REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.37375 OF 2016

DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY … PETITIONER

VERSUS

VIRENDER LAL BAHRI & ORS. … RESPONDENTS

WITH

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.37372 OF 2016

MA No.1423 OF 2017 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.12247 OF 2016

MA No.1787 OF 2017 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.10210 OF 2016

MA No.1786 OF 2017 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.10207 OF 2016

MA No.45 OF 2018 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.6239 OF 2017

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J U D G M E N T

R.F. NARIMAN, J.

1. This batch of cases relates to whether the proviso contained in

Section 24 of  the Right  to Fair  Compensation and Transparency in

Land  Acquisition,  Rehabilitation  and  Resettlement  Act,  2013  [“2013

Act”]  is  a  proviso to  Section 24(1)(b)  or  whether  it  is  a  proviso to

Section  24(2).  The  reason  for  this  confusion  is  because  of  the

placement of the proviso of sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013

Act. This is a case where the old British ditty comes to mind:

“I’m the Parliament’s draftsman,

I compose the country’s laws,

And of half the litigation

I’m undoubtedly the cause!”1

2. The  High  Court  of  Delhi,  in  a  judgment  dated  21.05.2015,

namely,  Tarun Pal Singh v. Lieutenant Governor, Government of

NCT of Delhi and Ors., W.P.(C) 8596/2014 [“Tarun Pal Singh”], had

held  that  the  said  proviso  would  govern  Section  24(1)(b),  and  not

Section 24(2). This judgment has been followed in a number of other

judgments  of  the same High Court.  DDA has filed  appeals  against

1 See Eera (through Dr. Manjula Krippendorf) v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr., (2017) 15 SCC 133 at paragraph 115.

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Tarun Pal Singh (supra) and all the judgments that have followed in

its wake. By a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, namely,

Delhi Metro Rail Corporation v. Tarun Pal Singh,  (2018) 14 SCC

161 [“Delhi Metro Rail Corporation”], the Division Bench of this Court

has taken the view that  the proviso to Section 24 governs Section

24(2) and not Section 24(1)(b). As a result of this judgment, there is no

doubt that the main judgment of the High Court of Delhi in Tarun Pal

Singh (supra) and all the judgments that have followed would have to

be upset.

3. Shri  Dhruv  Mehta,  learned  Senior  Advocate  appearing  on

behalf  of  the  respondents,  however,  contends  that  the judgment  in

Delhi  Metro  Rail  Corporation  (supra)  itself  requires  a  relook.

According to him, if the proviso to Section 24 were to govern Section

24(2) and not Section 24(1)(b), a valuable right of lapsing would be

taken away and also, various repugnancies and inconsistencies would

follow. According to Shri Amarendra Sharan, learned Senior Advocate

appearing on behalf of the DDA, this being a very recent judgment of

this Court ought not to be disturbed as it has correctly appreciated and

laid down the law in great detail.  

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4. Before  entering  into  the  controversy  raised  by  the  learned

counsel,  the  setting  of  Section  24,  together  with  certain  other

provisions, must first be seen. Section 24 occurs as a part of the 2013

Act.  This Act repeals the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [“1894 Act”] by

Section 114 of the 2013 Act, which reads as follows:

“114.  Repeal  and  saving.—(1)  The  Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) is hereby repealed.

(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act the repeal under sub-section (1) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) with regard to the effect of repeals.”

5. In a lengthy Statement of Objects and Reasons, it is stated that

the 1894 Act has been found to be inadequate in addressing certain

issues, and therefore, needs to be replaced by an up-to-date measure.

