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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NOS. 25331-33 OF 2015

DNYANDEO SABAJI NAIK AND ANR        ..Petitioners

VERSUS

MRS.PRADNYA PRAKASH KHADEKAR  AND ORS                                ..Respondents  

J U D G M E N T

  Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J

1. The Special Leave Petitions in the present case arise from three

orders of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in a First Appeal:

(i) an order dated 22 November 2013 by which a year’s time was granted to the

petitioners (in terms as prayed) to vacate the premises which formed the subject

matter of a decree for eviction, until 30 November 2014;  

(ii) an order dated 2 December 2013 by which the High Court disposed of the

First Appeal in terms of the undertaking filed by the petitioners; and  

REPORTABLE  

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(iii)  an order dated 16 June 2015 by which the petition for review has been

dismissed.  There is a delay of 503 and 522 days respectively in the Special

Leave  Petitions  filed  against  the  orders  dated  2  December  2013  and  22

November 2013.  Since the petitioners moved the High Court in a petition for

review, we condone the delay and having heard counsel, proceed to dispose of

the Special Leave Petitions by this judgment.

2. The  subject  matter  of  the  dispute  comprises  of  commercial

premises bearing Shop No.8 A, Bhatia Bhuvan Ground Floor, D S Babrekar

Marg, Off Gokhale Road (North), Dadar, Mumbai  400 028.  The finding of fact

(as  will  be  elucidated  hereafter)  is  that  the  premises  were  granted  under  a

conducting  agreement  to  the  petitioners  for  carrying  on  the  business  of  a

laundry. The case of the original plaintiff who sued for possession was that the

premises were granted on the basis of a conducting agreement on 31 July 1968

on a royalty of Rs.260 per month.  The suit for eviction was filed against the

petitioners in the Court of Small Causes on 26 April 1984.  Initially, the  suit was

decreed  on  15  September  1999.  In  an  appeal  filed  by  the  petitioners,  the

appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court by a judgment dated 10 January

2002 held that since the petitioners were in occupation of the premises under a

conducting agreement, there was no relationship of licensor and licensee.  As a

result,   the  Court  of  Small  Causes  was  held  to  have  no  jurisdiction  under

Section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts’ Act.  The appeal against the

judgment and decree of the Trial Court was hence allowed. The judgment of the

appellate  Bench  was  questioned  in  a  Writ  Petition  filed  by  the

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predecessor-in-interest of the respondents.  The petition was dismissed by a

learned Single Judge of the High Court on 24 June 2002.

3. The respondents thereupon instituted a suit in the City Civil Court

for recovering possession of the premises.  The suit was decreed by a judgment

dated 5 May 2012.  The trial judge entered a finding of fact that the premises

had been given on a conducting basis.  In support of this finding, the trial Judge

adverted to the admission of the first defendant in certain proceedings which

were instituted before the Labour Court under the Payment of Wages Act to the

effect  that  the laundry had been taken over on a conducting basis from the

original Plaintiff.   The finding recorded by the trial judge was in the following

terms :

“The  question  to  be  considered  in  this  case  is  as  to whether  the  business  of  the  laundry  was  given  to  the defendant no.1 on conducting basis or not.  It is pertinent to note that the workers of the Kismet Laundry had filed case in the Labour Court under the Payment of Wages Act bearing Case nos.530 of 1974 and 531 of 1974 against the defendant  no.1  and  the  plaintiff.  In  that  case  defendant no.1 had given evidence.  He has admitted that he has taken  laundry  business  “Kismat  Laundry”  for  conducting the laundry business on 01/08/1968 on payment of royalty of  Rs.260/-  from  the  plaintiff.   In  his  cross-examination DW-1 Dnyandeo Sabaji  Naik  in  this  suit  admitted  about giving  deposition  in  the  labour  Court.  Thus,  from  the admissions of the defendant no.1 it is established that the original plaintiff had given laundry business on conducting basis  to  the  defendant  no.1.   In  his  cross-examination defendant  no.1  has  also  further  admitted  that stock-in-trade, furniture relating to the business were given to him and the royalty of Rs.260/- per month was fixed. He has also not disputed the receipts which were issued by the  plaintiff  accepting  of  payment  of  royalty  of  Rs.260/- from the defendant no.1 towards conducting his business. Moreover  the copy of  license issued under  the Bombay Shops  and  Establishment  Act  produced  in  the  Small Causes Court  relating  to  the business run  from the  suit

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premises has been admitted by the defendant no.1 in his evidence.  It  is  admitted that in the licence the name of business  of  Kismat  Laundry  managed  by  Bluestar  Art Dyers and Cleaners has been mentioned.  In the licence Narayan Narvakar was shown as the owner and Naik was shown as conductor of business.  Thus, on the basis of the documentary  evidence  and  on  the  admissions  of  the defendant no.1 it has been established by the plaintiffs that the  suit  premises  and  business  therein  was  given  on conducting basis to the defendant no.1.”

