1    

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA    

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION       

Civil Appeal  No  11086   of  2018    

Dr RS Grewal & Ors      ..Appellants   

VERSUS  

Chander Parkash Soni & Anr    ..Respondents   

 With  

 Civil Appeal  No  11087   of  2018  

And with  

Civil Appeal  No 11088 of 2018  

J U D G M E N T  

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J  

1 This appeal arises from a judgment of a learned Single Judge of the High  

Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dated 21 January 2016 in a second  

appeal. The High Court reversed the judgment and the decree of the trial Court,  

which was confirmed in first appeal, by which a suit for possession of certain  

property in the occupation of the defendants as tenants had been decreed.   

REPORTABLE

2    

2 Dr Hira Singh was the owner of a residential house (shown in the site plan  

filed together with the suit) together with some shops constructed on property  

bearing Municipal No B-XX-69 (Old) 515 (New) at College Road, Civil Lines,  

Ludhiana.  The family pedigree is depicted below:  

Late Dr. Hira Singh  

(Died in 1945)  

         Late Lt. Col   

   Dr. Shiv Dev Singh Grewal               Late Dayawant Kaur    Late Dr. Shiv Dev Kaur   

         (Died on 14.08.1968)                    (Died in 1922)                        (issueless   widow)   

                                                              (Died on 15.02.1998)  

Late Dr. Jaswant Kaur   

(Died issueless)  

                                                                 Dr. R.S. Grewal  

   Late Dr. J.S. Grewal        (Issueless, widower)       (Died on 09.07.1993)  

        Dr. Gagandeep                   Ramandeep       Er. Amandeep  

On 16 September 1944, Dr Hira Singh executed a will by which he bequeathed  

his property to his son, Shiv Dev Singh Grewal, subject to a right of residence for  

his widowed daughter, Shiv Dev Kaur Grewal in the property situated at Civil  

Lines, Ludhiana.  The will contains the following recital:

3    

“I own a kothi on Iqbal Road opposite to Govt. College in Civil  

Lines. I have myself purchased its land and I also reside in  

this Kothi and some outer portion thereof has been given on  

rent.”  

The testator made a disposition in the following terms in favour of his son:  

“After my death, my son Shivdev Singh will be the absolute  

owner of my property, mentioned above, situate in village  

Gujarwal i.e. land and houses owned by me as well as the  

mortgaged land. My son Shivdev Singh will also be the owner  

of the money which is due to me.”  

The will adverted to the fact that some portion of the property at Civil Lines was in  

the occupation of tenants. According to the will, the rent recovered was to be  

spent for the education and maintenance of a young child - Shiv Charan Kaur,  

who was brought up by the testator. A life interest in the property at Civil Lines  

was created in favour of Shiv Dev Kaur, the daughter of the testator in the  

following terms:  

“My daughter Bibi Shivdev Kaur will get this Kothi situated on  

Iqbal Road till her life time subject to the abovesaid rights of  

Bibi Shiv Charan Kaur and that after my death Shivdev Kaur  

would be entitled to settle and reside in this Kothi as and  

when necessary and can spend the income from rent on  

herself. But these rights shall ensure to her till her life time.   

She will not be entitled to transfer or burden this Kothi along  

with the attached land nor could she mortgage, gift the same,  

nor could she sell or exchange it.  This Kothi shall also be the  

sole ownership of my son Shivdev Singh subject to the above  

mentioned rights. Through this will I appoint my aforesaid son  

Shivdev Singh as my executor but he shall act according to  

the recitals in this will and shall arrange for the maintenance  

and marriage of Bibi Shiv Charan Kaur and after recovering  

the rent of the concerned portion of the Kothi, he shall spend  

the same in accordance with the above mentioned  

directions.”  

4    

The testator’s son, who was a legatee under the will, was also appointed as an  

executor. The testator died in 1945. His son died on 14 August 1968. The first  

appellant is the grandson of the testator, while the second and third appellants  

are the sons of the first appellant.   

