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PETITIONER: DARSHAN SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF PUNJAB.ATTAR SINGHV.STATE OF PUNJAB.UNION OF INDIA-

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/12/1952

BENCH: MUKHERJEA, B.K. BENCH: MUKHERJEA, B.K. HASAN, GHULAM SASTRI, M. PATANJALI (CJ) AIYAR, N. CHANDRASEKHARA BOSE, VIVIAN

CITATION:  1953 AIR   83            1953 SCR  319

ACT: East Punjab Cotton Cloth and Yarn Order, 1947-Provincial law prohibiting  export of essential commodity  without  permit- Validity-Essential  Supplies (Temporary Powers)  Act,  1946, ss.  3  and 4-" Trade and Commerce ",  meaning  of-  Whether include   export-Construction  of  statutes-Acts   must   be construed as a whole.

HEADNOTE:    Section  3 of the Essential Supplies  (Temporary  Powers) Act,  1946,  which was passed by the Indian  Legislature  in 1946  empowered the Central Government by notified order  to provide  for  regulating  and  prohibiting  the  production, supply and distribution of any essential commodity and trade and commerce therein; s. 4 of the Act empowered the  Central Government  to  delegate  its  powers  under  s.  3  to  the Provincial Government or any officer thereof.  The  Governor of  the Punjab to whom such powers had been delegated  under s.  4 passed the East Punjab Cotton Cloth and  Yarn  Control Order, 1947, which prohibited the export of cotton cloth and yarn to any country outside India except under a permit, and made export without permit an offence.  The validity of this order  was  questioned on the ground that the  Governor  had acted  in excess of his powers in so far as  lie  prohibited export outside India without a permit:     Held,  (i)  that, keeping the object  of  the  Essential Supplies  Act, 1946, in view and reading the words  "  trade and  commerce  "  in a. 3 of the Act in  the  light  of  the context,  these words could be interpreted as including  the export   of   goods  outside  the   Province   including   a neighbouring  foreign State and the Governor in passing  the impugned Order did not act in excess of the powers delegated to him;    (ii)that  as the Central Legislature was fully  competent to legislate on exports and imports and making any provision relating thereto under the Government of India Act, 1935, it had  power  to make a law prohibiting export  to  a  foreign State,  even  &part from the powers conferred on it  by  the India (Central Government and and Legislature) Act, 1946  (9

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JUDGMENT: 320 (iii)     even  taking the legislation to be purely  on  the provincial  subjects of production, distribution and  supply of  goods, restriction of import as ancillary to  production and  supply of essential commodities would be  quite  within the  scope  and ambit of such legislation and  in  pith  and substance  the  enactment would be one  dealing  exclusively with these provincial matters.    It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that the language used  ’by  the  legislature is the true  depository  of  the legislative intent, and that words and phrases occurring  in a  statute  are to be taken not in an isolated  or  detached manner  dissociated  from the context,  but are to  be  read together  and  construed  in the light of  the  purpose  and object of the Act itself.

