bearing in mind  

the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual maturity.

“4.1 In  those  legal  systems  recognizing  the   concept of the age of criminal responsibility for   juveniles, the beginning of that age shall not be  fixed at too low an age level,  bearing in mind   the facts  of emotional,  mental  and intellectual   maturity.”                                                           

24. The  Beijing  Rules  take  into  account  penological  

objectives  in  addition  to  rehabilitation  of  the  offender.  In  2

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Rule 17.1, the  guiding  principles  of  adjudicating  matters  

involving juveniles are enlisted:

(a) The  reaction  shall  always  be  proportional  to  not only the circumstances and the gravity of the  offence, but also to the circumstances and needs  of the juvenile as well as to the needs of society;

(b) Restrictions on personal liberty of the juvenile  shall be imposed only after careful consideration  and shall be limited to the possible minimum;

(c) Deprivation  of  personal  liberty  shall  not  be  imposed unless the juvenile is adjudicated of a  serious  act  involving  violence  against  another  person  or  of  persistence  in  committing  other  serious  offences  and  unless  there  is  no  other  appropriate response;

(d) The  well-being  of  the  juvenile  shall  be  the  guiding factor while considering his case.

It is clear that the Beijing Rules do not prohibit detention of a  

juvenile if he is proved to have committed a violent, serious  

offence,  or to  have  repeatedly  committed  such  serious  

offences though Rule 17.2 of the Beijing Rules prohibits the  2

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imposition  of  capital  punishment  of  juveniles.  Thus,  the  

Rules  do  not  advocate  leniency  in  dealing  with  such  

offenders but only contemplate that detention be limited to  

the most serious cases where no other alternative is found  

appropriate after careful consideration.

25. The  Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1990  

(“CRC”), in Article 1, adopts a chronological definition of a  

“child”,  viz.  less than 18 years old,  unless majority  under  

national legislation is attained earlier:

“For the purposes of the present Convention, a  child means every human being below the age  of  eighteen  years  unless  under  the  law  applicable  to  the  child,  majority  is  attained  earlier.”

Article 37(a) of  the  CRC prohibits  the imposition  of  

capital punishment and life imprisonment without possibility  

of  release  on  offenders  below  18  years  of  age.  The  CRC  

further  obliges  State  Parties  to  establish  a  minimum age  

below  which  children  shall  be  presumed  not  to  have  the  

capacity to infringe the penal law (Article 40(3)(a)).   

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26. Rule 1.2 of the Havana Rules provide that a juvenile  

should be deprived of his/her liberty only as a measure of  

the  last  resort  limited  to  exceptional  cases  and  for  the  

minimum necessary period. Even then, detention should be  

in such a manner and in conditions that respect the human  

rights of juveniles (Rule 12).

Rule 11(a) of the Havana Rules, 1990 define a juvenile  

as every person under the age of 18, and allow national laws  

to determine a minimum age below which such person will  

not be detained.

27. Under  Article  43  of  the  CRC,  constitution  of  a  

Committee for the purpose of examining the progress made  

by  the  State  parties  on  the  rights  of  the  child  is  

contemplated.   The first  meeting of  the Committee under  

Article 44 was to be within 2 years of the coming into force  

of  the  convention  so  far  as  a  particular  State  party,  in  

respect  of  whom  review  of  the  progress  is  made,  is  

concerned.  Thereafter, the Committee is required to meet  

every 5 years.  In January, 2000, the Committee considered  

the  initial  report  of  India  submitted  on  19.03.1997  and  2

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adopted certain “concluding observations” the relevant part  

of which are extracted hereinbelow:

“79. The  Committee  is  concerned  over  the   administration of juvenile justice in India and its   incompatibility with articles 37, 40 and 39 of the   Convention  and  other  relevant  international   standards.   The Committee is  also concerned at   the very young age of criminal responsibility – 7   years – and the possibility of trying boys between   16 and 18 years of age as adults.  Noting that the   death penalty is de facto not applied to persons   under 18, the Committee is very concerned that   de jure, this possibility exists.  The Committee is   further  concerned  at  the  overcrowded  and  unsanitary  conditions  of  detention  of  children,   including detention with adults; lack of application   and  enforcement  of  existing  juvenile  justice   legislation;  lack  of  training  for  professionals,   including  the  judiciary,  lawyers  and  law  enforcement  officers,  in  relation  to  the   Convention, other existing international standards   and the 1986 Juvenile Justice Act; and the lack of   measures and enforcement thereof  to  prosecute   officials who violate these provisions.

80. The Committee recommends that the State   party  review  its  laws  in  the  administration  of   juvenile  justice  to  ensure  that  they  are  in   accordance  with  the  Convention,  especially   Articles  37,  40  and  39,  and  other  relevant   international standards such as the United Nations   Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of   Juvenile  Justice  (the  Beijing  Rules),  the  United  Nations Guidelines for  the Prevention of Juvenile   Delinquency  (the  Riyadh  Guidelines),  the  United   Nations  Rules  for  the  Protection  of  Juveniles   Deprived  of  their  Liberty  and  the  Vienna  Guidelines for Action on Children in the Criminal   Justice System.

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81. The Committee recommends that the State   party abolish by law the imposition of the death   penalty on persons under 18.  The Committee also   recommends that the State party consider raising   the age of criminal responsibility and ensure that   persons under 18 years are not tried as adults.  In   accordance  with  the  principle  of  non- discrimination  contained  in  article  2  of  the   Convention,  the  Committee  recommends  article   29(h) of the 1986 Juvenile Justice Act be amended  to ensure that boys under 18 years are covered by   the definition of juvenile, as girls already are.  The   Committee  recommends  that  the  1986  Juvenile   Justice Act be fully enforced and that the judiciary   and lawyers be trained and made aware of it.  The   Committee further recommends that measures be   taken  to  reduce  overcrowding,  to  release  those  who cannot be given a speedy trial and to improve   prison  facilities  as  quickly  as  possible.   The   Committee  recommends  that  the  State  party   ensure  regular,  frequent  and  independent   monitoring of institutions for juvenile offenders.”

It is pursuant to the aforesaid concluding observations of the  

Committee  made  in  the  year  2000  that  the  JJ  Act  was  

amended in the later part of that year by having a uniform  

age of 18 for both male and female juveniles.