3 A suit for possession was instituted by the appellants and by proforma  

respondent no 2 against the first respondent in the Court of the Civil Judge,  

Senior Division, Ludhiana. The first respondent is a tenant inducted by Shiv Dev  

Kaur Grewal. The foundation of the suit was that Shiv Dev Kaur Grewal was only  

entitled to a life interest in the property in terms of the will executed by her father  

and upon her death the appellants were entitled to possession of the shop from  

the defendant. The plea that was set up in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the plaint was  

in the following terms:  

“14 That Dr Shivdev Kaur Grewal has died on 15.2.1998 and  

on her death her right to live in the main kothi alongwith right  

to utilize the usufruct of the main house and the shops came  

to an end.  The plaintiffs became entitled to the possession of  

the main house and the shops came to an end.  The plaintiffs  

became entitled to the possession of the main house as well  

as the shops on the main road being the owners of property  

No.B-XX 69 (od) 515(new), college road, civil lines, Ludhiana.  

15 That defendant claims that he has taken the shop in his  

possession on rent as a tenant from Dr Shivdev Kaur Grewal  

and as such refuses to vacate the shop and deliver its vacant  

possession to the plaintiffs who are the real owners.  The  

claim of the defendant is false.  Defendant has no right in  

shop and cannot claim himself to be a tenant. Dr Shivdev  

Kaur Grewal had no right to let out the property. She could  

only enjoy the usufruct of the main house.  In any case any  

tenancy is created by Dr Shivdev Kaur Grewal, that shall not  

bind the plaintiffs who are the absolute owners of the  

property. Without prejudice to the plea of the plaintiffs that Dr  

Shivdev Kaur Grewal could not let the property, it is submitted  

that even if any tenancy existed as being claimed by the  

defendant which had allegedly been created by Dr Shivdev  

Kaur Grewal, that comes to an end with the death of Dr

5    

Shivdev Kaur Grewal and the possession of the defendant is  

become unlawful only from date of death of Dr Shivdev Kaur  

and as such the defendant is not entitled to continue in  

occupation of shop as a tenant.  The alleged tenancy stood  

terminated and extinguished with the death of Dr Shivdev  

Kaur Grewal.  The plaintiffs being the lawful owners are  

entitled to possession of the shop. The plaintiffs are being  

denied possession of the shop by the defendant.”  

In the written statement, a plea was raised that Shiv Dev Kaur was not a limited  

owner of the property. Moreover, it was pleaded that the defendant was in  

occupation as a tenant and a suit for possession was not maintainable. Assuming  

that the appellants had become owners as alleged, it was contended that the  

tenancy shall stand attorned to them after the death of Shiv Dev Kaur. On these  

grounds, it was urged that the suit for possession was not maintainable.   

4 The suit for possession was decreed and the first appeal was dismissed.  

The basis of the decree for possession was that Shiv Dev Kaur had only a limited  

right in the property which had not converted into an absolute ownership and  

hence on her death the property would revert back to Dr Shiv Dev Singh. The  

judgment of the trial Court as confirmed in appeal was the subject matter of a  

second appeal before the High Court. The second appeal was admitted on the  

following substantial questions of law:  

1 Whether the defendants continue to be tenants even after  

the change of the ownership; and  

2 Whether the possession of the tenant becomes unlawful  

the moment there was a change of ownership.  

The High Court while setting aside the judgment of the first appellate Court held  

that Shiv Dev Kaur had created a tenancy in favour of the defendant and the

6    

relationship of landlord and tenant did not cease to exist on her death. The  

remedy of the appellants as owners was to seek eviction under prevailing rent  

control legislation and not by means of a suit for possession, treating the first  

respondent as trespasser. On this ground, the decree for possession was set  

aside, though with the observation that this would not preclude the appellants  

from seeking ejectment of the first respondent on any of the grounds available  

under the applicable rent control legislation.  