Paragraph 18 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons is relevant,

and reads as follows:

“Statement of Objects and Reasons.— xxx xxx xxx 18.  The  benefits  under  the  new  law  would  be available in all the cases of land acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 where award has not been  made  or  possession  of  land  has  not  been taken. xxx xxx xxx”

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6. The Preamble of the Act is also important and reads as follows:

“An Act to ensure, in consultation with institutions of local self-government and Gram Sabhas established under  the  Constitution,  a  humane,  participative, informed  and  transparent  process  for  land acquisition  for  industrialisation,  development  of essential  infrastructural  facilities  and  urbanisation with the least disturbance to the owners of the land and other affected families and provide just and fair compensation  to  the  affected  families  whose land has been acquired or proposed to be acquired or are affected by such acquisition and make adequate provisions  for  such  affected  persons  for  their rehabilitation and resettlement and for ensuring that the  cumulative  outcome of  compulsory  acquisition should be that affected persons become partners in development  leading  to  an  improvement  in  their post-acquisition social and economic status and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.”

The Preamble of the Act makes it clear that a humane, participative,

informed and transparent process for land acquisition has become the

felt  need  of  the  times.  This  approach  must  also  be  with  the  least

possible  disturbance  to  owners  of  land.  It  is  in  this  backdrop  that

Section 24 of the Act has been enacted. Section 24 reads as follows:

“24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.—(1)  Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings

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initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894),—

(a) where no award under Section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or

(b) where an award under said Section 11 has  been  made,  then  such  proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.

(2)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  sub- section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where an award under the said Section 11 has been made five years or  more prior  to  the commencement  of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed  and  the  appropriate  Government,  if  it  so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act:

Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under Section 4 of the said  Land  Acquisition  Act,  shall  be  entitled  to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”

7. It will be noticed that Section 24(1) begins with a non-obstante

clause, the idea being that despite the fact that the 1894 Act has been

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repealed  by  Section  114  of  the  2013  Act,  yet,  under  certain

circumstances, compensation is payable not under the provisions of

the repealed Act, but under the provisions of the 2013 Act. In fact, in

DDA v. Sukhbir Singh, (2016) 16 SCC 258, this Court, after setting

out Section 24, then set out the statutory scheme contained therein as

follows:

“11. Section 24(1) begins with a non obstante clause and  covers  situations  where  either  no  award  has been made under the Land Acquisition Act, in which case the more beneficial provisions of the 2013 Act relating  to  determination  of  compensation  shall apply,  or  where  an  award  has  been  made  under Section  11,  land  acquisition  proceedings  shall continue  under  the  provisions  of  the  Land Acquisition  Act  as  if  the  said  Act  had  not  been repealed.

12. To  Section  24(1)(b)  an  important  exception  is carved  out  by  Section  24(2).  The  necessary ingredients of Section 24(2) are as follows:

(a)  Section  24(2)  begins  with  a  non obstante  clause  keeping  sub-section  (1) out of harm’s way; (b)  For  it  to  apply,  land  acquisition proceedings  should  have  been  initiated under the Land Acquisition Act; (c) Also, an award under Section 11 should have been made 5 years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act; (d) Physical possession of the land, if not taken,  or  compensation,  if  not  paid,  are fatal to the land acquisition proceeding that

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had  been  initiated  under  the  Land Acquisition Act; (e)  The  fatality  is  pronounced  by  stating that the said proceedings shall be deemed to  have  lapsed,  and  the  appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall, in this game of snakes and ladders, start all over again.

13. The picture that therefore emerges on a reading of Section 24(2) is that the State has no business to expropriate from a citizen his property if  an award has  been  made  and  the  necessary  steps  to complete  acquisition  have  not  been  taken  for  a period of five years or more. These steps include the taking of physical possession of land and payment of  compensation.  What  the  legislature  is  in  effect telling the executive is that they ought to have put their house in order and completed the acquisition proceedings  within  a  reasonable  time  after pronouncement of award. Not having done so even after a leeway of five years is given, would cross the limits of legislative tolerance, after which the whole proceeding would be deemed to have lapsed. It is important to notice that the section gets attracted if the acquisition proceeding is  not  completed within five years after pronouncement of the award. This may happen either because physical possession of the  land  has  not  been  taken  or  because compensation  has  not  been  paid,  within  the  said period of five years. A faint submission to the effect that  “or”  should  be read as “and”  must  be turned down for two reasons. The plain natural meaning of the sub-section does not lead to any absurdity for us to  replace  language  advisedly  used  by  the legislature.  Secondly,  the  object  of  the  Act,  and Section 24 in particular, is that in case an award has been made for five years or more, possession ought to have been taken within this period, or else it  is

