Page 1

1

REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  4842 OF 2013 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.38886 of  

2012)

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI & ANR.      …Appellants

Versus

MEHAR SINGH                                                            …Respondent

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4965 OF 2013 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.4057 of  

2013)

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI & ANR.       …Appellants

Versus

SHANI KUMAR                                                             …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.

1. Leave granted in both the petitions.

Page 2

2.  In both the appeals the judgments of the Delhi High  

Court are under challenge. Appeal arising out of SLP (Civil)  

No.  38886 of  2012 is  against  Judgment  dated 09/07/2012  

passed  in  Writ  Petition  (Civil)  No.3918  of  2012.   Appeal  

arising  out  of  SLP  (Civil)  No.4057  of  2013  is  against  

Judgment  dated 21/05/2012  passed in  Writ  Petition  (Civil)  

No.3015 of 2012.  Since both these appeals raise the same  

question  of  law,  they  can  be  disposed  of  by  a  common  

judgment.  It may be stated here that while issuing notice,  

this  Court  has  stayed  the  orders  impugned  in  both  the  

appeals.  

3. The facts relating to the appeal  against respondent -  

Mehar Singh could be shortly stated.  

4.  FIR  No.126/04  was  registered  against  respondent  -  

Mehar Singh and others under Sections 143, 341, 323 and  

427 of the Indian Penal Code (“the IPC”) upon a complaint  

received from Ramji Lal s/o.  Mamraj Saini r/o.  Khetri -  the  

owner  of  Bus  No.RJ-18P  0493.   The  substance  of  the  

complaint was that when the bus reached the bus stand of  

2

Page 3

village Raipur on 15/5/2004 at about 3.15 p.m, respondent -  

Mehar Singh along with others armed with iron chain, lathi,  

belts, danda, stones etc. stopped the bus on the road and  

rebuked the conductor of the bus as to how he dared to take  

the fare from one of his associates.  Sanjay Singh, Basant,  

Udai  Bhan,  Rajesh,  Sandeep,  Jagmal,  Suresh  and  Karan  

Singh intervened and tried to save the conductor of the bus.  

During intervention, Sanjay and Basant suffered injuries on  

their  back,  eyes and ears.  All  the accused broke the side  

window panes of the bus by throwing stones and by giving  

blows  with  lathis/dandas.  When  the  other  passengers  

intervened,  the  accused  fled  the  spot.  The  complainant  

along with the injured reached the police station and lodged  

the aforementioned complaint.   

5. In  the  year  2009,  the  appellants  issued  an  

advertisement  for  filling-up  the  post  of  constables  (Exe.)  

(male).   It  appears  that  in  the  criminal  case  registered  

against  respondent  -  Mehar  Singh,  he  arrived  at  a  

compromise  with  the  complainant.   In  terms  of  the  

3

Page 4

compromise,  he and other  accused were acquitted of  the  

offences  under  Sections  323,  341  and  427  of  the  IPC  on  

30/1/2009.  As regards the offence under Section 147 of the  

IPC, the trial court acquitted him and other co-accused for  

want of evidence.  It is pertinent to note that the witnesses  

turned hostile. Respondent  -  Mehar  Singh  applied  for  the  

post of constable pursuant to the advertisement issued by  

the  appellants.   In  relevant  papers,  he  disclosed  his  

involvement  in  criminal  case  and  his  acquittal  as  both  

parties had entered into a compromise.  He was assigned  

Roll No.422165 and put through the physical endurance and  

measurement test and written test. After interview, he was  

declared  provisionally  selected,  subject  to  verification  of  

character  and  antecedents.   During  character  and  

antecedent verification, his involvement in the criminal case  

and his  subsequent acquittal  due to compromise between  

the parties was taken into account.  

6. The case of respondent - Mehar Singh was examined by  

the Screening Committee constituted by respondent 1 i.e.  

4

Page 5

the Commissioner of Police, Delhi.  The Screening Committee  

observed  that  respondent  -  Mehar  Singh  and  others  had  

assaulted the bus conductor with iron chain, belt and stones  

in a preplanned manner and caused injuries to him, which  

showed respondent - Mehar Singh’s violent nature and scant  

respect for the law of the land. The Screening Committee in  

the  circumstances  did  not  recommend  his  case  for  

appointment to the post of constable.  

