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PETITIONER: D. N. BANERJI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: P. R. MUKHERJEE AND OTHERS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/12/1952

BENCH: AIYAR, N. CHANDRASEKHARA BENCH: AIYAR, N. CHANDRASEKHARA SASTRI, M. PATANJALI (CJ) MUKHERJEA, B.K. BOSE, VIVIAN HASAN, GHULAM

CITATION:  1953 AIR   58            1953 SCR  302  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1956 SC 676  (20)  R          1957 SC 110  (3,4)  R          1957 SC 532  (24A)  R          1958 SC 321  (6)  RF         1958 SC 353  (18)  R          1960 SC 610  (20)  E&R        1960 SC 675  (5,6,12,14)  R          1961 SC1567  (4)  E          1964 SC 903  (10)  RF         1968 SC 554  (6,7,24,26)  R          1970 SC1453  (8)  R          1972 SC 763  (12)  E&R        1978 SC 548  (4,10,34,37,43,50,60,62,65,67,  R          1980 SC2181  (54)  F          1987 SC 117  (16)  R          1988 SC1182  (7)  R          1990 SC2047  (7)  R          1992 SC 780  (10)

ACT:  Industrial   Disputes  Act,  1947,  s.  2  (j)  and   (k)- "Industry,"    "Industrial  dispute",   meaning   of-Dispute between  municipality and its  employees-Whether  industrial dispute-Legality of reference to Tribunal.

HEADNOTE:   The expression industrial dispute " in the Industrial Dis- putes  Act, 1947, includes disputes  between  municipalities and their employees in branches of work that can be regarded as  analogous to the carrying on of a trade or business.   " Undertaking  "  in the first part of the  definition  and  " industrial  occupation  or  avocation" in  the  second  part obviously mean much more than what is ordinarily  understood by  trade  or  business.   The  definition  was   apparently intended to include within its scope what might not strictly be called a trade or business venture.    Where  the chairman of a municipality -dismissed  two  of its  employees, namely, the Sanitary Inspector and the  Head Clerk, and-the Municipal Workers’ Union, of which these  two

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employees  were  members  questioned the  propriety  of  the dismissal  and claimed that they should be  re-instated  and the matter was referred by the Government to the  Industrial Tribunal for adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act, and  an  objection was raised by the municipality  that  the dispute was not an industrial dispute:   Held, that the definition of " industrial dispute " in the said  Act was -wide enough to cover the dispute in  question and the matter could properly be referred to a Tribunal  for adjudication under the said Act.   Held  also, that though the power of a Tribunal under  the Industrial  Disputes Act, 1947, to reinstate  its  employees trenches  on  the  power to appoint  and  dismiss  employees conferred on the chairman of a municipality by ss. 66 and 67 of the Bengal Municipal Act and there is thus an invasion on the provincial field of legislation, the Industrial Disputes Act  is  not  invalid on this ground as it is  in  pith  and substance  a  law  in  respect  of  industrial  and   labour disputes, which is a central subject.   Profulla  Kumar  Mookerjee  v. Bank  of  Conbinerce  Ltd., Khulna   (L.R.  74  I.A.  23),  Western   India   Automobile Association  v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay ([1949]   F.C.R. 321), National Association 303 of  Local Government Officers v. Bolton Corporation  ([1943] A.C.   16(  and  Federated  Municipal  and   Shire   Council Employees’  Union of Australia v. Melbourne Corporation  (26 Com.  L.R. 508) referred to

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION-: Case No. 282  of 1951.  Appeal  under  Art. 132 (1) of the Constitution  of  India from the Judgment and Order dated June 1, 1950 1 of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Harries C. J. and  Banerjee J.)  in Civil Rule No. 563 of 1950 and Original Side  Matter No. 25 of 1950.  Panchanan Ghose (A.  K. Dutt and B. L. Jarafdar, with him) for the appellant. B.   Sen for respondents Nos. 1 and 2. S.   N. Mukherjee for respondent.  No. 3.   1952.   December  5.  The  Judgment  of  the  Court   was delivered by    CHANDRA,SEKHARA  AIYAR J.-Pratul Chandra Mitra  was  the Head Clerk, and Phanindra Nath Ghose, the Sanitary Inspector of the Budge Budge Municipality, and they were also  members of  the Municipal Workers’ Union.  On receipt of  complaints against    them   for   negligence,   insubordination    and indiscipline,  the  Chairman of the  Municipality  suspended them  on 13th July, 1949, drew up separate proceedings,  and called  for an explanation within a specified  date.   After the  explanations were received, they were considered  at  a meeting  of the Commissioners held on 6th August, 1949,  and by  a  majority, the Commissioners confirmed  the  order  of suspension and directed the dismissal of the two  employees. At  the  instance  of  the  Municipal  Workers’  Union,  who questioned  the  propriety of the dismissal the  matter  was referred  by  the State of West Bengal  on  24th  September, 1949, to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication under  the Industrial  Disputes  Act.  The Tribunal made its  award  on 13th February, 1950,. that the suspension and punishment  of the  two  employees  were cases  of  victimisation,  and  it directed their reinstatement in their respective offices, 304