& CRIMINAL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Cases Nos. 11 and  12  of 1950.   Appeals  under Art. 132 (1) of the  Constitution  of India  from the Judgment and Order dated April 5,  1950,  of the  High  Court of Judicature for the State  of  Punjab  at Simla (Khosla J.) in Criminal Revision Nos, 1144 and 1147 of 1949. Achhru Ram (Gopal Singh, with him) for the appellant in Case No. 11. H.   J. Umrigar for the appellant in Case No. 12. S.   M.  Sikri (Advocate-General of Punjab) (H.  S.  Gujral, with him) for  the respondent, the State of Punjab. M.   C. Setalvad (Attorney-General for India) (B.  Sen, with him) for the Intervener.   1952.   December  5.  The  Judgment  of  the  Court   was delivered by   MUKHERJEA J.-The facts giving rise to these two connected appeals  may be briefly narrated as follows: Darshan  Singh, the  appellant in Case No. 1-1, and Attar Singh who  is  the appellant  in  Case No. 12, along with three  other  persons were  tried by the Special Magistrate, Ambala, East  Punjab, on  charges  under section 120-B of the Indian  Penal  Code, read  with section 3/10 of the East Punjab Cotton Cloth  and Yarn (Regulation of’ Movement) Order, 1947, and section 7 of the  Essential  Supplies Act, 1946.  There  wets  a  further charge  under  section,  8 of  the  Essential  Supplies  Act against three of these accused, Darshan Singh begning on  of them. 321 The  allegation against all the accused, in  substance,  was that they conspired to export 76 bags of mill-made cloth  to Pakistan without a permit, by smuggling them through     the customs barrier near Wagha, on the morning of the 26th ,May, 1948.  Wagha  is., about 18 miles from Amritsar,  and  at  a distance  of  nearly half a mile from this  place  lies  the actual  Indo-Pakistan border.  Between the  customs  barrier and  the  border  there is a small Police  Post  and  almost opposite  the  Police Post is the customs  office  which  is located in a tent.  The prosecution case’ is that at about 7 a. m. on the 26th of May, 1948, a truck, loaded with a large quantity  of millmade cloth owned by the accused Ram  Singh, arrived at the customs barrier near Wagha.  Rajendra  Singh, another accused, who was on duty at that time as the Customs Supervisor, allowed the truck to pass through and the  truck stopped  near the customs office on the side of  the  Police Post.  As soon as the truck stopped, Darshan Singh, who  was

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the Deputy Superintendent in charge of the customs  barrier, and  Attar  Singh, who was a Customs Preventive  Officer  at Amritsar and was then under order of transfer to some  other place, went to the Police Station and asked Kulraj, the Sub- Inspector in charge of the same, to allow the lorry to  pass through  upto  the border.  Kulraj did not  accede  to  this request  and  thereupon both Darshan Singh and  Attar  Singh went back to the customs tent.  The truck was then  unloaded and the goods were handed over to a large number of  coolies who  began carrying them towards the border, being  followed by both Attar Singh and Ram Singh.  A little later,  Kailash Chandra, a Police Sub-Inspector of Amritsar who was at  that time on special duty in connection with checking and  detec- tion  of  smuggling cases, arrived at the place on  a  motor bicycle  and being informed by Kulraj of what  had  happened before,  both  he and Kulraj proceeded in  his  motor  cycle towards  the  border  and  overtook  the  coolies  who  were carrying the goods.  The coolies were rounded up and brought back to the border along 322 with  Attar  Singh, though Ram Singh managed to  Slip  away. Kailash  Chandra  made a report of the occurrence  to  Inder Singh, who was the head of the Special Police  Establishment at Delhi dealing with smuggling cases, and after a  detailed investigation, the five accused were sent up to take  their- trial.   The trying Magistrate convicted all of  them  under section  120-B of the Indian Penal Code, read  with  section 3/10 of the East ’Punjab Cotton Cloth and Yarn Order,  1947, and sentenced them to rigorous imprisonment for a period  of one  year  each.  Attar Singh was  further  convicted  under section  7 of the Essential Supplies Act and  Darshan  Singh under section 8 of the said Act, and there was a sentence of one  year’s  rigorous imprisonment and a fine of  Rs.  1,000 upon each one of them under these sections, the sentence  of rigorous  imprisonment to run concurrently with that on  the previous charges.  Against this judgment there was an appeal taken by all the accused to the Court of the Sessions Judge at Amritsar.  The Additional  Sessions Judge, who heard the appeal,  acquitted two  of  the accused but maintained the  conviction  of  the other  three,  namely, Attar Singh, Ram  Singh  and  Darshan Singh, though their sentences were reduced.  Thereupon these three persons presented three separate revision petitions to the High Court of East Punjab at Simla which were heard  and disposed  of  by  Mr. Justice Khosla  sitting  singly.   The learned Judge dismissed the revision petitions but granted a certificate  under  article 132 of the Constitution  on  the ground that the cases involved a substantial question of low as to the interpretation of the Constitution.  It is on  the strength  of  this certificate that these two  appeals  have come  before  us, one being filed by Darshan Singh  and  the other  by Attar Singh.  No appeal has been preferred by  the accused Ram Singh.   The  constitutional point involved in these  appeals  has been presented before us very lucidly by Mr. Achhru Ram  who appeared on behalf of Darslian 323 Singh, the appellant in Case No. II, and his contention,  in substance,  is  that the East Punjab Cotton Cloth  and  Yarn Order,  1947, which was promulgated by the Governor of  East Punjab by notification dated 15th November, 1647, and  under the provisions of which the prosecution was launched against the accused, was ultra vires the authority of the  Governor, in so far as it purported to legislate on matters of  export and import across the customs frontier, and consequently the