7. On 3/3/2011, appellant 2 - the Deputy Commissioner of  

Police  (Recruitment),  New  Delhi  issued  a  notice  to  

respondent - Mehar Singh calling upon him to show cause as  

to why his candidature should not be cancelled.   He replied  

to the show cause notice.  He submitted that he was falsely  

implicated  in  the  criminal  case  and acquitted  in  the  year  

2009  after  a  full  fledged  trial.  He  submitted  that  a  mere  

registration  of  an  FIR  would  not  show  any  criminal  

propensity.   According  to  him  the  offence  was  falsely  

reported by the complainant due to local issues and to avoid  

prolonged proceedings, the issue was settled between him  

5

Page 6

and the complainant and the trial court had acquitted him.  

The  Screening  Committee  did  not  find  his  reply  to  be  

convincing.   In  his  order  dated  22/3/2011,  the  Deputy  

Commissioner of Police (Recruitment), New Delhi stated that  

the Screening Committee has, inter alia, observed that the  

actions  of  respondent  -  Mehar  Singh  depicted  his  violent  

nature and that he had no respect for the law of the land and  

on  considering  the  totality  of  the  circumstances,  the  

Screening  Committee  held  that  he  was  not  suitable  for  

appointment to the post of constable.   By the said letter,  

candidature of respondent - Mehar Singh was cancelled.  

8. On  22/4/2011,  respondent  -  Mehar  Singh  filed  O.A.  

No.1819 of 2011 before the Central Administrative Tribunal  

(for  short  “the Tribunal”),  Principal  Bench,  New  Delhi  

challenging  the  order  of  the  Screening  Committee.   The  

Tribunal by its order dated 7/3/2012 allowed his application.  

The Tribunal set aside order dated 22/03/2011 cancelling the  

candidature  of  Mehar  Singh.   The  Tribunal  referred  to  a  

couple of cases in which persons charged under Section 307  

6

Page 7

of the IPC were  appointed by the appellants and held that  

there was total non-application of mind on the part of the  

appellants.   A direction was given to consider the case of  

respondent - Mehar Singh if he was otherwise found to be fit,  

within six months.  

9. Aggrieved by the order dated 7/3/2012 passed by the  

Tribunal, the appellants filed a writ petition before the Delhi  

High Court.  The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition  

holding  that  since  respondent  -  Mehar  Singh  had  been  

acquitted of the offences for which he had faced trial, the  

same cannot be held against him. Being aggrieved by the  

said judgment and order, the appellants have preferred this  

appeal by special leave.  

10. The facts relating to the appeal  against respondent -  

Shani  Kumar  could  be  shortly  stated.  In  2007,  FIR  

No.114/2007  was  registered  against  respondent  Shani  -  

Kumar under Sections 307, 504 and 506 of the IPC at Police  

Station  Babri,  District  Muzuffar  Nagar,  (U.P.).  Admittedly,  

pursuant to an advertisement issued in the year 2009 for the  

7

Page 8

post of Constable (Exe.) (male) in Delhi Police for Phase II  

respondent - Shani Kumar applied for it.   He mentioned in  

his  application as  well  as  attestation form that  a  criminal  

case  was  registered  against  him.  On  23/4/2010,  he  was  

provisionally selected to the said post subject to verification  

of antecedents.  On 14/5/2010, he was acquitted in the said  

case  by  giving  him  benefit  of  doubt.  On  3/3/2011,  the  

appellants issued a show cause notice to respondent - Shani  

Kumar  calling  upon  him  to  show  cause  as  to  why  his  

candidature to the  post of Constable (Exe) (male) in Delhi  

Police should not be cancelled as he along with other co-

accused was  found  involved  in  the  offence of  attempt  to  

commit  murder  with  deadly  weapons  and  causing  bullet  

injuries  to  the  complainant’s  brother.  Respondent  -  Shani  

Kumar sent a reply to the show cause notice on 14/3/2011,  

which did not find favour with the appellants. By order dated  

22/3/2011,  the  Deputy  Commissioner  of  Police,  

(Recruitment),  NPL,  Delhi  cancelled  respondent  -  Shani  

Kumar’s candidature to the post of Constable (Exe.) (male).  

8

Page 9

11. Being  aggrieved  by  this  cancellation,  respondent  -  

Shani Kumar filed O.A. No.1821 of 2011 before the Tribunal.  