28. It needs to be clarified that the concluding observations  

of  the  Committee  under  Article  45  of  the  UN Convention  

(CRC)  are  qua  a  particular  State  party  whereas  general  

comments  of  the  Committee  under  the  same  Article  are  

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authoritative interpretations addressed to all  State parties.  

The  above  distinction  between  “concluding  observations”  

and “general comments” is highlighted to draw attention to  

the fact that in the meeting of the Committee held in Geneva  

in the year 2007 certain general observations with regard to  

MCAR of 18 years were made which would be applicable to  

State parties other than India as the law had already been  

amended  in  our  country  pursuant  to  the  concluding  

observations  made  by  the  Committee  in  the  year  2000  

specifically  qua  India.   The  views  of  the  Committee  in  

respect of other member States may be usefully taken note  

at  this  stage  by  extracting  the  recommendations  in  the  

nature of general comments in paras 36, 37 and 38 of the  

Report:

“36.  The  Committee  also  wishes  to  draw  the  attention of States parties to the upper age-limit   for the application of the rules of juvenile justice.   These  special  rules  -  in  terms  both  of  special   procedural  rules  and  of  rules  for  diversion  and  special  measures -  should apply,  starting at  the   MACR set in the country, for all children who, at   the time of their alleged commission of an offence   

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(or act punishable under the criminal law),  have   not yet reached the age of 18 years.

“37.  The  Committee  wishes  to  remind  States   parties  that  they  have  recognized  the  right  of   every child alleged as, accused of, or recognized as   having  infringed  the  penal  law  to  be  treated  in   accordance with the provisions of article 40 of CRC.   This means that every person under the age of 18   years at the time of the alleged commission of an   offence  must  be  treated  in  accordance  with  the   rules of juvenile justice.

“38.  The Committee, therefore, recommends that   those States parties which limit the applicability of   their  juvenile  justice  rules  to  children under  the  age of 16 (or lower) years, or which allow by way   of  exception that  16 or  17-year-old children are   treated as adult criminals, change their laws with   a  view  to  achieving  a  non-discriminatory  full   application  of  their  juvenile  justice  rules  to  all   persons  under  the  age  of  18  years. The  Committee  notes  with  appreciation  that  some  States parties allow for the application of the rules   and regulations of juvenile justice to persons aged  18 and older, usually till the age of 21, either as a   general rule or by way of exception.”   

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                                                    (emphasis  added)

29. Both  sides  have  laboured  to  assist  the  Court  with  

elaborate  and  detailed  scientific  and  medical  literature  in  

support  of  their  respective  stands.   The  scientific  and  

medical opinion on the issue is not at variance and it cannot  

be.  The difference lies in the respective perceptions as we  

will presently see.  The works and opinions placed goes to  

show  that  studies  of  adolescent  brain  anatomy  clearly  

indicate that regions of the brain that regulate such things  

as foresight, impulse control and résistance to peer pressure  

are in a developing stage upto the age of 18.  These are  

normative phenomenon that a teenager cannot control and  

not a pathological illness or defect.  An article by  Laurence  

Steinberg & Laura H. Carnell  titled “Should the Science of  

Adolescent Brain Development inform Public Policy” is relied  

upon.  On the basis of the above it is contended that there is  

no  answer  to  the  question  when  an  adolescent  brain  

becomes  an  adult  brain  because  the  structural  and  

conventional changes do not take place on a uniform time  

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scale.   It  is  further argued that intellectual maturity of an  

adolescent  is  different  from  emotional  or  social  maturity  

which makes an adolescent mature for some decisions but  

not for others, a position also highlighted by the Act which  

pre-supposes the capacity of a child under 18 to consent for  

his adoption under Section 41(5) of the Act.   On the said  

materials  while  the  petitioners  argue  that  the  lack  of  

uniformity of mental  growth upto the relevant age i.e.  18  

years  would  justify  individualized  decisions  rather  than  

treating adolescent as a class the opposite view advanced is  

that between the lower and the upper age, the age of 18  

provides a good mid point of focus which may result in some  

amount of over-classification but that would be inevitable in  

any situation and a mid point reduces the chances of over-

classification  to  the  minimum.   These  are  the  varying  

perceptions alluded to earlier.

30.    It  may  be  advantageous  to  now  take  note  of  the  

Juvenile Justice System working in other jurisdictions.

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A - CANADA

In  Canada,  the  Youth  Criminal  Justice  Act,  2002  

provides for criminal justice to young persons aged between  

12 to 18 years. The Preamble expressly states that the Act  

was  enacted  pursuant  to  Canada’s  obligations  under  the  

CRC.  The  Preamble  also  declares  that  “Canadian  society  

should have a youth criminal justice system that commands  

respect, takes into account the interests of victims, fosters  

responsibility and ensures accountability through meaningful  

consequences and effective rehabilitation and reintegration,  

and that reserves its most serious intervention for the most  

serious  crimes  and  reduces  the  over-reliance  on  

incarceration  for  non-violent  young  persons.”  (emphasis  

added)

While a ‘child’ is a person aged less than 12 years, a  

‘young  person’  is  one  aged  between  12  and  18  years.  

Section  13  establishes  “youth  justice  courts”  which  have  

exclusive jurisdiction to try offences committed by a young  

person.  The  Act  makes  special  provisions  where  a  young  

person  commits  a  “serious  offence”  (indictable  offence  3

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punishable   with  more  than  5  years’  imprisonment)  and  

“serious violent offence” (first  and second degree murder,  

manslaughter,  aggravated  sexual  assault,  attempted  

murder).  Custody  sentences  are  reserved  for  violent  and  

serious crimes, but cannot exceed the maximum punishment  

that can be awarded to adults for the same offence (Section  

38(2)(a)).  One  sentencing  option  is  the  “Intensive  

Rehabilitative  Custody  and  Supervision  Order”,  which  is  

reserved  for  serious  violent  offenders  including  for  

aggravated  sexual  assault.  When  the  offender  attains  18  

years,  the  Court  may  place  him  in  an  adult  correctional  

centre if this is in his best interest or in public interest.

Section 34 permits the Youth Justice Court to order for  

the mental and psychological assessment of the young  

person for the following reasons only:

a. Considering  an  application  for  release  from or  detention in custody;

b. Deciding  on  an  application  for  hearing  the  offender on adult sentence;

c. Making or reviewing a youth sentence;

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d. Considering  an  application  relating  to  continuation of custody;

e. Making an order for conditional supervision;

f. Authorizing  disclosure  of  information  about  a  young person.