4. Against the judgment and order of the Trial Court, decreeing the

suit for possession, the petitioners filed a First Appeal.  On 22 November 2013,

the learned Single Judge of the High Court passed the following order in the

First Appeal :

“In this Appeal, after hearing the learned counsel for the Appellants  fully,  I  disclose  that  there  is  no  merit  in  the Appeal. However, as the Appellants have been conducting the  business  at  the  suit  premises  since  more  than  40 years, it  was suggested that some time can be given to Appellants  to  vacate  the  suit  premises.   The  learned counsel for the Appellants sought instructions and makes statement that the Appellants are ready to give undertaking that  they will  vacate the suit  premises on or before 30 th November, 2014.  The learned counsel for the Respondent Nos.1 and 3 submits that Appellants to disclose the names of all the occupants of the suit premises.

2. The learned counsel for the Respondents submits that if the Royalty of Rs.5,000/- per month as directed by this Court is continued to be paid till 30th November, 2014 and undertaking be given that Appellants will not alienate the property or create any third party right in any manner in the  suit  property  or  part  with  the  possession  of  the property, then the Respondents  are ready and willing to accept  the said undertaking and ready to  accommodate the Appellants by giving time to Appellants to vacate the suit premises.

3. In view of this development and submissions made by the learned counsel of both the sides, Appellants to give their  undertaking.  Stand over  to 29 th November, 2013 at 3.00 p.m.”   

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5. In pursuance of the above order, the petitioners filed undertakings

to vacate the premises on or before 30 November 2014.  The petitioners took

the benefit of the order of the High Court by which they were granted a year’s

time to vacate the premises.  The undertakings formed the basis of the order of

the learned Single Judge dated 2 December 2013 when the First Appeal was

disposed of.  The matter did not rest there.  An application for extension of time

to vacate the premises was filed before the High Court which was allowed by

the learned Single Judge in the following terms, by an order dated 5 December

2014 :

“Application  is  moved for  extension  of  time till  31st May, 2015  and  also  seeking  leave  to  deposit  the  rent  from September, 2014 onwards.  This Court by order dated 2nd December,  2013,  has  granted  time  to  the  applicant  to vacate the suit premises till 30th November, 2014.  Now the applicant seeks extension of time.  The learned counsel for the applicant submits that his daughter is doing her post graduation and the applicant wants some time to find out other  premises  for  their  laundry  business.  The  learned counsel  for  the  respondent  submits  that  the  applicants have  put  up  partition  in  the  suit  premises  and  abused respondent  when  they  went  to  take  possession  30th November, 2014 at 7.00 p.m. In view of the submissions, Civil  Application  is  disposed  of  by  passing  the  following order.

Order

i) Applicant shall vacate the premises and hand over possession of suit premises to respondent at 7.00 p.m. on 31st March, 2015.

ii) This  is  the  last  extension  and  hereafter  no extension will be given.

iii) Applicant to remove any construction i.e. partition if put up at the time of handing over possession.

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iv) The applicant shall give undertaking to that effect on or before 9th December, 2014.

v) The applicant is directed to deposit the arrears of rent from September, 2014 onwards till 31st March, 2015, on or before 17th December, 2014.”

6. By and as a result of the above order, the petitioners obtained an

extension of time until 31 March 2015 to vacate the premises. The petitioners

then  filed  a  Review  Petition  before  the  High  Court  on  17  March  2015.

Together with the Review Petition, the petitioners filed another application for

extension of time to vacate the premises by a further period of five years. The

learned Single Judge dismissed the Review Petition on 16 June 2015.   

7. The  petitioners  moved  this  Court  under  Article  136  of  the

Constitution.  On  28  August  2015,  notice  was  issued  in  the  application  for

condonation of delay as well as on the Special Leave Petitions and a stay of

dispossession  was  granted  conditional  on  the  petitioners  depositing  an

amount of Rs 15,000 towards compensation for using the premises with effect

from 1 December 2013.

