DHARAM PAL Vs STATE OF HARYANA
Bench: ALTAMAS KABIR,SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR,RANJAN GOGOI,M.Y. EQBAL,VIKRAMAJIT SEN
Case number: Crl.A. No.-000148-000148 / 2003
Diary number: 14918 / 2002
Advocates: VINAY GARG Vs
KAMAL MOHAN GUPTA
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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 148 of 2003
DHARAM PAL & ORS. … APPELLANTS
VS. STATE OF HARYANA & ANR. …
RESPONDENTS
WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 865 of 2004, 1334 of 2005 and 537
of 2006
J U D G M E N T
ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI. 1. This matter was initially directed to be heard by
a Bench of Three-Judges in view of the conflict of
opinion in the decisions of two Two-Judge Benches, in
the cases of Kishori Singh and Others Vs. State of Bihar
and Others [(2004) 13 SCC 11]; Rajender Prasad Vs.
Bashir and Others [(2001) 8 SCC 522] and SWIL Limited
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Vs. State of Delhi and Others [(2001) 6 SCC 670]. When
the matter was taken up for consideration by the Three-
Judge Bench on 1st September, 2004, it was brought to the
notice of the court that two other decisions had a
direct bearing on the question sought to be determined.
The first is the case of Kishun Singh Vs. State of Bihar
[(1993) 2 SCC 16], and the other is a decision of a
Three-Judge Bench in the case of Ranjit Singh Vs. State
of Punjab [(1998) 7 SCC 149]. Ranjit Singh’s case
disapproved the observations made in Kishun Singh’s
case, which was to the effect that the Session Court has
power under Section 193 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, hereinafter referred to as “the Code”,
to take cognizance of an offence and summon other
persons whose complicity in the commission of the trial
could prima facie be gathered from the materials
available on record. According to the decision in
Kishun Singh’s case (supra), the Session Court has such
power under Section 193 of the Code. On the other hand,
in Ranjit Singh’s case (supra), it was held that from
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the stage of committal till the Session Court reached
the stage indicated in Section 230 of the Code, that
Court could deal only with the accused referred to in
Section 209 of the Code and there is no intermediary
stage till then enabling the Session Court to add any
other person to the array of the accused.
2. The Three-Judge Bench took note of the fact that
the effect of such a conclusion is that the accused
named in column 2 of the charge-sheet and not put up for
trial could not be tried by exercise of power by the
Session Judge under Section 193 read with Section 228 of
the Code. In other words, even when the Session Court
applied its mind at the time of framing of charge and
came to the conclusion from the materials available on
record that, in fact, an offence is made out against
even those who are shown in column 2, it has no power to
proceed against them and has to wait till the stage
under Section 319 of the Code is reached to include such
persons as accused in the trial if from the evidence
adduced, their complicity was also established. The
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further effect as noted by the Three-Judge Bench was
that in less serious offences triable by the Magistrate,
he would have the power to proceed against those
mentioned in column 2, in case he disagreed with the
police report, but in regard to serious offences triable
by the Court of Session, the Court could have to wait
till the stage of Section 319 of the Code was reached.
The Three-Judge Bench disagreed with the views expressed
in Ranjit Singh’s case, but since the contrary view
expressed in Ranjit Singh’s case had been taken by a
Three-Judge Bench, the Three-Judge Bench hearing this
matter, by its order dated 20th January, 2005, directed
the matter to be placed before the Chief Justice for
placing the same before a larger Bench.
3. In view of the above, the matter has been placed
before the Constitution Bench for consideration.
4. The questions which require the consideration of
the Constitution Bench are as follows:
(i) Does the Committing Magistrate have any other
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role to play after committing the case to the
Court of Session on finding from the police
report that the case was triable by the Court of
Session?
(ii) If the Magistrate disagrees with the police
report and is convinced that a case had also
been made out for trial against the persons who
had been placed in column 2 of the report, does
he have the jurisdiction to issue summons
against them also in order to include their
names, along with Nafe Singh, to stand trial in
connection with the case made out in the police
report?
(iii) Having decided to issue summons against the
Appellants, was the Magistrate required to
follow the procedure of a complaint case and to
take evidence before committing them to the
Court of Session to stand trial or whether he
was justified in issuing summons against them
without following such procedure?