By  order  dated  24/1/2012,  the  Tribunal  allowed  the  

application and set aside order dated 22/3/2011 cancelling  

his candidature.  A direction was issued that respondent -  

Shani  Kumar  be  offered  appointment  to  the  said  post  as  

expeditiously as possible.  Being aggrieved by the Tribunal’s  

order, the appellants filed writ petition before the Delhi High  

Court.   The  High  Court  dismissed  the  appellants’  writ  

petition. Hence, this appeal by special leave.  

12. We  have  heard  Mr.  Rakesh  Kumar  Khanna,  learned  

Additional  Solicitor  General  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  

appellants and Mr. Ajesh Luthra, learned counsel appearing  

on behalf of the respondents.   We have perused the written  

submissions  filed  by  the  appellants  as  well  as  by  the  

respondents in both the appeals.   

13. Mr. Rakesh Kumar Khanna, learned Additional Solicitor  

General, submitted that the employment in Delhi Police is of  

a very sensitive nature.  Therefore, the character, integrity  

9

Page 10

and antecedents of a candidate aspiring to join it, assume  

importance.   Keeping  this  in  mind,  the  Commissioner  of  

Police  issued  a  Standing  Order  No.398/2010  dated  

23/11/2010 laying down a uniform policy for deciding cases  

of candidates provisionally selected in Delhi Police involved  

in  criminal  cases  (facing  trial  or  acquitted).  A  Screening  

Committee has been constituted for that purpose.  Taking an  

overall  view of  the matter,  in  the interest  of  Delhi  Police,  

which is  a disciplined force,  the Screening Committee has  

taken  a  decision  to  cancel  the  candidature  of  both  the  

respondents.   The  respondents  have  not  challenged  the  

Standing  Order.   The  decision  taken  by  the  Screening  

Committee, in the circumstances, ought not to be interfered  

with.   Counsel  submitted  that  it  is  the  settled  law  that  

acquittal of a person in a criminal case does not entitle him  

to  reinstatement  as  a  matter  of  right.   The  appointing  

authority may still find such a person unfit to be appointed to  

the post.  Counsel submitted that even in cases of acquittal,  

departmental proceedings may follow when the acquittal is  

otherwise  than  honourable.   If  the  acquittal  in  a  criminal  

10

Page 11

case is on account of flawed prosecution, it would not have  

any  impact  on  the  finding  of  misconduct  recorded  in  a  

departmental enquiry on the basis of adequate evidence.  It  

is  only  if  a  person  is  honourably  acquitted,  that  he  can  

possibly  argue  that  he  should  be  appointed  to  any  post.  

Counsel  submitted  that  assuming  the  appellants  have  

appointed  some persons  with  criminal  antecedents  in  the  

past; the doctrine of equality is not attracted to such cases.  

He submitted that  if  some candidates  have been granted  

some benefits inadvertently, such order does not confer any  

right on the respondents to get the same relief.   Counsel  

submitted that the impugned order does not take note of the  

above  vital  aspects  and,  therefore,  must  be  set  aside.  In  

support of his submissions, counsel relied on the judgments  

of this Court in  Delhi Administration through its Chief  

Secretary & Ors.  v. Sushil Kumar  1  ; Suresh Pathrella    

v.   Oriental  Bank of  Commerce  2  ;  Fuljit  Kaur  etc.  v.    

State of Punjab etc  3  ; K. Venkateshwarlu  v.  State of    

1 (1996) 11 SCC 605 2 (2006) 10 SCC 572 3 (2010) 11 SCC 455

11

Page 12

Andhra Pradesh  4  ; Deputy Inspector General of Police    

& Anr.  v.  S. Samuthiram  5  ; Chandigarh Administration    

& Anr.  v.  Jagjit Singh & Anr.  6   and  Maharaj Krishan  

Bhatt & Anr.  v.  State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors.  7  .     

14. Mr. Ajesh Luthra, learned counsel for the respondents  

submitted that the appellants’ reliance on Sushil Kumar is  

misplaced because Sushil Kumar has been distinguished in  

Commissioner  of  Police  v.  Dhaval  Singh  8  .    Sushil  

Kumar was a case of concealment of facts whereas in this  

case,  there  is  no  concealment.   Counsel  submitted  that,  

many a time, due to personal enmity and political reasons,  

people are falsely implicated in criminal cases. Very often,  

criminal  cases  end  in  acquittal  or  are  compounded.  