8. The submission which has been urged on behalf of the petitioners

is that the learned Single Judge of the High Court was manifestly in error in

rejecting the First Appeal without reasons. It  was urged that the petitioners

would be entitled to assail the judgment and order dated 22 November 2013

on merits notwithstanding the fact that the petitioners had filed an undertaking

to vacate the premises by 30 November 2014. In support of the submission

reliance was placed on a judgment of this Court in P R Deshpande v. Maruti

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Balaram Haibatti1  to advance the submission that the filing of an undertaking

does not disentitle a litigant to question the legality of the judgment dismissing

the First Appeal.   

9. We are unable to accept the contention which has been advanced

on behalf of the petitioners.  The order of the High Court dated 22 November

2013 indicates that at the hearing of the First Appeal, the learned Single Judge

indicated to the petitioners that she found no substance in the First Appeal. At

this stage, counsel for the petitioners, upon seeking instructions, stated that

the  petitioners   would  be  willing  to  furnish  an  undertaking  to  vacate  the

premises by 30 November 2014.  The respondents acceded to this request

subject to the compensation being determined at Rs 5000 per month as was

directed by the High Court previously. The order of the High Court indicates

that the petitioners were granted a period of ten days even thereafter to reflect

upon the undertaking which they were to file and it was only on 2 December

2013  that  the  First  Appeal  was  eventually  disposed  of  in  terms  of  the

undertaking.   The  petitioners  sought  and  obtained  the  benefit  of  an  order

granting them a period of one year to vacate the premises. The matter did not

rest there. The petitioners moved the High Court again for extension of time

which was allowed to them by an order dated 5 December 2014.  The order of

the High Court indicates that the extension was sought on the ground that the

daughter of the applicant was pursing her post graduate studies and in order

to enable the petitioners “to find out other premises for their laundry business”.

1 [(1998) 6 SCC 507]

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This sequence of events leaves no manner of doubt that the undertaking was

not  called for  by the High Court  to secure the occupation of  the premises

during the period that the petitioner would have required to further assail the

order of the High Court in this Court.  The petitioners, on the contrary, clearly

indicated that they would rest content with a time of one year to vacate the

premises and in fact obtained a further extension of time of four months even

after the expiry of the initial term of one year.  

10. The judgment of this Court in P R Deshpande (supra) lays down

the following principle:

“11. A party to a lis can be asked to give an undertaking to  the  court  if  he  requires  stay  of  operation  of  the judgment.  It is done on the supposition that the order would remain unchanged.  By directing the party to give such an undertaking, no court can scuttle or foreclose a statutory  remedy  of  appeal  or  revision,  much  less  a constitutional  remedy.   If  the  order  is  reversed  or modified by the superior court or even the same court on  a  review, the  undertaking  given  by  the  party  will automatically  cease  to  operate.   Merely  because  a party  has  complied  with  the  directions  to  given  an undertaking as a condition for obtaining stay, he cannot be presumed to communicate to the other party that he is thereby giving up his statutory remedies to challenge the order.”

11. The above principle applies in a situation where an undertaking is

filed by a litigant, as a part of a condition for stay of operation of the judgment of

the High Court.  The filing of such an undertaking does not deprive the litigant of

the remedy to question the judgment of the High Court under Article 136 of the

Constitution.   Such a situation must,  however, be distinguished from a case

(such as the present) where a litigant rests content with seeking time to vacate

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the premises and the circumstances of the case indicate that the litigant did not

intend to pursue any further  remedy before this Court to assail the judgment of

the High Court.  Having furnished an unconditional undertaking to vacate the

premises, it would be manifestly an abuse of the process for the petitioners to

seek recourse to their remedies on the merits of the issues which arose in the

First Appeal.

12. This case indicates a blatant abuse of the process of the Court.

The petitioners not only took the benefit of an order of the High Court granting

them one year’s time to vacate the premises but obtained a further extension of

a period of four months to vacate.  The petitioners then filed a Review Petition

before the High Court  and moved another  application,  this  time seeking an

extension of five years to vacate the premises.  The time of the High Court and,

unfortunately, of this Court as well had to be devoted to a thoroughly frivolous

proceeding.  Learned counsel for the petitioners in fact sought to urge that as a

result of the judgment of the City Civil Court, the petitioners have been deprived

of establishing that their status as licensees fructified into a tenancy with effect

from 1 February 1973. Quite apart from the fact that such a plea would not be

open to the petitioners in the background of what has been observed earlier, we

find even on merits that the submission requires only be stated to be rejected.