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(iv) Can the Session Judge issue summons under
Section 193 Cr.P.C. as a Court of original
jurisdiction?
(v) Upon the case being committed to the Court of
Session, could the Session Judge issue summons
separately under Section 193 of the Code or
would he have to wait till the stage under
Section 319 of the Code was reached in order to
take recourse thereto?
(vi) Was Ranjit Singh's case (supra), which set aside
the decision in Kishun Singh's case(supra),
rightly decided or not?
5. The facts which led to the order of the learned
Magistrate, which was subsequently challenged in
Revision before the Session Judge and the High Court are
that except for one Nafe Singh, who was shown as an
accused, the Appellants Dharam Pal and others were
included in column 2 of the police report, despite the
fact that they too had been named as accused in the
First Information Report. After going through the
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police report, the learned Judicial Magistrate First
Class, Hansi, summoned the Appellant and three others,
who were not included as accused in the charge-sheet for
the purpose of facing trial along with Nafe Singh. The
learned Magistrate purported to act in exercise of his
powers under Section 190 of the Code, but without taking
recourse to the other provisions indicated in Sections
200 and 202 of the Code, before proceeding to issue
summons under Section 204 of the Code.
6. The order of the learned Magistrate was questioned
by way of Revision before the Additional Session Judge,
Hisar, in Criminal Revision No. 27 of 2000, who upheld
the order of the learned Magistrate and dismissed the
Revision. The order of the learned Session Judge was,
thereafter, challenged before the High Court, which also
upheld the views expressed by the learned Magistrate as
well as the Session Judge, and dismissed the Appellants’
application under Section 482 of the Code for quashing
the order dated 25th March, 2002, passed by the
Additional Session Judge, Hisar, affirming the order
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dated 21st July, 2000, of the Judicial Magistrate First
Class, Hansi, passed on an application filed under
Section 190 of the Code for summoning the Appellants in
connection with FIR No. 272 dated 13th October, 1999,
registered under Sections 307 and 323 read with Section
34 of the Indian Penal Code, with Narnaund Police
Station.
7. Appearing for the Appellants in Criminal Appeal
No. 148 of 2003, filed by Dharam Pal and Others, Mr.
Brijender Chahar, learned Senior Advocate, submitted
that the learned Session Judge and the High Court erred
in holding that the Committing Magistrate was competent
to entertain a protest petition in order to summon the
Appellants who had not been shown as accused in the
charge-sheet. Mr. Chahar contended that in fact the
Magistrate under the garb of a protest petition had
usurped the powers of the Session Judge under Section
319 of the Code in a case triable exclusively by the
Court of Session. Mr. Chahar urged that once a police
report was filed before a Magistrate, which disclosed
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that an offence had been committed, which was
exclusively triable by Court of Session, the Magistrate
had no other function but to commit the same to the
Court of Session, even if on looking into the police
report, he was convinced that the others mentioned in
column 2 of the police report were also required to be
sent up for trial. Mr. Chahar submitted that the
Magistrate had exceeded his jurisdiction and both the
Session Judge and the High Court had misconstrued the
provisions of Sections 190, 193 and 209 of the Code, in
upholding the order of the learned Magistrate. In this
regard, Mr. Chahar brought into focus the provisions of
the 1898 Code of Criminal Procedure and the
corresponding provisions in the present Code, which
replaced the 1898 Code. Learned counsel pointed out
that in Section 207A of the 1898 Code, the Magistrate
was mandatorily required to hold a mini-trial before
committing the case to the Court of Session, whereas
under Section 190 of the Code of 1973, the Magistrate,
having jurisdiction, may take cognizance of any offence:
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(a) Upon receiving a complaint of facts, which
constitute such offence;
(b) Upon a police report of such facts;
(c) Upon information received from any person other
than a police report, or upon his own knowledge,
that such offence has been committed.
8. Mr. Chahar submitted that the difference in the
two provisions was intentional and had been made in
order to shorten the proceedings before the Magistrate.