Further, assessment may be ordered only where (i) the  

offender has committed a serious violent crime, or (ii)  the  

Court  suspects  he  is  suffering  from  a  mental  illness  or  

disorder,  or  (iii)  the  offender  has  a  criminal  history  with  

repeated  findings  of  guilt.  Thus,  an  assessment  under  

Section 34 cannot be ordered for determining whether the  

offender  lacks  sufficient  “maturity”  to  be  classified  as  a  

“juvenile/young person” (and thus qualify for the benefits of  

the Act). This Act, like the JJ Act uses the chronological test  

for  determining  its  beneficiaries.  However,  in  cases  of  

serious  and  serious  violent  crimes,  the  offender  may  be  

punished by the Youth Justice Court with equivalent years of  

imprisonment as in the case of an adult (Sections 38 & 39).

In its concluding remarks on Canada (dt. 05.10.2012),  

the Committee on Rights of the Child expressed concern that  

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the  State  had  taken  no  steps  to  raise  the  MACR  and  

continued to try children under 18 as adults (in relation to  

the  circumstances  or  gravity  of  the  offence).  Besides  

recommending the increase in  MACR,  the Committee  also  

recommended that the State i.e. Canada to ensure that no  

person  under  18  is  tried  as  an  adult  irrespective  of  the  

circumstances or the gravity of the offence.7

B – UNITED KINGDOM

31. Children  less  than  10  years  of  age  are  irrefutably  

considered as incapable of committing an offence. Children  

between 10-18 years  are capable of  committing offences,  

but are usually tried in the Youth Court, unless they have  

committed serious offences (such as rape or  homicide) or  

have  been  charged  with  adults  (co-defendants),  in  which  

case they are tried in the Crown Court. When jointly charged  

with  adult  co-defendants,  though  the  charges  must  be  

framed in the Magistrate’s court with the other defendants,  

the juvenile should be sent to the Crown Court for  trial  if  

7 Committee on the Rights of the Child, 61st Session, 05 October 2012,     CRC/C/CAN/CO/3-4, paras 85-86, p.20.

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there is a “real prospect” of him being sentenced to over 2  

years’ custody period.

The general policy of law in the UK is (i) juveniles under  

18 years, especially under 15 years, should be tried as far as  

possible  by  the  Youth  Court,  reserving  trial  in  the  Crown  

Court for serious cases, and (ii) first time offenders aged 12-

14 years  and all  offenders  under  12 years  should  not  be  

detained in custody.  

Sentencing:  “Detention  and Training  Orders”  may be  

given to an offender aged 12-17 years, the first half of which  

is  served in  custody and the second half  is  served in the  

community.  These  usually  last  between  4  months  and  2  

years.

“Extended”  custodial  sentences  are  given  to  young  

persons if their crime is so serious that no other alternative  

is suitable, or if the young person is a habitual offender, or if  

the Judge thinks the person is a risk to public safety. Under  

S.91  of  the  Powers  of  Criminal  Courts   (Sentencing)  Act,  

2000, a person below 18 years who is convicted of a serious  

offence,  may be sentenced to a period not exceeding the  3

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maximum term of  imprisonment  for  adults,  including  life.  

The place of detention is a young offender institution. The  

Sentencing Guidelines provide that a sentence exceeding 2  

years in respect of youth aged 12-17 years and accused of a  

grave offence should be made only when such a sentence is  

a  “realistic  possibility”.  Instances of  such offences include  

sexual assault. Where a person is convicted of murder, he  

must be sentenced to detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure.

C – UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

32. The  US  has  a  relatively  high  rate  of  juvenile  

delinquency.  In  2011,  the  number  of  juvenile  delinquents  

was 129,456 out of a population of 250 million. Although the  

traditional  age of  majority is  18 years,  nearly all  States  

permit  persons  less  than  18  years  to  be  tried  as  

adults.  

For example, in California, the majority age is 18 years,  

but persons older than 14 years may be tried as adults if  

they commit serious crimes (rape, robbery, murder etc.). The  

state of New York pegs the age of juvenility at 16 years, and  

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permits  the  prosecution  of  persons  aged  between  13-16  

years as  adults  in  case of  serious crimes.  In  Florida,  the  

prosecutor  has  discretion  to  decide  whether  to  try  the  

juvenile  as  such  or  as  an  adult,  owing  to  concurrent  

jurisdiction of the juvenile and ordinary criminal courts.

There  are  three  legal  mechanisms  that  permit  the  

juvenile to be tried as an adult in the States:

i. Judicial  Waiver:  The  juvenile  judge  has  the  discretion  to  waive  jurisdiction  and transfer  the  case  to  the  adult  criminal  courts.  Presently,  all  states  except  Nebraska,  New  York,  and  New  Mexico,  provide  for  judicial  waiver. This discretion is entirely left to the  Judge in some States, whereas others provide  some criteria  for  its  exercise.   In  Breed  v.  Jones (1975), the Court held that adjudicating  a  juvenile  first  in  a  juvenile  court,  which  subsequently waived jurisdiction, followed by  adjudication by an adult  court,  violated the  Fifth  Amendment  protection  against  double  jeopardy.;

ii. Prosecutorial Discretion : Where the prosecutor  

has the discretion to decide whether  to  try  3

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the  offender  in  a  juvenile  or  adult  criminal  

court. This is most common in cases of repeat  

offenders;

iii.Statutory  exclusion:  Where  State  legislation  provides that the youth be tried as an adult,  based on factors such as the gravity of the  offence,  prior  criminal  record,  age  of  the  youth etc.

iv.Blended  Sentencing:  A  juvenile  court  may  sentence  a  convicted  juvenile  offender  to  both  a  juvenile  sentence  and  an  adult  sentence.  The  adult  sentence  is  suspended  on  the  condition  that  the  juvenile  offender  successfully  completes  the  term  of  the  juvenile  disposition  and  refrains  from  committing  any  new  offence.  For  example,  juvenile  courts  in  the  State  of  Texas  may  award up to 40 years’ sentence to offenders.

The trial procedure and sentencing principles applicable to  

adults  are  equally  applicable  in  case  a  person  under  18  

years  is  transferred  to  an  adult  criminal  court.  Juveniles  

cannot,  however,  be  sentenced  to  death  (Roper  v.  

