DINESH KUMAR Vs CHAIRMAN.AIRPORT AUTH.OF INDIA
Bench: R.M. LODHA,H.L. GOKHALE
Case number: Crl.A. No.-002170-002171 / 2011
Diary number: 39008 / 2010
Advocates: NAVIN PRAKASH Vs
M. V. KINI & ASSOCIATES
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos.2170-2171 OF 2011 [ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (CRL) NOS. 10278-10279 OF 2010]
DINESH KUMAR ... APPELLANT(S)
Versus
CHAIRMAN, AIRPORT AUTHORITY OF INDIA AND ANOTHER . RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
R.M. LODHA,J. Leave granted.
2. The appellant is being prosecuted for the offences
punishable under Section 13(2) read with Sections 13(1)(d)
and 13(1)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for
short, “P.C. Act”).
3. On November 4, 2009, the sanctioning authority
granted sanction to prosecute the appellant for the offences
indicated above. After the sanction order was challenged by
the appellant in the High Court on November 26, 2009, the
charge-sheet has been filed by the Central Bureau of
Investigation (CBI) -respondent No. 2- against the appellant
on November 30, 2009 in the Court of Special Judge,
Ernakulam. Following that, summons came to be issued to the
appellant on December 18, 2009. During the pendency of the
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matter before the High Court, wherein the sanction order has
been challenged by the appellant, the Court of Special Judge
has taken cognizance against the appellant.
4. The Single Judge of the High Court was not persuaded
with the contentions raised by the appellant and dismissed
the appellant's Writ Petition on July 19, 2010.
5. Against the order of the Single Judge, the appellant
preferred an intra-court appeal. The Division Bench of the
High Court dismissed the intra-court appeal on September 29,
2010 observing that it was open to the appellant to question
the validity of the sanction order during trial on all
possible grounds and the CBI could also justify the order of
granting sanction before the Trial Judge.
6. Mr. Deepak Bhattacharya, learned counsel for the
appellant referred to Section 19(4) of the P.C. Act and
submitted that the appellant challenged the legality and
validity of the sanction order at the first available
opportunity, even before the charge-sheet was filed and,
therefore, the Division Bench was not justified in
relegating the appellant to agitate the question of validity
of sanction order in the course of trial. He relied upon
the decisions of this Court in Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan
vs. State of Gujarat1; Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Anr. v. Special
Judicial Magistrate and Ors.2; Abdul Wahab Ansari vs. State
1 (1997)7SCC 622
2 1998(5) SCC 749
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of Bhar and another3 and State of Karnataka vs. Ameerjan4.
7. Mr. Deepak Bhattacharya, in view of the law laid down
by this Court in the above decisions, submitted that the
High Court ought to have gone into the merits of the
challenge to sanction order. According to learned counsel,
on its face, the sanction order suffers from non-application
of mind.
8. On the other hand, Mr. H.P. Raval, learned Additional
Solicitor General for the Central Bureau of Investigation
– respondent No. 2- supported the view of the Division
Bench. He submitted that in a case where validity of the
sanction order is sought to be challenged on the ground of
non-application of mind, such challenge can only be made in
the course of trial. In this regard, he heavily relied upon
a decision of this Court in Parkash Singh Badal and another
vs. State of Punjab and others5. He also relied upon a
recent decision of this Court in Ashok Tshering Bhutia vs.
State of Sikkim6.
9. This Court has in Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan1
considered the significance and importance of sanction
under the P.C. Act. It has been observed therein that the
sanction is not intended to be, nor is an empty formality
but a solemn and sacrosanct act which affords protection to
government servants against frivolous prosecutions and it
3 (2000)8 SCC 500 4 (2007)11 SCC 273 5 (2007)1 SCC 1 6 (2011)4 SCC 402
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is a weapon to ensure discouragement of frivolous and
vexatious prosecution and is a safeguard for the innocent
but not a shield for the guilty. This Court highlighted
that validity of a sanction order would depend upon the
material placed before the sanctioning authority and the
consideration of the material implies application of mind.
