07 July 2014
Supreme Court
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DINESH TIWARI Vs STATE OF U.P.

Bench: SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA,V. GOPALA GOWDA
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001365-001365 / 2014
Diary number: 9291 / 2008
Advocates: KEDAR NATH TRIPATHY Vs PRASHANT CHAUDHARY


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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1365 OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) No.3051/2008)

DINESH TIWARI        … APPELLANT

Versus

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.        … RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.

Leave granted.    

2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order  

dated  11th December,  2007  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  

Judicature  at  Allahabad  in  Criminal  Miscellaneous  

Application No.26878 of 2007.  By the impugned judgment,  

the  High  Court  dismissed  the  application  filed  by  the  

appellant-accused  u/s  482  Cr.P.C  for  quashing  the  order  

dated 1st September, 2007 passed by the Additional Sessions  

Judge/F.T.C  No.3,  Basti  in  Sessions  Trial  No.207/07  in  

State  v.  Ram  Vijay  Yadav  etc.   By  the  said  order,  the  

Additional  Sessions  Judge  framed  the  charge  against  the

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appellant-accused for the offence u/s 302, 323, 504 and 506  

IPC.  

3. The factual matrix of the case is as under:

One Mahender Prasad Tiwari complainant lodged an FIR  

against  the present  appellant-Dinesh Tiwari,  Sadhu Saran  

and Ram Vijay Yadav for the offence u/s 302, 323, 504 and  

506  IPC  in  Police  Station  Mahuli,  District  Sant  Kabir  

Nagar.  It  was  registered  as  Crime  No.84/2006.  It  was  

alleged that the appellant along with Sadhu Saran committed  

murder  of  Arvind  Kumar  Tiwari  son  of  the  complainant.  

Reasons  for  enmity  and  detail  event  of  murder  were  

mentioned in the FIR.  

Police started the investigation but subsequently, on  

the  order  of  the  Government  the  investigation  was  

transferred to CBCID.  CBCID submitted charge sheet against  

Sadhu Saran Yadav co-accused for the offence u/s 302, 323,  

504 and 506 IPC. It was mentioned in the charge sheet that  

investigation shall continue against rest of the accused  

persons. The CJM took cognizance of the offence vide order  

dated 8th May, 2006.  The case was committed to the Court of  

Sessions and was registered as S.T. No. 149/2006 titled  

State v. Sadhu Saran Yadav. Thereafter, CBCID submitted the  

charge sheet against Ram Vijay Yadav for the offence u/s  

302, 323, 504 and 506 IPC and as against the appellant for

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the offence u/s 323, 504 and 506 IPC.  No charge sheet was  

submitted against the appellant for the offence u/s 302  

IPC. The cognizance was taken by CJM on charge sheet no.5A  

of 2006 on 23rd January, 2007.  Bail was granted to the  

appellant for the offence u/s 323, 504 and 506 IPC.  The  

case was committed to the Court of Sessions by the CJM  

after  taking  cognizance  and  the  Sessions  Court  framed  

charge against the appellant for the offence u/s 302 IPC,  

apart from Section 323, 504 and 506 IPC.

4. The aforesaid order was challenged by the appellant by  

filing criminal miscellaneous application u/s 482 Cr.P.C.  

for quashing the order framing the charge u/s 302 IPC. The  

High  Court  by  impugned  judgment  and  order  dated  11th  

December, 2007 dismissed the same.   

5. Counsel  for  the  appellant  has  made  the  following  

submissions:

(a) Appellant-accused was not given an opportunity  

of being heard before framing of the charge u/s 302  

IPC.

(b) Neither any charge sheet was submitted by the  

investigating agency against the appellant for the  

offence u/s 302 IPC nor any cognizance was taken by  

the  CJM  against  him  for  the  said  offence.  But  

Sessions Judge after committal framed the charge u/s  

302 IPC which was not permissible.

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6. Per  contra,  according  to  learned  counsel  for  the  

respondents, there is ample material on record to show  

that  the  appellant  along  with  Sadhu  Saran  committed  

murder of Arvind Kumar Tiwari son of the complainant and  

hence the Trial Court rightly framed the charge u/s 302  

IPC.  