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Simmons8)  or  imprisoned  for  life  without  possibility  of  

parole (Graham v. Florida9).

D - BRAZIL

33. The  Statute  of  the  Child  and  the  Adolescent,  1990,  

enacted in compliance with the CRC, treats persons below  

18 years (but above 12 years) as adolescents. ‘Councils of  

Guardianship’,  municipal  tribunals  comprising  five  locally  

elected members, deal with cases involving preadolescents  

(younger children). Juvenile Courts deal with cases involving  

older children. Confinement and incarceration are reserved  

for older youths up to the age of 21 years.

E - BANGLADESH

34. The  minimum  age  of  criminal  responsibility  in  

Bangladesh is  9 years (raised from 7 years in 2004). The  

Children Act, 1974 defines a child and youthful offender as  

one  below  16  years of  age.  The  Act  provides  for  the  

establishment of Juvenile Courts with exclusive jurisdiction to  

try youthful  offenders  (Section 13,  Children Act).  Ordinary  8 543 US 551 (2005) 9 560 US 48 (2010)

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criminal courts may act as Juvenile Courts if the latter are  

not  established.  Procedure  under  the  Criminal  Procedure  

Code,  1898 is  followed. Section 51 prohibits the award of  

death  sentence,  imprisonment  and  transportation  to  a  

youthful  offender.  The proviso to this  section provides for  

situations (serious crimes or where the juvenile is so unruly  

or  depraved)  permitting  the  Court  to  sentence  him  to  

imprisonment. However, the period of imprisonment cannot  

exceed  the  period  of  maximum punishment  for  adults.  It  

appears  that  life  imprisonment  may  be  awarded  in  these  

exceptional cases to juveniles.

F - AFGHANISTAN

35. The Juvenile  Code sets  the  minimum age of  criminal  

responsibility  at  12 years.  A child is  defined as a person  

below 18 years of age. Trial of children in conflict with the  

law  is  conducted  by  dedicated  Juvenile  Courts.  Juvenile  

offenders are prosecuted by special ‘Juvenile Prosecutors’.

Sentences  of  death  and  life  imprisonment  cannot  be  

awarded  to  juveniles.  For  juveniles  aged  between  12-16  

years,  1/3rd of  the maximum punishment to adults can be  4

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awarded. For juveniles aged between 16-18 years, ½ of the  

maximum punishment to adults can be awarded.

G - BHUTAN

36. The minimum age of criminal responsibility is 10 years.  

Although not expressly defined, a juvenile is understood as a  

person below 18 years of age. Bhutan does not possess a  

special legislation dealing with juvenile offenders; there are  

no specialized Juvenile courts either. Section 213 of the Civil  

and  Criminal  Procedure  Code  has  certain  provisions  

regulating the trial of a juvenile offender. Persons below 18  

years can be awarded half of the adult sentence.

H - NEPAL

37. The minimum age of criminal responsibility is 10 years.  

A child is  a person below  16 years.  Youth between 16-18  

years are charged and tried as adults.

38. The  next significant  aspect  of  the  case  that  would  

require to be highlighted is  the differences in the juvenile  

justice system and the criminal  justice system working  in  

India.  This would have relevance to the arguments made in  4

Page 44

W.P. No.204 of 2013.   It may be convenient to notice the  

differences by means of the narration set out hereinunder:

Pre-trial Processes

Filing of FIR:

Criminal Justice System: The system swings into action  

upon receipt of information (oral or written) by the officer in  

charge of a police station with regard to the commission of a  

cognizable offence.

JJ System: Rule 11(11) of the JJ Rules, 2007 states that  

the Police are not required to file an FIR or a charge-sheet  

while dealing with cases of juveniles in conflict with the law.  

Instead, they must only record the information of the offence  

in the general daily diary, followed by a report containing the  

social  background  of  the  juvenile,  circumstances  of  the  

apprehension and the alleged offence.

An FIR is necessary only if the juvenile has (i) allegedly  

committed a serious offence like rape or murder, or (ii) has  

allegedly committed the offence with an adult.

Investigation and Inquiry:

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Criminal Justice System: Ss.  156 and 157, CrPC deals  

with  the  power  and  procedure  of  police  to  investigate  

cognizable offences. The police may examine witnesses and  

record their statements. On completion of the investigation,  

the police officer is required to submit a Final Report to the  

Magistrate u/s 173(2).

JJ  System:  The  system  contemplates  the  immediate  

production of the apprehended juvenile before the JJ Board,  

with  little  scope  for  police  investigation.  Before  the  first  

hearing, the police is only required to submit a report of the  

juvenile’s  social  background,  the  circumstances  of  

apprehension  and  the  alleged  offence  to  the  Board  (Rule  

11(11)).  In  cases  of  a  non-serious  nature,  or  where  

apprehension of the juvenile is  not in the interests of the  

child,  the  police  are  required  to  intimate  his  

parents/guardian that the details of his alleged offence and  

his  social  background  have  been  submitted  to  the  Board  

(Rule 11(9)).

Arrest

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Criminal  Justice System: Arrest  of  accused persons is  

regulated  under  Chapter  V  of  the  CrPC.  The  police  are  

empowered to arrest a person who has been accused of a  

cognizable offence if the crime was committed in an officer’s  

presence   or  the  police  officer  possesses  a  reasonable  

suspicion  that  the  crime  was  committed  by  the  accused.  

Further,  arrest  may be necessary  to  prevent  such  person  

from  committing  a  further  crime;  from  causing  

disappearance or tampering with evidence  and for proper  

investigation  (S.41).  Persons  accused  of  a  non-cognizable  

offence  may  be  arrested  only  with  a  warrant  from  a  

Magistrate (S.41(2)).  

JJ System: The JJ Rules provide that a juvenile in conflict  

with  the  law  need  not  be  apprehended  except  in  serious  

offences entailing adult  punishment  of  over  7  years (Rule  

11(7)).  As  soon  as  a  juvenile  in  conflict  with  the  law  is  

apprehended,  the  police  must  inform  the  designated  

Child/Juvenile  Welfare  Officer,  the  parents/guardian  of  the  

juvenile,  and  the  concerned  Probation  Officer  (for  the  

purpose of the social background report) (S.13 & R.11(1)).  

