IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.3190                       OF 2011   (Arising out of Special Leave Petition No. 12187 of 2009)  

Devinder Singh ……Appellant

Versus

Municipal Council, Sanaur   ……Respondent

J U D G M E N T

G.S. Singhvi,  J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This  appeal  is  directed against  the order  passed by the Division  

Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the writ petition filed by  

the respondent whereby the award passed by Labour Court, Patiala (for  

short, “the Labour Court”) for reinstatement of the appellant was set aside  

and it was declared that he shall be entitled to wages in terms of Section  

17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, “the Act”).

3. The  appellant  was  engaged  by  the  respondent  with  effect  from  

1.8.1994 for doing the work of clerical nature.  He was paid consolidated  

1

salary  of  Rs.1,000/-  per  month.  He  continued  in  the  service  of  the  

respondent till 29.09.1996.  His service was discontinued with effect from  

30.9.1996  without  giving  him  notice  and  compensation  as  per  the  

requirement of Section 25-F of the Act.  

4. The appellant challenged the termination of his service by raising  

an industrial dispute, which was referred by the State Government to the  

Labour  Court.    In  the  statement of  claim filed  by him, the appellant  

pleaded  that  he  had  continuously  worked  in  the  employment  of  the  

respondent from 1.8.1994 to 29.9.1996; that his service was terminated  

without  holding  any  enquiry  and  without  giving  him  notice  and  

compensation and that persons junior to him were retained in service.  In  

the written statement filed on behalf of the respondent, it was pleaded that  

the  appellant  was  engaged  on  contract  basis  and  his  service  was  

terminated  because  the  Director,  Local  Self  Government  did  not  give  

approval to the resolution passed for his employment.  According to the  

respondent, the resolution passed for engaging the appellant was sent to  

the Deputy Director  for approval,  but  the same was returned with the  

remark that the approval may be obtained from the Director, Local Self  

Government.  Thereafter, the resolution was sent to the Director, Local  

Self  Government  but  no  response  was  received  from  the  concerned  

2

authority and, therefore, it became necessary to discontinue the service of  

the appellant.  

5. After  considering  the  pleadings  of  the  parties  and  the  evidence  

produced by them, the Labour Court passed an award for reinstatement of  

the  appellant  without  back  wages.  The  Labour  Court  held  that  the  

appellant had worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year preceding  

the termination of his service and that his service was terminated with  

effect from 30.9.1996 without complying with the mandatory provisions  

contained in Section 25F of the Act.  The Labour Court rejected the plea  

that  the  termination  of  the  appellant’s  service  is  covered  by  Section  

2(oo)(bb) of the Act by observing that no evidence was produced by the  

respondent  to  prove  that  it  was  a  case  of  termination  of  service  in  

accordance with the terms of the contract of employment.  

6. The Division Bench of the High Court entertained and allowed the  

writ petition filed by the respondent by relying upon the judgments of this  

Court  in  Secy., State of Karnataka  v. Umadevi   (2006) 1 SCC 1;  

State of M.P.  v. Lalit Kumar Verma (2007) 1 SCC 575;  Uttranchal  

Forest Development Corporation v M.C. Joshi (2007(2) SCC (L&S)  

813;  M.P. Administration v. Tribhuban (2007) 9 SCC 748; Mahboob  

3

Deepak  v.  Nagar  Panchayat,  Gajraula (2008)  1  SCC  575  and  

Ghaziabad Development Authority v.  Ashok Kumar (2008) 4 SCC  

261.  The Division Bench was of the view that the Labour Court should  

not have ordered reinstatement of the appellant because his appointment  

was  contrary  to  the  recruitment  rules  and  Articles  14  and  16  of  the  

Constitution and it would not be in public interest to sustain the award of  

reinstatement  after  long  lapse  of  time.   Simultaneously,  the  Division  

Bench declared that the appellant shall be entitled to wages in terms of  

Section 17-B of the Act.  