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statutorily presumed that  the balance between the citizen’s right to retain his own property and the right of  the State to expropriate it  for  a public  purpose gets  so  disturbed  as  to  make  the  acquisition proceedings  lapse.  Alternatively,  if  compensation has  not  been  paid  within  this  period,  it  is  also statutorily presumed that the aforesaid balance gets disturbed  so  as  to  free  such  property  from acquisition.”

8. The judgment of this Court in  Delhi Metro Rail Corporation

(supra), after setting out Section 24, has found:

“23. An  exception  is  also  carved  out  by  a  non obstante  clause  contained  in  sub-section  (2)  of Section 24; it begins with “notwithstanding anything contained  in  sub-section  (1)”.  Thus,  it  would supersede the provisions of Section 24(1) also. In case of land acquisition proceedings, initiated under the  1894  Act,  wherein  an  award  has  been  made within 5 years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act, if physical possession has not been taken or compensation has not been paid, then the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed. The proviso to sub-section (2)  makes it  clear that when the award has been made and, compensation in  respect  of  majority  of  holdings  has  not  been deposited  in  the  account  of  beneficiaries  the acquisition  would  not  lapse.  However,  all  the beneficiaries  shall  be  entitled  to  enhanced compensation under the 2013 Act. This proviso is to be necessarily part of sub-section (2) of Section 24 only.  The  legislative  intention  is  clear  that  it  is enacted as proviso to Section 24(2), and otherwise also if read as if it were a proviso to Section 24(1)

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(b),  it  would  create  repugnancy  with  the  said provision and the provisions of Section 24(1)(b) and the proviso to Section 24(2) would become wholly inconsistent with each other. This is a trite law that the  interpretation  which  creates  inconsistency  or repugnancy has to be avoided and the proviso has to  be  part  of  Section  24(2)  as  enacted.  As  per fundamental  rule  of  its  construction,  no  contrary intention is available in the provisions so as not to read it as part of Section 24(2). As Section 24(1)(b) provides, in case award has been passed under the 1894 Act, the proceedings shall continue of the said Act as if it has not been replaced whereas Section 24(2)  provides  deemed  lapse  in  case  award  is passed 5 years or more before commencement of the 2013 Act and possession has not been taken or compensation  has  not  been  paid  and  as  per  the proviso  with  respect  to  majority  of  landholdings compensation has not been deposited in account of landowners.  In  case award has  been passed few days before commencement of the 2013 Act,  then deposit of compensation with respect to majority of holding is bound to take time, that is why legislature has made difference of consequences based upon time-gap in passing of award as requisite steps to be  taken  are  bound  to  consume  some  time  by providing proceedings to continue under  the 1894 Act.

xxx xxx xxx

27. At  the  cost  of  repetition,  we  observe  that  a reading of Sections 24(1) and 24(2) conjointly and homogeneously makes it abundantly clear that they operate  in  two  different  fields.  Section  24(1)(b) unequivocally indicates that in case the award has been  passed  under  the  1894  Act,  all  the proceedings shall  continue as if  the 1894 Act has not  been  repealed.  Section  24(1)(a)  makes  the provision  of  the  2013  Act  applicable  only  in  case

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where  the  award  has  not  been  passed.  In  other words, it gives a clue that when an award has been passed,  obviously  further  proceedings  have  to  be undertaken  under  the  1894  Act,  to  that  extent proceedings under the said Act are saved, and the 2013 Act will not apply. In such cases, there is no necessity  of  initiation  of  acquisition  proceedings afresh except  in cases as provided under Section 24(2).

xxx xxx xxx

29. We  have  already  clarified  supra  based  on  a catena of judgments, that a proviso appended to a provision  has  to  be  specifically  interpreted  in  the manner so as to enable the field which is covered by the main provision. The proviso is only an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted and  no  other.  The  proviso  deals  with  a  situation which takes something out of the main enactment to provide a particular course of action, which course of  action  could  not  have  been  adopted  in  the absence of the proviso.