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The  Municipality  took the matter to the High   Court  at Calcutta  by  means of a petition for a writ  of  certiorari under  articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. There  were prayers in the petition for quashing the proceedings  before the  Tribunal,  for cancellation of the award,  and  for  an order restraining the authorities from giving effect to  the award  and from taking any steps in pursuance  thereof.   At the  instance of the High Court, a separate application  was filed  under article 227.  Both the petitions were heard  by Harries C. J. and Sambhu Nath Baneriee J.   The   points  raised  before  them  on  behalf   of   the petitioners  were  five  in  all:  (a)  that  there  was  no industrial   dispute,  and  therefore  there  could  be   no reference under the Industrial Disputes Act to any Tribunal; (b)  that the said Act was not applicable to  disputes  with Municipalities; (e) that even if it did, it was ultra vires; (d)   ’that   the   Tribunal  should   not   have   directed reinstatement  of the dismissed employees; and (e) that  the award  was  bad  on  the  merits.   These  contentions  were negatives  by  the learned Judges, and  the  petitions  were dismissed.   But leave was granted under article 132 (1)  of the Constitution, and that is how the matter has now come up before us.    It  is  not necessary to dwell at any length  on  points (c), (d) and (e).  If the Industrial Disputes Act applies to Municipalities  and their employees, the power to  reinstate dismissed  employees,  held  in  Western  India   Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay and Others (1) to be  within the competence of a Tribunal under the Act,  will trench  no  doubt on the power to appoint and  dismiss  con- ferred  on the Chairman and Commissioners of  Municipalities under sections 66 and 67 of the Bengal Municipal Act.   This invasion  of  the provincial field of legislation  does  not however  render the Industrial Disputes Act of  the  central legislature invalid, as we. have to pay regard primarily  to the pith and (1)  [1949] F. C. R. 321. 305 substance of the challenged Act in considering the  question of  conflict between the two jurisdictions.  Industrial  and labour  disputes  are within the competence of  the  central legislature,  and the impugned Act deals with  this  subject and  not  with local government.  The point  is  covered  by Profulla  Kumar Mookerjee v. Bank of Commerce  Ltd.,  Khulna (1).   Whether  on the facts of a particular case the  dismissal of  an  employee  was wrongful or justified  is  a  question primarily for the Tribunal to decide, and here the  Tribunal held  that the dismissals were clear cases of  victimisation and hence wrongful.  Unless there was any -grave miscarriage of  justice  or  flagrant  violation  of  law  calling   for intervention,  it is not for the High Court  under  articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to interfere.     Points  (a) and (b) are interlaced.  The  dismissal  of the  two  employees was taken up by the  Municipal  Workers’ Union  who  challenged it as grossly improper.  Thus  it  is clear  that there was a dispute between the employer,  viz., the   Municipality  on  the  one  side,  and   the   workman represented by the Union on the other.  But what is urged by the Municipality is that it was not an "industrial dispute " within the meaning of the Act, and hence there was no juris- diction  in  the  Government  to  refer  the  dispute  to  a Tribunal.   It  is  contended  on  their  behalf  that   the Municipality in discharging its normal duties connected with local  self-government  is not engaged in  any  industry  as

