DR. KAZIMUNNISA (DEAD) BY LR. Vs ZAKIA SULTANA (DEAD) BY LR.
Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.K. AGRAWAL, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE
Judgment by: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE
Case number: C.A. No.-018783-018784 / 2017
Diary number: 931 / 2015
Advocates: EJAZ MAQBOOL Vs
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 18783-18784 OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) Nos.1401-1402/2015)
Dr.Kazimunnisa (Dead) By L.R. ...Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Zakia Sultana (Dead) By L.R.& Ors. ….Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1) Leave granted.
2) These appeals are filed against the final
judgment and order dated 17.09.2014 passed by
the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the
State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh
in Writ Petition No. 15055 of 2004 and Writ Petition
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No. 27567 of 2008 whereby the Division Bench
allowed Writ Petition No.15055 of 2004 by reversing
the judgment dated 16.06.2004 of the Special Court
in LGC No.41 of 1998 and dismissed Writ Petition
No. 27567 of 2008 while confirming the judgment
dated 23.10.2008 of the Special Court in LGC No.50
of 2004.
3) In order to appreciate the issues involved in
these two appeals, few relevant facts need mention.
4) The dispute in these appeals relate to land
bearing old Survey No. 129 (new Survey No. 358),
T.S. Nos.1/3 and 5/3 situated at Banjara Hills,
Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as the "suit
land”).
5) The questions, which broadly fall for
consideration in these appeals are, first, who is/are
the owner(s) of the suit land and, if so, on what
basis and of which portion and for how much area;
Second, who is/are in possession of the suit land
and of how much area and of which portion and
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since when and whether their possession has been
legal on such area and, if so, its basis and whether
they or any of them have, at any point of time,
encroached upon any parcel of suit land to the
detriment of its owner's interest and, if so, to what
extent, they encroached and since when ?
6) These questions have to be decided in the light
of the relevant provisions of The Andhra Pradesh
Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982(hereinafter
referred to as “the Act”).
7) Two cases were filed by the respondents
through power of attorney holder against the
appellant herein before the Special Court under
Section 8 of the Act for claiming possession of the
portion of the suit land.
8) One case was filed on 02.01.1998, i.e., (LGC
No.41/1998) whereas the other was filed on
15.04.2004,i.e.,(LGC No.50/2004). So far as LGC
No. 50/2004 is concerned, it was filed two months
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prior to the disposal of first case, i.e., LGC No.
41/1998.
9) So far as LGC No.41/1998 is concerned, it was
filed against Kazimmunisa (since dead and now
represented by her legal representative-appellant
herein) as non-applicant No. 1, District Collector,
Ranga Reddy District as non applicant No. 2 and
the Special Officer,Urban Land Ceiling, Hyderabad
as non applicant No. 3.
10) So far as LGC No. 50/2004 is concerned, it
was filed only against Kazimmunisa and her family
member as non-applicant No. 1 (now represented by
her legal representative).
11) In other words, in LGC No.50/2004, District
Collector, Ranga Reddy Dist. and Special Officer,
Urban Land Ceiling, Hyderabad were not impleaded
as non-applicants though both these State
authorities were impleaded in LGC No. 41/1998 as
non-applicant Nos. 2 and 3.
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12) So far as LGC No. 41/1998 is concerned, the
application was founded on the allegations that the
respondents are the owners of the suit land. The
respondents, in support of their claim of ownership
over the suit land traced their title through some
documents of title of their predecessor-in-title,
entries in the revenue records and other
documentary evidence and on the basis of these
documents, alleged that their title over the suit land
including portion of the suit land is prima facie
established as against the appellant.
13) The respondents then alleged that the original
appellant herein (non-applicant No. 1 in the case)
illegally and without any lawful title and authority
has encroached upon a portion of the suit land of
which the respondents are the owners and hence
under the provisions of the Act, the respondents
have become entitled to claim possession of the
illegally encroached portion of the suit land from the
appellant which essentially belonged to them.
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14) The appellant (non-applicant No. 1) denied the
respondents’ case and contended that, firstly, the
respondents are not the owners of the portion of the
suit land; Secondly and on the other hand, the
appellant is the lawful owner of portion of the suit
land; Thirdly, the appellant has been in lawful
possession of the said portion of the suit land as
owner thereof; Fourthly, the appellant has not
encroached upon any portion of the suit land as
alleged by the respondents. The
appellant(non-applicant No.1), in support of her
case, also filed documents of title, revenue entries
and other documents.
15) So far as the District Collector (non-applicant
No. 2) is concerned, he also filed the written
statement(counter affidavit) on behalf of the State.