5 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submits that the life  

interest which was created in favour of the daughter of the testator was personal  

in nature. In a judgment inter partes rendered by this Court in Shivdev Kaur  

(Dead) by LRs v RS Grewal1, it has been held that the limited interest acquired  

by Shiv Dev Kaur during her life time under the will of the testator had not  

fructified into full ownership under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act  

1956.  This was because in terms of the exception contained in sub-section (2) of  

Section 14, Shiv Dev Kaur had acquired only a limited interest in the property of  

her father by virtue of the will. Learned counsel submitted that that in  

consequence, Shiv Dev Kaur enjoyed an interest that continued through her life  

time. It was urged that she was not entitled under the testamentary disposition of  

her father to create a tenancy in the property. In any event, any tenancy so  

created would have no existence after her life time, having due regard to the fact  

that the restricted interest which she acquired was personal to her. Finally, it was  

also urged that the shops were constructed by Shiv Dev Kaur after the execution  

                                                           1 (2013) 4 SCC 636

7    

of the will, as noticed by the High Court and that in consequence the creation of  

the tenancy had no legal effect.    

6 On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the first  

respondent submitted that though Shiv Dev Kaur had a life interest in the  

property, the will empowered her to create a tenancy.  The first respondent is a  

tenant protected under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949, having  

due regard to the definition of the expression ‘landlord’ in Section 2(c). It has  

been urged that the tenancy created by Shiv Dev Kaur does not come to an end  

and with her death, the tenant does not become a trespasser. Learned counsel  

submitted that the adjudication rendered by this Court in 2013 to the effect that  

Shiv Dev Kaur continued to have a restricted interest in the property does not  

render the answering respondent a trespasser.  In other words, it has been urged  

that the answering respondent being a tenant, a suit for possession was not  

maintainable and an order for eviction can only be obtained by resorting to the  

provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949.    

7 While dealing with the rival submissions it is necessary at the outset to  

clear the ground in regard to the nature of the interest which Shiv Dev Kaur  

obtained under the will executed by her father, Dr Hira Singh, on 16 September  

1944. This issue has been the subject of an adjudication by this Court in Shivdev  

Kaur (supra). A brief background of the circumstances leading up to the  

adjudication by this Court would be necessary. Shiv Dev Kaur, claiming rights  

under the will, instituted a suit against her nephew for a mandatory injunction  

seeking his eviction from the suit premises.  She asserted a right of absolute  

ownership by virtue of the provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act

8    

1956.  The suit was contested.  During the pendency of the suit the defendant  

instituted a suit against Shiv Dev Kaur for a permanent injunction restraining her  

from alienating the property. The trial Court held that Shiv Dev Kaur did not have  

absolute ownership over the property and that she was not entitled to interfere in  

respect of the agricultural lands and other property. The trail Court held that she  

could not be dispossessed from the suit premises, subject to the final decision of  

another suit. The appellate court confirmed the view that Shiv Dev Kaur did not  

have an absolute right of ownership. The High Court held against Shiv Dev Kaur  

in a second appeal. In appeal, this Court had to construe the provisions of  

Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act 1956. Section 14 reads thus:  

“10. Section 14 of the 1956 Act reads as under:  

14.Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property.—

(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether  

acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall  

be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited  

owner.  

***  

(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any  

property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other  

instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under  

an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument  

or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in  

such property.”  

(emphasis added)  

The aforesaid statutory provisions provide for conversion of  

life interest into absolute title on commencement of the 1956  

Act, however, sub-section (2) carves out an exception to the  

same as it provides that such right would not be conferred  

where a property is acquired by a Hindu female by way of gift  

or under a will or any other instrument prescribing a restricted  

estate in that property.”  

A two Judge Bench of this Court held that since Shiv Dev Kaur had acquired only  

a life interest under the will of her father, the provisions contained in sub-section  

(2) of Section 14 would apply and her restricted interest had not been crystallised

9    

into absolute ownership. Dr Justice BS Chauhan, J, speaking for the two Judge  

Bench held thus:  

“14. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue can be  

summarised to the effect that if a Hindu female has been  

given only a “life interest”, through will or gift or any other  

document referred to in Section 14 of the 1956 Act, the said  

rights would not stand crystallised into absolute ownership as  

interpreting the provisions to the effect that she would acquire  

absolute ownership/title into the property by virtue of the  

provisions of Section 14(1) of the 1956 Act, the provisions of  

Sections 14(2) and 30 of the 1956 Act would become otiose.  