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defined  in  the Act.  It is this question that we  have  to consider,  and  for  this purpose it  becomes  necessary  to examine rather closely some of the provisions in the Act  to ascertain their true scope and meaning.  " Industry " and " industrial dispute " are defined in the Act in section 2, clauses (j) and (k) as follows:   "(j) ’ industry’ means any business, trade,  undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and (1947) L. R. 74.  I. A. 23. 306 includes  any  calling, service, employment,  handicraft  or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen;  (k)     industrial   disputes   means   any   dispute   or difference  between  employers  and  employers,  or  between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is  connected with the employment or non-employment  or  the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person."   As clause (k) refers to workmen, we must also look at the definition  of  " workman" in clause (s) which is  in  these terms:    "workman"  means  any  person  employed  (including   an apprentice)  in any industry to do any skilled or  unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward and includes, for the  purposes of any proceedings under this Act in  relation to  an industrial dispute, a workman discharged during  that dispute,  but  does not include any person employed  in  the naval, military or air service of the Government."   Corresponding definitions of "trade dispute" and workman" are found in section 8 of the Industrial Courts Act, 1919 (9 and 10; Geo.  V, c. 69), and they run in these terms:  "  The  expression ’trade dispute’ means  any  dispute  or difference between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen connected with the employment or non-employment, or  the  terms of the employment or with the  conditions  of labour of any person :  The expression ’workman’ means any person who has  entered into or works under a contract with an employer whether  the contract  be  by  way of manual labour,  clerical  work,  or otherwise, be expressed or implied, oral or in writing,  and whether it be a contract of service or of apprenticeship  or a contract personally to execute any work or labour."   "  Trade  dispute  " as defined in the  English  Act  and "industrial  dispute"  as defined in our Act mean  the  same thing practically. 307 It has to be conceded, even at the outset, that an  industry can be carried on by or under the authority of the  Central, or  State  Government,  or  by  or  on  behalf  of  a  local authority.  This is made clear not only by the provision  in sub-clause  (i) of clause (a) of section 2 but also  by  the definition  of  " employer" in clause (g) to  the  following effect: " ’employer’ means-   (i)  in relation to an industry, carried on by  or  under the authority of any department of the Central Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or  where  no  authority  is prescribed,  the  head  of  the department;  (ii)    in  relation  to an industry carried on by  or  on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer  of that authority; ".   Where  a dispute arises in such an industry  between  the employees- on the one side and the Central Government or the State  or  the  local  body on the other,  it  would  be  an

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industrial dispute undoubtedly.  But where a dispute  arises in connection with the discharge of the normal activities of Government  or  of  a  local body,  it  is  argued  for  the appellant  that  the  dispute  cannot  be  regarded  as   an industrial dispute.  The soundness of this contention  falls to be examined.  In the ordinary or non-technical sense, according to  what is understood by the man in the street, industry or business means  an  undertaking where capital and  labour  co-operate with  each other for the purpose of producing wealth in  the shape  of  goods,  machines,  tools  etc:,  and  for  making profits.   The  concept of industry in this  ordinary  sense applies even to agriculture, horticulture, pisciculture  and -so on and so forth.  It is also clear that every aspect  of activity in which the relationship of employer and  employee exists  or  arises does not thereby become  an  industry  as commonly  understood.   We  hardly  think  in  terms  of  an industry,  when we have regard, for instance, to the  rights and duties of master and servant, or of a Government and its secretariat, or the members of 40 308 the  medical profession working in a hospital.  It would  be regarded  as  absurd to think so ; at any  rate  the  layman unacquainted with advancing legal concepts of what is  meant by industry would rule out such a connotation as impossible. There  is nothing however to prevent a statute  from  giving the  word industry " and the words " industrial dispute "  a wider  and  more comprehensive import in order to  meet  the requirements of rapid industrial progress and to bring about in the interests of industrial peace and economy, a fair and satisfactory  adjustment of relations between employers  and workmen  in a variety of fields of activity.  It is  obvious that the limited concept of what an industry meant in  early times must now yield place to an enormously wider concept so as to take in various and varied forms of industry, so  that disputes  arising in connection with them might  be  settled quickly without much dislocation and disorganisation of  the needs   of  society  and  in  a  manner  more   adapted   to conciliation  and  settlement than a  determination  of  the respective rights and liabilities according to strict  legal procedure and principles.  The conflicts between capital and labour have now to be determined more from the standpoint of status  than  of contract.  Without such  an  approach,  the numerous  problems that now &rise for solution in the  shape of industrial disputes cannot be tackled Satisfactorily, and this  is why every civilised government has thought  of  the machinery of conciliation officers, Boards and Tribunals for the effective settlement of disputes.  It  is  therefore incumbent on us to  ascertain  what  the statute  means  by " industry" and  "  industrial  dispute", leaving  aside the original meaning attributed to the  words in a simpler state of society, when we had only one employer perhaps,   doing  a  particular  trade  or  carrying  on   a particular business with the help of his own tools, material and  skill  and employing a few workmen in  the  process  of production  or  manufacture,  and when  such  disputes  that occurred  and  not go behind individual  levels  into  acute fights 309 between  rival organisations of workmen and  employers,  and when large scale strikes and look-outs throwing society into chaos  and confusion were practically unknown.   Legislation had to keep pace with the march of times and to provide  for new  situations.  Social evolution is a process of  constant

