Page 1

1

                REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  4563     OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P (C) No.26941 of 2011)

Dina Nath (D) by Lrs. & Anr. …Appellants

Versus

Subhash Chand Saini & Ors. …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

T.S. Thakur, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. I have had the privilege of going through the elaborate  

Order  proposed  by  my Esteemed  Brother  J.S.  Khehar,  J.  

While I entirely agree with the view that the power to strike  

out the defence vested in the Court under Section 15 (7) of  

the Delhi Rent Control Act is discretionary and ought to be  

1

Page 2

2

exercised only when the tenant deliberately, contumaciously  

or negligently fails to deposit the rent due from him, I have,  

however, not been able to persuade myself to hold that such  

deliberate,  neglect  or  contumacious  failure  has  been  

established against the petitioner-tenant in the instant case  

so as to justify the exceptional step of the Court striking out  

his defence at the threshold.

3. The facts giving rise to the controversy have been set  

out at great length in the judgment of my Erudite Brother.  I,  

therefore,  do not consider it necessary to recapitulate the  

same over again except to the extent it may be necessary in  

the course of this judgment to do so. Before adverting to the  

factual matrix relevant to  the question of striking out  the  

tenant’s defence, we need to remind ourselves of the spirit  

underlying the Rent Control Legislations in general and Delhi  

Rent  Control  Act,  1958  in  particular.  The  historical  

perspective in which these legislations came about has been  

traced in several decisions of this Court. Nagindas Ramdas  

v. Dalpatram Ichharam @ Brijram and Ors. (1974) 1  

SCC 242 is one such decision in which this Court traced the  

2

Page 3

3

historical compulsions that led to the enactment of the rent  

laws in this country. The broad policy underlying these laws  

including the  Delhi  Rent  Control  Act,  observed this  Court,  

was to protect the tenants against unreasonable demands of  

the landlords as to rents, evictions and repairs. The following  

passage is an apposite reminder of the times that saw the  

enactment  of  these  laws and  the  purpose  underlying  the  

same:

“...The  strain  of  the  last  World  War,  Industrial   Revolution,  the  large-scale  exodus  of  the  working   people  to  urban areas  and the social  and political   changes  brought  in  their  wake  social  problems  of   considerable  magnitude  and  complexity  and  their   concomitant  evils.  The  country  was  faced  with   spiralling inflation, soaring cost of living, increasing   urban  population  and  scarcity  of  accommodation.   Rack  renting  and  large  scale  eviction  of  tenants   under  the  guise  of  the  ordinary  law,  exacerbated   those  conditions  making  the  economic  life  of  the   community  unstable  and insecure.  To tackle  these   problems and curb these evils,  the Legislatures of   the  States  in  India  enacted  Rent  Control   legislations...

...The language of the preambles of the Delhi Rent   Act  and Madras  Rent  Act  is  strikingly  similar.  The  broad  policy  and  purpose  as  indicated  in  their   preambles is, substantially the same viz., “to protect   tenants  against  their  landlords  in  respect  of  the   rents,  evictions  and  repairs".  With  the  same  beneficent end in view, all the three Acts interfere   with contractual tenancies and make provisions for   fixation  of  fair  and  standard  rents,  or  protection  against  eviction  of  tenants not  only  during  the  continuance of their contractual tenure but also after   

3

Page 4

4

its determination. Indeed, the neologism "statutory   tenant"  has  come  into  existence  because  of  this   protective policy which is common to all enactments   of this kind...”

(emphasis supplied)

4. The above decision was followed  in  D.C. Bhatia and  

Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. (1995) 1 SCC 104  in  

which this Court referred to the challenge mounted against  

such rent laws and the restrictions placed by the same upon  

the rights of the landlord to seek eviction of their tenants.  

This  Court  while  upholding  the  constitutional  vires  of  The  

Delhi  Rent  Control  Act,  1958  restricted  the  eviction  of  

tenants except on the special grounds stated in the statute.  

Reference may also be made to  Ashoka Marketing Ltd.  

and Anr. v. Punjab National Bank and Ors.  (1990) 4  

SCC  406 where  the  Delhi  Rent  Act  once  again  fell  for  

consideration  before  a  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court.  

Relying upon the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the  

enactment, this Court held that the purpose of the Act, inter  

alia, was to give the tenants a larger measure of protection  

against eviction.  This Court observed:

“...The  statement of  objects  and  reasons  for  the   

4

Page 5

5

enactment of the Rent Control Act, indicates that it   has been enacted with a view:

(a)  to  devise  a  suitable  machinery  for   expeditious  adjudication  of  proceedings   between landlords and tenants;

(b)  to  provide  for  the  determination  of  the   standard rent payable by tenants of the various   categories of premises  which should be fair to  the  tenants,  and  at  the  same  time,  provide   incentive  for  keeping  the  existing  houses  in   good  repairs,  and  for  further  investment  in   house construction; and

(c)  to  give  tenants  a  larger  measure  of   protection against eviction.

This  indicates that  the object  underlying the Rent   Control  Act  is  to  make  provision  for  expeditious   adjudication  of  disputes  between  landlords  and  tenants, determination of standard rent payable by   tenants  and  giving  protection  against  eviction  to   tenants. The premises belonging to the Government   are excluded from the ambit of the Rent Control Act   which  means  that  the  Act  has  been  enacted  primarily  to  regulate  the  private  relationship   between landlords and tenants with a view to confer   certain benefits on the tenants and at the same time   to balance the interest of the landlords by providing   for expeditious adjudication of proceedings between   landlords and tenant...”

(empahasis supplied)

5. The  Delhi  Rent  Control  Act  though  originally  drafted  

with the highly pro-tenant objective has been amended in  

the  years  1960,  1963,  1976,  1984,  1988  and  1995.  The  

Delhi Rent (Repeal) Bill, 2013 is currently pending before the  

Parliament  which  aims  at  safeguarding  the  interests  of  

5

Page 6

6

landlords.   Significantly,  the  1988 Amendment  limited  the  

application  of  the  Delhi  Rent  Control  Act  to  only  such  

premises as were let out for a rent of less than Rs.3500/- per  

month. In  D.C. Bhatia’s  case (supra) this Court observed  

that the object of the Amending Act was quite different from  

the objects of the Parent Act and that the Amending Act was  

an attempt to rationalize the Rent Control Act by restoring  

the  balance  between  the  interests  of  the  landlords  and  

tenants.  The Court said:  

“...As  a  result  of  these  legislations  a  host  of   problems  have  cropped  up.  These  problems  have  been stated in the various Committee Reports set   out  earlier  in  the  judgment.  Representations were   also  made  by  the  landlords  highlighting  these   problems. In order to tackle the problems created by   the  Rent  Act,  the  Delhi  Rent  Control  Act  was   amended in 1988 by Delhi Rent Control Amending   Act, 1988 (Act 57 of 1988).

...The  objects  of  the  Amending  Act  are  quite   different from the objects of the parent Act. One of   the objects of Amending Act was to rationalise the   Rent  Control  Law  by  bringing  about  a  balance   between the interest of landlords and tenants. The   object was not merely to protect the weaker section   of the community. In fact, the representations made  by  the  landlords'  association  and  the  reports  of   various Committees indicated, the laws were being   very often abused by the rich tenants against poor   or middle class landlords. The Rent Act had brought   to a halt house-building activity for letting out. Many   people with accommodation to spare did not let out   such  accommodation  for  the  fear  of  losing  the   

6

Page 7

7

accommodation altogether. As a result of all these,   there was acute shortage of accommodation which   caused hardship to the rich and the poor alike. In  the  light  of  this  experience,  the  Amending  Act  of   1988 was passed.

...In order to strike a balance between the interests   of the landlords and also the tenants and for giving   a boost to house building activity, the Legislature in   its wisdom has decided to restrict the protection of   the Rent Act only to those premises for which rent is   payable upto the sum of Rs. 3,500/- per month and   has decided not to extend this statutory protection   to the premises constructed on or after the date of   coming  into  operation  of  the  Amending  Act  for  a   period of ten years. This is a matter of legislative   policy. The Legislature could have repealed the Rent   Act altogether. It can also repeal it step by step. It  has  decided to  confine the  statutory  protection to   the existing tenancies whose monthly rent did not   exceed Rs. 3,500/-.”

(emphasis supplied)

6. Having said that, we must refer to the decision of this  

Court  in  M/s  Rahabhar  Productions  Pvt.  Ltd.  v.   