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accused  could not be held guilty of any offence for  having violated such provisions.   For  a  proper  appreciation of raised   by  the  learned counsel,   it  would  be  necessary  to  refer  to   certain provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, as well  as to those of a number of later enactments.  Under entries  27 and  29 of List II of the Government of India Act,  1935,  " trade  and  commerce  within the province "  and  "  produc- tion......   supply  and  distribution  of  goods   "   were provincial  subjects, while " import and export  across  the customs  frontier " was a central subject being  covered  by item  19 in List I. Section 102 of the Government  of  India Act,  1935,  gave  the  Central  Legislature  the  power  to legislate on provincial subjects if and when a  proclamation was issued by the Governor-General that a state of emergency existed  in the country, and such legislation  would,  under sub-section (4) ’of the section, cease to have effect on the expiration   of   a.  period  of’  six  months   after   the proclamation  had ceased to operate.  It appears that  these extraordinary powers were assumed by the Central Legislature during  the  period  of  the  last  war  when  there  was  a Proclamation  of Emergency by the Governor-General, and  the Defence of India Rules promulgated during this period  dealt with  various’  provincial  matters.   The  Proclamation  of Emergency was revoked by the Governor-General under  section 102, clause (3), of the Constitution Act on 1st April, 1946, and the result of the revocation was that all orders  passed on  the basis of the Defence of India Act or the Defence  of India Rules ceased to be 42 324 operative after the 30th of September, 1946.  The  (state of the  country, however, was at that time far from normal  and it was considered necessary that the control of the  Central Legislature over the production, supply and distribution  of goods  should not be discontinued.  To meet this  situation, the British Parliament passed a temporary Act (9 and 10 Geo. 6 chapter 39) which gave the Indian Legislature, during  the period  specified  in the Act, the power to make  laws  with regard  to  certain provincial subjects.  The  provision  of section 2 of the Act, so far as is necessary for our present purpose,  stood as follows:    "(1) Notwithstanding anything in the Government of India Act,  1935, the Indian Legislature shall, during the  period mentioned in section 4 of this Act, have power to make  laws with respect to the following matters:   (a)trade and commerce (whether or not within a  Province) in  and the production, supply and distribution  of,  cotton and woollen textiles, paper, petroleum products, spare parts of  mechanically propelled vehicles, coal, iron,  steel  and mica; ".   Armed with this authority, the Indian Legislature  passed the  Essential  Supplies  (Temporary Powers)  Act  of  1946, sections 3 and 4 of which are in these terms:-  "  3.  The Central Government so far as it appears  to  it necessary   or  expedient  for  maintaining  or   increasing supplies  of any essential commodity or for  securing  their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices  may, by notified order provide for regulating and prohibiting the production,  supply and distribution thereof and  trade  and commerce therein. *              *                           *        *   4.The  Central  Government may by notified  order  direct that  the  power  to make orders under section  3  shall  in