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growth,  and the State cannot afford to stand still  without taking  adequate measures by means of legislation  to  solve large  and momentous problems that arise is  the  industrial field from day to day almost.  These remarks are necessary for a proper understanding  of the meaning of the terms employed by the statute.  It is  no doubt true that the meaning should be ascertained only  from the  words employed in the definitions, but the  get-up  and context are also relevant for ascertaining what exactly  was meant  to  be  conveyed by  the  terminology  employed.   As observed,  by  Lord  Atkinson in  Keates  v.  Lewis  Merthyr Consolidated  Collieries  (1), " In the  construction  of  a statute  it  is,  of  course, at all  times  and  under  all circumstances  permissible  to have regard to the  state  of things  existing at the time the statute was passed, and  to the  evils  which,  as appears from it  provisions,  it  was designed to remedy." If the words are capable of one meaning alone, then it must be adopted, but if they are  susceptible of  wider import, we have to pay regard to what the  statute or the particular piece of legislation had in view.   Though the definition may be more or less the same in two different statutes,  still the objects to be achieved not only as  set out  in  the  preamble  but  also  as  gatherable  from  the antecedent   history  of  the  legislation  may  be   widely different.  The same words may mean one thing in one context and another in a different context.  This is the reason  why decisions  on the meaning of particular words or  collection of words found in other statutes are scarcely of much  value when  we  have to deal with a specific statute of  our  own; they  may  be  helpful, but cannot be  taken  as  guides  or precedents. (1)  [1911] A.C. 641 at 642. 310  The words " industrial dispute " convey the meaning to the ordinary mind that the dispute must be such as would  affect large  groups  of workmen and employers ranged  on  opposite sides on some general questions on which each group is bound together by a community of interests-such as wages, bonuses, allowances,  pensions,  provident fund,  number  of  working hours per week, holidays and so on.  Even with reference  to a  business  that is carried on, we would  hardly  think  of saying  that  there  is  an  industrial  dispute  where  the employee is dismissed’ by his employer and the dismissal  is questioned as wrongful.  But at the same time, having regard to the modern conditions of society where capital and labour have  Organised  themselves into groups for the  purpose  of fighting  their disputes and settling them on the  basis  of the  theory  that  in  union  is  strength,  and  collective bargaining has come to stay, a single employee’s case  might develop  into an industrial dispute, when as often  happens, it  is taken up ’by the trade union of which be is a  member and  there  is  a  concerted demand  by  the  employees  for redress.   Such trouble may arise in a single  establishment or a factory.  It may well arise also in such a manner as to cover the industry as a whole in a case where the grievance, if any, passes from the region of individual complaint  into a  general  complaint on behalf of all the  workers  in  the industry.  Such widespread extension of labour unrest is not a rare phenomenon but is of frequent occurrence.  In such  a case,  even an industrial dispute in a  particular  business becomes   a  large  scale  industrial  dispute,  which   the Government cannot afford to ignore as a minor trouble to  be settled between the particular employer and workman.    When  our  Act came to be passed,  labour  disputes  had already  assumed  big proportions, and  there  were  clashes