Section 14(2) carves out an exception to the rule provided in  

sub-section (1) thereof, which clearly provides that if a  

property has been acquired by a Hindu female by a will or gift,  

giving her only a “life interest”, it would remain the same even  

after commencement of the 1956 Act, and such a Hindu  

female cannot acquire absolute title.”  

Hence, the concurrent finding that Shiv Dev Kaur did not acquire an absolute title  

was affirmed.  

8 The adjudication in the present case must hence proceed on the  

foundation that Shiv Dev Kaur had a life interest in the property.  

9 The essence of the submission of the appellants is that Shiv Dev Kaur  

having held a right which was personal in nature, she was not entitled to create a  

tenancy and, in any event, the tenant would cease to have a surviving interest in  

that character upon her death.  In this context, reliance was placed on the  

following observations contained in a decision of a Bench of two judges of this  

Court in Ranvir Dewan v Rashmi Khanna2 where, Justice AM Sapre explained  

the concept of a life interest in the following terms:  

                                                           2 (2018) 12 SCC 1

10    

“42.6 ... it is a settled principle of law that the “life interest”  

means an interest which determines on the termination of life.   

It is incapable of being transferred by such person to others  

being personal in nature.  Such person, therefore, could enjoy  

the “life interest” only during his/her lifetime which is  

extinguished on his/her death.”   

10  Now reading the will executed by Dr Hira Singh on 16 September 1944, it  

is evident that while his son Shiv Dev Singh Grewal was to be the absolute owner  

of his properties upon the death of the testator, a life interest was created in  

favour of Shiv Dev Kaur.  She was “entitled to settle and reside in this kothi as  

and when necessary” and “could spend the income from rent on herself” during  

her lifetime. However, she was not entitled to transfer, mortgage, sell or gift the  

property.  In consequence, the testator directed that his son would ensure that the  

rent that was recovered would be spent in accordance with the directions  

contained in the will. The testator’s priority was to ensure that following his death  

his widowed daughter had adequate financial means. Expenses for the repairing  

of the property and for the payment of land revenue were to be paid by Shiv Dev  

Kaur during her lifetime. The disposition specifically contemplated her entitlement  

to spend the income received by way of rent on herself. Creation of a tenancy  

was an incident of the life interest which she had. It was means of her generating  

rental income to sustain herself. This was authorised by the will.  

11 But the submission which has been urged on behalf of the appellants is  

that the life interest being personal to Shiv Dev Kaur, the tenancy which she  

created would stand terminated with her death.  In other words, according to the  

appellants, with the death of Shiv Dev Kaur, the first respondent became a

11    

trespasser on the property and was liable to be removed in consequence of the  

decree for possession.   

12 This submission cannot be accepted both as a matter of first principle and  

having regard to the precedent on the subject. The expression ‘landlord’ is  

defined in Section 2(c) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949 thus:  

“Sec.2 In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the  

subject or context, -  

***  

(c) ‘Landlord’ means any person for the time being entitled to  

receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether  

on his own account or on behalf, or for the benefit, of any  

other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or  

administrator for any other person, and includes a tenant who  

sublets any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter  

authorised, and every person, from time to time, deriving title  

under a landlord;”  

A landlord within the meaning of Section 2(c) is not necessarily the owner of the  

property.  The definition of the expression ‘landlord’ is relatable to an entitlement  

to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land. The inclusive definition of  

‘landlord’ under Section 2(c) would take in its sweep Shiv Dev Kaur who held a  

life interest in the property. This position in law has been explained in a decision  

of a two Judge Bench of this Court in KD Dewan v Harbhajan S Parihar3, where  

it was held thus:  