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The juvenile so apprehended is placed in the charge of the  

Welfare Officer. It is the Welfare Officer’s duty to produce  

the juvenile before the Board within 24 hours (S. 10 & Rule  

11(2)).  In no case can the police send the juvenile to  

lock up or jail, or delay the transfer of his charge to the  

Welfare Officer (proviso to S.10 & R.11(3)).

Bail

Criminal  Justice  System:  Chapter  XXXIII  of  the  CrPC  

provides for bails and bonds. Bail may be granted in cases of  

bailable  and  non-bailable  offences  in  accordance  with  Ss.  

436 and 437 of the CrPC. Bail in non-bailable offences may  

be refused if there are reasonable grounds for believing that  

the person is guilty of an offence punishable with death or  

imprisonment  for  life,  or  if  he  has  a  criminal  history  

(S.437(1)).

JJ System: A juvenile who is accused of a bailable or non-

bailable offence “shall” be released on bail or placed under  

the care of a suitable person/institution. This is subject to  

three exceptions: (i) where his release would bring him into  

association  with  a  known  criminal,  (ii)  where  his  release  

would  expose  him  to  moral,  physical  or  psychological  4

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danger, or (iii) where his release would defeat the ends of  

justice. Even where bail is refused, the juvenile is to be kept  

in an observation home or a place of safety (and not jail).

Trial and Adjudication

The  trial  of  an  accused  under  the  criminal  justice  

system  is  governed  by  a  well  laid  down  procedure  the  

essence of which is clarity of the charge brought against the  

accused; the duty of the prosecution to prove the charge by  

reliable  and  legal  evidence  and  the  presumption  of  

innocence of the accused.  Culpability is to be determined on  

the  touchstone  of  proof  beyond  reasonable  doubt  but  if  

convicted,  punishment  as  provided  for  is  required  to  be  

inflicted with little or no exception.  The accused is entitled  

to  seek  an  exoneration  from  the  charge(s)  levelled  i.e.  

discharge (amounting to an acquittal) mid course.

JJ  System:  Under  S.14,  whenever  a  juvenile  charged  

with  an  offence is  brought  before  the  JJ  Board,  the  latter  

must conduct an ‘inquiry’ under the JJ Act. A juvenile cannot  

be tried with an adult (S.18).

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Determination of the age of the juvenile is required to  

be  made on the basis  of  documentary  evidence (such as  

birth certificate,  matriculation certificate,  or Medical  Board  

examination).

The Board is expected to conclude the inquiry as soon  

as  possible  under  R.13.  Further,  the  Board  is  required  to  

satisfy itself that the juvenile has not been tortured by the  

police or any other person and to take steps if ill-treatment  

has  occurred.  Proceedings  must  be  conducted  in  the  

simplest  manner and a child-friendly atmosphere must be  

maintained (R.13(2)(b)),  and the juvenile must be given a  

right  to  be  heard  (clause  (c)).  The  inquiry  is  not  to  be  

conducted in the spirit of adversarial proceedings, a fact that  

the  Board  is  expected  to  keep  in  mind  even  in  the  

examination of witnesses (R.13(3)). R.13(4) provides that the  

Board must try to put the juvenile at ease while examining  

him and recording his statement; the Board must encourage  

him to speak without fear not only of the circumstances of  

the  alleged  offence  but  also  his  home  and  social  

surroundings.  Since  the  ultimate  object  of  the  Act  is  the  

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rehabilitation  of  the  juvenile,  the  Board  is  not  merely  

concerned  with  the  allegations  of  the  crime  but  also  the  

underlying social causes for the same in order to effectively  

deal with such causes.

The Board  may dispense with  the  attendance  of  the  

juvenile during the inquiry, if thought fit (S. 47). Before the  

Board  concludes  on  the  juvenile’s  involvement,  it  must  

consider  the  social  investigation  report  prepared  by  the  

Welfare Officer (R.15(2)).

The  inquiry  must  not  prolong  beyond  four  months  

unless the Board extends the period for special reasons due  

to the circumstances of the case. In all non-serious crimes,  

delay  of  more  than  6  months  will  terminate  the  trial  

(R.13(7)).

Sentencing  :   The Board is empowered to pass one of the  

seven  dispositional  orders  u/s  15  of  the  JJ  Act:  

advice/admonition,  group  counseling,  community  service,  

payment of fine, release on probation of good conduct and  

placing the juvenile under the care of parent or guardian or a  

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suitable institution, or sent to a Special home for 3 years or  

less. Where a juvenile commits a serious offence, the Board  

must report the matter to the State Govt. who may keep the  

juvenile in a place of Safety for not more than 3 years. A  

juvenile cannot be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.

Post-trial Processes

JJ System: No disqualification attaches to a juvenile who  

is found to have committed an offence. The records of his  

case are removed after the expiry of period of appeal or a  

reasonable period.

S. 40 of the JJ Act provides that the rehabilitation and  

social reintegration of the juvenile begins during his stay in a  

children’s home or special home. “After-care organizations”  

recognized  by  the  State  Govt.  conduct  programmes for  

taking  care  of  juveniles  who  have  left  special  homes  to  

enable them to lead honest, industrious and useful lives.

Differences  between  JJ  System and  Criminal  Justice  System

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1. FIR  and  charge-sheet  in  respect  of  juvenile  offenders is filed only in ‘serious cases’, where  adult punishment exceeds 7 years.

2. A  juvenile  in  conflict  with  the  law  is  not  “arrested”,  but  “apprehended”,  and  only  in  case of allegations of a serious crime.

3. Once  apprehended,  the  police  must  immediately place such juvenile under the care  of a Welfare Officer, whose duty is to produce  the juvenile before the Board. Thus, the police  do not retain pre-trial custody over the juvenile.

4. Under  no circumstances is  the juvenile  to  be  detained  in  a  jail  or  police  lock-up,  whether  before, during or after the Board inquiry.

5. Grant of Bail to juveniles in conflict with the law  is the Rule.

6. The JJ board conducts a child-friendly “inquiry”  and not an adversarial trial. This is not to say  that  the  nature  of  the  inquiry  is  non- adversarial,  since  both  prosecution  and  defence submit their cases. Instead, the nature  of  the  proceedings  acquires  a  child-friendly  colour.