Rajendra K. Tandon (1998) 4 SCC 49,  where this Court  

held  that  while  the  provisions  of  the  rent  law  must  be  

construed  harmoniously  so  as  to  balance  the  rights  and  

obligations of the tenant and the landlord, Courts cannot be  

unmindful of the fact that the legislative object of the law  

continues to be to curb the tendency of the landlords to evict  

the tenants on one pretext or the other so that the former  

7

Page 8

8

can rent out the premises at a higher rate of rent. This Court  

observed:

“...The Act which was brought on the Statute book  in 1958 is a composite legislation in the sense that   while providing protection to the tenants who, under   common  law,  including  Transfer  of  Property  Act,   could be evicted from the premises let out to them,   at any time by the landlord on the termination of   their tenancy, it restricts the right of the landlords   to evict  the tenants at  their  will.  The Act is  thus   beneficial  as also restrictive in nature.  The Courts  are,  therefore,  under  a  legal  compulsion  to  harmoniously read the provisions of the Act so as to   balance  the  rights  of  the  landlord  and  the   obligations of the tenant towards each other   keeping    in  mind that  one of  the objects of  the legislature   while enacting the Act was to curb the tendency of   the  greedy  landlords  to  throw  out  the  tenants,   paying  lower  rent,  in  the  name  of  personal   occupation and rent out the premises at the market   rate...”

(emphasis supplied)

7. There  is  thus  no  gainsaying  that  while  legislative  

intervention has tried to moderate the law with a view to  

restoring the balance between the rights and obligations of  

the landlords on the one hand and the tenants on the other,  

the  spirit  and  purpose  underlying  the  rent  legislation  

continues to be to protect the tenants against arbitrary and  

unfair demands for eviction or enhancement of rents.  The  

pendulum has undoubtedly swung in favour of the landlords  

8

Page 9

9

not  only  by  reason  of  these  amendments  to  the  rent  

legislation which were perceived to be halting house-building  

activity and leading to a visible reluctance among the owners  

to let out the available accommodation for fear of losing the  

same  altogether.  Judicial  pronouncements  have  also  

liberalized  the  approach  to  be  adopted  qua the  landlord’s  

prayer  for  eviction  when  such  eviction  is  sought  on  the  

ground of bonafide personal need of the landlord.  Decisions  

of this Court in Mst. Bega Begum and Ors. v. Abdul Ahad  

Khan (Dead) by LRs. and Ors. (1979) 1 SCC 273, M/s  

Central  Tobacoo  Co.  Bangalore  v.  Chandra  Pakash  

1969  (2)  UJ  432  and  Phiroze  Bamanji  Desai  v.  

Chandrakant  N.  Patel  and  Ors.  1974  (1)  SCC  661,  

interpreted  the  Rent  Control  legislation  rather  narrowly  

placing a relatively heavier burden on the landlords in cases  

where vacation of the tenants was sought on the ground of  

bona  fide personal  requirement  of  the  former.  Recent  

decisions  have  made  a  significant  departure  from  that  

approach.  In  Mohd. Ayub and Anr.  v.  Mukesh Chand  

(2012) 2 SCC 155 this Court observed that the landlord’s  

9

Page 10

10

requirement need not be one of dire necessity. So long as  

the need was bona fide, the mere affluence of the landlord  

would not be  a ground to reject his application for eviction.  

To  the  same  effect  is  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  

Bhimanagouda Basanagouda Patil v. Mohd. Gudusaheb  

(2003) 3 SCC 101.  

8. The noticeable shift  in the approach adopted towards  

eviction matters  based on personal  bona fide requirement  

does  not,  however,  necessarily  cascade  into  a  similar  

approach towards grounds other than personal requirement,  

especially where the default in the payment of rent is set up  

as a ground for eviction.  In such cases, the Courts will have  

to adopt a relatively liberal approach towards the tenant. Just  

because  there  is  a  default  in  payment  of  rent  may  not  

necessarily result in an order of eviction unless the statute  

clearly or unequivocally so mandates.   

9. In the case at hand, Section 15(7) of the Delhi Rent  

Control  Act  leaves  wide  discretion  with  the  Trial  Court  

whether or not to strike out the defence of the tenant even  

where a default is proved. Exercise of that discretion in turn  

10

Page 11

11

depends upon whether or not the default in payment of rent  

is seen by the Courts to be deliberate or contumacious in  

nature.  That  is  because  Section  15(7)  of  the  Delhi  Rent  

Control Act cannot be so interpreted as to negate or frustrate  

the spirit of the legislation which aims at granting protection  

to  the  tenants  from  eviction.  The  provision must  be  so  

construed as to promote the object underlying the Act.  To  

the  same effect  are  the  pronouncements  of  this  Court  in  

which this Court has considered striking off the defence of  

the tenant to be an “exceptional step” warranted only when  

the tenant’s conduct is seen to be negligent,  deliberate or  

contumacious.  

10. In  Miss  Santosh Mehta v.  Om Prakash and Ors.   

(1980) 3 SCC 610 while interpreting Section 15 (7) of the  

Delhi Rent Control Act Krishna Iyer J. held that the power to  

strike out the party’s defence is an exceptional step and is  

only to be exercised where a “mood of defiance” and “gross  

negligence” on the part of the tenant is detected. This Court  

warned against the landlord using Section 15 (7) as a “booby  

trap” to get the tenant evicted.  One can do no better than  

11

Page 12

12

to reproduce the passage in which this Court indicated the  

correct approach to be adopted in such matters. This Court  

said:

“3. We must adopt a socially informed perspective   while construing the provisions and then it  will  be   plain that the Controller is armed with a facultative   power.  He  may,  or  not  strike  out  the  tenant's   defence.  A  judicial  discretion  has  built-in-self- restraint,  has  the  scheme of  the  statute  in  mind,   cannot  ignore  the  conspectus  of  circumstances   which are present in the case and has the brooding   thought  playing  on  the  power  that,  in  a  court,   striking out a party's defence is an exceptional step,   not  a  routine  visitation  of  a  punitive  esteem   following upon a mere failure to pay rent. First of all,   there must  be a failure to pay rent  which,  in  the   context, indicates willful failure, deliberate default or  volitional  non-performance. Secondly,  the  Section  provides no automatic weapon but prescribes a wise   discretion, inscribes no mechanical consequence but   invests a power to overcome intransigence. Thus, if   a tenant fails or refuses to pay or deposit rent and   the  court  discerns  a  mood  of  defiance  or  gross   neglect, the tenant may forfeit his right to be heard  in defence. The last resort cannot be converted into   the first resort; a punitive direction of court cannot   be used as a booby trap to get the tenant out. Once  this  teleological  interpretation  dawns,  the  mist  of   misconception about matter of-course invocation of   the power to strike out will vanish. Farewell to the   realities of a given case is playing truant with the   duty underlying the power.

4...The effect of striking out of the defence under s.   15(7) is that the tenant is deprived of the protection   given by s. 14 and, therefore, the powers under s.   15(7)  of  the  Act  must  be  exercised  with  due   circumspection.”

12

Page 13

13

(emphasis supplied)

11. Subsequent decisions rendered on the subject have not,  

in my opinion, in the least bit diluted leave alone digressed  

from the above principles that governs the exercise of power  

under Section 15(7). Even later decision of this Court in Miss  

Santosh Mehta’s  case (supra)       also recognises that  

mere failure to pay rent is not enough to justify an order  

striking out the defence.  It is only wilful failure, deliberate  

default  or  volitional non-performance that  can call  for  the  

exercise  of  that  extraordinary  power  vested  in  the  Court.  

More importantly, the plenitude of the discretionary power of  

the Court under Section 15 (7) was held to be vesting a wise  

discretion and not an automatic weapon to be used against  

the tenant. The power to strike out the defence is available  

only to overcome intransigence, especially when   the power  

is penal in nature, the exercise whereof would deprive the  

tenant of the protection available to him under Section 14.  

13

Page 14

14

The same must, therefore, be exercised with due care and  

circumspection.  

12. Even in Smt. Kamla Devi v. Shri Vasudev (1995) 1  

SCC 356 this Court reiterated that the power to strike out  

the  defence  simply  vested  the  Rent  Controller  with  the  

discretion  to  do  so.  It  was  not  mandatory  for  the  Rent  

Controller to strike out the defence simply because a default  

had  occurred.  The  exercise  of  that  discretion  obviously  

depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The  

decision  in  M/s  Jain  Motor  Car  Co.,  Delhi  v.  Smt.  

Swayam Prabha Jain & Anr. (1996) 3 SCC 55 does not  

disturb the legal parameters regulating the exercise of the  

power but deals more with the facts and circumstances of  

that case in which the power was found to have been rightly  

exercised.