“8. A perusal of the provision, quoted above, shows that the  

following categories of persons fall within the meaning of  

landlord: (1) any person for the time being entitled to receive  

rent in respect of any building or rented land; (2) a trustee,  

guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other  

person; (3) a tenant who sub-lets any building or rented land  

                                                           3 (2002) 1 SCC 119

12    

in the manner authorised under the Act; and (4) every person  

from time to time deriving title under a landlord. Among these  

four categories of persons, brought within the meaning of  

“landlord”, Mr Sharma sought to derive support from the last  

category. Even so, that category refers to a person who  

derives his title under a landlord and not under an owner of a  

premises. For purposes of the said category the transferor of  

the title referred to therein must fall under any of the  

categories (1) to (3). To be a landlord within the meaning  

of clause (c) of Section 2 a person need not necessarily  

be the owner; in a vast majority of cases an owner will be  

a landlord but in many cases a person other than an  

owner may as well be a landlord. It may be that in a given  

case the landlord is also an owner but a landlord under  

the Act need not be the owner. It may be noted that for  

purposes of the act the legislature has made a distinction  

between an owner of a premises and a landlord. The Act  

deals with the rights and obligations of a landlord only as  

defined therein. Ownership of a premises is immaterial  

for purposes of the Act.”      (emphasis supplied)  

13 In B Bal Reddy v Teegala Narayana Reddy4, a three Judge Bench of this  

Court held that the interest of a protected tenant subsists so long as a protected  

tenancy has not been validly terminated. Moreover, even if the protected tenant  

has lost possession without a valid termination of that status, they would be  

entitled to the existence of protection under tenancy legislation. Justice UU Lalit,  

speaking for the Bench observed:  

“11. It is well settled that the interest of a protected tenant  

continues to be operative and subsisting so long as  

“protected tenancy” is not validly terminated. Even if such  

protected tenant has lost possession of the land in question,  

that by itself does not terminate the “protected tenancy”. The  

observations of the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High  

Court in Sada case [Sada v. Tehsildar, AIR 1988 AP 77 :  

(1987) 2 An LT 749 : 1987 SCC OnLine AP 187] were quoted  

with approval by this Court in Boddam Narsimha v. Hasan Ali  

Khan [Boddam Narsimha v. Hasan Ali Khan, (2007) 11 SCC  

410] are quite eloquent: (Sada case[Sada v. Tehsildar, AIR  

1988 AP 77 : (1987) 2 An LT 749 : 1987 SCC OnLine AP  

187] , SCC OnLine AP para 44)  

                                                           4 (2016) 15 SCC 102

13    

“44. In our view, this contention is not correct. If a protected  

tenant is already in physical possession on the date of  

notification there is no problem at all. If proceedings under  

Sections 19, 32 or 44 are pending, the date of vesting gets  

itself postponed. If the “protected tenancy” stood validly  

terminated by the date of notification under Sections 19, 32 or  

44, in that case, no certificate at all can be issued. But, as  

long as a person continued to be a “protected tenant” either  

under Sections 34, 37 or 37-A, as per the Act and has not lost  

that status, whether he is in actual possession or not on the  

date of notification, and is also to be “deemed” to be in  

possession under the first part of the Explanation subject to  

Section 32(7) and the proviso to Section 38-E(1), the  

ownership stands transferred straightaway to such protected  

tenant by the very force of Section 38-E(1). Further, Section  

38-E(2) read with the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area)  

Protected Tenants (Transfer of Ownership of Lands) Rules,  

1973 contemplates a full-fledged inquiry after notice to the  

landholders or after hearing objections of any other interested  

person (vide Rules 4 and 5). Once a certificate is issued, the  

same is, under Section 38-E(2), “conclusive evidence” of the  

ownership of the protected tenant, and cannot be defeated by  

the result of any inquiry under second part of the Explanation  

to Section 38-E. Another reason for this view is that the  

inquiry under Section 38-E(2) read with the 1973 Rules  

referred to above, is to be done by the Tribunal (the Revenue  

Divisional Officer) and obviously his decision to grant the  

ownership certificate will not and cannot be jeopardised by  

the result of any inquiry by a subordinate official like the  

Tahsildar, who deals with the granting of possession to a  

“protected tenant”.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

…   

In the absence of such valid termination of “protected  

tenancy”, the interest of such protected tenant continued to  

be operative and subsisting in law and could devolve on his  

legal heirs and representatives who could then claim  

restoration of possession.”  