He also denied the respondents’ claim including the
respondents’ title over the suit land. He found fault
in the title traced by the respondents’ over the suit
land and contended that the respondents have not
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been able to establish their prima facie title over the
suit land. He then alleged that the Government
record does not support the respondents’ case and
nor the facts stated in the application by the
respondents tracing their title tally with the
Government's record.
16) Parties then adduced evidence. The Special
Court, by order 16.06.2004, dismissed the
respondents’ application finding no merit therein.
17) So far as LGC No. 50/2004 is concerned, it
was in relation to another portion of the same suit
land. This application was also based on somewhat
identical averments on which LGC No. 41/1998 was
founded for claiming relief therein. The respondents,
as mentioned above in LGC 50/2004, impleaded
only the original appellant as non-applicant No.1
but neither impleaded the District Collector nor the
Special Officer Urban Land Ceiling, Hyderabad as
non-applicant along with the appellant.
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18) The original appellant herein filed written
statement in (LGC No. 50/2004) and denied the
respondents’ claim. She took the same defense,
which she had taken in LGC No. 41/1994 to prove
her ownership over the portion of the suit land. She
also raised the plea of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of
Civil Procedure 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the
Code”) and also raised the plea of limitation.
19) By order dated 23.10.2008, the Special Court
allowed this application (LGC No.50/2004) and held
that the applicants(respondents herein) are prima
facie the owners of the portion of the suit land,
which has been in possession of the appellant. It
was held that the original appellant herein was
neither able to rebut the case of respondents as per
Section 10 of the Act by proving their prima facie
legal title over the suit land nor legal possession
over the portion of the suit land and, therefore, she
is held as "land grabber" in relation to the land in
her possession under the Act and, hence, she is
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liable to restore the portion of the suit land which is
held to be in her illegal possession to the
applicants(respondents herein).
20) The appellant, felt aggrieved of the judgment of
the Special Court dated 23.10.2008 passed in LGC
No.50/2004, filed writ petition under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India whereas the respondents
felt aggrieved of the order dated 16.04.2004 passed
in LGC No. 41/1994 also filed writ petition in the
High Court.
21) The High Court clubbed both the writ
petitions. By common impugned judgment, the High
Court allowed the writ petition filed by the
respondents, set aside the judgment dated
16.04.2004 passed in LGC No.41/1994 and, in
consequence, allowed their application and, in
consequence, dismissed the writ petition filed by the
appellant against the judgment dated 23.10.2008
passed in LGC No. 50/2004 and affirmed the
judgment of Special Court dated 23.10.2008.
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22) The effect of the impugned judgment of the
High Court is that both LGCs, i.e., 41/1994 and
50/2004 filed by the respondents against the
appellant stand decreed in relation to the respective
suit land involved in both the applications and the
original appellant herein has to restore the
possession of the portion of the suit lands which is
in her possession to the respondents.
23) Felt aggrieved, the original appellant has
challenged the impugned common judgment of the
High Court by way of appeal by special leave before
this Court.
24) Heard Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned senior
counsel for the appellant and Mr. Basava Prabhu
Patil, learned senior counsel for respondent Nos.3,7
and 8, Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel
for respondent No.2 and Mr. P. Venkat Reddy,
learned counsel for respondent Nos.4 & 5.
25) Having heard the learned senior counsel for
the parties at length and on perusal of their written
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submissions and the record of the case, we are
inclined to allow the appeals in part and while
setting aside of the impugned judgment of the High
Court and also of the Special Court in both the
cases (L.G.C. Nos.41/1994 and 50/2004) remand
both the LGCs to Special Court for their disposal
afresh on merits in accordance with law as
indicated below.
26) In our considered opinion, the need to remand
the aforementioned two LGCs to the Special Court is
considered necessary due to the following reasons.
27) First, we find that the trial of the two cases
before the Special Court was not satisfactory
inasmuch as when admittedly two LGCs (41/1994
and 50/2004) arising between the same parties and
in relation to the same piece of suit land were filed
for grant of identical reliefs under the Act then, in
our view, both the cases should have been clubbed
together for their disposal on merits in accordance
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with law to avoid any conflicting decision in both
the cases.
28) It was more so when both the cases were
capable of being clubbed together because both
were pending though filed one after the other,
neither the parties nor the Courts below took note of
this with the result, the same resulted in passing
two conflicting orders - one was decreed and the
other suffered dismissal. This recourse adopted by
the Court below caused prejudice to the parties and,
especially, to the party who lost the case.