13. Coming  then  to  the  case  at  hand  there  are  three  

distinct  aspects  from  which  the  question  of  default  in  

payment of rent has to be viewed.  The first and foremost is  

14

Page 15

15

whether  the  arrears  which  the  Court  determined  and  

directed the petitioner to pay were paid.  The answer to that  

question is in the affirmative. The Trial Court passed an order  

dated  21-04-2008  under  Section  15(1)  of  the  Delhi  Rent  

Control Act, 1958 directing the petitioner to deposit arrears  

of  rent  from  1st November,  2007  to  April,  2008  and  to  

continue to pay future rent @ Rs.66/- p.m. by the 15th of  

each succeeding English calendar month.  It is not in dispute  

that the petitioner complied with the order regarding deposit  

of  arrears  in the  right  earnest  inasmuch as  on 21st April,  

2008,  the  date  on  which  order  under  Section  15(1)  was  

passed. He paid to respondent No.1 the entire amount in  

cash representing arrears of rent from 1st November, 2007 to  

April, 2008.

14. The second aspect is that over and above the amount  

directed  to  be  deposited,  the  petitioner  paid  an  amount  

equivalent to ten months rent, although there was neither  

any legal  obligation cast  upon him to do so nor  was any  

direction  issued  by  the  Trial  Court  for  making  any  such  

15

Page 16

16

payment.  It is also common ground that though the excess  

amount paid by the petitioner did not represent any admitted  

liability, the excess amount received was neither  adjusted  

against  future  rent  nor  was  it  refunded  to  him.  It  is  

significant to note that although the respondent-landlord had  

claimed  arrears  even  for  the  period  beginning  from  1st  

January,  2007  to  October,  2007,  the  Trial  Court  had  

excluded that period from its order as the liability for that  

period was disputed on account of the specific case set up by  

the  petitioner  that  rent  for  the  said  period  stood  paid.  

Adjustment of the excess amount paid to the respondent-

landlord towards the future rent for the period commencing  

from 1st May, 2008 was the only legal option. Payment of the  

said  excess  amount  having  been  acknowledged  by  the  

landlord, the same must in the absence of a direction from  

the Court be deemed to have been received and held by the  

landlord for  the  benefit  of  the  tenant.  Adjustment  of  any  

such excess amount against future liability was in that view  

the only possible and legally valid method of appropriation of  

that amount. Viewed thus, the amount paid by the petitioner  

16

Page 17

17

on 21st April, 2008 covered the entire period upto February,  

2009.

15. The third aspect is that between the date of the order  

dated  21st April,  2008  under  Section  15(1)  of  the  Act  till  

February, 2009 the petitioner had made further payments of  

rent.  One of these payments was made on 27th June, 2008  

while  the  second  payment  was  made  on  17th December,  

2008. These payments represented rent for a period of six  

months.  This means that  the  petitioner  had paid advance  

rent upto 31st August, 2009. Not only that, the petitioner had  

made two further deposits, one on 1st May, 2009 and the  

second on 5th May, 2009. These payments when taken into  

consideration cleared the entire rent liability of the petitioner  

for a period of one year and nine months commencing from  

1st September,  2009 onwards. If that be so the petitioner  

was not in default on the date of the order passed by the  

Trial Court striking out his defence and for a considerable  

period beyond that.  The petitioner has in the special leave  

petition referred to certain subsequent payments also but we  

17

Page 18

18

consider  it  unnecessary  to  go  into  those  details.  What  is  

important is that as on the date of the order passed by the  

Trial  Court  on  21st April,  2008  itself  the  entire  arrears  

directed to be deposited by the petitioner stood paid by him  

and so also on the date of the order  passed by the Trial  

Court striking out his defence, rent for the entire intervening  

period and  even  beyond had  been  paid.  These  payments  

may  require  reconciliation,  calculations  and  suitable  

adjustments against the months for which rent was payable  

but what cannot be disputed is that the amount which the  

petitioner was called upon to pay and which he has, pursuant  

to the direction of the Trial Court, paid or deposited has been  

at all relevant points of time in excess of what was payable  

to  the  landlord.  The  charge  of  contumacious  failure  and  

deliberate default in making the payment levelled against the  

tenant is, therefore, not well-founded. The petitioner on the  

contrary was at all points of time keen to pay the amount of  

rent in excess of what was lawfully due. This may have been  

partly  because  of  the  consequences  that  flow  from  non-

payment and partly because the amount of contractual rent  

18

Page 19

19

is, by the current standard of market rent, very meagre. The  

withholding of  such a meagre amount was a  risk that  no  

prudent tenant protected under the Rent Control law of the  

land could take nor was it a case where by withholding the  

kind of amount which was due towards rent would have in  

any manner benefitted the tenant, just as the same would  

not have deprived the landlord of any major financial income  

from the property let out by him. It is true that just because  

the amount payable for the premises is low and payment or  

non-payment  thereof  makes  little  difference  to  either  the  

tenant or the landlord, is no reason for the tenant not paying  

the rent as and when due.  The question, however, is not  

whether the denial of the amount would have caused any  

major prejudice to the landlord or put the tenant under any  

financial  burden.  The  question  is  whether  the  tenant  was  

guilty of contumacious conduct in withholding such payment.  

While answering that question, the amount of rent payable  

for  the premises may be a factor  which cannot be totally  

brushed  aside.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  the  facts  and  

circumstances of the case at  hand do not,  in my opinion,  

19

Page 20

20

suggest  any  negligence,  defiance  or  contumacious  non-

payment of the amount due to the landlord to warrant the  

taking of that “exceptional step” which is bound to render the  

tenant defenceless in his contest against the landlord.  

16. It is noteworthy that in the course of hearing before us,  

learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant had offered to raise  

rent by ten times of the current amount and pay the same in  

advance for a period of five years to show his  bona fides.  

From the point of view of the landlords this may be seen as a  

damage control desperate bid to avoid eviction by winning  

the sympathy of the Court but from the point of view of the  

tenant it only shows that the tenant does not grudge the  

landlord  getting  what  is  legitimately  due  to  him.  The  

cumulative  effect  of  all  these  circumstances,  in  my  view,  

entitles the tenant to an opportunity to contest the suit for  

eviction.  It  is  a  different  matter  that  the  contest  may  

eventually  result  in  his  eviction  but  there  is  no  need  to  

prejudge  the  matter  on  merits  nor  any  valid  reason  to  

20

Page 21

21

deprive the tenant-petitioner the bare minimum opportunity  

to contest the eviction petition on merits.

17. In the result, I allow this appeal, set aside the order  

passed by the Courts below and dismiss the petition filed by  

the respondent-landlords under  Section 15(7) of the Delhi  

Rent Control Act leaving it open to the petitioner to make  

good his offer by enhancing the rent voluntarily by ten times  

the current rent and depositing the future rent for a period of  

five years, as offered by him, in advance.  The parties are  

left to bear their own costs.

………………….……….…..…J.     (T.S. Thakur)

New Delhi April 16, 2014

21

Page 22

22

“REPORTABLE”

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.   4563       OF 2014

(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) No. 26941 OF 2011)

Dina Nath (D) By Lrs. & Anr. ….  Appellants

Versus

Subhash Chand Saini & Ors.          ….  Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Jagdish Singh Khehar, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. It is not a matter of dispute that the appellants rented a shop  

bearing no. 1445-A, Dariba Kalan, Delhi, wherein the monthly  

payable rent is Rs. 66/-.  The 25 respondents jointly own the  

abovementioned tenanted premises.  The rent for the shop is  

22

Page 23

23

paid to respondent no. 1, who holds a power of attorney to  

collect rent (on behalf of the respondents). In November 2007,  

the respondents filed an eviction petition under Section 14 (1)  

(a)  (b)  (c)  and  (j)  of  the  Delhi  Rent  Control  Act,  1958  

(hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the  Rent  Act”)  seeking  

repossession of the rented premises, for a variety of reasons. It  

was, inter alia, alleged, that the appellants had neither paid  

nor tendered rent with effect from January, 2007, despite the  

service  of  a  demand  notice,  requiring  the  tenants  to  pay  

arrears of rent.  It was also asserted, that the appellants had  

sublet the tenanted premises to his son. In this behalf, it was  

alleged that the appellant’s son was using the shop for running  

a “halwai” (traditional Indian sweetmeat maker) business.  The  

shop was originally let out for selling cold drinks, biscuits etc.  

On the issue of usage, it was pointed out, that since the shop  

was  now  being  used  for  running  “halwai”  business,  the  

appellants were using LPG cylinders in the rented premises.  