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7. The emphasis of criminal  trials is  to record a  finding  on  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  accused. In case of established guilt, the prime  object  of  sentencing  is  to  punish  a  guilty  offender. The emphasis of juvenile ‘inquiry’ is  to find the guilt/innocence of the juvenile  and  to investigate the underlying social or familial  causes of the alleged crime. Thus, the aim of  juvenile  sentencing  is  to  reform  and  rehabilitate the errant juvenile.

8. The  adult  criminal  system  does  not  regulate  the  activities  of  the  offender  once  s/he  has  served the sentence. Since the JJ system seeks  to  reform  and  rehabilitate  the  juvenile,  it  establishes post-trial  avenues for  the juvenile  to make an honest living.

39. Having laid bare all  that is necessary for a purposive  

adjudication of the issues that have been raised by the rival  

camps we may now proceed to examine the same.

The  Act,  as  manifestly  clear  from  the  Statement  of  

Objects  and  Reasons,  has  been  enacted  to  give  full  and  

complete  effect  to  the  country’s  international  obligations  

arising from India being a signatory to the three separate  

conventions  delineated  hereinbefore,  namely,  the  Beijing  

Rules,  the  UN  Convention  and  the  Havana  Rules.  5

Page 54

Notwithstanding the avowed object of the Act and other such  

enactments  to  further  the  country’s  international  

commitments,  all  of  such  laws  must  necessarily  have  to  

conform to the requirements of a valid legislation judged in  

the context of the relevant constitutional provisions and the  

judicial verdicts rendered from time to time.  Also, that the  

Act  is  a  beneficial  piece of  legislation and must therefore  

receive its due interpretation as a legislation belonging to  

the  said  category  has  been  laid  down  by  a  Constitution  

Bench  of  this  Court  in  Pratap  Singh  vs.   State  of  

Jharkhand and Another10.  In other words, the Act must be  

interpreted  and  understood  to  advance  the  cause  of  the  

legislation  and  to  confer  the  benefits  of  the  provisions  

thereof to the category of persons for whom the legislation  

has been made.

40. Dr.  Swamy at  the  outset  has  urged that  there  is  no  

attempt on his part to challenge the constitutional validity of  

the  Act,  particularly,  the  provisions  contained  in  Sections  

2(k) and 2(l) of the Act and what he seeks is a mere reading  

down of the Act.  It is not very difficult to understand the  10 (2005) 3 SCC 551

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reason  for  the  argument;  Dr.  Swamy  seeks  to  overcome  

what  he  perceives  to  be  a  bar  to  a  direct  challenge  on  

account of the decision of this Court in  Salil Bali (supra).  

But if the argument advanced if is to be carried to the fullest  

extent the implication is obvious.  If the Act is not to be read  

down,  as  urged,  it  will  stand  invalidated  on  grounds  of  

unconstitutionality.   The argument,  therefore,  is  really the  

other  side  of  the  same coin  which  has  been  cast  by  Dr.  

Hingorani  who  is  more  forthright  in  his  challenge  to  the  

validity  of  the  Act  on  the  twin  grounds  already  noticed,  

namely, that the Act would result in over-classification if all  

juveniles, irrespective of the level of mental maturity, are to  

be grouped in one class and on the further ground that the  

Act replaces the criminal justice system in the country and  

therefore derogates a basic feature of the Constitution.  If  

the arguments are to be understood and examined from the  

aforesaid perspective, the conclusion is obvious – what the  

Court is required to consider, apart from the incidental and  

side  issues  which  would  not  be  of  much  significance,  is  

whether the Act would survive the test of constitutionality if  

the same is not to be read and understood in the manner  5

Page 56

urged.   Of  course,  if  the  constitutionality  of  the  Act  is  to  

become suspect, the further question, as we have already  

indicated, is what should be the course of action that would  

be open to this Coordinate Bench in view of the decision in  

Salil Bali (supra).   

41. Dr. Swamy would urge that the relevant provisions of  

the Act i.e. Sections 1(4), 2(k), 2(l) and 7 must be read to  

mean that juveniles (children below the age of 18) who are  

intellectually,  emotionally  and mentally  mature  enough to  

understand  the  implications  of  their  acts  and  who  have  

committed serious crimes do not come under the purview of  

the Act.  Such juveniles are liable to be dealt with under the  

penal  law of  the  country  and by  the  regular  hierarchy  of  

courts  under  the  criminal  justice  system  administered  in  

India.  This is what was intended by the legislature; a plain  

reading, though, shows an unintended omission which must  

be made up or furnished by the Court.  It is further urged  

that if the Act is not read in the above manner the fall out  

would render the same in breach of Article 14 as inasmuch  

as in that event there would be a blanket/flat categorisation  

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of all  juveniles,  regardless of  their  mental  and intellectual  

maturity,  committing  any  offence,  regardless  of  its  

seriousness,  in  one  homogenous  block  in  spite  of  their  

striking  dissimilarities.   This,  Dr.  Swamy  contends,  is  a  

classification  beyond  what  would  be  permissible  under  

Article 14 in as much as the result of such classification does  

not further the targeted object i.e. to confer the benefits of  

the  Act  to  persons  below  18  who  are  not  criminally  

responsible  in  view  of  the  low  level  of  mental  maturity  

reached  or  achieved.   This,  in  substance,  is  also  the  

argument of Dr. Hingorani, who, in addition, has contended  

that  the  Act  replaces  the  criminal   justice  system of  the  

country by a scheme which is not even a poor substitute.  

The  substituted  scheme  does  not  even  remotely  fit  with  

constitutional  tapestry  woven  by  certain  basic  features  

namely the existence of a criminal justice system.   

42. Reading  down the  provisions  of  a  statute  cannot  be  

resorted  to  when  the  meaning  thereof  is  plain  and  

unambiguous  and  the  legislative  intent  is  clear.   The  

fundamental principle of the “reading down” doctrine can be  

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summarized  as  follows.   Courts  must  read  the  legislation  

literally  in  the  first  instance.   If  on  such  reading  and  

understanding  the  vice  of  unconstitutionality  is  attracted,  

the  courts  must  explore  whether  there  has  been  an  

unintended legislative omission.  If such an intendment can  

be  reasonably  implied  without  undertaking  what,  

unmistakably, would be a legislative exercise, the Act may  

be read down to save it from unconstitutionality.  The above  

is  a  fairly  well  established  and  well  accepted  principle  of  

interpretation  which  having  been  reiterated  by  this  Court  

time and again would obviate the necessity of any recall of  

the huge number of precedents available except, perhaps,  

the view of Sawant, J.  (majority view) in  Delhi Transport  

Corporation vs. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and Others11  

which  succinctly  sums  up  the  position  is,  therefore,  

extracted below.