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between workmen and employers in several instances.  We  can assume  therefore that it was to meet such a situation  that the  Act  was enacted, and it is consequently  necessary  to give  the  terms  employed  in the  Act  referring  to  such disputes a wide an 311 import  as  reasonably  possible.   Do  the  definitions  of "industry",  "industrial dispute" and "workman" take in  the extended  significance,  or exclude it?  Though the  word  " undertaking " in the definition of 1 " industry " is  wedged in   between  business  and  trade  on  the  one  hand   and manufacture on the other, and though therefore it might mean only  a  business or( trade undertaking, still  it  must  be remembered  that if that were so, there was no need  to  use the  word  separately  from business or  trade.   The  wider import  is attracted even more clearly when we look  at  the latter  part  of the definition which refers to  "  calling, service, employment, or industrial occupation or a  vocation of  workmen."  "  Undertaking " in the  first  part  of  the definition and " industrial occupation or avocation " in the second part obviously mean much more than what is ordinarily understood  by  trade  or  business.   The  definition   was apparently  intended to include within its scope what  might not strictly be called a trade or business venture.    Another  provision in the Act defining " public  utility service  " and contained in sub-clause (n) of section  2  is very  relevant  and  important in the  interpretation  of  " industry  "  and  " industrial dispute " and it  is  to  the following effect : " ’public utility service’ means- (i)  any railway service (ii) any  section  of an industrial  establishment,  on  the working  of  which the safety of the  establishment  or  the workmen employed therein depends; (iii)     any postal, telegraph or telephone service; (iv) any industry which supplies power, light, or water to the public; (v)  any system of public conservancy or sanitation; (vi) any  industry  specified  in  the  Schedule  which  the appropriate   Government  may,  if  satisfied  that   public emergency or public interest so requires, by notification in the official Gazette declare to be a public’ utility service for the purposes of this 312 Act,   for  such  period  as  may  be  specified   in    the notification ;   Provided  that the period so specified shall not, in  the first  instance,  exceed  six  months but  may,  by  a  like notification,  be extended from time to time, by any  period not exceeding six months, at any one time if in the  opinion of  the  appropriate Government public emergency  or  public interest requires such extension."    A  public utility service such as  railways,  telephones and the supply of power, light or water to the public may be carried  on by private companies or  business  corporations. Even conservancy or sanitation may be so carried on,  though after  the introduction of local self-government  this  work has in almost every country been assigned as a duty to local bodies  like our Municipalities or District Boards or  Local Boards.  A dispute in these I services between employers and workmen is an industrial dispute, and the proviso to section 10  lays down that where such a dispute arises and a  notice under section 22 has been given, the appropriate  Government shall make a reference under the sub-section.  If the public utility  service  is  carried on by  a  corporation  like  a

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Municipality  which is the creature of a statute, and  which functions under the limitations imposed by the statute, does it cease to be an industry for this reason ? The only ground on  which  one  could say that what  would  amount  to  .the carrying on of an industry if it is done by a private person ceases  to be so if the same work is carried on by  a  local body  like  a Municipality is that in the  latter  there  is nothing like the investment of any capital or the  existence of  a  profit  earning motive as there  generally  is  in  a business.   But neither the one nor the other seems  a  sine qua  non  or necessary element in the modern  conception  of industry.   In specifying the purpose to which the municipal fund  is applicable,  section 108 of the Bengal Municipal Act (XV  of 1932) enumerates under 36 separate heads several things such as the construction and 313 maintenance of streets, lighting, water supply, conservancy, maintenance  of dairy farms and milk depots, the  taking  of markets  on lease etc.  They may be described as the  normal functions or ordinary activities of the Municipality.   Some of  these  functions  may appertain to and  partake  of  the nature of an industry, while others may not.  For  instance, there  is  a necessary element of  distinction  between  the supply  of power and light to the inhabitants of  a  Munici- pality   and  the  running  of  charitable   hospitals   and dispensaries for the aid of the poor.  In ordinary parlance, the  former  might be regarded as an industry  but  not  the latter.   The very idea underlying the entrustment  of  such duties or functions to local bodies is not to take them  out of the sphere of industry but to secure the substitution  of public authorities in the place of private employers and  to eliminate  the motive of profit-making as far  as  possible. The  levy  of taxes for the maintenance of the  services  of sanitation and conservancy or the supply of light and  water is ’a method adopted and devised to make up for the  absence of  capital.   The  undertaking or the  service  will  still remain within the ambit of what we understand by an industry though  it  is carried on with the aid of taxation,  and  no immediate material gain by way of profit is envisaged.  In  National Association of Local Government  Officers  v. Bolton  Corporation (1), after referring to the  definitions of  " trade dispute " and "workman " contained in the  order of  reference  to  the  National  Arbitration  Tribunal  and pointing out that they are identical with and have the  same meaning  as  the  definitions contained  in  the  Industrial Courts  Act, 1919, Lord ,Wright observed as follows at  page 184 of the Report :  " The appellant contended that they include the members of the  appellant trade union.  The respondents  disputed  this because, they said, the definitions do not include employees of a public or local authority like the respondents, and, in particular, such (1)  [1943] A. C. 166. 314 employees  who  are engaged in  professional,  technical  or administrative  services.  In my opinion,  the  respondents’ contention   would   unduly  narrow  and  limit   the   wide connotation  which  should here be given to ’trade’  and  to ’workman’.  Section II of the Act of 1919 shows that  ’trade ’  is used as including ’ industry ’ because it refers to  a trade  dispute  in the industry of  agriculture.   The  same inference appears from the short title.  It is described  as an  Act  to provide for the establishment of  an  industrial court in connexion with trade disputes.  Trade and  industry