The same view has been reiterated by a two Judge Bench in Nandkishor  

Savalaram Malu (Dead) through Legal Representatives v Hanumanmal G  

Biyani (Dead) through Legal Representatives5:  

                                                           5 (2017) 2 SCC 622

14    

“27. Once the tenancy is created either orally or in writing  

with respect to a land or building then it is always subject to  

the relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882  

(hereinafter referred to as “the TP Act”) and the State Rent  

Acts. Sections 105 to 111 of the TP Act provide certain  

safeguards, create some statutory rights, obligations, duties  

whereas the State Rent Acts, inter alia, specify the grounds to  

enable the lessor to evict the lessee/tenant from the demised  

premises.”  

In V. Dhanapal Chettiar v Yesodai Ammal6, a seven judge bench of this Court  

while considering state rent legislations, held thus:  

“6. … the tenant continues to be a tenant even though the  

contractual tenancy has been determined by giving of a valid  

notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act… in  

our opinion it will suffice to say that the various State Rent  

Control Acts make a serious encroachment in the field of  

freedom of contract. It does not permit the landlord to snap  

his relationship with the tenant merely by his act of serving a  

notice to quit on him. In spite of the notice, the law says that  

he continues to be a tenant and he does so enjoying all the  

rights of a lessee and is at the same time deemed to be under  

all the liabilities such as payment of rent, etc. in accordance  

with the law.”   

In Gian Devi v Jeevan Kumar7, a Constitution Bench of this Court dealt with the  

question of whether the rule of heritability extends to a statutory tenancy of  

commercial premises as much as it did to residential premises under the Delhi  

Rent Control Act 1958. The Court while holding this in the affirmative discussed  

the concept of statutory tenant and held thus:  

“2. … “Statutory tenant” is not an expression to be found in  

any provision of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 or the rent  

control legislation of any other State. It is an expression  

coined by the Judges in England and, like many other  

concepts in English law, it has been imported into the  

jurisprudence of this country and has become an expression  

of common use to denote a tenant whose contractual tenancy  

                                                           6 (1979) 4 SCC 214  7 (1985) 2 SCC 683

15    

has been determined but who is continuing in possession of  

the premises by virtue of the protection against eviction  

afforded to him by the rent control legislation. Though the  

expression “statutory tenant” has not been used in any rent  

control legislation the concept of statutory tenant finds  

recognition in almost every rent control legislation.  

15. … It is also important to note that notwithstanding the  

termination of the contractual tenancy by the landlord, the  

tenant is afforded protection against eviction and is permitted  

to continue to remain in possession even after the termination  

of the contractual tenancy by the Act in question and  

invariably by all the Rent Acts in force in various States so  

long as an order or decree for eviction against the tenant on  

any of the grounds specified in such Acts on the basis of  

which an order or decree for eviction against the tenant can  

be passed, is not passed.  

…  

31. … The termination of the contractual tenancy in view of  

the definition of tenant in the Act does not bring about any  

change in the status and legal position of the tenant, unless  

there are contrary provisions in the Act; and, the tenant  

notwithstanding the termination of tenancy does enjoy an  

estate or interest in the tenanted premises. This interest or  

estate which the tenant under the Act despite termination of  

the contractual tenancy continues to enjoy creates a heritable  

interest in the absence of any provision to the contrary…”  

We have relied on the above decision only for its explanation of the meaning of  

the concept of a statutory tenant.  

Speaking for the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Krishna Prosad v  

Sarajubala8, Bachawat, J observed thus:   

“… The Rent Control and the Tenancy Acts create a special  

world of their own. They speak of life after death. The  

statutory tenancy arises phoenix-like out of the ashes of the  

contractual tenancy. The contractual tenant may die but the  

statutory tenant may live long thereafter. The statutory tenant  

is an ex-tenant and yet he is a tenant…”  

                                                           8 AIR 1961 Cal 505. The above observation was also reiterated in Damadilal and Ors v Parashram  

and Ors ( 1976 ) 4 SCC 855

16    

14  The provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949 are  

available to the tenant. The tenant has a protected status. That status cannot be  

disrupted or brought to an end except on grounds specified in the enactment. The  

first respondent in whose favour the tenancy was created would be covered  

under the definition of the expression ‘tenant’ in Section 2(i)9 of the East Punjab  

Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949. The status of a statutory tenant enures as a  

consequence of rent control legislation. The East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction  