7. Shri R.L.Batta, learned senior counsel for the appellant argued that  

the impugned order is liable to be set aside because while interfering with  

the award of the Labour Court,  the Division Bench of the High Court  

ignored the judicially recognised parameters for the exercise  of power  

under Article  226 of the Constitution.   Learned senior counsel further  

argued that the High Court was not justified in upsetting the award of  

reinstatement simply because there was some time gap between reference  

of the dispute by the State Government and adjudication thereof by the  

Labour Court.   Learned senior counsel then relied upon the judgments of  

this  Court  in  Harjinder  Singh  v.  Punjab  State  Warehousing  

Corporation  (2010) 3 SCC 192 and  Anoop Sharma v. Public Health  

Division, Haryana (2010) 5 SCC 497 and argued that the Labour Court  

4

did not commit any illegality by ordering reinstatement of the appellant  

because his service was terminated in clear violation of Sections 25-F and  

25-G of the Act.  

8. Shri Sanjay Jain, learned counsel for the respondent argued that the  

High  Court  did  not  commit  any  error  by  setting  aside  the  award  of  

reinstatement  because  initial  appointment  of  the  appellant  was  not  

sanctioned by law.  Learned counsel submitted that the action taken by  

the  respondent  was  legally  correct  and  justified  because  the  Director,  

Local  Self  Government  did  not  approve  the  resolution  passed  by  the  

respondent for engaging the appellant.  Shri Jain further submitted that  

service of the appellant was terminated in accordance with the conditions  

stipulated in the contract of employment and, as such, it cannot be termed  

as retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Act.    

9. We  have  considered  the  respective  submissions  and  carefully  

perused the record. Sections 2(oo), 2(s) and 25F of the Act which have  

bearing on the decision of this appeal read as under:

“2. (oo) “retrenchment” means the termination by the employer  of  the  service  of  a  workman  for  any  reason  whatsoever,  otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary  action, but does not include –  

(a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or

5

(b) retirement  of  the  workman  on  reaching  the  age  of  superannuation  if  the  contract  of  employment  between  the  employer  and  the  workman  concerned  contains  a  stipulation in that behalf; or

(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of  the non-renewal of the contract of employment between  the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry  or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation  in that behalf contained therein; or

(c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of  continued ill-health;  

2 (s)   “workman" means any person (including an apprentice)  employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled,  technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or  reward,  whether  the  terms  of  employment  be  express  or  implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act  in relation to an industrial  dispute,  includes any such person  who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection  with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal,  discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not  include any such person— (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or  the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of  1957); or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or  other employee of a prison; or (iii) who  is  employed  mainly  in  a  managerial  or  administrative  capacity;  or  who,  being  employed  in  a  supervisory  capacity,  draws  wages exceeding  ten  thousand  rupees  per  mensem  or exercises,  either  by  the  nature  of  the  duties  attached  to  the  office  or  by  reason  of  the  powers  vested  in  him,  functions  mainly of a managerial nature.

25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of  workmen.– No  workman  employed  in  any  industry  who  has  been  in  continuous service for not less than one year under an employer  shall be retrenched by that employer until– (a) the  workman  has  been  given  one  month’s  notice  in  

writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the  period of notice has expired, or the workman has been  

6

paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the  notice;

(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment,  compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days’  average  pay  for  every  completed  year  of  continuous  service or any part thereof in excess of six months; and

(c) notice  in  the  prescribed  manner  is  served  on  the  appropriate  Government  or  such  authority  as  may  be  specified by the appropriate Government by notification  in the Official Gazette.”  

10. The definition of the term “retrenchment” is quite comprehensive.  

It covers every type of termination of the service of a workman by the  

employer  for  any reason  whatsoever,  otherwise  than  as  a  punishment  

inflicted by way of disciplinary action.  The cases of voluntary retirement  

of  the  workman,  retirement  on  reaching  the  age  of  superannuation,  

termination  of  service  as  a  result  of  non-renewal  of  the  contract  of  

employment  or  of  such  contract  being  terminated  under  a  stipulation  

contained  therein  or  termination  of  the  service  of  a  workman  on  the  

ground  of  continued  ill  health  also  do  not  fall  within  the  ambit  of  

retrenchment.   