Compounding  or  acquittal  of  a  criminal  case  should,  

therefore, not act as an obstacle to a person being appointed  

to any post.  Counsel submitted that an order of acquittal is  

always  honourable.   An  acquittal  is  an  acquittal  for  all  

4 (2012) 8 SCC 73 5 (2013) 1 SCC 598 6 AIR 1995 SC 705 7 (2008) 9 SCC 24 8 (1999) 1 SCC 246

12

Page 13

purposes.   Relying  on   Ghurey  Lal  v.  State  of  U.P.  9  ,  

counsel submitted that a person is innocent unless proved  

otherwise. Administrative authorities cannot adjudicate the  

suitability  of  a  selected  candidate  in  this  manner.   Quasi  

judicial  authorities  cannot  overreach  the  judgments  

delivered by a competent court of law.  Counsel submitted  

that Lok Adalats have been created under the provisions of  

the  Legal  Services  Authorities  Act,  1987  to  encourage  

compromises. If a selectee is to be denied appointment by  

adjudging him unsuitable because the criminal case against  

him has ended into acquittal only because of compromise,  

then,  it  will  defeat  the  object  of  the  said  Act.   Counsel  

submitted  that  the  present  case  is  different  from  cases  

involving  departmental  proceedings.   In  the  matter  of  

appointments,  principles  relating  to  pendency  of  criminal  

case and initiation of departmental proceedings will not be  

applicable.  Counsel  attacked  the  proceedings  of  the  

Screening  Committee  as  being  arbitrary,  unguided  and  

unfettered.   He  cited  cases  where,  according  to  him,  the  

9 JT 2008(10) SC324

13

Page 14

Screening Committee has recommended candidates against  

whom FIRs  have been registered  for  serious  offences,  for  

appointment.  Counsel further pointed out that involvement  

in a criminal  case is  not a disqualification or a stipulation  

towards  ineligibility  in  Delhi  Police  (Appointment  and  

Recruitment)  Rules,  1980  (“the  Delhi  Police  Rules”).  

Counsel submitted that for verification of antecedents, the  

appellants  must  not  rely  upon  the  criminal  case  where  

acquittal  has  been  the  final  outcome.   It  is  open  for  the  

appellants  to  conduct  an  independent  enquiry  about  the  

character  and  antecedents  of  a  candidate  concerned.  

Counsel submitted that inasmuch as the respondents have  

honestly  disclosed  that  criminal  cases  were  registered  

against them and they ended either in acquittal or acquittal  

on  account  of  compromise,  they  cannot  be  denied  

appointment in Delhi Police once having been selected for  

the  same.   He  submitted  that  the  appeals,  therefore,  be  

dismissed.   

14

Page 15

15. Before  we  deal  with  the  rival  submissions,  it  is  

necessary  to  refer  to  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  

Jainendra Singh v.  State of Uttar Pradesh  10  .    In  that  

case the appellant had applied for the post of constable and  

was selected for the same.  He had suppressed the fact that  

a  criminal  case  was  registered  against  him.  Subsequently  

the  said  fact  came  to  light  and  his  appointment  was  

terminated.   Thereafter,  he  was  acquitted  in  the  criminal  

case.  The question which fell for consideration of this Court  

was  whether,  after  a  person  is  appointed  to  a  post  in  a  

disciplined force, it comes to light that he had suppressed  

the  fact  that  he  was  involved  in  a  criminal  case  his  

appointment  can  be  terminated  on  the  ground  of  

suppression of material facts.  Noticing conflicting decisions  

of this Court on this point and also the fact that different  

yardsticks are being applied in the matter of grant of relief,  

this Court formulated issues and referred them to a larger  

bench.   Since  all  the  formulated  issues  are  premised  on  

suppression  of  facts  and  since  in  this  case  there  is  no  

10 (2012) 8 SCC 748

15

Page 16

suppression of facts it is not necessary for us to defer the  

judgment  of  this  case till  the reference is  answered by a  

larger Bench.  