Act 1949 aims at regulating conditions of tenancy, controlling rents and  

preventing unreasonable eviction of tenants. For the advancement of these  

objects, tenants are invested with rights and landlords are subjected to  

obligations. The first respondent in whose favour a tenancy was created acquired  

a status of a statutory tenant and that status does not stand obviated by the death  

of Shiv Dev Kaur. The remedy available to the appellants to remove the first  

respondent from the property is by pursuing eviction proceedings on one or more  

of the grounds available in the enactment. Section 13 lays down the procedure for  

eviction of tenants. Only upon the satisfaction of the Controller that sufficient  

grounds exist for eviction of the tenant can an order be passed directing the  

tenant to vacate the premises. The protection offered to a statutory tenant can  

only be overcome by following the procedure laid out in the enactment.  

                                                           9 “Sec.2 In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, -  

***  

(i) "tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building or rented  land and includes a tenant continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour,  but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building or rented land by its tenant, unless  with the consent in writing of the landlord, or a person to whom the collection of rent or fees in a public  market, cart-stand or slaughter-house or of rents for shops has been farmed out or leased by a  municipal, town or notified area committee;“

17    

15 In Dahya Lala  v Rasul Mahomed Abdul Rahim10, a Constitution Bench  

of this Court dealt with a case where a mortgagee who was granted possession  

of land under a deed of mortgage had inducted a tenant on the land. The  

appellants as owners of the equity redemption applied under the Bombay  

Agricultural Debtors’ Relief Act 1947 for redemption of the mortgaged land.  An  

award was made on a compromise that the mortgagor was entitled to take  

possession from the tenant who had been inducted by the mortgagee. The tenant  

who was evicted applied for the restoration of possession under Section 29 of the  

Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948. The High Court upheld the  

plea on the ground that the tenant was entitled to continue in occupation on the  

same terms on which he was inducted by the mortgagee.  Assailing the judgment  

of the High Court it was contended by the appellants that a person could be said  

to lawfully cultivate land within the meaning of Section 4 only if he had derived his  

right to cultivate directly from the owner of the land and not from some other  

person such as a mortgagee who had a limited interest in the land. Justice JC  

Shah, speaking for the Constitution Bench held that under the Transfer of  

Property Act 1882, the right of a tenant who is inducted by a mortgagee in  

possession ordinarily comes to an end with the redemption of the mortgage.  

However, that rule would have no application to the interpretation of a statute  

such as the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 which had been  

enacted with the object of protecting persons lawfully possessing agricultural  

lands.  This Court held:  

“7. …But a tenant of the mortgagee in possession is inducted  

on the land in the ordinary course of management under  

                                                           10 (1963) 3 SCR 1

18    

authority derived from the mortgagor and so long as the  

mortgage subsists, even under the ordinary law he is not  

liable to be evicted by the mortgagor. It appears that the  

legislature by restricting the exclusion to mortgagees in  

possession from the class of deemed tenants intended that  

the tenant lawfully inducted by the mortgagee shall on  

redemption of the mortgage be deemed to be tenant of the  

mortgagor. In our view, therefore, the High Court was right in  

holding that the respondent was entitled to claim the  

protection of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands  

Act, 1948 as a deemed tenant.”  

A similar view was held by a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in  

Jagan Nath v Mittar Sain11 where the High Court was dealing with the question  

of whether by virtue of a tenant executing a fresh rent note in favour of the  

mortgagee, the tenancy under the mortgagor comes to an end and a new tenancy  

comes into being under the mortgagee. The High Court held thus:  

“(3) That a tenant inducted by the mortgagee remains a  

tenant during the continuance of the mortgage and on the  

redemption of the mortgage, the tenancy comes to an end;  

(4) That in the case of agricultural tenancies, proposition No.  

(3) does not absolute hold good. There is an exception to it,  

namely, that the tenant of a mortgagee of agricultural land will  

continue to be its tenant even after redemption provided he  

has been inducted bona fide and in the like manner as a  

prudent owner would have done for the proper management  

of the land. Even in such a case, the operation of the lease  

cannot extend beyond the period for which it was granted. No  

lease can be granted if there is an express prohibition in the  

mortgage deed.”  