30. The proviso appended to Section 24(2) indicates that it carves out an exception for a situation where the  land  acquisition  proceedings  shall  not  be deemed to lapse. Thus, for the applicability of the proviso, a case has to be covered by Section 24(2) i.e. award has been made five years or more prior to the enforcement of the 2013 Act.

31. The  proviso  to  Section  24(2)  contemplates  a situation  where  with  respect  to  majority  of  the holding  compensation  not  deposited  event  of minority  of  holding  the  landowners  are  paid, meaning thereby that for majority of the landholding in case amount is deposited acquisition is saved by the proviso. The proviso in fact extends the benefit even  to  those  landholders  who  have  received compensation  as  per  the  1894  Act.  Thus  all

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landholders  are  to  receive  benefit  of  higher  and liberal  compensation  under  the  2013  Act.  This situation is one where land acquisition proceedings shall  not  lapse  and  are  saved.  The  purpose  and object of the proviso is to give benefit of computation of compensation to all landholders and to save land acquisition proceedings. Hence, it is evident that the proviso is appropriately be treated as a proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 24 and cannot be read as proviso to Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act. xxx xxx xxx

34. This Court  specifically  held in  DDA v.  Sukhbir Singh [DDA v.  Sukhbir Singh, (2016) 16 SCC 258 : (2017) 5 SCC (Civ) 779] that the objective of Section 24(2) is to punish the State if it has been “tardy in tendering or  paying compensation”  even after  five years  have  elapsed  after  passing  of  the  award, specifically this Court held that Section 24(2) is an exception to Section 24(1)(b) and for Section 24(2) to apply, the award under Section 11 should have been  made  five  years  or  more  prior  to commencement of the 2013 Act.

35. It was urged at the end by Mr. Anil Goel, learned counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  some  of  the landowners  that,  since  the  amount  has  not  been deposited with respect to majority of holding in the account of the beneficiaries, the acquisition stands lapsed.  We have held  that  the proviso to  Section 24(2) is not applicable in the instant case, same is applicable  where  the  award  had  been  passed  5 years  before.  In  a  case  where  award  has  been passed within 5 years, the said proviso of Section 24(2)  cannot  be  said  to  be  applicable.  The submission made on the basis of the proviso cannot be said to be sustainable.”

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9. The first important thing to be noticed is that Section 24(1) and

(2) deal with different subjects.  Section 24(1) deals with compensation

whereas  Section  24(2)  deals  with  lapsing  of  the  acquisition  itself.

There are many cogent reasons as to why the proviso in the Section is

really a proviso to Section 24(1)(b) and not to Section 24(2).  

10. Firstly,  the  scheme of  Section  24(1)  is  to  provide  enhanced

compensation under the 2013 Act even in cases where a Section 4

notification has been made under a repealed statute, namely, the Land

Acquisition Act, 1894, but where no award has been pronounced on

01.01.2014, when the 2013 Act comes into force. This is clear from a

reading of Section 24(1)(a). Section 24(1)(b) then goes on to state that

where  an  award  has  been  made  under  the  repealed  Act  prior  to

01.01.2014,  then  compensation  and  all  other  provisions  of  the

repealed Act will continue to apply to such award. To this, an exception

has been carved out by the proviso, which states that even in such

cases where compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings

has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then  all

beneficiaries specified in the Section 4 notification shall be entitled to

compensation  under  the  2013  Act.  Read  thus,  the  proviso  is  an

exception to Section 24(1)(b) in cases where a Section 4 notification 13

covers many land holdings in the majority of which, compensation has

not yet been deposited, making it clear, therefore, that compensation

not  having  been  paid  to  substantially  all  such  persons,  the  more

beneficial provisions of the 2013 Act should apply.  Read thus, there is

no  inconsistency  or  repugnancy  between  the  proviso  and  Section

24(1)(b) of the Act.  