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relation to such matters and subject to such conditions,, if any,  as may be specified in the direction,  be  exercisable also by 326 (a)    *             *          *            * (b)such  Provincial Government or such officer or  authority subordinate  to a Provincial Government as may be  specified in the direction."     By a notification dated 20th of December, 1946,  issued under  section  4 mentioned above,  the  Central  Government delegated to the Governor of Punjab the powers under section 3  of the Act.  On the 15th of November, 1947, the  Governor of  East Punjab, in exercise of the powers delegated by  the said  notification, passed the East Punjab Cotton Cloth  and Yarn (Regulation of Movement) Order, 1947, and sections 2, 3 and  10 of the Order are material for our  present  purpose. Section 2 is in these terms:-      "In  this Order unless there is anything repugnant  in the subject or context, (a) " export " means to take out  of the  Province of the East Punjab or the said land  by  rail, road  or river to any Province or State of the Dominions  of India  and Pakistan and includes taking out of the  Province of  East Punjab to any place, situated in the said lands  as well  as out of the said lands to any place situated in  the East Punjab.  "   Section 3 runs as follows:-    "  No  person shall export or attempt to  export  cotton cloth  or yarn except under the authority and in  accordance with the conditions of a permit, issued by a permit  issuing authority..........   The  permit  shall  be  in  form   IV, specified in Schedule ’A’ annexed to this Order ".    Section 10 provides:-   "If  any person contravenes any provision of this  Order, he shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to 3  years,  with fine or both and without  prejudice  to  any other  general punishment which may be imposed by any  court trying  such contravention may direct that any cotton  cloth and/,or yarn in respect of which the court is satisfied that this  order, has been contravened together with the 326 covering   and packing of such cloth shall be  forfeited  to His Majesty."    The  point for our consideration is, whether the  -above provisions  which prohibit inter alia the export of  certain essential commodities to any country outside India without a permit and make the violation of such provisions an offence, were validly made by the Governor in exercise of the  powers delegated  to him under section 4 of the Essential  Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act 1946 ?    It  is not suggested by the learned counsel  that  there was anything improper in the Central Government’s delegating its powers to the Governor of East Punjab under section 4 of the   Essential  Supplies  (Temporary  Powers)   Act.    His contention is that the Governor, in making the order,  acted in  excess  of  is delegated authority  by  prohibiting  the export  of  cotton  cloth and yarn to any  I  place  outside India.   Matters of export and import, it is said, were  not within the scope of section 3 of the Essential Supplies  and :the  notification tinder section 4 could only  delegate  to the  Governor  such powers as the Central  Government  could itself ’exercise under section 3. Section 3 of the Essential Supplies Act, it is true, authorised the Central  Government to  make  provisions  for  regulating-and  prohibiting   the production,   supply  and  distribution  of  the   essential commodities  -specified  in  the  Act  and  also  trade  and