Learned counsel submitted that, in terms of the old
Code, two stages of trial were contemplated which were
eliminated by the amended provisions of the Code of
1973. In such circumstances, the view expressed in
Ranjit Singh’s case appeared to be correct as against
the decision in Kishun Singh’s case, wherein it was held
that the Session Court had power under Section 193 of
the Code to take cognizance of the offence and summon
other persons, whose complicity in the commission of the
offence could prima facie be gathered from the materials
available on record.
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9. The submissions made in the above Appeal were also
reiterated in Criminal Appeal No. 865 of 2004, filed by
Naushad Ali, as the point involved in the said appeal is
more or less the same as in the appeal filed by Dharam
Pal and others.
10. Mr. Amarendra Sharan, learned Senior Advocate,
appearing for the Appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1334
of 2005, took an additional ground that the order of the
learned Magistrate, as upheld by the superior Courts,
was in violation of the provisions of Article 21 of the
Constitution, inasmuch as, the learned Magistrate issued
summons to those included in column 2, without following
the procedure indicated in Sections 190, 200, 202 and
thereafter 204 of the Code. Mr. Sharan submitted that
when the Magistrate decided to take cognizance on the
basis of the protest petition filed in regard to the
charge-sheet filed by the investigating authorities, he
ought to have taken recourse to the provisions relating
to taking cognizance on the basis of a complaint within
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the meaning of Section 190(1)(a) of the aforesaid Code.
Not having done so, the order directing summons to issue
against the Appellants was in violation of the
provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution and was,
therefore, liable to be set aside.
11. Appearing for the Appellants in Criminal Appeal
No. 148 of 2003 and Criminal M.P. No. 12963 of 2013, Mr.
Siddhartha Dave, learned Advocate, submitted that in
order to appreciate the order of the Magistrate issuing
summons in a Session triable case, it would be necessary
to go back to the source of power of the Magistrate in
issuing summons to the Appellants under Section 204 of
the Code. Mr. Dave urged that the source of power of
the Magistrate to issue such summons could only be
traced back to Section 190(1)(b) of the Code, which
provides as follows:
“190.Cognizance of offences by Magis- trates.- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second
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class specially empowered in this be- half under sub-section (2), may take cognizance of any offence -
(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such of- fence;
(b) upon a police report of such facts;
(c) upon information received from any person other than a police of- ficer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been commit- ted.
(2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the second class to take cognizance under sub-sec- tion (1) of such offences as are within his competence to inquire into or try.”
12. Mr. Dave submitted that it is only upon receipt of
a police report and the objection thereto that the
Magistrate may issue summons to the Appellants under
Section 204 of the Code, without taking any further
recourse to the other provisions relating to cognizance
of offences on a complaint petition. Mr. Dave submitted
that after taking cognizance upon a police report under
Section 190(1)(b), the next stage would be issuance of
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summons under Section 204 of the Code and there are no
intervening stages in the matter. Accordingly, the only
course available to the Committing Magistrate, on
receipt of a police report under Section 173(3) of the
Code, in a Session triable case, would be to commit the
case to the Court of Session, which could, thereafter,
take recourse to Section 319 of the Code, since it did
not have any other power to summon any other person
named in column 2 of the charge-sheet, without receiving
fresh evidence against them. Mr. Dave submitted that the
cognizance referred to in Section 193 of the Code would
be not of the offence in respect of which cognizance had
already been taken by the Magistrate, but cognizance of
the commitment of the case to the Court of Session for
trial.
13. Mr. Dave submitted that having regard to the
provisions of Section 204 of the Code, where some amount
of application of mind was required by the learned
Magistrate, the necessity of applying his mind by
holding an independent inquiry was minimal. It was
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urged that since the Magistrate had no power to proceed
to Section 190 of the Code, the matter has to be
committed to the Session Court, without any choice being
left to the learned Magistrate to take recourse to any
other course of action. In support of his submissions,
Mr. Dave referred to the decision of this Court in
Rashmi Kumar Vs. Mahesh Kumar Bhada [(1997) 2 SCC 397],
wherein the question of the court’s powers at the stage
of taking cognizance of an offence under Sections 190,
200 and 202 of the Code fell for consideration and it
was held that at the stage of taking cognizance of an
offence, the court should consider only the averments
made in the complaint as the court is not required to
sift or appreciate any evidence at that stage.