10. The provisions contained in Section 19(1),(2),(3) and
(4) of the P.C. Act came up for consideration before this
Court in Parkash Singh Badal and another5. In paras 47 and
48 of the judgment, the Court held as follows:
“47: The sanctioning authority is not required to separately specify each of the offences against the accused public servant. This is required to be done at the stage of framing of charge. Law requires that before the sanctioning authority materials must be placed so that the sanctioning authority can apply his mind and take a decision. Whether there is an application of mind or not would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and there cannot be any generalised guidelines in that regard.
48: The sanction in the instant case related to the offences relatable to the Act. There is a distinction between the absence of sanction and the alleged invalidity on account of non-application of mind. The former question can be agitated at the threshold but the latter is a question which has to be raised during trial.”
11. While drawing a distinction between the absence of
sanction and invalidity of the sanction, this Court in
Parkash Singh Badal5 expressed in no uncertain terms that the
absence of sanction could be raised at the inception and
threshold by an aggrieved person. However, where sanction
order exists, but its legality and validity is put in
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question, such issue has to be raised in the course of
trial. Of course, in Parkash Singh Badal5, this Court
referred to invalidity of sanction on account of non-
application of mind. In our view, invalidity of sanction
where sanction order exists, can be raised on diverse
grounds like non-availability of material before the
sanctioning authority or bias of the sanctioning authority
or the order of sanction having been passed by an authority
not authorised or competent to grant such sanction. The
above grounds are only illustrative and not exhaustive. All
such grounds of invalidity or illegality of sanction would
fall in the same category like the ground of invalidity of
sanction on account of non-application of mind – a category
carved out by this Court in Parkash Singh Badal5, the
challenge to which can always be raised in the course of
trial.
12. In a later decision, in the case of Aamir Jaan4, this
Court had an occasion to consider the earlier decisions of
this Court including the decision in the case of Parkash
Singh Badal5. Ameerjan4 was a case where the Trial Judge, on
consideration of the entire evidence including the evidence
of sanctioning authority, held that the accused Ameerjan was
guilty of commission of offences punishable under Sections
7,13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act.
However, the High Court overturned the judgment of the Trial
Court and held that the order of sanction was illegal and
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the judgment of conviction could not be sustained. Dealing
with the situation of the case wherein the High Court
reversed the judgment of the conviction of the accused on
the ground of invalidity of sanction order, with reference
to the case of Parkash Singh Badal5, this Court stated in
Ameerjan4 in para 17 of the Report as follows:
“17. Parkash Singh Badal, therefore, is not an authority for the proposition that even when an order of sanction is held to be wholly invalid inter alia on the premise that the order is a nullity having been suffering from the vice of total non-application of mind. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the said decision cannot be said to have any application in the instant case.”
13. In our view, having regard to the facts of the
present case, now since cognizance has already been taken
against the appellant by the Trial Judge, the High Court
cannot be said to have erred in leaving the question of
validity of sanction open for consideration by the Trial
Court and giving liberty to the appellant to raise the issue
concerning validity of sanction order in the course of
trial. Such course is in accord with the decision of this
Court in Parkash Singh Badal5 and not unjustified.
14. Mr. Deepak Bhhatcharya submits that the appellant
resides in Delhi and he would be put to grave hardship if
the question of validity of sanction is left open to be
decided in the course of trial as the appellant will have
to remain present before the Trial Court at Ernakulam on
each and every date of hearing. He, however, submits that
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if the personal appearance of the appellant is dispensed
with, unless required by the Trial Court, the appellant will
not be averse in raising the issue of validity of sanction
before the Trial Judge.
15. Mr. H.P. Raval has no objection if a direction in
this regard is given by us.
16. In view of the above contentions and the factual and
legal position indicated above, we are satisfied that the
impugned order does not call for any interference. Appeals
are, accordingly, dismissed. However, it will be open to
the appellant to raise the issue of invalidity of sanction
order before the Trial Judge. In the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the present case, appellant is permitted to
appear before the Trial Court through his advocate. His
personal appearance shall not be insisted upon by the Trial
Court except when necessary.
.....................J. (R.M. LODHA)
......................J. (H.L. GOKHALE)
NEW DELHI NOVEMBER 22, 2011.
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