This,  according  to  the  respondents,  had  damaged  the  old  

construction.  Additionally  it  was alleged, that the appellants  

had also raised illegal constructions, and had thereby altered  

the structure of the rented shop. In this behalf it was asserted,  

that the appellants had lowered the floor of the premises (by  

23

Page 24

24

approximately 3 feet below the plinth level) by excavating and  

dismantling the flooring. It was also alleged, that a ‘chabutra’  

(a covered sitting platform) measuring about 4.5 feet and a  

‘chhajja’  (over  hanging cover)  measuring  7.8 feet,  had also  

been constructed unauthorizedly by the appellants. It was also  

asserted, that the appellants had demolished the side pillars of  

the constructed portion of the rented premises, and had also  

removed  both the side walls  on  which  the  entire  roof,  and  

upper  storeys  were  resting.  It  was  also  alleged,  that  the  

appellants  had  demolished  the  front  door  wall,  and  had  

installed  a  loft  in  the  shop.  Likewise,  the  appellants  were  

alleged  to  have  demolished  the  back  wall  of  the  shop  to  

increase the length of the tenanted premises.

3. The appellants entered appearance before the Rent Controller  

and contested the eviction petition.  For the said purpose, the  

appellants filed a written statement on 7.2.2008, denying and  

disputing all the allegations made by the respondents in the  

eviction petition.

4. Since  one  of  the  grounds  on  which  the  eviction  of  the  

appellants was sought, was on account of non-payment of rent  

with effect from January, 2007; the Rent Controller passed an  

24

Page 25

25

order dated 21.4.2008 under Section 15(1) of  the Rent Act,  

requiring the appellants to deposit the undisputed arrears of  

rent, and to pay future rent. The aforesaid order of the Rent  

Controller is being extracted hereunder :-

“E-931/2007

21.04.08

Arguments heard u/s 15(1) of DRC Act. The rate of rent and the  relationship is not in dispute between the parties though the  petitioner  claims  the  arrears  w.e.f.  01.01.2007  and  the  respondent states that he has paid rent upto October, 2007.

Since the orders u/s 15(1) of DRC Act are to be passed on the  admitted facts, the respondent is directed to pay or deposit the  arrears of rent w.e.f 01.11.2007 till date @ Rs.66/-pm within 30  days from today and further  continue to  pay or  deposit  the  future rent at the said rate month by month before 15th of each  succeeding English Calendar month.

          SD/-

       ARC/DELHI/21.04.2008”

A  perusal  of  the  order  dated  21.4.2008  reveals,  that  the  Rent  

Controller having taken into consideration, the assertion made in the  

written statement, that the appellants have already paid rent from  

25

Page 26

26

1.1.2007 up to October 2007, directed the appellants to pay rent only  

with  effect  from 1.11.2007.  The  arrears  were  ordered to  be paid  

within 30 days (of 21.4.2008). Future rent was ordered to be paid  

every month (i.e., “month by month”) before the 15th day of each  

succeeding English calendar month.

5. On  account  of  the  non-compliance  of  the  order  dated  

21.4.2008, the respondents filed an application under Section  

15(7) of the Rent Act on 28.4.2009, praying for striking out the  

defence of the appellants. The appellants filed a reply to the  

aforesaid application on 17.8.2009. Before filing the aforesaid  

reply, on 1.5.2009 i.e., on the very day the appellants came to  

know of the filing of the application under Section 15(7) of the  

Rent  Act,  the  appellants  deposited  rent  before  the  Rent  

Controller, for the period from November, 2009 to July, 2010. In  

making the aforesaid deposit,  the appellants had mistakenly  

mentioned that the rent was being deposited from November,  

2009,  although  they  ought  to  have  deposited  rent  from  

November,  2008.   Immediately  on  realizing  the  aforesaid  

mistake, the appellants again deposited rent before the Rent  

Controller for the period from November, 2008 to October 2009  

on 5.5.2009.

26

Page 27

27

6. For an effective determination of the controversy before us, it  

is essential to extract herein the factual position indicated by  

the appellants in their reply dated 17.8.2009 (to the application  

filed by the respondents under Section 15(7) of the Rent Act).  

Accordingly,  paragraphs  3,  4  and  6  of  the  abovementioned  

reply, are being reproduced hereunder :-

“3.  Para 3 of the application in so far it states about contents of  the  written  statement  is  a  matter  of  record.  However,  it  is  specifically  denied  that  the  respondent  has  made  any  false  statement or furnished a false information before this Hon’ble  Court. In fact the rent was paid from January 2007 to  October  2007 to the petitioner No.1 but he deliberately did not issue any  rent receipt and because the respondent had no proof about  the payment of rent in writing, to avoid any kind of controversy,  the rent for the period with effect from January 2007 onwards  was paid by  respondent No.1 to petitioner No.1 vide receipt  dated 21.4.2008.

4.   Para 4 of the application is admitted. It would not be out  of place to mention that the Petitioner No.1 used to collect rent  from the respondent No.1 not every month but after 3 months  or 6 months or years time.  The respondent No.1, at the time  when the order  u/s.  15(1)  of  DRC Act  was  passed,  was  not  present in the Court. However, passing of the order was duly  communicated  through  the  clerk  of  the  counsel  to  the  respondent  No.1.  In  the  evening  of  21.4.2008 the  petitioner  No.1 personally went to the respondent No.1 and collected the  rent from him with effect from 1.1.2007 to 30.4.2008. He did  not adjust the rent already paid and has already submitted the  

27

Page 28

28

rate of rent being too meager and the respondent No.1 was not  interested to enter into any controversy, the rent for the period  with  effect  from  1.1.2007  to  30.4.2008  was  paid  by  the  respondent No.1 to the petitioner No.1 against Receipt No. 21  dated  21.4.2008 which  also  included  the  house  tax  for  the  years  2007-2008  and  2008-2009.  The  petitioner  No.1  also  stated to the respondent No. 1 that he may not deposit rent in  the court as he will directly receive the rent from him by issuing  receipts.  The respondent No.1 being an old and aged person,  not knowing the intricacies of law and also the repercussions of  non-deposit of rent every month believed the petitioner No.1 in  good faith. Though on 21.4.2008 the respondent No. 1 offered  to pay advance rent for a years time yet the petitioner No.1  refused to accept the same. It was, however, a fault on the part  of  respondent No.1 for  not  depositing the rent  in  the court.  After 21.4.2008 the petitioner No.1 again collected the rent for  the month of May 2008 in the end of May 2008 but issued the  receipt  subsequently  which  was  dated 27.6.2008.  Thereafter  despite  request  of  the  respondent  No.1  the  petitioner  No.1  procrastinated the acceptance of rent and finally in the month  of October 2008 he accepted the rent for the period with effect  from 1.6.2008 to 31.10.2008 and again he did not issue a rent  receipt. The rent receipt was later on issued in the month of  December 2008 when the respondent No.1 asked for the same,  number of times.  After October 2008 the petitioner No. 1 did  not accept the rent from the respondent No.2 because due to  his illness the respondent No.1 was not coming to the shop for  some time. It was only because of serious illness of respondent  No.1, due to which the counsel could not be contacted by him  so  as  to  deposit  the  rent  in  the  court.  On  28.4.2009  the  petitioner No.1 taking advantage of the situation has filed the  present application.

xxx xxx xxx

28

Page 29

29

6.  Para 6 of the application is not admitted as such and hence  denied.  As already submitted herein  above the  rent  till  the  month of March 2008 was paid in October 2008 itself but the  petitioner  No.1  deliberately  issued  receipt  in  the  month  of  December 2008 and now for his own deliberate attempt and  the ignorance of respondent No.1 the petitioner No.1 is trying  to take advantage. There has never been a deliberate attempt  on the part of respondent No.1 of noncompliance of the orders  passed  by  this  Hon’ble  Court  but  it  was  only  account  of  misrepresentation of  petitioner No.1, non-intentional  violation  occurred.”  

(emphasis is mine)

7. By an order dated 14.9.2009 the Rent Controller allowed the  

application filed by the respondents under Section 15(7) of the  

Rent Act, and thereby, struck off the defence of the appellants  

in the pending eviction petition.   Dissatisfied with the order  

passed by the Rent Controller, the appellants approached the  

Rent Control Tribunal.  By an order dated 24.5.2010, the Rent  

Control  Tribunal  dismissed  the  appeal  preferred  by  the  

appellants.  Dissatisfied,  the  appellants  approached  the  High  

Court of Delhi (hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”) by  

filing a petition under Article 227 of the  Constitution of India,  

wherein, the appellants assailed the order passed by the Rent  

Controller  dated 14.9.2009, as well as, the order of the Rent  

Control  Tribunal  dated 24.5.2010.  The High Court  dismissed  

the  petition  filed  under  Article  227  on  10.5.2011.  It  is,  

29

Page 30

30

therefore, that the appellants approached this Court, by filing a  

Petition for  Special  Leave to Appeal  (C)  no.  26941 of  2011,  

wherein we have now granted leave.