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commerce  therein; but it is argued by the  learned  counsel that  the expression, " trade and commerce ", as used in the section,  must be taken to mean trade and commerce within  a province  or at the most between provinces inter se, but  it cannot  include  any transaction by way of  exporting  goods outside India.  This interpretation, somewhat restricted  as it  appears to us, is sought to be supported by  a  two-fold argument.   In  the  first  Place, it,  is  said,  that  the Essential  Supplies Act, as its, Preamble shows, was  passed by  the  Central Legislature in exercise  of  the  authority conferred  upon  it  by the India  (Central  Government  and Legislature)  Act, 1946, (9 and, 10 Geo. 6, c. 39)  and that statute 327 conferred, only for a short period of time, a, power in  the Central   Indian.Legislature   to   legislate   on   certain provincial  matters,  which  it  could  not  do  after   the revocation   of  the  Proclamation  of  -Emergency  on   the termination  of  the war.  It is said, therefore,  that  the Essential  Supplies Act purported to deal  exclusively  with provincial  matters, and import and export of goods  outside the  Indian  territory, being a central subject,  could  not reasonably  be brought within the purview of the  Act.   The other  line of reasoning that is put forward in  support  of the  argument is, that the intention of the  Central  Legis- lature   not  to  include  export  and  import  within   the provisions of the Essential Supplies Act is evidenced by the fact,  that  the Central Legislature dealt with  export  and import -of goods separately, and by an, altogether different set  of  enactments  which  exist  side  by  side  with  the Essential  Supplies  Act and other legislation of  the  same type  preceding  it.  It is pointed out that  there  was  an order made under the Defence of India Rules on 3rd November, 1945,   (being  Order  No.  91  c.  w.  (1)   45)   imposing prohibitions  on  export of various  descriptions  of  goods specified  therein.  The Defence of India Rules were due  to expire on the 30th September, 1946.  On the 26th  September, 1946,  the Essential Supplies Ordinance was passed and  this was  later replaced by the Essential Supplies Act.   On  the very day that this Ordinance ,was passed, another Ordinance, being Ordinance No. XX of 1946, was promulgated, which inter alia continued the provisions of the Defence of India  Rules relating to prohibition and restriction of import and export of goods.  Subsequently on the 26th of March, 1947, the  Im- ports  and  Exports (Control) Act was  passed,  which  dealt comprehensively with the subject of control over exports and imports.   As  it  would be unnatural to  suppose  that  the legislature   was   legislating   on   the   same    subject simultaneously by two parallel sets of legislation  existing side  by side, it is argued that export and import of  goods were  not within the scope and intendment of  the  Essential Supplies Act. 328 These arguments though somewhat plausible at first sight, do not  appear  to  us  to be sound or  convincing.   It  is  a cardinal  rule of interpretation that the language  used  by the  legislature is the true depository of  the  legislative intent,  and that words and phrases occurring in  a  statute are  to  be  taken not in an  isolated  or  detached  manner dissociated  from the context, but are to be  read  together and construed in the light of the purpose and object of  the Act itself.   The  object of the Essential Supplies Act, as set out  in the  preamble, was to provide for the continuance, during  a limited  period  of  time,  of  the  power  to  control  the

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production,  supply  and  distribution  of,  and  trade  and commerce  in,  foodstuffs,  cotton  and  woollen   textiles, petroleum,  iron and other essential commodities, a list  of which  appeared in the Act itself.  Section 3, which is  the most  material  part  of the Act,,  authorised  the  Central Government,  whenever it considered expedient or  necessary, for  maintaining  or increasing supplies  of  any  essential commodity  or for securing their equitable distribution  and availability  at fair prices, to provide by notified  order, for  regulating or prohibiting, the production,  supply  and distribution   thereof   or  trade  and  commerce   therein. Keeping   this  object  in  view  and  reading  the   words" trade  and  commerce " in the light of  the  context,  there appears to be no reason why these words should not be  taken in  their ordinary or natural sense and why  restriction  on the  export  of  goods  to any  place  outside  a  province, including  a neighbouring foreign State should be deemed  to be  outside  their  scope and  ambit.   For  maintenance  or increase  of  supply  of  essential  commodities  within   a province  and  to secure their  equitable  distribution  and availability at fair prices, it might certainly be necessary to  restrict export of the goods outside the  province,  and Pakistan being a foreign State abutting on the very  borders of  East  Punjab, it was quite natural for the  East  Punjab Governor  to mention Pakistan as one of the places to  which export  of  goods from his province should  not  be  allowed without a proper permit.  As 329 the  main object of the legislation was the  continuance  of control  over  the production, supply  and  distribution  of commodities  considered  essential to the community  and  as these  are provincial subjects, the Central  Legislature  in legislating on them must have to invoke the powers conferred upon  it by the India (Central Government  and  Legislature) Act,  1946 (9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 39) spoken of above; and  that is  plainly the reason why a reference to that  statute  was made  in  the second paragraph, of the preamble.   But  from this  it cannot be argued that the Central  Legislature  was legislating only in exercise of the powers which it  derived from the British Parliament and that it did not exercise the powers  which  it itself had under the Government  of  India Act.   It is not disputed that the Central  Legislature  was fully  competent to legislate on exports and  imports  which are  central subjects and in making any  provision  relating thereto,  it cannot be said that it acted in excess  of  its authority.   Even   taking  the  legislation  to  be  purely  on   the provincial  subjects of production, distribution and  supply of  goods, restriction of export as ancillary to  production and  supply of essential commodities would, in our  opinion, be quite within the scope and ambit of such legislation  and in  pith  and  substance it would be  an  enactment  dealing exclusively with these provincial matters.   Looked  at  from  this  standpoint,  the  other  argument advanced by Mr. Achhru Ram would also be found to be without any  substance.  The imports and Exports Act or the  earlier Order  and  Ordinance, referred to by the  learned  counsel, were  legislation essentially on the subject of exports  and imports.   Their object was to regulate or  control  imports and exports generally and they dealt with a large variety of articles far outnumbering those enumerated in the  Essential Supplies Act.  The object of the imports and Exports Act was not  to regulate production and distribution of  commodities considered essential to the community 330