14. Mr. Dave also referred to the decision of this
Court in Indian Carat Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Karnataka
and Another [(1989) 2 SCC 132], wherein this Court has
held that despite a police report that no case had been
made out against an accused, the Magistrate could take
cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(b),
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taking into account the statement of witnesses made
under police investigation and issue process. Reference
was also made to the decision of this Court in
Abhinandan Jha Vs. Dinesh Mishra [(1967) 3 SCR 668], in
which the same view had been expressed. In the said
case, it was held that the Magistrate had no power to
direct the police to submit a charge-sheet, when the
police, after investigation into a cognizable offence,
had submitted a report of the action taken under Section
169 of the 1898 Code that there was no case made out for
sending of the accused for trial.
15. Mr. Dave also referred to the decision of this
Court in Raj Kishore Prasad Vs. State of Bihar and
Another [(1996) 4 SCC 495], in which it was also held
that while committing a case under Section 209 of the
Code, the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to associate
any other person as accused in exercise of powers under
Section 319 of the Code or under any other provision.
It was further observed that a proceeding under Section
209 of the Code before a Magistrate is not an inquiry
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and material before him is not evidence. It is only
upon committal can the Court of Session exercise
jurisdiction under Section 319 of the Code and add a new
accused, on the basis of evidence recorded by it. Mr.
Dave also urged that in the decision of this Court in
SWIL Limited (supra), which was one of the cases brought
to the notice of the Referring Court, it was held that a
person not mentioned as accused in the charge-sheet
could also be summoned by the Magistrate after taking
cognizance of the offence, if some material was found
against him, having regard to the FIR, his statement
recorded by the police and other documents. It was also
held that Section 319 of the Code did not operate in
such a situation. Mr. Dave submitted that the aforesaid
decision had not taken note of the decision in Raj
Kishore Prasad’s case (supra), wherein just the contrary
view had been taken and was, therefore, per incuriam.
Mr. Dave submitted that the entire exercise undertaken
by the Magistrate was contrary to the provisions of law
and orders summoning the Appellants as accused in these
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cases, were, therefore, liable to be quashed.
16. On behalf of the State, it was sought to be urged
by Mr. Rajeev Gaur ‘Naseem’, learned AAG, that under
Section 193 of the Code, the Session Court was entitled
to take cognizance and issue summons. Contrary to what
had been indicated by the Referring Court, Mr. Gaur
urged that the law had been correctly stated in Kishun
Singh’s case (supra) and the Session Court, after
receiving the case for commitment, was entitled under
Section 193 of the Code to take cognizance and issue
summons to those not named as accused in the charge-
sheet.
17. Mr. Gopal Singh, learned Standing Counsel for the
State of Bihar, appearing in three of the matters,
submitted that the question has been considered in the
case of Kishori Singh (supra), in which the view
expressed in Ranjit Singh’s case (supra) was followed
and it was held that under the scheme of the Code, in a
case where the offence is triable solely by the Court of
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Session, when the police files a charge-sheet and arrays
some only as accused persons, though many more might
have been named in the FIR, the Magistrate or even the
Session Judge would have no jurisdiction to array them
as accused persons at a stage prior to Section 319 of
the Code, when some evidence or materials were collected
during the trial.
18. In the last of several matters heard by this
Court, namely, Criminal Appeal No. 1334 of 2005, filed
by one Chandrika Prasad Yadav against the State of
Bihar, Mr. K.K. Tyagi, learned counsel, appearing for
the Respondent No. 2 – complainant, contended that the
Magistrate had sufficient powers to issue process
against those persons who had not been shown as accused,
but had been included in column 2 of the charge-sheet,
even after cognizance was taken. He referred to various
decisions, which had already been referred to by the
other counsel.
19. Even in Criminal Appeal No. 865 of 2004, Mr.
Shishir Pinaki, learned Advocate appearing for
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Respondent No. 2 (complainant), urged that the
Magistrate has been vested with control over the
proceedings under Article 20 of the Constitution and
hence it was within his powers to issue summons under
Section 204 of the Code, even if he disagreed with the
police report filed under Section 173(3) of the Code,
without taking recourse to the provisions of Section
202, before proceeding to issue process under Section
204 of the Code.