“255. It  is  thus  clear  that  the  doctrine  of   reading down or of recasting the statute can be   applied  in  limited  situations.  It  is  essentially   used,  firstly,  for  saving  a  statute  from  being  struck  down  on  account  of  its   unconstitutionality.  It  is  an  extension  of  the  principle  that  when  two  interpretations  are   

11 1991 Supp. (1) SCC 600  5

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possible — one rendering it constitutional and   the other making it unconstitutional, the former   should  be  preferred.  The  unconstitutionality   may spring from either the incompetence of the   legislature  to  enact  the  statute  or  from  its   violation  of  any  of  the  provisions  of  the   Constitution.  The  second  situation  which   summons its aid is where the provisions of the   statute  are  vague  and  ambiguous  and  it  is   possible  to  gather  the  intentions  of  the   legislature from the object of the statute,  the   context in which the provision occurs and the   purpose for  which it  is  made.  However,  when  the  provision  is  cast  in  a  definite  and  unambiguous  language  and  its  intention  is   clear,  it  is  not  permissible  either  to  mend  or   bend it even if such recasting is in accord with   good  reason  and  conscience.  In  such  circumstances, it is not possible for the court to   remake the statute. Its only duty is to strike it   down  and  leave  it  to  the  legislature  if  it  so   desires,  to  amend  it.  What  is  further,  if  the   remaking of the statute by the courts is to lead   to its distortion that course is to be scrupulously   avoided. One of the situations further where the   doctrine can never be called into play is where   the  statute  requires  extensive  additions  and  deletions. Not only it  is no part of the court’s   duty  to  undertake  such  exercise,  but  it  is   beyond its jurisdiction to do so.”

43. In  the  present  case  there  is  no  difficulty  in  

understanding the clear and unambiguous meaning of the  

different  provisions  of  the  Act.   There  is  no  ambiguity,  

muchless any uncertainty, in the language used to convey  

what the legislature had intended.  All persons below the age  

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of  18 are put  in  one class/group by the  Act  to  provide a  

separate scheme of investigation, trial and punishment for  

offences committed by them.  A class of persons is sought to  

be created who are treated differently.  This is being done to  

further/effectuate the views  of the international community  

which India has shared by being a signatory to the several  

conventions and treaties already referred to.

44. Classification  or  categorization  need  not  be  the  

outcome of a mathematical or arithmetical precision in the  

similarities of the persons included in a class and there may  

be  differences  amongst  the  members  included  within  a  

particular  class.   So  long  as  the  broad  features  of  the  

categorization are identifiable  and distinguishable  and the  

categorization made is reasonably connected with the object  

targeted, Article 14 will not forbid such a course of action.  If  

the inclusion of all under 18 into a class called ‘juveniles’ is  

understood in the above manner,  differences inter se and  

within  the  under  18  category  may  exist.  Article  14  will,  

however,  tolerate  the  said  position.   Precision  and  

arithmetical  accuracy  will  not  exist  in  any  categorization.  

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But  such  precision  and  accuracy  is  not  what  Article  14  

contemplates.  The above principles have been laid down by  

this  Court  in  a  plethora  of  judgments  and  an  illustrative  

reference to some may be made by recalling the decisions in  

Murthy  Match  Works  and  Others  vs.  The  Asstt.  

Collector of Central Excise and Another12, Roop Chand  

Adlakha and Others  vs.  Delhi Development Authority  

and  Others13,  Kartar  Singh  vs.  State  of  Punjab14,  

Basheer  alias  N.P.  Basheer  vs.State  of  Kerala15,  B.  

Manmad  Reddy   and  Others  vs.  Chandra  Prakash  

Reddy  and  Others16,  Transport  and  Dock  Workers  

Union and Others vs. Mumbai Port Trust and Another17  

.   

45. If  the  provisions  of  the  Act  clearly  indicate  the  

legislative intent in the light of the country’s international  

commitments  and  the  same  is  in  conformity  with  the  

constitutional requirements, it is not necessary for the Court  

to understand the legislation in any other manner.  In fact, if  12 (1974) 4 SCC 428 13 1989 Supp (1) SCC 116 14 (1994) 3 SCC 569 15 (2004) 3 SCC 609 16 (2010) 3 SCC 314  17 (2011) 2 SCC 575

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the Act is plainly read and understood, which we must do,  

the resultant effect thereof is wholly consistent with Article  

14.   The  Act,  therefore,  need  not  be  read  down,  as  

suggested, to save it from the vice of unconstitutionality for  

such unconstitutionality does not exist.   

46. That  in  certain  foreign  jurisdictions,  details  of  which  

have  been  mentioned  earlier  to  bring  about  clarity  and  

completeness to the issues arising, the position is otherwise  

would hardly be of any consequence so far as our country is  

concerned.  Contrary  international  opinion,  thinking  or  

practice, even if assumed, does not dictate the legislation of  

a sovereign nation.  If the legislature has adopted the age of  

18  as  the  dividing  line  between  juveniles  and  adults  and  

such a decision is constitutionally permissible the enquiry by  

the Courts must come to an end.  Even otherwise there is a  

considerable body of world opinion that all under 18 persons  

ought  to  be  treated  as  juveniles  and  separate  treatment  

ought to be meted out to them so far as offences committed  

by such persons are concerned.   The avowed object is  to  

ensure their rehabilitation in society and to enable the young  

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offenders to become useful members of the society in later  

years.  India has accepted the above position and legislative  

wisdom has led to the enactment of the JJ Act in its present  

form.   If  the  Act  has  treated  all  under  18  as  a  separate  

category for the purposes of  differential treatment so far as  

the commission of offences are concerned, we do not see  

how  the  contentions  advanced  by  the  petitioners  to  the  

contrary  on  the  strength  of  the  thinking  and  practices  in  

other jurisdictions can have any relevance.   