16. The  question  before  this  Court  is  whether  the  

candidature  of  the  respondents  who  had  made  a  clean  

breast of their involvement in a criminal case by mentioning  

this fact in their application/attestation form while applying  

for a post of constable in Delhi Police; who were provisionally  

selected subject to verification of their antecedents and who  

were  subsequently  acquitted/discharged  in  the  criminal  

case, could be cancelled by the Screening Committee of the  

Delhi Police on the ground that they are not found suitable  

for appointment to the post of constable.  

17. We must first deal with the submission that under the  

Delhi Police Rules, past involvement of a person in a criminal  

case is not a disqualification for appointment. It is true that  

Rule  6 thereof  which provides for  grounds for  ineligibility,  

criminal  antecedents  of  a  person  is  not  mentioned  as  a  

ground  for  ineligibility.   But,  to  conclude  from  this  that  

16

Page 17

instances  of  moral  turpitude,  however  grave,  could  be  

overlooked  because  they  do  not  find  mention  in  Rule  6,  

would be absurd. In any case, Standing Order No. 398/2010  

issued by the Delhi Police to which our attention is drawn  

empowers  the police to  take appropriate decision in  such  

cases. Pertinently the respondents have not challenged the  

Standing Order. This Standing Order incorporates policy for  

deciding cases of candidates provisionally selected in Delhi  

Police involved in criminal cases (facing trial or acquitted).  It  

would be appropriate to re-produce the relevant portions of  

the said Standing Order:  

“STANDING ORDER NO. 398/2010

POLICY  FOR  DECIDING  CASES  OF  CANDIDATES  PROVISIONALLY  SELECTED  IN  DELHI  POLICE  INVOLVED IN CRIMINAL CASES (FACING TRIAL OR  ACQUITTED).   

During the recruitments made in Delhi Police,  several  cases  come  to  light  where  candidates  conceal  the fact  of their  involvement in criminal  cases in the application Form/Attestation Form in  the  hope  that  it  may  not  come  to  light  and  disclosure  by  them  at  the  beginning  of  the  recruitment  process  itself  may debar  them from  participating in the various recruitment tests. Also  

17

Page 18

the appointment if he/she has been acquitted but  not honourably.  

In order to formulate a comprehensive policy,  the following rules shall  be applicable for all  the  recruitments conducted by Delhi Police:-

1). xxx xxx xxx 2). xxx xxx xxx

3). If  a  candidate  had  disclosed  his/her  involvement  and/or  arrest  in  criminal  cases,  complaint case, preventive proceedings  etc. and  the case is pending investigation or pending trial,  the candidature will  be kept in abeyance till  the  final  decision  of  the  case.   After  the  court’  judgment,  if  the  candidate  is  acquitted  or  discharged,  the  case  will  be  referred  to  the  Screening  Committee  of  the  PHQ  comprising  of  Special  Commissioner  of  Police/Administration,  Joint  Commissioner  of  Police/Headquarters  and  Joint  Commissioner  of  Police/Vigilance  to  assess  his/her suitability for appointment in Delhi Police.  

4) If  a  candidate   had  disclosed  his/her  involvement   in  criminal  case,  complaint  case,  preventive proceedings etc. both in the application  form as  well  as in  the attestation form but was  acquitted or discharged by the court, his/her case  will  be  referred  to  the  Screening  Committee  of  PHQ to assess his/her suitability for appointment in  Delhi Police.  

5). xxx xxx xxx

6). Such candidates against whom charge-sheet  in any criminal case has been filed in the court and  the charges fall in the category of serious offences  or  moral  turpitude,  though  later  acquitted  or  acquitted  by  extending  benefit  of  doubt  or  the  

18

Page 19

witnesses  have  turned  hostile  due  to  fear  of  reprisal  by  the  accused  person,  he/she  will  generally  not  be  considered  suitable  for  government service.  However, all such cases will  be judged by the Screening Committee of PHQ to  assess  their  suitability  for  the  government  job.  The details of criminal cases which involve moral  turpitude may kindly be perused at Annexure ‘A’.  

7) Such cases in which a candidate had faced  trial in any criminal case which does not fall in the  category of  moral  turpitude and is  subsequently  acquitted by the court and he/she discloses about  the  same  in  both  application  form  as  well  as  attestation form will  be judged by the Screening  Committee  to decide about his/her suitability for  the government job.  

8)  xxx xxx xxx

9). If  any candidate is discharged by extending  the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 this  will  also  not  be  viewed  adversely  by  the  department for his/her suitability for government  service.  