11. If, on the other hand, the proviso is read as a proviso to Section

24(2),  many anomalies  arise.  Firstly,  as  has been correctly  held  in

Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (supra), for sub-section (2) of Section

24 to apply, (i) the award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act should have

been made five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act;

and  (ii)  physical  possession  of  the  land  has  not  been  taken  or

compensation has not been paid. Take a case where the award has

been made six years before 01.01.2014, and physical possession of

the land has not been taken. The acquisition is deemed to have lapsed

in such circumstances. If the proviso is to apply to Section 24(2), then

notwithstanding  that  physical  possession  has  not  been  taken,  yet,

there  will  be  no  lapse,  as  has  been  held  in  Delhi  Metro  Rail

Corporation (supra). This would fly in the face of several judgments of

this Court where it  has been held that a proviso cannot be used to 14

nullify or set at naught the substantive provision contained in the main

enactment. Thus, in  Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf, (1976) 1

SCC 128, this Court held:

“18. We may mention in fairness to Counsel that the following, among other decisions, were cited at the Bar bearing on the uses of provisos in statutes: CIT v.  Indo-Mercantile  Bank  Ltd, [AIR  1959  SC 713  : 1959 Supp (2)  SCR 256, 266 :  (1959) 36 ITR 1]; Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v.  Asstt. CST [AIR 1955 SC 765 : (1955) 2 SCR 483, 493 : (1955) 6 STC 627]; Thompson v. Dibdin [(1912) AC 533, 541 : 81 LJKB 918 : 28 TLR 490]; Rex v. Dibdin [1910 Pro Div 57, 119, 125] and Tahsildar Singh v.  State of U.P. [AIR 1959 SC 1012 : 1959 Supp (2) SCR 875, 893 : 1959 Cri  LJ  1231].  The  law is  trite.  A proviso  must  be limited to the subject-matter of the enacting clause. It is a settled rule of construction that a proviso must prima facie be read and considered in relation to the principal matter to which it is a proviso. It is not a separate  or  independent  enactment.  “Words  are dependent on the principal enacting words to which they are tacked as a proviso. They cannot be read as divorced from their context” (Thompson v. Dibdin, 1912  AC  533).  If  the  rule  of  construction  is  that prima  facie  a  proviso  should  be  limited  in  its operation  to  the  subject-matter  of  the  enacting clause,  the  stand  we  have  taken  is  sound.  To expand the enacting clause, inflated by the proviso, sins  against  the  fundamental  rule  of  construction that a proviso must be considered in relation to the principal matter to which it  stands as a proviso.  A proviso  ordinarily  is  but  a  proviso,  although  the golden rule is to read the whole section, inclusive of the proviso, in such manner that they mutually throw light  on  each  other  and  result  in  a  harmonious construction.

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“The  proper  course  is  to  apply  the  broad general Rule of construction which is that a section or enactment must be construed as a whole, each portion throwing light if need be on the rest.

The  true  principle  undoubtedly  is,  that  the sound interpretation and meaning of the statute, on a view of  the enacting clause, saving clause, and proviso, taken and construed together is to prevail. (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edn., p. 162)”

(emphasis supplied)

In S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman, (1985) 1 SCC 591, this  

Court held:

“27. The next question that arises for consideration is as to what is the scope of a proviso and what is the ambit of an Explanation either to a proviso or to any other statutory provision. We shall first take up the question of  the nature,  scope and extent  of  a proviso. The well-established rule of interpretation of a proviso is that a proviso may have three separate functions.  Normally,  a  proviso  is  meant  to  be  an exception to something within the main enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the  proviso  would  be  within  the  purview  of  the enactment. In other words, a proviso cannot be torn apart from the main enactment nor can it be used to nullify or set at naught the real object of the main enactment.”