8. The question for this Court’s consideration is, whether it was  

just  and  appropriate  for  the  succeeding  courts  (the  Rent  

Controller, Rent Control Tribunal and the High Court) to have  

accepted the prayer made by the respondents, for striking out  

the defence of the appellants, in the eviction proceedings.  For  

determining the issue in hand, it is essential to extract herein  

Section  15 of  the  Rent  Act.  The  same is  being  reproduced  

hereunder :-

“15.  When a tenant can get  the benefit  of  protection  against eviction. -  

(1)  In every proceeding of the recovery of possession of  any premises on the ground specified in clause (a) of the  proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14, the Controller shall,  after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, make  an  order  directing  the  tenant  to  pay  to  the  landlord  or  deposit with the Controller within one month of the date of  the order,  an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which  it was last paid for the period for which the arrears of the  rent were legally recoverable from the tenant including the  period  subsequent  thereto  up  to  the  end  of  the  month  previous to that in which payment or deposit is made and to  continue to pay or deposit, month by month, by the fifteenth  

30

Page 31

31

of each succeeding month, a sum equivalent to the rent at  that rate.

(2)  If, in any proceeding for the recovery of possession of  any premises on any ground other than that referred to in  sub-section (1), the tenant contests the claim for eviction,  the landlord may, at any stage of the proceeding, make an  application to the Controller for an order on the tenant to  pay to the landlord the amount of rent legally recoverable  from the  tenant  and  the  Controller  may,  after  giving  the  parties  an  opportunity  of  being  heard,  make  an  order  in  accordance with the provisions of the said sub-section.

(3)  If, in any proceeding referred to in sub-section (1) or  sub-section (2), there is any dispute as to the amount of rent  payable  by  the  tenant,  the  Controller  shall,  within  fifteen  days of the date of the first hearing of the proceeding, fix an  interim  rent  in  relation  to  the  premises  to  be  paid  or  deposited in accordance with the provisions of sub-section  (1) or sub-section (2), as the case may be until the standard  rent  in  relation  thereto  is  fixed  having  regard  to  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  and  the  amount  of  arrears  if  any,  calculated on the basis of the standard rent shall be paid or  deposited by the tenant within one month of the date on  which the standard rent is fixed or such further time as the  Controller may allow in this behalf.

(4)  If, in any proceeding referred to in sub-section (1) or  sub-section (2),  (there is  any dispute as to  the person or  persons to  whom the rent  is  payable,  the Controller  may  direct the tenant to deposit with the Controller the amount  payable by him under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) or  sub-section (3), as the case may be, and in such a case, no  person shall be entitled to withdraw the amount in deposit  

31

Page 32

32

until the Controller decides the dispute and makes an order  for payment of the same.

(5)  If the Controller is satisfied that any dispute referred to  in sub-section (4) has been raised by a tenant for reasons  which  are false or  frivolous,  the Controller  may order the  defence against eviction to be struck out and proceed with  the hearing of the application.

(6)  If a tenant makes payment or deposit as required by  sub-section (1) or subsection (3), no order shall be made for  the recovery of possession on the ground of default in the  payment of rent by the tenant, but the Controller may allow  such costs as he may deem fit to the landlord.

(7)  If  a  tenant  fails  to  make  payment  or  deposit  as  required  by  this  section,  the  Controller  may  order  the  defence against eviction to be struck out and proceed with  the hearing of the application.”

9. It  is  not  a  matter  of  dispute,  that  the  Rent  Controller  had  

passed an order dated 21.4.2008 under Section 15(1) of the Rent  

Act.   By  the  above  order,  the  Rent  Controller  had  required  the  

appellants to pay arrears of rent to the respondents from October  

2007 upto date,  within 30 days (i.e.,  by 21st of  May,  2008).   The  

appellants were required to pay future rent at the rate of Rs. 66/- per  

month,  “month  by  month”,  by  the  15th  day  of  each  succeeding  

32

Page 33

33

English  calendar  month.   Even though I  will  deal  with  the actual  

details of the delay in payment of future rent, “month by month”, it  

is  clear  from the  acknowledged  factual  position  disclosed  by  the  

appellants in their  reply dated 17.8.2009, that there was delay in  

doing so.  Despite this acknowledged position, the issue that arises  

for consideration is, whether the said delay would be sufficient by  

itself, in terms of the mandate contained under Section 15(7) of the  

Rent Act, to strike out the defence of the appellants.  Insofar as the  

instant issue is concerned reference may be made to the provision  

itself  (Section 15(7) of the Rent Act),  which clearly uses the word  

“may” with reference to striking out the defence of a tenant.  The  

use of the word “may” postulates, that a discretion is vested with the  

Rent Controller to strike out (or not to strike out) the defence of a  

tenant, who has committed breach of an order passed under Section  

15(1) of the Rent Act.   It  is  therefore apparent, that despite non-

compliance by a tenant, of directions issued under Section 15(1) of  

the Rent Act,  there would be situations wherein the defence of  a  

tenant would not be struck off.  The issue in hand is no longer  res  

integra.  This Court has had various occasions to interpret Section  

15(7) of the Rent Act, wherein it has laid down the parameters to be  

taken into consideration, while passing an order for striking out the  

defence of the tenant (under Section 15(7) of the Rent Act).  I have  

33

Page 34

34

endeavoured to examine a few of those judgments, in the following  

paragraph.

10.1.  The power of the Rent Controller under Section 15(7) of the  

Rent Act to strike out a tenant’s defence in an eviction petition on  

her failure to deposit rent, came to be examined by this Court in Miss  

Santosh Mehta Vs. Om Prakash and Others, (1980) 3 SCC 610.  In the  

aforesaid judgment, this Court held as under:-

“3.  We  must  adopt  a  socially  informed  perspective  while  construing  the  provisions  and  then  it  will  be  plain  that  the  Controller is armed with a facultative power. He may, or may  not  strike out  the tenant's  defence.  A  judicial  discretion has  built-in-self-restraint,  has the scheme of  the statute in mind,  cannot  ignore  the  conspectus  of  circumstances  which  are  present in the case and has the brooding thought playing on  the power that, in a court, striking out a party's defence is an  exceptional step, not a routine visitation of a punitive extreme  following upon a mere failure to pay rent. First of all, there must  be a failure to pay rent which, in the context, indicates wilful  failure,  deliberate  default  or  volitional  non-performance.  Secondly,  the  Section  provides  no  automatic  weapon  but  prescribes  a  wise  discretion,  inscribes  no  mechanical  consequence but invests a power to overcome intransigence.  Thus, if a tenant fails or refuses to pay or deposit rent and the  court discerns a mood of defiance or gross neglect, the tenant  may forfeit  his  right to be heard in defence.  The last  resort  cannot be converted into the first resort; a punitive direction of  court cannot be used as a booby trap to get the tenant out.  Once  this  teleological  interpretation  dawns,  the  mist  of  misconception about matter-of-course invocation of the power  to strike out will vanish. Farewell to the realities of a given case  is playing truant with the duty underlying the power.

34

Page 35

35

4. There is no indication whatsoever in the Act to show that the  exercise  of  the  power  of  striking  out  of  the  defence  under  Section     15(7)     was  imperative  whenever  the  tenant  failed  to    deposit  or  pay  any  amount  as  required  by  Section     15  .  The    provisions contained in Section     15(7)     of  the Act  are directory    and not mandatory. It cannot be disputed that Section     15(7)     is    a  penal  provision  and  gives  to  the  Controller  discretionary  power in the matter of striking out of the defence, and that in  appropriate cases, the Controller may refuse to visit upon the  tenant the penalty of non-payment or non-deposit. The effect of  striking  out  of  the  defence  under  Section     15(7)     is  that  the    tenant is deprived of the protection given by Section     14     and,    therefore, the powers under Section     15(7)     of the Act must be    exercised with due circumspection.”

(emphasis is mine)

10.2.  On  the  issue  in  hand,  reference  may  also  be made to  the  

judgment of this Court in Kamla Devi Vs. Vasdev, (1995) 1 SCC 356.  

In  the instant  judgment,  this  Court  opined that  sub-section (7)  of  

Section 15 of the Rent Act allows a discretion to the Rent Controller,  

to  strike  out  the  tenant’s  defence,  in  case  of  non-compliance  of  

direction to deposit rent.  It was clearly opined, that Section 15(7) of  

the Rent Act did not postulate a mandatory provision for striking out  

the defence of the tenant, on account of failure to make payment or  

deposit pursuant to an order passed by the Rent Controller under  

Section 15(1) of the Rent Act.  While so holding, this Court observed  

as under:-

35

Page 39

39

one month in time particularly when the default was not wilful  or contumacious. At one time, we were inclined to remand the  case  to  the  Rent  Controller  so  that  the  appellant's  plea  regarding extension of time in depositing the rent for the month  of February, 1972 may be considered but having regard to the  fact that the appellant had already pleaded those facts which  have already been considered by the High Court, we feel that it  would not be in the interest of justice now to remand the case  as  the  High  Court  appears  to  be  justified  in  coming  to  the  conclusion that the appellant was negligent and careless as the  rent  could  still  be  deposited  by  any  other  partner,  if  the  attorney had fallen ill or one partner had forgotten the date of  deposit. Any other explanation offered by the appellant would  be obviously an after thought and, therefore,  as pointed out  earlier, it will not serve any purpose to remand the case to the  Rent  Controller.  The  result  is  that  the  appeal  has  to  be  dismissed and is hereby dismissed but without any order as to  costs allowing three months time to the appellant to vacate the  premises on filing the usual undertaking to this effect in this  Court failing which the respondent-landlady will be entitled to  recover possession from the appellant through police force.”