29) Indeed, in our view, this was an appropriate
case where the provisions of Order II Rule 3 of the
Code, which deals with joinder of causes of action,
could have been resorted to by the Court suo moto
for clubbing the two cases as the facts involved in
both the cases satisfied the attributes of Order II
Rule 3 of the Code.
30) Second, we find that the case which was filed
first,i.e.,(L.G.C.No.41/1994), the District Collector
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and the Special Officer, Urban Land Ceiling,
Hyderabad were rightly made parties
-non-applicants by the respondents whereas in
other case, i.e., (L.G.C. No.50/2004) filed
subsequently, both the State authorities were not
made parties for the reasons best known to the
respondents.
31) In our opinion, these two State authorities
should also have been arrayed as non-applicants in
the second case, i.e., LGC No. 50/2004 like the
earlier one to maintain parity in both the cases. The
parties so also the Courts below overlooked this
aspect though material for the proper disposal of
both the cases.
32) Third, we find that though the District
Collector filed his counter affidavit in first case (LGC
No.41/1994) in which he not only denied the
respondents’ title but also pointed out as to who
was the original owner of the suit land but neither
the respondents countered these averments nor the
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District Collector adduced any evidence to prove the
averments.
33) Similarly, no counter affidavit was filed in
second case (LGC 50/2004) by the District Collector
because he was not made party in the case. This
was another infirmity in the trial of both the cases,
which resulted in passing conflicting decisions in
both the cases.
34) This was neither noticed by the Special Court
nor High Court which resulted in recording
reversing finding on the same set of facts and
evidence.
35) Fourth, we also find that the issue of
maintainability of application and also issue of
limitation in filing the two applications by the
respondents under the Act should also have been
decided along with other issues.
36) Lastly, we find that the High Court while
reversing the findings of the Special Court decided
the writ petition under Article 227 like a first
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Appellate Court by appreciating the entire evidence
little realizing that the jurisdiction of the High Court
while deciding the writ Petition under Article 227 is
not akin to appeal and nor it can decide the writ
petition like an Appellate Court.
37) The writ petition, in our opinion, should have
been decided by the High Court keeping in view the
scope and ambit of Article 227 for its exercise as
explained by this Court consistently in series of
decisions while examining the legality and
correctness of judgment of Special Court impugned
in the writ petition.
38) In the light of aforementioned five reasons, we
have formed an opinion that the trial in both the
cases was unsatisfactory inasmuch as it caused
prejudice to the parties and especially to the one
who lost the case. It is for these reasons, we do not
consider it proper to probe at this stage the entire
factual issues argued by the learned counsel for the
parties at great length with reference to the
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pleadings and the evidence of the parties. We also
do not consider it proper to record any finding on
merits either way and leave the parties to contest
the case before the Special Court de novo on merits.
39) In view of foregoing discussion, the appeals
succeed and are allowed in part. The impugned
judgment as also that of the Special Court are set
aside.
40) As a consequence, both the cases, i.e., LGC
Nos.41/1994 and 50/2004 are restored to their
respective files before the Special Court. It is
directed that both the cases be clubbed together for
their disposal on merits. It is further directed that
the District Collector and the Special Officer, Urban
Land Ceiling, Hyderabad would also be made party
in LGC No.50/2004 as non-applicant Nos. 2 and 3
respectively. These two newly added non-applicants
in LGC No. 50/2004 are afforded an opportunity to
file their counter affidavits in LGC No.50/2004.
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41) All the parties in both the cases are also
afforded an opportunity to amend their pleadings in
case, if they so consider it proper and also file any
additional evidence both oral and documentary in
addition to what has already been filed in support of
their respective case, if they so desire to file.
42) After completion of the pleadings, if considered
necessary, the Court may also frame additional
issues or/and recast the issues already framed and
then decide both the cases by common judgment.
43) As mentioned above, the cases in question
arise out of the Act and hence the factual and legal
findings have to be rendered keeping in view the
relevant provisions of the Act as interpreted by this
Court in decided cases cited by the learned counsel
in support of their contentions.
44) We, however, make it clear that we have not
expressed any opinion on the merits of the case and
nor recorded any finding on the merits of the
controversy. The Special Court would, therefore,
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decide both the cases strictly in accordance with
law on merits without making any reference to the
order of the Special Court and High Court and
uninfluenced by any observations made by this
Court, High Court and Special Court, in any of their
judgments.
………...................................J. [R.K. AGRAWAL]
…...……..................................J. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
New Delhi; November 15, 2017
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