7. Chapter XVIII of Cr.P.C. deals with “Trial before a  

Court of Session”.  As per Section 226, when the accused  

person  is  brought  before  the  Court  in  pursuance  of  a  

commitment  of  the  case  u/s  209,  the  prosecutor  is  

required  to  open  his  case  by  describing  the  charge  

brought against the accused and stating by what evidence  

he proposes to prove his guilt of the accused.  

8. Section  227  deals  with  Discharge  and  it  reads  as  

follows:

“227. Discharge.-If, upon consideration of the  record of the case and the documents submitted  therewith, and after hearing the submissions of  the accused and the prosecution in this behalf,  the  Judge  considers  that  there  is  not  sufficient  ground  for  proceeding  against  the  accused,  he  shall  discharge  the  accused  and  record his reasons for so doing.”

As per the aforesaid provision, upon consideration of  

the  records  of  the  case  and  the  documents  submitted  

before him and after hearing the submissions of the party  

accused  and  the  prosecution  if  the  Judge  is  of  the

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opinion that no sufficient ground is made out to proceed  

against  the  accused,  he  is  required  to  discharge  the  

accused and record his reasons for doing so.  

9. Section 228 relates to framing of charge as follows:

“228.Framing  of  charge.-(1),  If,  after  such  consideration  and  hearing  as  aforesaid,  the  Judge is of opinion that there is ground for  presuming  that  the  accused  has  committed  an  offence which-

(a) is  not  exclusively  triable  by  the  Court  of  Session,  he  may,  frame  a  charge  against  the  accused and, by order, transfer the case for  trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate (or any  other Judicial Magistrate of the first class  and  direct  the  accused  to  appear  before  the  Chief Judicial Magistrate, or, as the case may  be, the Judicial Magistrate of the first class,  on such date as he deems fit, and thereupon  such  Magistrate]  shall  try  the  offence  in  accordance with the procedure for the trial of  warrant-cases instituted on a police report;

(b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall  frame in writing a charge against the accused. (2)  Where  the  Judge  frames  any  charge  under  clause (b) of sub-section (1), the charge shall  be read and explained to the accused and the  accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty  of the offence charged or claims to be tried.”

From sub Section (1) of Section 228, it is clear that  

after  such  consideration  and  hearing,  as  given  under  

Section 227, if Judge forms an opinion that there is a  

ground for presuming that the accused has committed an  

offence, Judge may frame the charge(s).

From Section 228 it is clear that no separate hearing  

is required to be given for framing the charge if the

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accused  is  not  discharged  upon  consideration  of  the  

record of the case and documents and after hearing the  

submissions under Section 227.

10. Relative scope of Sections 227 and 228 Cr.P.C. was  

noticed and considered by this Court in  Amit Kapoor v.  

Ramesh Chander and another, (2012) 9 SCC 460.  This Court  

held as follows:

“17. Framing  of  a  charge  is  an  exercise  of  jurisdiction  by  the  trial  court  in  terms  of  Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is  discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under  both these provisions, the court is required to  consider the “record of the case” and documents  submitted  therewith  and,  after  hearing  the  parties, may either discharge the accused or  where  it  appears  to  the  court  and  in  its  opinion there is ground for presuming that the  accused  has  committed  an  offence,  it  shall  frame  the  charge.  Once  the  facts  and  ingredients  of  the  section  exists,  then  the  court would be right in presuming that there is  ground to proceed against the accused and frame  the charge accordingly. This presumption is not  a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction  of the court in relation to the existence of  constituents  of  an  offence  and  the  facts  leading to that offence is a sine qua non for  exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be  weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine  distinction  between  the  language  of  Sections  227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is the  expression of a definite opinion and judgment  of the Court while Section 228 is tentative.  Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of  charge, the Court should form an opinion that  the accused is certainly guilty of committing  an  offence,  is  an  approach  which  is  impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the  Code.”