(emphasis is mine) A  perusal  of  the  above  conclusions,  recorded  in  Jain  Motor  Co.,  

Delhi’s case (supra) reveals, that even a single willful default, could  

be sufficient in striking out a tenant’s defence.

10.4. The interpretation with reference to striking out the defence of  

a  tenant  under  Section  15(7)  of  the  Rent  Act,  also  came  up  for  

consideration before this Court in Aero Traders (P) Ltd. Vs. Ravinder  

Kumar Suri, (2004) 8 SCC 307, wherein, this Court opined as under:-

“6.  The  question  which,  therefore,  requires  consideration  is  whether the appellant has made out any ground for exercising  discretion  in  his  favour  of  not  striking  out  his  defence.  According to Black's Law Dictionary "judicial discretion" means  the exercise of judgment by a judge or court based on what is  fair  under  the  circumstances  and  guided  by  the  rules  and  

39

Page 40

40

principles  of  law;  a  court's  power to  act  or  not  act  when a  litigant is not entitled to demand the act as a matter of right.  The word "discretion" connotes necessarily an act of a judicial  character, and, as used with reference to discretion exercised  judicially, it implies the absence of a hard-and-fast rule, and it  requires an actual exercise of judgment and a consideration of  the facts and circumstances which are necessary to make a  sound, fair and just determination, and a knowledge of the facts  upon  which  the  discretion  may  properly  operate.  (See  27  Corpus  Juris  Secundum  page  289).  When  it  is  said  that  something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities  that something is to be done according to the rules of reason  and justice and not according to private opinion; according to  law and not  humour.  It  only  gives certain  latitude or  liberty  accorded by statute or rules, to a judge as distinguished from a  ministerial or administrative official, in adjudicating on matters  brought before him. 7. In the present case, the finding of the Rent Controller and  also of the Rent Control Tribunal is that the appellant set up a  totally false plea of his having sent the rent through cheques to  the landlord. Apart from pleading that he had sent the amount  through  cheques,  he  pleaded  no  other  fact  which  could  be  taken into consideration by the Rent Controller for exercising  discretion in his favour. It may be noted that the premises are  commercial  and are situate in  Karol  Bagh,  which  is  a  prime  business area of Delhi and the rent is a paltry sum of Rs. 30/-  per  month.  But  the  appellant  did  not  pay  even  this  small  amount of rent, which is virtually a pittance, and has remained  in  arrears  for  a  long period  of  time.  There  is  absolutely  no  ground  on  which  any  discretion  could  be  exercised  in  his  favour.  The  High  Court  was,  therefore,  perfectly  justified  in  setting aside the order passed by the Rent Control Tribunal and  restoring that of the Rent Controller.”

(emphasis is mine) 10.5. Last of all reference may be made to the recent decision of this  

Court in Amrit Lal Vs. Shiv Narain Gupta, (2010) 15 SCC 510.  In the  

instant case the Rent Controller in exercise of the discretion vested  

in  him  under  Section  15(7)  of  the  Rent  Act,  had  struck  off  the  

defence of the tenant.  The Appellate Authority, however, reversed  

40

Page 41

41

the judgment of the Rent Controller.  Thereupon, the matter came up  

for  consideration  before  the  High  Court  under  Article  227  of  the  

Constitution of India.  The High Court set aside the order passed by  

the  Appellate  Authority.   The  tenant  thereupon  approached  this  

Court,  assailing  the  order  of  striking  off  his  defence.   While  

adjudicating upon the controversy, this Court held as under:-

“11. So far as the order striking out the defence of the tenant  is concerned, it is clear that as far back as on 27.10.1983, the  trial court has passed a judicial order under Section 15(1) of the  Act, directing the tenant to deposit the rent month by month.  Instead,  the  tenant  defaulted  in  making  the  deposits  for  a  period of about three-and-a-half years.  The learned counsel for  the  appellant  submitted  that  striking  out  defence  against  eviction is an order which entails serious consequences on the  tenant  and  ordinarily  the  defence  should  not  be  struck  off  unless the default is contumacious or deliberate.  Sub-section  (7) of Section 15 confers a discretion on the Controller who may  order the defence against eviction to be struck out and proceed  with the hearing of  the application if  a tenant fails  to make  payment or deposit, as required by Section 15.  In the present  case, the tenant stopped making deposits from the month of  October 1992.  For the period between October 1992 to March  1993, it can be understood that the tenant believing that there  was a compromise, did not make the deposit but the factum of  compromise was disowned by the landlord on 23-3-1993.  If the  tenant believed bona fide that there was a compromise, then,  he should have acted accordingly and paid or tendered the rent  to the landlord @ Rs.500 per month which was agreed upon  between the parties on his own saying.   If  the landlord was  disputing compromise, then the tenant should have tendered or  deposited the rent before the Controller.  There is a complete  silence on the part of the tenant in paying or tendering the rent  for  the  period  for  which  he  has  defaulted.   In  such  circumstances, the default in payment of rent cannot be said to  

41

Page 42

42

be  bona  fide.   The  proceedings  before  the  Controller  have  unfortunately  remained  pending  for  a  long  time,  almost  20  years by this time.

12. In the facts and circumstances of this case, it cannot be  said that the High Court did not have jurisdiction or exceeded in  exercise of jurisdiction in entertaining the petition under Article  227  of  the  Constitution  and  setting  aside  the  order  of  the  Appellate Authority and restoring that of the trial court.”

(emphasis is mine)

11. It is apparent, that this Court has clearly opined, that the power  

vested under Section 15(7) of the Rent Act to strike off the defence  

of  a  tenant,  is  discretionary  and  not  mandatory.   It  is  therefore  

imperative to understand, that every violation in implementation of  

the direction(s) issued by a Rent Controller under Section 15(1) of  

the Rent Act, will not ipso facto lead to the striking out the defence of  

a tenant.  A Rent Controller must exercise his discretion, keeping in  

mind the nature of the non-compliance.  If the non-compliance is not  

serious,  or  is  based on good reason,  a Rent Controller  would not  

strike off the defence of the tenant.  Only when the non-compliance  

of the order passed by the Rent Controller under Section 15(1) of the  

Rent Act, depicts irrational disregard to the order, or when the non-

compliance is repeated, or when no justification has been expressed  

for  the  same,  or  for  such  other  similar  reason(s),  the  discretion  

vested  in  Section  15(7)  of  the  Rent  Act,  would  entitle  the  Rent  

42

Page 43

43

Controller to strike off the defence of a tenant.  In a given case even  

a  single  default  depicting  willful,  contumacious,  or  negligent  and  

careless  behaviour,  could  lead  to  the  striking  out  of  a  tenant’s  

defence. It is therefore apparent, that judicial discretion exercised in  

such a matter must be tempered with self-restraint, keeping in mind,  

that striking out a tenant’s defence is an exceptionally harsh step,  

which ought not be taken in a routine and casual manner.  The Court  

must carefully evaluate the facts of the given case, before exercising  

its discretion.   

12. The  question  which  arises  for  adjudication  in  the  present  

controversy is, whether the Rent Controller, the Rent Control Tribunal  

and the High Court, were justified in the facts and circumstances of  

the  instant  case,  in  ordering  (or  upholding)  the  striking  out  the  

defence of the appellants herein.  Herein, the order dated 21.4.2008  

passed by the Rent Controller under Section 15(1) of the Rent Act,  

required the payment of arrears of rent claimed by the respondents  

(with  effect  from 1.11.2007 upto  date,  at  the  rate  of  Rs.66/-  per  

month), within 30 days (i.e., by 21.5.2008).  The above order also  

directed the appellants to pay future rent at the rate of Rs.66/- per  

month,  “month  by  month”,  by  the  15th  day  of  each  succeeding  

English calendar month.  It is not a matter of dispute, that arrears of  

rent though directed to be paid from 1.11.2007 were actually paid  

43

Page 44

44

with  effect  from  1.1.2007,  on  21.4.2008  itself.   The  appellants-

tenants therefore, voluntarily paid ten months rent in excess of the  

directions contained in the order dated 21.4.2008.  In making the  

aforesaid payment, the appellants had exercised their discretion of  

caution, and had deposited arrears of rent with effect from 1.1.2007,  

as  claimed  by  the  respondents.   The  aforesaid  discretion  was  

exercised in the manner aforementioned (as is disclosed in the reply  

filed by the appellants, dated 17.8.2009) keeping in mind the fact,  

that  the  respondents  had  not  issued  receipts  to  the  appellants,  

despite their having been paid rent from 1.1.2007 upto 30.10.2007.  