(emphasis supplied)

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Similarly, in J.K. Industries Ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Factories and

Boilers, (1996) 6 SCC 665, this Court found:

“33. A proviso to a provision in a statute has several functions and while  interpreting a  provision of  the statute, the court is required to carefully scrutinise and find out the real object of the proviso appended to  that  provision.  It  is  not  a  proper  rule  of interpretation of a proviso that the enacting part or the  main  part  of  the  section  be  construed  first without reference to the proviso and if the same is found to be ambiguous only then recourse may be had to examine the proviso as has been canvassed before us. On the other hand an accepted rule of interpretation  is  that  a  section  and  the  proviso thereto must be construed as a whole, each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest. A proviso is normally  used  to  remove  special  cases  from  the general enactment and provide for them specially.

34. A proviso  qualifies  the  generality  of  the  main enactment by providing an exception and taking out from the main provision, a portion, which, but for the proviso  would  be  a  part  of  the  main  provision.  A proviso must, therefore, be considered in relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. A proviso should not be read as if providing something by  way  of     addition     to  the  main  provision  which is     foreign     to the main provision itself.”

(emphasis supplied)

It  could  not  possibly  have been the  unintended result  of  a  proviso

taking away lapsing of the acquisition where the subject matter of the

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proviso is  wholly  unrelated to  physical  possession of  land but  only

related to compensation not being paid.  

12. Secondly, if read as a proviso to Section 24(2), arbitrary results

would ensue, rendering the proviso arbitrary, and hence, liable to be

struck down under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Take the case

of a Section 4 notification applying only to a single piece of land with a

single  owner.  If  the conditions of  sub-section (2)  of  Section 24 are

fulfilled,  the  acquisition  would  lapse.  However,  in  the  case  of  a

neighbouring land, which happens to be land belonging to the same

owner,  which  is  one  among  twenty  pieces  of  land  that  have  been

acquired  under  a  single  Section  4  notification,  if  compensation  in

respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited, such

acquisition will not lapse, but only higher compensation under the 2013

Act  would  be  paid.  Obviously,  a  particular  land holder’s  acquisition

lapsing cannot be dependent upon a contingency as to whether his

land alone is acquired or is acquired in conjunction with other persons’

lands.   

13. Thirdly,  take the converse case where an award is  made in

respect of a large number of lands covered by the same Section 4

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notification, and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings

has been deposited. Can it then be said that in such a case, lapsing

will  take place because the proviso in  such a case will  not  apply?

Obviously, therefore, whether compensation in respect of a majority of

land holdings has or has not been deposited would have no bearing on

whether  lapsing  does  or  does  not  take  place  under  a  totally

independent provision, namely, Section 24(2).

14. Fourthly, the language of the proviso makes it clear that it does

not  refer  to  the award spoken of  in  Section 24(2)  for  two reasons.

First, the expression, “an award has been made” in the proviso cannot

be  equated  to  “such award  has  been  made”.  Also,  the  words  “an

award” being made “five years or more prior to the commencement of

this  Act”  are conspicuous by their  absence in  the proviso.  Reading

these  words  in,  when the  legislature  has chosen not  to  add  them,

would do violence to the literal  language and plain meaning of  the

proviso. However, if the proviso is read as a proviso to Section 24(1)

(b),  it  would be perfectly  compatible with all  awards that  are made

under  Section 11,  whether  within  or  beyond five  years  prior  to  the

commencement of the 2013 Act, as has been pointed out hereinabove.

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15. We  must  not  forget  that  we  are  dealing  with  a  beneficial

legislation. The Preamble which has been referred to casts light on the

object sought to be subserved by the 2013 Act in general, as well as

by Section 24. We have already seen that land acquisition is to take

place in a humane fashion, with the least disturbance to the owners of

the land, as also,  to provide just  and fair  compensation to affected

persons. Viewed in the light of the Preamble, this legislation, being a

beneficial  legislation,  must be construed in a way which furthers its

purpose [see Eera (through Dr. Manjula Krippendorf) v. State (NCT

of Delhi) and Anr., (2017) 15 SCC 133 at paragraphs 106, 128, 129,

and 131]. On the assumption, therefore, that two views are possible,

the  view  which  accords  with  the  beneficial  object  sought  to  be

achieved by the legislation, is obviously the preferred view.