10). If a candidate was involved in a criminal case  which  was  withdrawn by the  State  Government,  he/she  will  generally  be  considered  fit  for  government  service,  unless  there  are  other  extenuating circumstances.”  

Annexure ‘A’ as mentioned in Clause 6 above lays down  

the following offences involving moral turpitude:

1. Criminal Conspiracy (Section 120-B, IPC)

19

Page 20

2. Offences  against  the  State  (Sections  121  –  130, IPC)

3. Offences relating to Army, Navy and Air Force  (Sections 131-134, IPC)

4. Offence  against  Public  Tranquility  (Section  153–A & B, IPC).

5. False  evidence  and  offences  against  Public  Justice (Sections 193-216A, IPC)

6. Offences  relating  to  coin  and  government  stamps (Section 231-263A, IPC).

7. Offences  relating  to  Religion  (Section  295- 297, IPC)

8. Offences  affecting  Human  Body  (Sections  302-304,  304B,  305-308,  311-317,  325-333,  335, 347, 348, 354, 363-373, 376-376-A, 376- B, 376-C, 376-D, 377, IPC)

9. Offences against Property (Section 379-462,  IPC)

10. Offences relating to Documents and Property  Marks (Section 465-489, IPC)

11. Offences  relating  to  Marriage  and  Dowry  Prohibition Act (Section 498-A, IPC)

18. Clause 3 of the Comprehensive Policy delineated in the  

Standing Order is material for the present case.  It refers to  

the  Screening  Committee  comprising  high  police  officers.  

20

Page 21

After  a  candidate,  who  has  disclosed  his  involvement,  is  

acquitted  or  discharged,  the  Committee  has  to  assess  

his/her suitability for appointment. Clause 6 states that those  

against whom serious offences or offences involving moral  

turpitude are registered and who are later on acquitted by  

extending benefit of doubt or because the witnesses have  

turned hostile due to fear of reprisal by the accused person  

shall  not  generally  be considered suitable  for  government  

service.  However, all such cases will be considered by the  

Screening  Committee  manned  by  senior  officers.   In  our  

opinion,  the  word  ‘generally’ indicates  the  nature  of  

discretion.  As a matter of rule, such candidates have to be  

avoided.   Exceptions  will  be  few  and  far  between  and  

obviously must be substantiated with acceptable reasons.   

19. A careful perusal of the policy leads us to conclude that  

the Screening Committee would be entitled to keep persons  

involved in grave cases of moral turpitude out of the police  

force even if they are acquitted or discharged if it feels that  

the  acquittal  or  discharge  is  on  technical  grounds  or  not  

21

Page 22

honourable.   The  Screening  Committee  will  be  within  its  

rights to cancel the candidature of a candidate if it finds that  

the acquittal is based on some serious flaw in the conduct of  

the prosecution case or is the result of material witnesses  

turning  hostile.   It  is  only  experienced  officers  of  the  

Screening Committee who will be able to judge whether the  

acquitted  or  discharged  candidate  is  likely  to  revert  to  

similar activities in future with more strength and vigour, if  

appointed,  to  the  post  in  a  police  force.   The  Screening  

Committee will  have to consider the nature and extent of  

such person’s involvement in the crime and his propensity of  

becoming a cause for worsening the law and order situation  

rather than maintaining it.  In our opinion, this policy framed  

by the Delhi Police does not merit any interference from this  

Court as its object appears to be to ensure that only persons  

with impeccable character enter the police force.   

20. We  find  no  substance  in  the  contention  that  by  

cancelling  the  respondents’  candidature,  the  Screening  

Committee has overreached the judgments of the criminal  

22

Page 23

court.   We  are  aware  that  the  question  of  co-relation  

between a criminal  case and a departmental  inquiry does  

not directly arise here, but, support can be drawn from the  

principles  laid  down  by  this  Court  in  connection  with  it  

because  the  issue  involved  is  somewhat  identical  namely  

whether to allow a person with doubtful integrity to work in  

the department.  While the standard of proof in a criminal  

case is the proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a  

departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities.  