And  therefore,  they  would  not  be  able  to  establish  the  above  

position, through evidence.  It  was only as a matter of prudence,  

foresight and precaution, that the appellants-tenants had tendered  

rent from 1.1.2007 even though the Rent Controller’s order required  

the appellants to pay arrears from 1.11.2007.

13. Having therefore discharged the liability of paying of arrears of  

rent, the next step in implementing the order dated 21.4.2008 was  

with reference to the payment of future rent.  By the order dated  

21.4.2008, the Rent Controller had directed the appellants to deposit  

future  rent  at  the rate  of  Rs.66/-  per month,  “month  by month”,  

before the 15th day of each succeeding English calendar month.  The  

Rent Controller had definitely and precisely, fixed the date by which  

44

Page 45

45

rent  for  each  succeeding  month  had  to  be  tendered  by  the  

appellants-tenants.  It was on account of the alleged non-payment of  

the future rent, in compliance with the directions contained in the  

Rent Controller’s order dated 21.4.2008, that the respondents filed  

an application under Section 15(7) of the Rent Act,  on 28.4.2009.  

The relevant period which falls for consideration, while determining  

the default/failure/lapse relating to the non-payment of future rent, is  

from 1.5.2008 to 31.3.2009.  From the pleadings before us, and the  

written  reply  filed  by  the  appellants  dated  17.8.2009  (to  the  

application filed by the respondents under Section 15(7) of the Rent  

Act), the factual position, can be summarized as follows:-

S. No. Month for  which rent  

payable

Last date of  payment as  per order  

dated  21.4.2008

Actual date  of payment  of rent for  

the relevant  month  

Whether rent  paid on time or  

in default of  order dated  21.4.2008

1. May 2008 15.06.2008 27.06.2008 Payment in  default of order

2. June 2008 15.07.2008 17.12.2008 Payment in  default of order

3. July 2008 15.08.2008 17.12.2008 Payment in  default of order

4. August 2008 15.09.2008 17.12.2008 Payment in  

45

Page 46

46

default of order 5. September  

2008 15.10.2008 17.12.2008 Payment in  

default of order 6. October 2008 15.11.2008 17.12.2008 Payment in  

default of order 7. November  

2008 15.12.2008 05.05.2009 Payment in  

default of order 8. December  

2008 15.01.2008 05.05.2009 Payment in  

default of order 9. January 2009 15.02.2009 05.05.2009 Payment in  

default of order 10. February 2009 15.03.2009 05.05.2009 Payment in  

default of order 11. March 2009 15.04.2009 05.05.2009 Payment in  

default of order

Based  on  the  factual  position  extracted  hereinabove,  I  shall  

endeavour to examine whether the discretion exercised by the courts  

below in striking out the defence of the appellants is sustainable in  

law.

14. First  and  foremost,  it  is  essential  to  deal  with  the  plea  

canvassed at  the hands of  the appellants,  namely,  that  on some  

occasions whilst the rent was tendered on an earlier date, the receipt  

for the same was issued by the respondents on a later date.  The  

submission advanced was, that it was imperative while adjudicating  

the present controversy, to take into consideration the actual date of  

46

Page 47

47

tender of rent, mentioned by the appellants-tenants in their written  

reply, and not the date indicated in the receipts acknowledging the  

payment of rent.  The courts below had rejected the instant plea  

canvassed at the hands of the appellant.  I  am satisfied, that the  

rejection of the plea by the courts below, was fully justified.  In this  

behalf it may be noted, that the respondents had sought eviction of  

the appellants on account of non-payment of rent, with effect from  

1.1.2007.  The reply of the appellants to the aforesaid assertion was,  

that they had actually paid rent upto 31.10.2007, and were in arrears  

only with effect from 1.11.2007.  Despite the aforesaid assertion, the  

appellants in the exercise of prudence, foresight and precaution, and  

as a matter of abundant caution, had tendered arrears of rent (in  

furtherance of the order dated 21.4.2008 passed under Section 15(1)  

of the Rent Act by the Rent Controller), from 1.1.2007 to 30.4.2008,  

even though the  appellants-tenants  had been directed  to  deposit  

arrears only from 1.11.2007.  The appellants have clearly expressed,  

that the respondents had claimed rent even for the period (1.1.2007  

to 31.10.2007) for which it had already been paid.  Therefore, the  

appellants-tenants tendered ten months rent twice over, because of  

the fact  that the respondents had not issued receipts despite the  

payment of rent.  In the above view of the matter, it is impossible to  

assume, that the appellants would continue to repose faith and trust  

47

Page 48

48

in the respondents, and unmindful of the consequences, continue to  

tender rent, without obtaining a receipt at the time of tendering rent.  

Therefore the contention, that the appellants had tendered rent for  

the period from June 2008 to October 2008, for which a receipt was  

issued only on 17.12.2008, cannot be accepted.  For all intents and  

purposes it has to be assumed, that rent receipts were issued to the  

appellants  simultaneously  with  the  payment  thereof.   It  is  in  the  

above view of the matter, that the chart depicting the payment of  

rent,  in  terms  of  the  order  passed  by  the  Rent  Controller  on  

21.4.2008,  is  based  on  the  date  of  issue  of  receipts  by  the  

respondents.

15. Before venturing to examine the controversy on its merit, it is  

necessary to formulate four essential components of consideration,  

in  respect  of  the  controversy  in  hand.   These,  in  my  view,  have  

necessarily and mandatorily to be kept in mind while dealing with,  

striking  out  the defence of  a  tenant,  contemplated under  Section  

15(7) of the Rent Act.  The mandatory components are expressed  

hereunder:-                               (i) Undoubtedly, the provisions of  

the Rent Act are aimed at protecting tenants, against unreasonable  

demands of landlords as to rents, evictions and repairs.  The spirit  

and purpose underlying the Rent Act, is aimed at protecting tenants  

against arbitrary and unfair demands of eviction.  Whilst protecting  

48

Page 49

49

tenants,  the  legislature  has  also  incorporated  certain  provisions,  

including Section 15(7) of the Rent Act, for curbing abuse of the legal  

process,  by  tenants.   Section  15(7)  of  the  Rent  Act  is  aimed  at  

enforcing tenants to make deposits or payments of rent (both arrears  

and future) in compliance with directions issued by Rent Controllers.  

Section  15(7)  of  the  Rent  Act,  vests  a  discretion  with  Rent  

Controllers, to strike out the defence of tenants, who fail  to make  

payments or deposits contemplated under Sections 15 (1) and/or (3)  

of the Rent Act.  The landlord has no role in the matter.  It is the  

inaction of the tenant itself, which would prompt a Rent Controller, to  

strike out the tenants’ defence.  Such action is permissible, if it is  

found that the non-deposit (in compliance with a Rent Controller’s  

directions)  was  conscious  or  willful,  and  without  any  reasonable  

justification.  There is no question of any liberal approach towards a  

tenant,  who  fails  to  comply  with  directions  issued  by  the  Rent  

Controller under Sections 15(1) and/or (3) of the Rent Act.  For, it is  

out of the tenant’s own actions, that the consequences arise.  

(ii) The  relevant  date  for  determining  the  disobedience  of  the  

tenant is singularly, exclusively and solely referable, to the mandate  

of the schedule of payment, contained in the order passed by the  

Rent Controller.  This is clearly apparent from the use of the words “if  

a tenant fails to make payment or deposit as required …”.  Neither  

49

Page 50

50

the  date  of  moving  an  application  under  Section  15(7)  is  of  

relevance, nor the date on which the Rent Controller passes an order  

striking  out  the  defence  of  a  tenant  is  germane/apposite  for  the  

instant consideration.  For that matter, any other date, besides the  

schedule of  payment contemplated in the Rent Controller’s  order,  

would be totally irrelevant, for the purpose of a determination under  

Section 15(7) of the Rent Act.        (iii) The  deposits  

and payments, required to be made by a tenant under Sections 15(1)  

and/or  (3)  of  the  Rent  Act,  are  attributable  exclusively  for  the  

purpose expressed by the tenant.  Therefore, if a payment is made  

by a tenant towards arrears of rent, the same cannot be assigned, or  

attributed, or credited, towards future rent.  Likewise, the vice versa.  