20. The issue in the Reference being with regard to
the powers of the Magistrate to whom a report is
submitted by the police authorities under Section 173(3)
of the Code, it is necessary for us to examine the
scheme of Chapter XIV of the Code, dealing with the
conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings.
21. Section 190, which has been extracted
hereinbefore, empowers any Magistrate of the First Class
or the Second Class specially empowered in this behalf
under Sub-section (2) to take cognizance of any offence
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in three contingencies. In the instant case, we are
concerned with the provisions of Section 190(1)(b) since
a police report has been submitted by the police, under
Section 173(3) of the Code sending up one accused for
trial, while including the names of the other accused in
column 2 of the report. The facts as revealed from the
materials on record and the oral submissions made on
behalf of the respective parties indicate that, on
receiving such police report, the learned Magistrate did
not straight away proceed to commit the case to the
Court of Session but, on an objection taken on behalf of
the complainant, treated as a protest petition, issued
summons to those accused who had been named in column 2
of the charge-sheet, without holding any further
inquiry, as contemplated under Sections 190, 200 or even
202 of the Code, but proceeded to issue summons on the
basis of the police report only. The learned Magistrate
did not accept the Final Report filed by the
Investigating Officer against the accused, whose names
were included in column 2, as he was convinced that a
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prima facie case to go to trial had been made out
against them as well, and issued summons to them to
stand trial with the other accused, Nafe Singh. The
questions which have arisen from the procedure adopted
by the learned Magistrate in summoning the Appellants to
stand trial along with Nafe Singh, have already been set
out hereinbefore in paragraph 4 of this judgment.
22. As far as the first question is concerned, we are
unable to accept the submissions made by Mr. Chahar and
Mr. Dave that on receipt of a police report seeing that
the case was triable by Court of Session, the Magistrate
had no other function, but to commit the case for trial
to the Court of Session, which could only resort to
Section 319 of the Code to array any other person as
accused in the trial. In other words, according to Mr.
Dave, there could be no intermediary stage between
taking of cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) and Section
204 of the Code issuing summons to the accused. The
effect of such an interpretation would lead to a
situation where neither the Committing Magistrate would
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have any control over the persons named in column 2 of
the police report nor the Session Judge, till the
Section 319 stage was reached in the trial.
Furthermore, in the event, the Session Judge ultimately
found material against the persons named in column 2 of
the police report, the trial would have to be commenced
de novo against such persons which would not only lead
to duplication of the trial, but also prolong the same.
23. The view expressed in Kishun Singh's case, in our
view, is more acceptable since, as has been held by this
Court in the cases referred to hereinbefore, the
Magistrate has ample powers to disagree with the Final
Report that may be filed by the police authorities under
Section 173(3) of the Code and to proceed against the
accused persons dehors the police report, which power
the Session Court does not have till the Section 319
stage is reached. The upshot of the said situation
would be that even though the Magistrate had powers to
disagree with the police report filed under Section
173(3) of the Code, he was helpless in taking recourse
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to such a course of action while the Session Judge was
also unable to proceed against any person, other than
the accused sent up for trial, till such time evidence
had been adduced and the witnesses had been cross-
examined on behalf of the accused.
24. In our view, the Magistrate has a role to play
while committing the case to the Court of Session upon
taking cognizance on the police report submitted before
him under Section 173(3) Cr.P.C. In the event the
Magistrate disagrees with the police report, he has two
choices. He may act on the basis of a protest petition
that may be filed, or he may, while disagreeing with the
police report, issue process and summon the accused.
Thereafter, if on being satisfied that a case had been
made out to proceed against the persons named in column
no.2 of the report, proceed to try the said persons or
if he was satisfied that a case had been made out which
was triable by the Court of Session, he may commit the
case to the Court of Session to proceed further in the
matter.
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25. This brings us to the third question as to the
procedure to be followed by the Magistrate if he was
satisfied that a prima facie case had been made out to
go to trial despite the final report submitted by the
police. In such an event, if the Magistrate decided to
proceed against the persons accused, he would have to
proceed on the basis of the police report itself and
either inquire into the matter or commit it to the Court
of Session if the same was found to be triable by the
Session Court.