11. In  State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money    (1976) 1 SCC  

822, a three Judge Bench of this Court analysed Section 2(oo) and held:

“……Termination  ...  for  any  reason  whatsoever’  are  the  key  words.  Whatever  the  reason,  every  termination  spells  retrenchment.  So  the  sole  question  is,  has  the  employee’s  

7

service been terminated? Verbal apparel apart, the substance is  decisive. A termination takes place where a term expires either  by  the  active  step  of  the  master  or  the  running  out  of  the  stipulated  term.  To  protect  the  weak  against  the  strong  this  policy  of  comprehensive  definition  has  been  effectuated.  Termination embraces not merely the act of termination by the  employer,  but  the  fact  of  termination  howsoever  produced.  Maybe, the present may be a hard case, but we can visualise  abuses by employers, by suitable verbal devices, circumventing  the  armour  of  Section  25-F  and  Section  2(oo).  Without  speculating on possibilities, we may agree that “retrenchment”  is no longer  terra incognita but area covered by an expansive  definition. It means “to end, conclude, cease”………………..”

The  ratio of the aforementioned judgement was approved by the  

Constitution Bench in  Punjab Land Development And Reclaimation  

Corporation Ltd.,  Chandigarh v.  Presiding Officer  Labour Court,  

Chandigarh (1990) 3 SCC 682.

12. Section  2(s)  contains  an  exhaustive  definition  of  the  term  

‘workman’.  The definition takes within its ambit any person including an  

apprentice employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled,  

technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward and  

it  is  immaterial  that  the  terms  of  employment  are  not  reduced  into  

writing.  The definition also includes a person, who has been dismissed,  

discharged or retrenched in connection with an industrial dispute or as a  

consequence  of  such  dispute  or  whose  dismissal,  discharge  or  

retrenchment has led to that dispute.  The last segment of the definition  

8

specifies certain exclusions.  A person to whom the Air Force Act, 1950,  

or the Army Act, 1950, or the Navy Act, 1957, is applicable or who  

is employed in the police service as an officer or other employee of  

a  prison  or  who  is  employed  mainly  in  managerial  or  

administrative  capacity  or  who  is  employed  in  a  supervisory  

capacity and is  drawing specified wages per mensem or exercises  

mainly managerial functions does not fall within the definition of  

the term ‘workman’.   

13. The source of employment, the method of recruitment, the  

terms  and  conditions  of  employment/contract  of  service,  the  

quantum of wages/pay and the mode of payment are not at  all  

relevant for deciding whether or not a person is a workman within  

the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act.   

14. It is apposite to observe that the definition of workman also  

does  not  make any distinction between full  time and part  time  

employee  or  a  person  appointed  on  contract  basis.  There  is  

nothing in the plain language of Section 2(s) from which it can be  

9

inferred that only a person employed on regular basis or a person  

employed for  doing whole time job is  a  workman and the one  

employed  on  temporary,  part  time  or  contract  basis  on  fixed  

wages or as a casual employee or for doing duty for fixed hours is  

not a workman.  

15. Whenever  an  employer  challenges  the  maintainability  of  

industrial  dispute  on  the  ground  that  the  employee  is  not  a  

workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act, what the  

Labour  Court/Industrial  Tribunal  is  required  to  consider  is  

whether the person is employed in an industry for hire or reward  

for  doing  manual,  unskilled,  skilled,  operational,  technical  or  

clerical work in an industry.  Once the test of employment for hire  

or  reward for doing the specified type of  work is  satisfied,  the  

employee would fall within the definition of ‘workman’.

16. In   Birdhichand Sharma v. First Civil Judge,Nagpur 1961  

(3)  SCR  161  this  Court  considered  the  question   whether  bidi  

rollers were workmen within the meaning of the term used in the  

10

Factories Act, 1948.  The factual matrix of the case reveals that the  

workers who used to roll the bidis had to work at the factory and  

were not at liberty to work at their houses.  Their attendance was  

noted  in  the  factory  and  they  had  to  work  within  the  factory,  

though there  was  freedom  of  doing  work  for  particular  hours.  