47. In  the  earlier  paragraphs  of  this  report  we  have  

analyzed in detail the difference between the criminal justice  

system and the system for dealing with offenders under the  

JJ  Act.   The  Act  does  not  do  away  or  obliterate  the  

enforcement  of  the  law  insofar  as  juvenile  offenders  are  

concerned.  The same penal law i.e. Indian Penal Code apply  

to  all  juveniles.   The  only  difference  is  that  a  different  

scheme for trial and punishment is introduced by the Act in  

place of the regular provisions under the Code of Criminal  

Procedure for trial of offenders and the punishments under  

the  Indian  Penal  Code.   The  above  situation  is  vastly  

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different from what was before the Court in  Mithu (supra)  

and  also  in  Dadu (supra).   In  Mithu (supra)  a  separate  

treatment of the accused found guilty of a second incident of  

murder during the currency of the sentence for an earlier  

offence of murder was held to be impermissible under Article  

14.   Besides  the  absence  of  any  judicial  discretion,  

whatsoever,  in  the matter  of  imposition of  sentence for  a  

second Act of murder was held to be “out of tune” with the  

constitutional philosophy of a fair, just and reasonable law.  

On the other hand in Dadu (supra), Section 32A of the NDPS  

Act which had ousted the jurisdiction of the Court to suspend  

a sentence awarded under the Act was read down to mean  

that the power of suspension, notwithstanding Section 32A  

of the NDPS Act, can still be exercised by the appellate court  

but subject to the conditions stipulated in Section 37 namely  

(i)  there  are  reasonable  grounds  for  believing  that  the  

accused is not guilty of such offence; and (ii) that he is not  

likely  to  commit  any  offence  while  on  bail  are  satisfied.  

Nothing as sweeping and as drastic in  Mithu  (supra) and  

Dadu (supra) has been introduced by the provisions of the  

Act so as to enable us to share the view expressed by Dr.  6

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Hingorani  that  the  Act  sets  at  naught  all  the  essential  

features  of  the  criminal  justice  system  and  introduces  a  

scheme  which  is  abhorrent  to  our  constitutional  values.  

Having  taken  the  above  view,  we  do  not  consider  it  

necessary to enter in the consequential arena, namely, the  

applicability  of  the  provisions  of  Article  20(3)  of  the  

Constitution  and  Section  300  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  

Procedure to the facts of the present case as on the view  

that we have taken no question of sending the juvenile –  

Raju to face a regular trial can and does arise.

48. Before parting, we would like to observe that elaborate  

statistics  have been laid  before us  to  show the extent  of  

serious crimes committed by juveniles and the increase in  

the rate of such crimes, of late.  We refuse to be tempted to  

enter into the said arena which is primarily for the legislature  

to consider.  Courts must take care not to express opinions  

on the sufficiency or adequacy of such figures and should  

confine its scrutiny to the legality and not the necessity of  

the law to be made or continued.  We would be justified to  

recall  the  observations  of  Justice  Krishna  Iyer  in  Murthy  

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March Works  (supra)  as  the  present  issues  seem to  be  

adequately taken care of by the same:

“13. Right  at  the  threshold  we  must  warn  ourselves of the limitations of judicial power in this   jurisdiction. Mr Justice Stone of the Supreme Court   of  the  United  States  has  delineated  these   limitations in  United States v.  Butler  (1936) 297  US 1 thus:

“The power of Courts to declare a statute   unconstitutional is subject to two guiding  principles of decision which ought never to   be absent from judicial consciousness. One   is that Courts are concerned only with the   power  to  enact  statutes,  not  with  their   wisdom.  The  other  is  that  while   unconstitutional exercise of power by the   executive and legislative branches of the   government is subject to judicial restraint,   the only check upon our exercise of power   is our own sense of self-restraint For the   removal  of  unwise laws from the statute   books appeal lies not to the Courts but to   the  ballot  and  to  the  processes  of   democratic Government.”

14. In short, unconstitutionality and not unwisdom  of  a  legislation  is  the  narrow  area  of  judicial   review. In the present case unconstitutionality is   alleged  as  springing  from  lugging  together  two   dissimilar categories of match manufacturers into   one compartment for like treatment.

15.  Certain  principles  which  bear  upon  classification  may  be  mentioned here.  It  is  true   that a State may classify persons and objects for   the purpose of legislation and pass laws for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  revenue  or  other  objects.   

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Every  differentiation is  not  a  discrimination.  But   classification can be sustained only if it is founded   on pertinent and real differences as distinguished   from  irrelevant  and  artificial  ones.  The  constitutional standard by which the sufficiency of   the  differentia  which  form  a  valid  basis  for   classification  may  be  measured,  has  been   repeatedly stated by the Courts.  If  it  rests on a   difference which bears a fair and just relation to   the  object  for  which  it  is  proposed,  it  is   constitutional.  To  put  it  differently,  the  means  must have nexus with the ends. Even so, a large   latitude is  allowed to  the State for  classification   upon a reasonable basis and what is reasonable is   a  question  of  practical  details  and  a  variety  of   factors  which  the  Court  will  be  reluctant  and   perhaps  ill-equipped  to  investigate.  In  this   imperfect world perfection even in grouping is an   ambition  hardly  ever  accomplished.  In  this   context,  we  have  to  remember  the  relationship   between the legislative and judicial  departments   of Government in the determination of the validity   of  classification.  Of  course,  in  the  last  analysis   Courts  possess  the  power  to  pronounce  on  the   constitutionality of the acts of the other branches   whether a classification is based upon substantial   differences  or  is  arbitrary,  fanciful  and   consequently  illegal.  At  the  same  time,  the   question of classification is primarily for legislative   judgment  and  ordinarily  does  not  become  a   judicial  question.  A  power  to  classify  being  extremely  broad  and  based  on  diverse   considerations  of  executive  pragmatism,  the   Judicature  cannot  rush  in  where  even  the   Legislature  warily  treads.  All  these  operational   restraints  on  judicial  power  must  weigh  more   emphatically where the subject is taxation.”

(Emphasis is ours)

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49. On the above note we deem it appropriate to part with  

the cases by dismissing the appeal filed by Dr. Subramanian  

Swamy and Others as well as the writ petition filed by the  

parents of the unfortunate victim of the crime.

...…………………………CJI. [P. SATHASIVAM]

.........………………………J. [RANJAN GOGOI]

…..........……………………J. [SHIVA KIRTI SINGH]

NEW DELHI, MARCH 28, 2014.

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