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and  it  was not as a means to secure that  object  that  it purported to prohibit or restrict exporting of goods.   Thus the  scope and purpose of the two sets of  legislation  were totally  different  and  there was  nothing  wrong  if  they existed  side by the side and were in operation at  one  and the  same  time,  We  are  not  told  that  there  was   any overlapping of the provisions of these two statutes; and  as the  competency of the legislature to enact both these  sets of  provisions  is not disputed, we do not  think  that  any occasional  overlapping,  even if it is  assumed  to  exist, would  be at all material.  In our opinion,  therefore,  the contentions  raised  in regard to the  constitutional  point involved in these appeals are unsupportable and could not be accepted.    As the appeals have come up before us on the strength of a   certificate  granted  under  article.  132(1)   of   the Constitution,  the appellants are not entitled to  challenge the  propriety of the decision appealed against on a  ground other  than that on which the certificate was  given  except with  the leave of this court as provided for by clause  (3) of  article  132 of the Constitution.  At the close  of  the arguments  of  the parties in regard to  the  constitutional point  referred, to above., we made it clear to the  learned counsel appearing for both the appellants that we would  not allow any question relating to the merits of the cases to be raised  before  us which turned merely  on  appreciation  of evidence by the courts below.  Mr. Umrigar, who appeared for Attar Singh the appellant in Case No. 12, however stated  to us  that  he would crave leave to bring to  our  notice  one important matter which, according to him, resulted in  grave miscarriage  of  Justice at least so far as his  client  was concerned.  He pointed out that both the Additional Sessions judge  and the learned Judge of the High Court  in  deciding the case against his client relied upon an admission alleged to  have been made by the latter that he was present at  the customs  barrier  at  Wagha on the morning  of  the  day  of occurrence and had gone there to say good-bye to the customs staff, he 331 being under an order of transfer from Amritsar to Gurdaspur. It  is  said by the learned counsel that  his  client  never admitted his presence at the customs barrier on the  morning of  26th  May,  1948, and that he neither did  nor  had  any occasion  to  put  forward  any  explanation  regarding  his presence  there at that time.  The whole thing, it is  said, is based upon sheer misapprehension and is not warranted  by anything appearing on the record.  There  is no doubt that the Additional Sessions  Judge  as well  as  the  High  Court did  refer  in  their  respective judgments  to the alleged admission of Attar Singh and  rely upon the same to arrive at their decision in the case.   The Additional Sessions Judge said in his judgment:   "  The  next important man is Attar  Singh  accused.   He admits his presence at the barrier on that morning, when  he says  that he had gone to bid good-bye to the customs  staff on his transfer to Gurdaspur According to the leave obtained by  him  he had yet to remain at Amritsar till 28th  and  in view of illness of his wife  he need not have been in  hurry to  go  to the barrier for this purpose so soon.  I  am  not convinced with his explanation."  The High Court in referring to the said admission observed as follows:   " Attar Singh admitted that he was present at the barrier on  that morning but the explanation he gave was this.   His office is at Amritsar but be had received orders of transfer