They could be removed from service on the ground of absence for  

eight  days.   The  wages  were    paid  on piece-rate  basis.   After  

considering these facts, the Court held that the bidi rollers were  

workmen.  The Court observed that when the operation was of a  

simple nature and did not require supervision, the control could  

be exercised at the end of the day by the method of rejecting bidis  

which did not meet the required standard and such supervision  

was sufficient to establish the employer employee relationship.

17. In   Silver Jubilee Tailoring House v. Chief Inspector of  

Shops  and  Establishments 1974  (3)  SCC  498  the  three  Judge  

Bench held that the tailors employed in a tailoring shop, who were  

paid according to their skill and work and the quality of whose  

work  was  regularly  checked  were  employees  covered  by  the  

11

Andhra Pradesh (Tilengana Area) Shops and Establishments Act,  

1951.   

18. In  L. Robert D’souza  v.  Executive Engineer (1982) 1 SCC  

645  the  Court  held  that  even  a  daily  rated  worker  would  be  

entitled  to  protection  of  Section  25-F  of  the  Act  if  he  had  

continuously worked for a period of one year or more.

19. Section 25 couched in negative form. It imposes a restriction on  

the  employer’s  right  to  retrench  a  workman  and  lays  down  that  no  

workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service  

for not less then one year under an employer shall be retrenched until he  

has been given one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for  

retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or he has been paid  

wages for the period of notice and he has also been paid, at the time of  

retrenchment, compensation equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay for  

every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess  

of six months and notice in the prescribed manner has been served upon  

the appropriate Government or the authority as may be specified by the  

appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.

12

20. This  Court  has  repeatedly  held that  the  provisions  contained  in  

Section 25F (a) and (b) are mandatory and termination of the service of a  

workman, which amounts to retrenchment within the meaning of Section  

2(oo)  without  giving  one  month’s  notice  or  pay  in  lieu  thereof  and  

retrenchment compensation is null and void/illegal/inoperative—State of  

Bombay v.  Hospital  Mazdoor  Sabha AIR  1960  SC  610, Bombay  

Union of Journalists v.  State of Bombay AIR 1964 SC 1617,  State  

Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money (supra),  Santosh Gupta v. State  

Bank of Patiala (1980) 3 SCC 340, Mohan Lal v. Bharat Electronics  

Ltd.(1981)  3  SCC  225,  L.  Robert  D’Souza v.  Southern  Railway  

(supra),  Surendra Kumar Verma v.  Central Government Industrial  

Tribunal-cum-Labour Court (1980) 4 SCC 443, Gammon India Ltd.  

v. Niranjan Dass (1984) 1 SCC 509, Gurmail Singh v. State of Punjab  

(1991) 1 SCC 189 and Pramod Jha v. State of Bihar (2003) 4 SCC 619.

21       In  Anoop  Sharma  v.  Executive  Engineer,  Public  Health  

Division, Haryana  (supra),  the Court considered the effect of violation  

of Section 25F, referred to  various precedents on the subject and held the  

termination  of  service  of  a  workman  without  complying  with  the  

mandatory  provisions  contained  in  Section  25-F  (a)  and  (b)  should  

ordinarily result in his reinstatement.  

13

22. We may now advert to the impugned order.  A careful analysis  

thereof  reveals  that  the  High  Court  neither  found  any  jurisdictional  

infirmity in the award of the Labour Court nor it came to the conclusion  

that the same was vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the  

record. Notwithstanding this, the High Court set aside the direction given  

by the Labour Court for reinstatement of the appellant by assuming that  

his initial appointment/engagement was contrary to law and that it would  

not be in public interest to approve the award of reinstatement after long  

lapse of time.  In our view, the approach adopted by the High Court in  

dealing with the award of the Labour Court was  ex facie erroneous and  

contrary to the law laid down in Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan  

AIR (1964) SC 477,  Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab  (1976) 2 SCC  

868  P.G.I.  of  Medical  Education & Research,  Chandigarh v.  Raj  

Kumar  (2001) 2 SCC 54,  Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai (2003)  

6SCC 675 and  Shalini Shyam  v. Rajendra Shankar Path  (2010) 8  

SCC 329.   