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are  thus treated as interchangeable terms.  Indeed  ’trade’ is not only in the etymological or dictionary sense, but  in the  legal  usage,  a  term of  the  widest  scope.   It  is connected originally with the word ’ tread "and indicates  a way of life or an occupation.  In ordinary usage it may mean the occupation of a small shopkeeper equally with that of  a commercial  magnate.  It may also mean a skilled craft.   It is true that it is often used in contrast with a profession. A  professional  worker  would not ordinarily  be  called  a tradesman,  but  the  word ’trade’ is  used  in  the  widest application  to the appellation ’trade unions .  Professions have  their  trade  unions.  It is also used  in  the  Trade Boards  Act  to include industrial undertakings.  I  see  no reason  to  exclude  from the operation  of  the  Industrial Courts Act the activities of local authorities, even without taking  into  account the fact that  these  authorities  now carry  on  inmost cases important  industrial  undertakings. The order expressly states in its definition section that  ’ trade  ’  or ’ industry ’ includes the  performance  of  its functions by a ’ public local- authority’.  It is true  that these  words are used in Part III, which deals with  ’recog- nized  terms and conditions of employment’, and in Part  IV, which deals with ’departures from trade practices ’ in  ’any industry or undertaking,’and not in Part I, which deals with ’national  arbitration  ’ and is the part material  in  this case, but I take them as illustrating what modern conditions involve-the idea that the functions of local 315 authorities   may  come  under  the  expression   trade   or industry.’  I think the same may be said of  the  Industrial Courts  Act  and  of Reg. 68-A, in both of  which  the  word ’trade’ is used in the very wide connotation which it  bears in  the  modern  legislation  dealing  with  conditions   of employment particularly in relation to matters of collective bargaining and the like.  "  The  justification for this rather long quotation is  that it deals With the specific point now in issue before us.   The  same question as the one now before us came  up  for decision  in  an  Australian  case  reported  in.  Federated Municipal and Shire Council Employees’ Union of Australia v. Melbourne Corporation (1),. and the judgments of some of the learned  Judges are instructive.  There was a  Union  called the  Federated Municipal and Shire Council Employees’  Union of Australia, which was registered as an Organisation  under the  Commonwealth  Conciliation and Arbitration  Act,  1914- 1915,   as  having  been  constituted  in  connection   with municipal  and shire councils, municipal trusts and  similar industries.  The organisation made claims in respect of work done   by   its  members  employed  by   certain   municipal corporations in respect of the making, maintenance, ’control and  lighting  of public streets.   The  original  reference stated the dispute as one which " relates to such operations of  the  said municipal corporations as do not  -consist  of municipal  trading," but it was subsequently amended  during argument  by substituting for the words " as do not  consist of municipal trading " the words " as consist of the making, maintenance,  control and lighting of public streets or  any of, them." Two points were argued before the High Court’ The first one raised the question of the existence and extent of the  immunity  of  municipalities  as  instrumentalities  of Government of the States, but it has no relevance here.  The second point which  is (1)  26 Com.  L.R. 508. 41 316