In G Ponniah Thevar v Nalleyam Perumal Pillai12, ‘A’ died leaving behind two  

widows. One of the widows instituted a suit for partition which ended in a  

compromise under which the other widow was given certain land for enjoyment  

                                                           11 1970 AIR (Punjab) 104  12 (1977) 1 SCC 500

19    

during her life time. During her life time she had inducted a tenant. The  

respondents filed a suit to evict the tenant on the ground that his tenancy rights  

did not enure beyond the life time of the widow. The High Court granted the  

decree for eviction. In appeal, this Court reversed the decree for eviction and  

construed the provisions of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act 1955. It  

held thus:    

“3. ...The Madras High Court had, apparently, followed certain  

decisions of that court which had applied the principle that a  

life-estate holder cannot create a tenancy which could last  

beyond the life of a life-estate holder. The view taken by the  

Madras High Court and applied to statutory tenancies runs  

counter not only to the principles underlying creation of  

statutory tenancy rights in agricultural land, throughout the  

length and breadth of the country, but, it seems to us to be  

obviously in conflict with the particular statutory protection  

conferred upon cultivating tenants in the State of Madras.  

These enactments are really meant for the purposes  

proclaimed by them. The obvious effect of such statutory  

provisions cannot be taken away or whittled down by forensic  

sophistry. Courts should not allow themselves to become  

tools for defeating clearly expressed statutory intentions.”  

A statutory protection granted for the benefit of the tenants under specific tenancy  

laws is to be viewed from a standpoint of protecting the interests of a particular  

class. Restrictions on recovery of possession of the premises let out to the  

tenants have been imposed for the benefit of the tenants as a matter of legislative  

policy.  

 16 There is a fallacy in the submission which was urged on behalf of the  

appellant.  The appellant postulates that a life interest is personal to the person  

who possesses it and the creation of a tenancy which will enure beyond her life  

amounts to a transfer of the life interest. What the submission overlooks is that the

20    

creation of the tenancy was an act of the person enjoying a life interest in the  

present case and was an incident of the authority of that individual to generate  

income from the property for her own sustenance. The creation of a tenancy is an  

incident of the exercise of such an authority.  The protection which is conferred  

upon the tenant against eviction, except on specified grounds, arises as a  

consequence of statutory prescription under rent control legislation.  The reason  

why the tenant is entitled to occupy the premises beyond the life time of the  

landlord who created the tenancy is simply as a result of a statutory enactment, in  

this case, the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act 1949. It is the intervention of a  

legislative mandate which enures to the benefit of the tenant.  Once this has taken  

place, it was not open to the civil court to entertain a suit for possession founded  

on the hypothesis that the tenant is a trespasser.   

17 In view of the above discussion, we have come to the conclusion that:  

(i) Shiv Dev Kaur was in terms of the will executed by her father, Dr Hira Singh on  

16 September 1944 entitled to a life interest in the property;  

(ii) Under the terms of the will, Shiv Dev Kaur was entitled to settle and reside in  

the property and benefit from the income arising out of the rent;  

(iii) The life estate granted to Shiv Dev Kaur enabled her to create a tenancy and  

receive the rent from the tenants on the property. She fulfilled the description of a  

‘landlord’ under Section 2(c) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949;  

(iv) The first respondent who was covered by the expression ‘tenant’ under  

Section 2(i) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949 acquired the  

character of a statutory tenant and was protected under it;

21    

(v) The statutory protection afforded to the tenant did not cease to exist upon the  

death of Shiv Dev Kaur;  

(vi) A suit for possession on the basis that the tenant was a trespasser after the  

death of Shiv Dev Kaur was not maintainable; and  

(vii) The remedy of the appellants was to pursue eviction proceedings on the  

grounds contemplated by the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949.  

18 For the above reasons, we are of the view that the judgment of the learned  

single Judge dated 21 January 2016 does not suffer from any error. The appeal  

shall accordingly stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.  

 Civil Appeal  Nos  11087 and 11088 of  2018      19 The appeals shall also stand dismissed in the same terms and with the  

same directions in Civil Appeal No 11086 of 2018.  

.....................................................J                     [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]        

.....................................................J              [Hemant Gupta]    New Delhi;  April  16, 2019