We have extracted in the earlier part of this judgment the specific finding of the

Trial  Court  based  on  the  admissions  of  the  predecessor-in-interest  of  the

petitioners that the premises were granted to them on the basis of a conducting

agreement.  Besides this,  in  the earlier  proceeding that  was instituted in the

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Small Causes Court, it was found that the premises have been granted under a

conducting agreement and there was no relationship of licensor and licensee.

That being the position, the petitioners would not acquire status as tenants with

effect from 1 February 1973, there being no licence in their favour.  

13. This Court must view with disfavour any attempt by a litigant to

abuse the process. The sanctity of the judicial process will be seriously eroded

if such attempts are not dealt with firmly. A litigant who takes liberties with the

truth or with the procedures of the Court should be left in no doubt about the

consequences to follow. Others should not venture along the same path in the

hope or on a misplaced expectation of judicial leniency.  Exemplary costs are

inevitable, and even necessary, in order to ensure that in litigation, as in the law

which is practised in our country, there is no premium on the truth.   

14. Courts across the legal system - this Court not being an exception

– are choked with litigation. Frivolous and groundless filings constitute a serious

menace  to  the  administration  of  justice.  They  consume  time  and  clog  the

infrastructure.  Productive resources which should be deployed in the handling

of genuine causes are dissipated in attending to cases filed only to benefit from

delay, by prolonging dead issues and  pursuing worthless causes.  No litigant

can  have  a  vested  interest  in  delay.   Unfortunately,  as  the  present  case

exemplifies, the process of dispensing justice is misused by the unscrupulous to

the detriment  of  the legitimate.  The present  case is  an illustration of  how a

simple  issue  has  occupied  the  time  of  the  courts  and  of  how  successive

applications have been filed to  prolong the inevitable.  The person in whose

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favour the balance of justice lies has in the process been left in the lurch by

repeated attempts to revive a stale issue.  This tendency can be curbed only if

courts across the system adopt an institutional approach which penalizes such

behavior.   Liberal  access  to  justice  does  not  mean  access  to  chaos  and

indiscipline.  A strong message must be conveyed that courts of justice will not

be allowed to be disrupted by litigative strategies designed to profit from the

delays of the law.  Unless remedial action is taken by all courts here and now

our society will breed a legal culture based on evasion instead of abidance.  It is

the duty of every court to firmly deal with such situations.  The imposition of

exemplary costs is a necessary instrument which has to be deployed to weed

out, as well as to prevent the filing of frivolous cases.  It is only then that the

courts can set apart time to resolve genuine causes and answer the concerns of

those who are in need of justice. Imposition of real time costs is also necessary

to ensure that access to courts is available to citizens with genuine grievances.

Otherwise, the doors would be shut to legitimate causes simply by the weight of

undeserving cases which flood the system.  Such a situation cannot be allowed

to come to pass.  Hence it is not merely a matter of discretion but a duty and

obligation cast upon all courts to ensure that the legal system is not exploited by

those who use the forms of the law to defeat or delay justice. We commend all

courts to deal with frivolous filings in the same manner.

15. We accordingly  dismiss  the  Special  Leave  Petitions  but  while

doing so, direct that:

(i) the petitioners shall vacate the premises on or before 7 March 2017;

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(ii) In case the petitioners fail to vacate the premises by the date indicated

in (i) above, they shall expose themselves to civil and criminal consequences

under the law;  

(iii) the petitioners shall pay all arrears for use of the premises computed at

the rate fixed in the order of this Court dated 28 August 2015 within four weeks;

and  

(iv) the petitioners shall  pay costs quantified at  Rs 5 lakhs (Rupees five

lakhs) to the respondents within two months.

16. We also clarify that this judgment shall not affect the contempt

proceedings which have been initiated against the petitioners.

17. There shall be an order in these terms.  

...........................................CJI             [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR]

                                                   .............................................J              [Dr  D Y  CHANDRACHUD]

                                                   ….........................................J              [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL]

New Delhi; March 1, 2017