23. In  Syed  Yakoob  v.  K.S.  Radhakrishnan (supra),  this  Court  

identified the limitations of certiorari jurisdiction of the High Court under  

Article 226 of the Constitution in the following words:

“The  question  about  the  limits  of  the  jurisdiction  of  High  Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been  

14

frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position  in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be  issued  for  correcting  errors  of  jurisdiction  committed  by  inferior  courts  or  tribunals:  these are  cases  where  orders  are  passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is  in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A  writ  can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction  conferred  on  it,  the  court  or  tribunal  acts  illegally  or  improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving  an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or  where  the  procedure  adopted  in  dealing  with  the  dispute  is  opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no  doubt  that  the  jurisdiction  to  issue  a  writ  of  certiorari  is  a  supervisory  jurisdiction  and  the  court  exercising  it  is  not  entitled to act as an appellate court. This limitation necessarily  means  that  findings  of  fact  reached  by  the  inferior  court  or  tribunal  as  result  of  the  appreciation  of  evidence  cannot  be  reopened or  questioned in writ  proceedings.  An error  of law  which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by  a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to  be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal, a writ  of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the  said  finding,  the  tribunal  had  erroneously  refused  to  admit  admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted  inadmissible  evidence  which  has  influenced  the  impugned  finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence,  that  would  be  regarded  as  an  error  of  law  which  can  be  corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of  cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of  fact  recorded  by  the  tribunal  cannot  be  challenged  in  proceedings  for  a  writ  of  certiorari  on  the  ground  that  the  relevant and material evidence adduced before the tribunal was  insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The  adequacy  or  sufficiency  of  evidence  led  on  a  point  and  the  inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  the tribunal,  and the  said  points  cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits  that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article  226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.”

15

In  the  second  judgment  –  Swaran  Singh  v.  State  of  Punjab  

(supra),  this  Court  reiterated  the  limitations  of  certiorari  jurisdiction  

indicated in Syed Yakoob v. Radhakrishnan (supra) and observed:

“In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a  writ  of  certiorari  can  be  issued  only  if  in  recording  such  a  finding,  the  tribunal  has  acted  on  evidence  which  is  legally  inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if  the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in  such  cases  the  error  amounts  to  an  error  of  law.  The  writ  jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by  inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a  result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or  they  act  illegally  or  improperly  in  the  exercise  of  their  jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.”

 In  Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai (supra), the two-Judge  

Bench noticed the distinction between the scope of Articles 226 and 227  

of  the  Constitution  and  culled  out  several  propositions  including  the  

following:

“(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued  for  correcting  gross  errors  of  jurisdiction  i.e.  when  a  subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction —by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in  excess  of  its  jurisdiction—by  overstepping  or  crossing  the  limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law  or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of  natural  justice  where  there  is  no  procedure  specified,  and  thereby occasioning failure of justice.”

24. We are also convinced that the reasons assigned by the High Court  

for setting aside the award of reinstatement are legally untenable.  In the  

first,  it  deserves  to  be  noticed  that  the  respondent  had  engaged  the  

16

appellant in the back drop of the ban imposed by the State Government  

on the filling up of the vacant posts.  The respondent had started a water  

supply scheme and for ensuring timely issue of the bills and collection of  

water charges, it needed the service of a clerk.  However, on account of  

the restriction imposed by the State Government, regular recruitment was  

not  possible.   Therefore,  resolution  dated  27.04.1995  was  passed  for  

engaging the appellant on contract basis.  The relevant portions of the  

resolution are extracted below:

“MUNICIPAL COUNCIL,SANAUR,(PATIALA).