Quite  often  criminal  cases  end  in  acquittal  because  

witnesses turn hostile.  Such acquittals are not acquittals on  

merit.   An  acquittal  based on  benefit  of  doubt  would  not  

stand  on  par  with  a  clean  acquittal  on  merit  after  a  full  

fledged trial, where there is no indication of the witnesses  

being won over.  In  R.P. Kapur v. Union of India  11    this  

Court has taken a view that departmental proceedings can  

proceed  even  though  a  person  is  acquitted  when  the  

acquittal is other than honourable.

11 AIR 1964 SC 787

23

Page 24

21. The expression ‘honourable acquittal’  was considered  

by this Court in S. Samuthiram.  In that case this Court was  

concerned  with  a  situation  where  disciplinary  proceedings  

were initiated against  a  police officer.   Criminal  case was  

pending against him under Section 509 of the IPC and under  

Section 4 of the Eve-teasing Act.  He was acquitted in that  

case  because  of  the  non-examination  of  key  witnesses.  

There was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal case.  

Two  material  witnesses  turned  hostile.   Referring  to  the  

judgment of this Court in  Management of Reserve Bank  

of India, New Delhi  v. Bhopal Singh Panchal12, where in  

somewhat similar fact situation, this Court upheld a bank’s  

action of refusing to reinstate an employee in service on the  

ground that in the criminal case he was acquitted by giving  

him benefit of doubt and, therefore, it was not an honourable  

acquittal,  this  Court  held  that  the  High  Court  was  not  

justified  in  setting  aside  the  punishment  imposed  in  

departmental  proceedings.   This  Court  observed  that  the  

expressions ‘honourable acquittal’, ‘acquitted of blame’ and  

12 (1994) 1 SCC 541

24

Page 25

‘fully  exonerated’  are  unknown  to  the  Criminal  Procedure  

Code  or  the  Penal  Code.   They  are  coined  by  judicial  

pronouncements.  It is difficult to define what is meant by  

the expression ‘honourably acquitted’.  This Court expressed  

that when the accused is acquitted after full consideration of  

prosecution  case  and  the  prosecution  miserably  fails  to  

prove  the  charges  leveled  against  the  accused,  it  can  

possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted.  

In  light  of  above,  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  since  the  

purpose  of  departmental  proceedings  is  to  keep  persons,  

who are guilty of serious misconduct or dereliction of duty or  

who are guilty of grave cases of moral turpitude, out of the  

department,  if  found  necessary,  because  they  pollute  the  

department, surely the above principles will apply with more  

vigour  at  the  point  of  entry  of  a  person  in  the  police  

department i.e. at the time of recruitment.  If it is found by  

the Screening Committee that the person against whom a  

serious  case  involving  moral  turpitude  is  registered  is  

discharged on technical grounds or is acquitted of the same  

charge but  the acquittal  is  not  honourable,  the Screening  

25

Page 26

Committee  would  be  entitled  to  cancel  his  candidature.  

Stricter norms need to be applied while appointing persons  

in a disciplinary force because public interest is involved in  

it.  

22.  Against the above background, we shall now examine  

what is the nature of acquittal of the respondents.  As per  

the complaint lodged by Ramji Lal, respondent Mehar Singh  

and others armed with iron chains, lathis, danda, stones etc.  

stopped a bus, rebuked the conductor of the bus as to how  

he  dared  to  take  the  fare  from  one  of  their  associates.  

Those  who  intervened  were  beaten-up.   They  received  

injuries.  The miscreants broke the side window panes of the  

bus by throwing stones.  The complainant was also injured.  

This  incident  is  undoubtedly  an  incident  affecting  public  

order.  The assault on the conductor was pre-planned and  

pre-meditated.  The FIR was registered under Sections 143,  

341, 323 and 427 of the IPC.  The order dated 30/01/2009  

passed  by  the  Additional  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,  Khetri  

shows that so far as offences under Sections 323, 341 and  

427 of the IPC are concerned, the accused entered into a  

26

Page 27

compromise  with  the  complainant.  Hence,  learned  

Magistrate acquitted respondent - Mehar Singh and others of  

the said offences. The order further indicates that so far as  

offence of rioting i.e. offence under Section 147 of the IPC is  

concerned,  three main  witnesses  turned hostile.   Learned  

Magistrate, therefore, acquitted all the accused of the said  

offence.   This  acquittal  can  never  be  described  as  an  

acquittal on merits after a full fledged trial.  Respondent -  

Mehar  Singh  cannot  secure  entry  in  the  police  force  by  

portraying  this  acquittal  as  an  honourable  acquittal.  