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to Gurdaspur.  His wife was ill and, therefore, he could not move  immediately.  So he applied for a few days leave,  and on the morning of the 26th of May he went to the barrier  to say goodbye to his colleagues in the Customs Department  and while  he  was there this incident took  place  without  his knowledge......... Attar Singh’s explanation of his presence at the spot does not convince me at all."    It  appears  that in course of the  examination  of  the accused Attar Singh under section 342 of the Criminal 43 332 Procedure  Code  before  the  trial  Magistrate  a  specific question  was put to him as to whether he could explain  his presence  on the scene of occurrence on the 26th May,  1948, although  it  was  alleged that he was on  leave.   To  this question he replied categorically that he was not present as alleged.  In this state of the records, we asked the learned Advocate-General, who appeared for the State of East Punjab, as to when and how was the admission referred to above  made by  Attar  Singh.  The Advocate-General, answered  that  the admission  might  be in the written  statement  which  Attar Singh  said  he would file when he  was  interrogated  under section  342  of the Criminal Procedure Code.  In  order  to clear  up the matter we had the further hearing of the  case adjourned  to enable the Advocate-General to produce  before us  the written statement, if any, that was filed  by  Attar Singh  in the trial court.  The case was again taken up  for hearing  on  the  26th of November last  and  the  Advocate- General  frankly stated to us that no written  statement  by Attar  Singh  ’was  on the records at  all.   It  is  clear, therefore,  that  both the courts below in coming  to  their decision  regarding the guilt of the accused did rely  to  a considerable  extent  on the so-called  admission  of  Attar Singh which, it must be held, had no existence in fact.  The Advocate-General  contends that even if there was  an  error committed  by  the courts below in this respect,  we  should nevertheless  dismiss  the  appeal  inasmuch  as  there   is sufficient evidence to support the conviction of the accused independently of the so-called admission of Attar Singh; and he invited us to examine the evidence ourselves and come  to our own decision on the point.  Without in any way disputing our  right  to adopt this course in cases where  it  may  be considered necessary, we think that in the circumstances  of the present case the proper order to make will be to  direct a  rehearing  of  the appeal by the Session&  Court  on  the evidence   as  it  actually  stands  after  excluding   from consideration  the alleged Admission of Attar Singh.   There can be no doubt 333 that the supposed admission was of a very damaging character and  was highly prejudicial to the accused.  It  is  quite,, problematic to value its effect upon the minds of the Judges in  the courts below and it is difficult for us to say  that had  it  been excluded from consideration the  courts  would have come to the same decision of guilt or that conversely a verdict  of  acquittal would have been a perverse  one.   In such  cases,  the function of this court, which  is  not  an ordinary  court of criminal appeal, is not so much to  weigh and  appraise  the evidence again to find out the  guilt  or innocence  of the accused as to see that the accused gets  a fair trial on proper evidence.  It  has been argued by Mr. Achhru Ram, and in our  opinion quite  rightly,  that if the case of Attar Singh  is  to  be heard  afresh, the same order should be made in the case  of Darshan  Singh as well.  Not only are the two cases  closely

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interconnected, but so far as Darshan Singh is concerned the prosecution  sought  to  establish his  complicity.  in  the affair primarily by adducing evidence to show that he was in the  company  of Attar Singh when both  of  them  approached Kulraj,  the  officer-in-charge of the police  station,  and requested  him  to  allow the truck to  pass  through.   The Additional Sessions Judge observed in his judgment that  the only  motive  of Darshan Singh was to  help  his  colleague, namely Attar Singh, who was about to leave the district.  It is  necessary,  therefore, that the case  of  Darshan  Singh should  also be reheard and the whole evidence  against  him reconsidered with a view to find out whether he is guilty or innocent.   The  result,  therefore,  is that both  the  appeals  are allowed.  The judgment of the High Court as well as that  of the  Additional Sessions Judge are set aside and  the  cases remitted  to  the Sessions Court in order that they  may  be heard  afresh on the evidence on record in the light of  the observations  made above after excluding from  consideration the supposed admission of Attar Singh., Pending the decision of the  Session a Court, the accused would remain on bail 7  on the same terms as before.                      Appeals allowed. Agent for the appellant in Case No. 11: Naunit Lal. Agent for the appellant in Case No. 12: A. D. Mathur. Agent for the respondent and the intervener G.    H. Rajadhyaksha.