Therefore,  payment  or  deposit  made  by  a  tenant  would  have  

reference  only  to  such  purpose,  as  is  ascribed  by  the  tenant,  in  

exercise of  his  independent discretion,  at  the time of  making the  

deposit.                         (iv) Acts  of  the  tenant  to  make  up  

deficiencies by making deposits, beyond the date/time contemplated  

by  the  Rent  Controller,  could  be  treated  as  an  acceptable  

payment/deposit, if there is adequate and acceptable explanation for  

the  delayed deposit.   And  not  otherwise.   For  the  above reason,  

subsequent acts of magnanimity shown by a tenant, to pay more  

than what was required by the Rent Controller (for that matter, many  

50

Page 51

51

folds more, as in the present case), would likewise be irrelevant.

16. Whether  or  not,  the  courts  below  exercised  their  discretion  

justifiably, in striking out the defence of the appellants under Section  

15(7) of the Rent Act, is being examined hereinafter, keeping in mind  

the above parameters.  Future rent was payable in terms of the  

order dated 21.4.2008, from the month of May, 2008.  The same was  

payable, “month by month”, before the 15th day of each succeeding  

English Calendar month.  Only twelve intervening months had lapsed  

in terms of the order dated 21.4.2008, when the application under  

Section 15(7) was filed by the respondents-landlords, on 28.4.2009.  

It is apparent from the above chart (see paragraph 13 above), that  

the appellants did not comply with the order dated 21.4.2008, for  

making  payments  towards  future  rent,  even  for  a  single  month,  

before the application under Section 15(7) of the Rent Act was filed,  

by the respondents-landlords on 28.4.2009.  The facts expressed in  

the  pleadings  reveal,  firstly,  that  the  appellants-tenants  did  not  

deposit any rent before the Rent Controller.  Secondly, that they did  

not even voluntarily tender rent by themselves to the respondents.  

Thirdly, that respondent no.1-Subhash Chand Saini, representing the  

respondents-landlords had himself approached the appellants, during  

the  period  under  reference,  for  collecting  rent.   Therefore  

deposit/payment  of  rent  was  never  unilaterally  made  by  the  

51

Page 52

52

appellants-tenants.  Payments towards future rent were made, only  

on the asking of the respondents-landlords.  These facts, certainly  

demonstrate a foolhardy attitude, on the part of the appellants, in  

the matter of payment of future rent.   In view of  the parameters  

expressed in paragraph 15 above, the relevant date for determining  

the delinquency of the tenant (while passing an order under Section  

15(7) of the Rent Act), is referable only to the schedule of payment  

mandated in the Rent Controller’s order dated 21.4.2008.  For the  

month of May, 2008, the direction was to pay rent by 15.6.2008; for  

the month of June, 2008, the payment had to be made by 15.7.2008;  

for July, 2008, payment had to be made by 15.8.2008 ….., so on and  

so forth, and finally, for the month of March, 2009, the payment had  

to be made by 15.4.2009.  Payments made for a particular month on  

a date later  than the one contemplated in  the order of  the Rent  

Controller dated 21.4.2008, is liable to be treated as a payment in  

violation of Rent Controller’s order.  Not once, was rent paid by the  

stipulated date.  The appellants were to pay only Rs.66 per month,  

for a shop located in a commercial area of Delhi, and, there was a  

continued default in making even this meager payment, “month by  

month”.  Fourthly, no acceptable excuse has been tendered, for the  

delayed  payment,  pertaining  to  any  of  the  twelve  months  under  

reference.   There  is  therefore  no  doubt  about  the  fact,  that  the  

52

Page 53

53

appellants  treated  the  directions  of  the  Rent  Controller  dated  

21.4.2008,  with  absolute  casualness.   There  is  an  unequivocal  

inference of a clear disregard to the directions issued by the Rent  

Controller.  The facts of this case depict a recalcitrant, as well as, a  

negligent and careless behaviour,  at  the hands of  the appellants.  

This is not a case of a single lapse, but of persistent repeated and  

unrelenting default in the payment of future rent, for all the months  

intervening the date when the order under Section 15(1) of the Rent  

Act was passed, and the date when the application under Section  

15(7) was filed by the respondents-landlords.  It is not possible to  

condone such indifference,  insensitivity,  disinterest  and apathy to  

judicial directions.  Judicial discretion in such a matter, taking into  

consideration the defaults committed by the appellants-tenants, in  

my view, was legitimately exercised by the Courts below, by striking  

out the defence of the appellants-tenants.

17. Furthermore,  in  my  view,  payment  voluntarily  made  by  the  

tenant on 21.4.2008 towards arrears of rent, cannot be attributable  

or assignable or creditable, towards future rent.  The said payment  

was made, in exercise of free discretion, towards arrears of rent.  It  

shall be deemed to be a deposit by the tenant for that purpose, and  

for no other purpose.  The respondents-landlords filed an application  

under Section 15(7) of the Rent Act on 28.4.2009 praying for striking  

53

Page 54

54

out the defence of the appellants-tenants for non-compliance of the  

order of the Rent Controller dated 21.4.2008.  Payments made by the  

appellants-tenants, for future rent payable upto 15.4.2009 (for the  

month of March, 2009), after the date of filing of the application (on  

29.4.2009), in my considered view, are not relevant, for determining  

the issue in hand.  The date on which the Rent Controller passed the  

order  striking  out  the  defence  of  the  appellants-tenants,  i.e.  

14.9.2009,  has  absolutely  no  nexus  to  the  consideration  

contemplated in Section 15(7) of the Rent Act.  The offer made by  

the appellants-tenants to raise the rent by ten times of the current  

amount, and to pay the same in advance for a period of five years, is  

nothing but an act of frustration, and is only aimed to prejudice the  

Court’s mind.  Section 15(7) of the Rent Act does not contemplate  

condonation of payments made in violation of the directions issued  

by the Rent Controller,  by subsequent payments, even where the  

tenant accepts to make a voluntary payment, many folds more than  

what is due to the landlord.  The only exception is when there is a  

reasonable explanation for delayed payment.  Unfortunately, there is  

no such explanation on behalf  of the tenant, in this case.  In my  

considered view, therefore, the action of the appellants-tenants in  

not  complying  with  the  schedule  of  payment  expressed  in  Rent  

Controller’s  order  dated  21.4.2008  (for  paying  future  rent),  

54

Page 55

55

consecutively  and  repeatedly  for  12  months,  is  nothing  but  a  

contumacious  failure  to  comply  with  the  directions  of  the  Rent  

Controller.   

18. The instant  controversy  actually  demonstrates how a  tenant  

has  effectively  frustrated  the  legislative  intent  contemplated  in  

Section 15(7) of the Rent Act.  The legislative purpose was, to curb  

tendencies of tenants, from abusing the legal process.  As already  

noticed  hereinabove,  the  respondents-landlords  filed  an  eviction  

petition in November, 2007.  Based on the non-compliance of the  

directions  issued  by  the  Rent  Controller  (on  21.4.2008),  the  

respondents-landlords moved an application on 28.4.2009, praying  

for  striking  out  the  defence  of  the  appellants-tenants.   After  the  

appellants-tenants filed their reply on 17.8.2009, the Rent Controller  

allowed the  above application,  and struck  off  the  defence  of  the  

appellants-tenants, by an order dated 14.9.2009.  The order of the  

Rent  Controller  dated  14.9.2009  was  assailed  by  the  appellants-

tenants before the Rent Control Tribunal.  The prayer made by the  

appellants-tenants was rejected by the above Tribunal on 21.4.2010.  

The appellants-tenants then approached the High Court by filing a  

petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.  The High Court  

dismissed the petition on 10.5.2011.  The said order was assailed by  

filing a Petition for Special Leave to Appeal.  The matter has been  

55

Page 56

56

pending disposal in this Court ever since.  The appellants-tenants,  

despite their contumacious disobedience, of the directions contained  

in the order of the Rent Controller dated 14.9.2009, have frustrated  

the process of law successfully, for about five years (from 28.4.2009,  

i.e.,  the date on which the application under Section 15(7) of the  

Rent Act was filed, till the disposal of the present Civil Appeal).  The  

tenants have achieved, what the legislation aimed to avoid.

19. In the above view of the matter, I am of the considered view,  

that the order passed by the Rent Controller dated 14.9.2009, which  

was upheld by the Rent Control Tribunal (on 24.5.2010) and the High  

Court  (vide  order  dated  10.5.2011)  calls  for  no  interference  

whatsoever.

20. For the reasons recorded hereinabove the appeal fails and is  

accordingly dismissed.

…………………………..J.  

(Jagdish Singh Khehar)

New Delhi;

April 16, 2014.

56

Page 57

57

57

Page 58

58

58