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material  was whether the employees of municipalities  could be  said to be engaged in an industrial dispute  within  the meaning of section 51, sub-section 35, of the  Constitution. The  corporations contended that they were not  carrying  on any industry but only the normal functions assigned to  them under  the  statute,  ,and  that  there  was  therefore   no industrial dispute that could be referred to the arbitration court.   The  meaning of the words " industrial  disputes  " used in the said sub-section had therefore to be ascertained and  adjudged.   The  majority of the  learned  Judges  four against  two-decided in favour of the Union.  Each side  put forward  an  extreme contention.  For the  claimant  it  was urged  that  "  industrial  " meant  simply  "  relating  to industry in the abstract," whether it be. in the exercise of trade,  commerce,  science  or  learned  professions.    The corporations  contended  that "industrial dispute"  meant  a trade  dispute," and that " trade dispute " meant a  dispute in  trade carried on by the employer for profit." A  formula midway  between these two extremes was postulated  in  these terms  by Isaacs and Rich JJ. who were two out of  the  four who constituted the majority:   Industrial disputes occur when, in relation to operations in which capital and labour are contributed in  co-operation for  the  satisfaction  of human wants  and  desires,  those engaged  in  co-operation  dispute as to  the  basis  to  be observed, by the parties engaged, respecting either a  share of  the product or any other terms and conditions  of  their co-operation.   After  giving  copious extracts from the  report  of  the Royal  Commission appointed in 1890 in England to deal  with labour  problems, they summed up their final  conclusion  in these words at page 664:   " The question of profit-making may be important from  an income  tax  point of view, as in many municipal  cases,  in England;  but, from an industrial dispute point of view,  it cannot  matter whether the expenditure is met by fares  from passengers or from rates." 317   Dealing  with the insistence by the corporations  of  the need  for the profit-making motive as an  essential  element before  one  can  say that a  trade  dispute  or  industrial dispute  has  arisen,  Powers J. who  was  also  the  Deputy President of the Arbitration Tribunal observed:  " So far as the question in this case is concerned, as the argument proceeded the ground mostly relied upon (after  the Councils   were   held   not   to   be   exempt   as   State instrumentalities)  was that the work was not carried on  by the municipal corporations for profit in the ordinary  sense of the term, although it would generally speaking be carried on by the Councils themselves to save contractors’  profits. If that argument were sufficient, then a philanthropist  who acquired a clothing’ factory and employed the same employees as the previous owner had employed would not be engaged  in, an occupation about which an industrial dispute could arise, if  he  distributed  the clothes made to the  poor  free  of charge  or  even if he distributed them to the poor  at  the bare   cost  of  production.   If  the  contention  of   the respondents  is  correct, a private company  carrying  on  a ferry  would be engaged in an industrial occupation.   If  a municipal  corporation  carried  it  on,  it  would  not  be industrial.  The same argument would apply to baths, bridge- building,  quarries,  sanitary  contracts,  gas-making   for lighting  streets  and public halls, municipal  building  of houses  or halls, and many other similar  industrial  under- takings.  Even coal-mining for use on municipal railways  or

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tramways would not be industrial work if. the contention  of the  respondents is correct.  If the works -in question  are carried  out by contractors or by private individuals it  is said to be industrial, but not industrial within the meaning of  the  Arbitration Act or Constitution if carried  out  by municipal corporations.  I cannot accept that view."  Having regard to the definitions found in our Act, the aim or  objective  that  the Legislature had  in  view  and  the nature,  variety  and range of disputes that  occur  between employers and employees, we are forced 318 to  the conclusion that the definitions in our  Act  include also  disputes that might arise between  municipalities  and their  employees in branches of work that can be said to  be analogous to the carrying out of a trade or business.  It is unnecessary  to decide whether disputes arising in  relation to  purely  administrative  work fall  within  their  ambit. After all, whether there is an industrial dispute at all  is for  the  Government primarily to find out, for it  is  only then  it  has jurisdiction to refer.  Moreover,  it  is  not every  case of an industrial dispute that the Government  is bound to refer.  They may refer some, but may not also.   It is a question of expediency.  There  was  no ground urged before us or before  the  High Court that the Sanitary Inspector and the Head Clerk of  the Municipality  were  officers and not "workmen "  within  the meaning  of the Act.  The dispute raised on their behalf  by the  Workers’  Union of which they were members is,  in  our view,  an " industrial dispute " within the meaning  of  the Act.  The order of the High Court is affirmed., and this  appeal is  dismissed with costs, only one set to be shared  between respondent 2 and respondent 3.                         Appeal dismissed. Agent for the appellant: Sukumar Ghose. Agent for respondents Nos. 1 and 2.: P. K. Bose. Agent for respondent No. 3       P. K. Chatterjee. 319