“19. At  the  initial  stage  of  framing  of  a  charge, the court is concerned not with proof  but with a strong suspicion that the accused  has  committed  an  offence,  which,  if  put  to

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trial,  could  prove  him  guilty.  All  that  the  court has to see is that the material on record  and  the  facts  would  be  compatible  with  the  innocence of the accused or not. The final test  of guilt is not to be applied at that stage. We  may refer to the well-settled law laid down by  this Court in  State of Bihar v.  Ramesh Singh:  (SCC pp. 41-42, para 4)

“4. Under Section 226 of the Code while  opening the case for the prosecution the  Prosecutor has got to describe the charge  against  the  accused  and  state  by  what  evidence he proposes to prove the guilt  of the accused. Thereafter comes at the  initial stage the duty of the court to   consider the record of the case and the  documents submitted therewith and to hear  the  submissions  of  the  accused  and  the  prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has  to pass thereafter an order either under  Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code.  If ‘the Judge considers that there is no  sufficient ground for proceeding against  the  accused,  he  shall  discharge  the  accused  and  record  his  reasons  for  so  doing’, as enjoined by Section 227. If,  on  the  other  hand,  ‘the  Judge  is  of  opinion  that  there  is  ground  for  presuming that the accused has committed  an  offence  which—  …  (b)  is  exclusively  triable by the court, he shall frame in  writing a charge against the accused’, as  provided in Section 228. Reading the two  provisions together in juxtaposition, as  they have got to be, it would be clear  that  at  the  beginning  and  the  initial  stage  of  the  trial  the  truth,  veracity  and  effect  of  the  evidence  which  the  Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to  be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight  to be attached to the probable defence of  the accused. It is not obligatory for the  Judge  at  that  stage  of  the  trial  to  consider  in  any  detail  and  weigh  in  a  sensitive balance whether the facts, if  proved,  would  be  incompatible  with  the  innocence  of  the  accused  or  not.  The  standard of test and judgment which is to  be  finally  applied  before  recording  a  finding regarding the guilt or otherwise  of  the  accused  is  not  exactly  to  be  applied  at  the  stage  of  deciding  the  matter under Section 227 or Section 228  of the Code. At that stage the court is  not  to  see  whether  there  is  sufficient

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ground for conviction of the accused or  whether the trial is sure to end in his  conviction. Strong suspicion against the  accused,  if  the  matter  remains  in  the  region  of  suspicion,  cannot  take  the  place  of  proof  of  his  guilt  at  the  conclusion  of  the  trial.  But  at  the  initial  stage  if  there  is  a  strong  suspicion which leads the court to think  that there is ground for presuming that  the accused has committed an offence then  it is not open to the court to say that  there  is  no  sufficient  ground  for  proceeding  against  the  accused.  The  presumption of the guilt of the accused  which is to be drawn at the initial stage  is not in the sense of the law governing  the  trial  of  criminal  cases  in  France  where  the  accused  is  presumed  to  be  guilty unless the contrary is proved. But  it is only for the purpose of deciding  prima  facie  whether  the  court  should  proceed  with  the  trial  or  not.  If  the  evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to  adduce to prove the guilt of the accused  even  if  fully  accepted  before  it  is  challenged  in  cross-examination  or  rebutted by the defence evidence, if any,  cannot  show  that  the  accused  committed  the  offence,  then  there  will  be  no  sufficient ground for proceeding with the  trial.  An  exhaustive  list  of  the  circumstances to indicate as to what will  lead to one conclusion or the other is  neither  possible  nor  advisable.  We  may  just illustrate the difference of the law  by one more example. If the scales of pan  as  to  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  accused  are  something  like  even  at  the  conclusion  of  the  trial,  then,  on  the  theory of benefit of doubt the case is to  end  in  his  acquittal.  But  if,  on  the  other hand, it is so at the initial stage  of making an order under Section 227 or  Section  228,  then  in  such  a  situation  ordinarily and generally the order which  will have to be made will be one under  Section 228 and not under Section 227.”

11. In this case, it is not alleged that the Sessions  

Judge has not followed Sections 226 and 227 Cr.P.C before

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framing the charge. Further, it is not the case of the  

appellant that the court has not given him hearing at the  

stage of discharge u/s 227 Cr.P.C. For framing of charge  

u/s  228,  the  judge  is  not  required  to  record  detail  

reasons as to why such charge is framed. On perusal of  

record and hearing the parties at the stage of discharge  

u/s 227 Cr.P.C. if the Judge is of opinion that there is  

ground for presuming that the accused has committed an  

offence, he is competent to frame charge for such offence  

even if not mentioned in the charge sheet. We find no  

merit  in  this  appeal.  The  appeal  is  accordingly  

dismissed.  

………………………………………………J.   (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)

 ………………………………………………J.                             (V. GOPALA GOWDA)

NEW DELHI, JULY 07, 2014.