16. We may also add that Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. v.

State of Tamil Nadu, (2015) 3 SCC 353, had held as follows:

“13. It  was faintly  suggested by Mr.  Subramonium Prasad,  learned AAG for  the State of  Tamil  Nadu that the proviso may come to the rescue of the State and save the proceedings from suffering lapse if it is held  that  since  there  was  an  award  leading  to payment of compensation in respect of some of the landholdings only, therefore all the beneficiaries may now be entitled to compensation in accordance with

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the provisions of the 2013 Act. This contention could have been considered with some more seriousness if  physical possession of the land had been taken but  since  that  has  not  been  done,  the  proviso dealing  only  with  compensation  cannot  be  of  any help to the State. Therefore, we are not required to go  deeper  into  the  effect  and  implications  of  the proviso  which  prima  facie  appears  to  be  for  the benefit  of  all  the landholders in a case where the award is subsisting because the proceedings have not lapsed and compensation in respect of majority of  landholdings  has  not  been  deposited  in  the account of the beneficiaries. There is nothing in the language of  the proviso to restrict  the meaning of the words used in Section 24(2) mandating that the proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed if the award is five years or more than five years old but the physical  possession of  the land has not  been taken over or the compensation has not been paid. The law is  trite  that  when the main  enactment  is clear  and  unambiguous,  a  proviso  can  have  no effect so as to exclude from the main enactment by implication what clearly falls within its express terms, as  held  by  the  Privy  Council  in  Madras  and Southern  Mahratta  Railway  Co.  Ltd. v.  Bezwada Municipality [(1943-44)  71 IA 113 :  (1944)  57 LW 422 : AIR 1944 PC 71] and by this Court in  CIT v. Indo Mercantile Bank Ltd. [AIR 1959 SC 713]. xxx xxx xxx

15. From the discussions made above, it  is amply clear that though there is lack of clarity on the issue whether compensation has been paid for majority of landholdings  under  acquisition  or  not,  there  is  no dispute  that  physical  possession  of  the  lands belonging to the appellants under consideration in these appeals have not been taken by the State or any other authority on its behalf and more than five years have elapsed since the making of the award

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dated 30-11-2006, and 1-1-2014 when the 2013 Act came  into  force.  Therefore,  the  conditions mentioned  in  Section  24(2)  of  the  2013  Act  are satisfied for allowing the plea of the appellants that the land acquisition proceedings must be deemed to have lapsed in terms of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.  The  appeals  are  disposed  of  accordingly.  It goes without saying that  the Government of  Tamil Nadu  shall  be  free,  if  it  so  chooses  to  initiate proceedings  of  such  land  acquisition  afresh  in accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act. In the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.”

This judgment has since been upset by a judgment of three learned

Judges in the case of Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra,

(2018)  3 SCC 412,  at  551 [“Indore Development Authority”].  The

judgment in  Indore Development Authority (supra) has itself been

referred  to  a  Bench  of  five  learned  Judges  vide order  dated

22.02.2018.

17. For all these reasons, it is better if this judgment were also to

be referred to the same Bench which is hearing Indore Development

Authority (supra) afresh, as that case also refers to different aspects

of  the same provision,  namely,  Section 24 of  the 2013 Act.  For  all

these reasons, we request the Chief  Justice of  India to refer  Delhi

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Metro Rail Corporation v. Tarun Pal Singh, (2018) 14 SCC 161 to

the aforesaid larger Bench for reconsideration thereof.  

       …………………………..J.         (R.F. NARIMAN)

        …………………………..J.          (VINEET SARAN)

New Delhi; February 27, 2019

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