26. Questions 4, 5 and 6 are more or less inter-
linked. The answer to question 4 must be in the
affirmative, namely, that the Session Judge was entitled
to issue summons under Section 193 Cr.P.C. upon the case
being committed to him by the learned Magistrate.
Section 193 of the Code speaks of cognizance of offences
by Court of Session and provides as follows :-
“193. Cognizance of offences by Courts of Session. - Except as otherwise expressly provided by this Code or by any other law for
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the time being in force, no Court of Session shall take cognizance of any offence as a Court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under this Code.”
The key words in the Section are that “no Court of
Session shall take cognizance of any offence as a Court
of original jurisdiction unless the case has been
committed to it by a Magistrate under this Code.” The
above provision entails that a case must, first of all,
be committed to the Court of Session by the Magistrate.
The second condition is that only after the case had
been committed to it, could the Court of Session take
cognizance of the offence exercising original
jurisdiction. Although, an attempt has been made by Mr.
Dave to suggest that the cognizance indicated in Section
193 deals not with cognizance of an offence, but of the
commitment order passed by the learned Magistrate, we
are not inclined to accept such a submission in the
clear wordings of Section 193 that the Court of Session
may take cognizance of the offences under the said
Section.
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27. This takes us to the next question as to whether
under Section 209, the Magistrate was required to take
cognizance of the offence before committing the case to
the Court of Session. It is well settled that
cognizance of an offence can only be taken once. In the
event, a Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence and
then commits the case to the Court of Session, the
question of taking fresh cognizance of the offence and,
thereafter, proceed to issue summons, is not in
accordance with law. If cognizance is to be taken of
the offence, it could be taken either by the Magistrate
or by the Court of Session. The language of Section 193
of the Code very clearly indicates that once the case is
committed to the Court of Session by the learned
Magistrate, the Court of Session assumes original
jurisdiction and all that goes with the assumption of
such jurisdiction. The provisions of Section 209 will,
therefore, have to be understood as the learned
Magistrate playing a passive role in committing the
case to the Court of Session on finding from the police
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report that the case was triable by the Court of
Session. Nor can there by any question of part
cognizance being taken by the Magistrate and part
cognizance being taken by the learned Session Judge.
28. In that view of the matter, we have no hesitation
in agreeing with the views expressed in Kishun Singh’s
case (supra) that the Session Courts has jurisdiction on
committal of a case to it, to take cognizance of the
offences of the persons not named as offenders but whose
complicity in the case would be evident from the
materials available on record. Hence, even without
recording evidence, upon committal under Section 209,
the Session Judge may summon those persons shown in
column 2 of the police report to stand trial along with
those already named therein.
29. We are also unable to accept Mr. Dave’s submission
that the Session Court would have no alternative, but to
wait till the stage under Section 319 Cr.P.C. was
reached, before proceeding against the persons against
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whom a prima facie case was made out from the materials
contained in the case papers sent by the learned
Magistrate while committing the case to the Court of
Session.
30. The Reference to the effect as to whether the
decision in Ranjit Singh’s case (supra) was correct or
not in Kishun Singh’s case (supra), is answered by
holding that the decision in Kishun Singh’s case was the
correct decision and the learned Session Judge, acting
as a Court of original jurisdiction, could issue summons
under Section 193 on the basis of the records
transmitted to him as a result of the committal order
passed by the learned Magistrate.
31. Consequent upon our aforesaid decision, the view
taken by the Referring Court is accepted and it is held
that the decision in the case of Kishun Singh vs. State
of Bihar and not the decision in Ranjit Singh Vs. State
of Punjab lays down the law correctly in respect of the
powers of the Session Court after committal of the case
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to it by the learned Magistrate under Section 209
Cr.P.C.
32. The matter is remitted to the Three-Judge Bench to
dispose of the pending Criminal Appeals in accordance
with the views expressed by us in this judgment.
…………………………………………………CJI. (ALTAMAS KABIR)
……………...……………………………………J (SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR)
……………………………………………………J. (RANJAN GOGOI)
……………………………………………………J. (M.Y. EQBAL)
……………………………………………………J. (VIKRAMAJIT SEN)
New Delhi Dated: July 18,2013.