            COPY OF RESOLUTION NO.30 DATED  27.04.1995 It has been informed by the office to the  house  that  one  vacancy  of  Clerk  in  the  office  of  Municipal  Council,  Sanaur  is  being vacant to the water supply branch.  Due  to  ban  imposed  by  the  Punjab  Government vacancy cannot be filed in at  present.  Municipal  Council  is  operating  two  tubewells  and  is  directly  supplying  water to the- general public. At present  Municipal  Council  is  operating  two  tubewells and is directly supplying water  to the general public.  Municipal Council  has given about 1500 water connections. In  respect  of  issuance  of  water  bills  and  their respective deposit there is need of  one Clerk. This vacancy can be filled in  after  receiving  sanction  from  the  government. Therefore at present for the  working of the office business as per the  instruction  of  the  Government,  sanction  may  kindly  be  accorded  for  employing  a  person as Clerk on contract basis on the  consolidated  salary  of  Rs.  One  thousand  

17

per  month.  This  matter  was  discussed  seriously by the house because to provide  water to the general public in the summer  season  is  very  essential.  Therefore,  to  run smoothly - the work of water supplying  Shri Devinder Singh son of .Shjri Hazura  Singh of Mohalla kanian, Sanaur is hereby  engaged  for  a  period  of  six  months  on  contract  basis  on  a    consolidated  salary   of   Rs.   One   thousand with  effect  from 02.05.1995.  Resolution was  unanimously passed.

Sd/- President Minicipal Council, Sanaur

Patiala

25. In furtherance of the aforesaid resolution, the respondent engaged  

the appellant, who was already in its employment, as a Clerk for a period  

of six months on contract basis on consolidated salary of Rs. 1,000/- per  

month.  At  the  end  of  six  months,  the  respondent  passed  another  

resolution  dated  30.11.1995  and  again  employed  the  appellant  for  a  

period of six months from 1.11.1995 to 20.4.1996.  This exercise was  

repeated in 1996 and the appellant’s term was extended for six months  

from  1.5.1996.   However,  his  engagement  was  discontinued  w.e.f.  

30.9.1996  without  giving  any  notice  or  pay  in  lieu  thereof  and  

compensation as per the requirement of clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-

F of the Act.   It  is true that the engagement of the appellant was not  

preceded by an advertisement and consideration of the competing claims  

of other eligible persons but that exercise could not be undertaken by the  

18

respondent because of the ban imposed by the State Government.  It is  

surprising that the Division Bench of the High Court did not notice this  

important facet of the employment of the appellant and decided the writ  

petition by assuming that his appointment/engagement was contrary to  

the recruitment rules and Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.  We may  

also add that failure of the Director, Local Self Government, Punjab to  

convey  his  approval  to  the  resolution  of  the  respondent  could  not  be  

made a ground for bringing an end to the engagement of the appellant  

and that too without complying with the mandate of Section 25-F(a) and  

(b).

26. The other  reason given by the High Court  is  equally untenable.  

The  appellant  could  hardly  be  blamed  for  the  delay,  if  any,  in  the  

adjudication of the dispute by the Labour Court or the writ petition filed  

by the respondent.  The delay of four to five years in the adjudication of  

disputes by the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal is a normal phenomena.  

If what the High Court has done is held to be justified, gross illegalities  

committed by the employer in terminating the services of workman will  

acquire legitimacy in majority of cases.  Therefore, we have no hesitation  

to disapprove the approach adopted by the High Court in dealing with the  

appellant’s case.

19

27. The plea of the respondent that the action taken by it is covered by  

Section  2(oo)(bb)  was  clearly  misconceived  and  was  rightly  not  

entertained by the Labour Court because no material was produced by the  

respondent  to  show  that  the  engagement  of  the  appellant  was  

discontinued  by  relying  upon  the  terms  and  conditions  of  the  

employment.

28. In the result,  the appeal  is allowed.  The impugned order is set  

aside and the award passed by the Labour Court for reinstatement of the  

appellant  is  restored.    If  the  respondent  shall  reinstate  the  appellant  

within a period of  four weeks from today,  the appellant  shall  also be  

entitled to wages for the period between the date of award and the date of  

actual  reinstatement.   The  respondent  shall  pay  the  arrears  to  the  

appellant  within  a  period  of  three  months  from  the  date  of  

receipt/production of the copy of this order.

           ………………………….J. (G.S. Singhvi)

………………………….J.       (Asok Kumar Ganguly)

New Delhi, April 11, 2011.

20