Pertinently, there is no discussion on merits of the case in  

this  order.    Respondent  -  Mehar  Singh  has  not  been  

exonerated after evaluation of the evidence.

23. So far as respondent - Shani Kumar is concerned, the  

FIR  lodged  against  him  stated  that  he  along  with  other  

accused abused and threatened the complainant’s brother.  

They opened fire at him due to which he sustained bullet  

injuries.  Offences under Sections 307, 504 and 506 of the  

IPC were registered against respondent - Shani Kumar and  

27

Page 28

others.   Order  dated  14/5/2010  passed  by  the  Sessions  

Judge,  Muzaffarnagar shows that  the complainant and the  

injured person did not support the prosecution case.  They  

were declared hostile.  Hence, learned Sessions Judge gave  

the accused the benefit of doubt and acquitted them.  This  

again is not a clean acquittal.  Use of firearms in this manner  

is a serious matter.  For entry in the police force, acquittal  

order  based on benefit  of  doubt  in  a serious  case of  this  

nature is bound to act as an impediment.  

24. In  this  connection,  we  may  usefully  refer  to  Sushil  

Kumar.  In that case, the respondent therein had appeared  

for recruitment as a constable in Delhi Police Services.  He  

was selected provisionally, but, his selection was subject to  

verification of character and antecedents by the local police.  

On verification, it was found that his antecedents were such  

that his appointment to the post of constable was not found  

desirable.   Accordingly,  his  name  was  rejected.   He  

approached  the  Tribunal.   The  Tribunal  allowed  the  

application  on  the  ground  that  since  the  respondent  had  

28

Page 29

been discharged and/or acquitted of the offence punishable  

under Section 304,  Section 324 read with Section 34 and  

Section 324 of  the  IPC,  he cannot  be denied the  right  of  

appointment  to  the  post  under  the  State.   This  Court  

disapproved of  the Tribunal’s  view.   It  was observed that  

verification of the character and antecedents is one of the  

important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is  

suitable to the post under the State.  This Court observed  

that  though  the  candidate  was  provisionally  selected,  the  

appointing authority found it not desirable to appoint him on  

account of his antecedent record and this view taken by the  

appointing authority in the background of the case cannot be  

said  to  be  unwarranted.   Whether  the  respondent  was  

discharged or acquitted of the criminal offences, the same  

has nothing to do with the question as to whether he should  

be appointed to the post.   What would be relevant is the  

conduct or character of the candidate to be appointed to a  

service and not the actual result thereof.  It was argued that  

Sushil Kumar must be distinguished from the facts of the  

instant case because the respondent therein had concealed  

29

Page 30

the fact that a criminal  case was registered against him,  

whereas, in the instant case there is no concealment.  It is  

not possible for us to accept this submission.  The aspect of  

concealment  was  not  considered in  Sushil  Kumar at  all.  

This Court only concentrated on the desirability to appoint a  

person,  against  whom  a  criminal  case  is  pending,  to  a  

disciplined force.     Sushil Kumar cannot be restricted to  

cases where there is concealment of the fact by a candidate  

that a criminal case was registered against him.  When the  

point  of  concealment  or  otherwise  and  its  effect  was  not  

argued before this Court,  it  cannot be said that in  Sushil  

Kumar this Court wanted to restrict its observations to the  

cases where there is concealment of facts.  

25. Reliance placed by the respondents on  Dhaval Singh  

is  misplaced.  In  Dhaval  Singh,  the  respondent had  not  

mentioned the fact that a criminal case was pending against  

him  in  the  application  form  submitted  by  him  on  21-

27/8/1995 seeking post of a constable.  He was provisionally  

selected  and  was  interviewed  pending  verification  of  his  

30

Page 31

character. Before any order of appointment could be issued  

in his favour, he, realizing the mistake, wrote a letter to the  

Deputy  Commissioner  of  Police  on  15/11/1995  that  a  

criminal  case  was  pending  against  him  and  he  had  

inadvertently not mentioned this fact in the application form.  

On the ground that the respondent had concealed a material  

fact, his candidature was cancelled on 20/11/1995.  He was  

acquitted in  the criminal  case on 8/12/1995.  On being so  

acquitted, he filed a representation before the Commissioner  

of  Police  which  was  turned  down.  He  approached  the  

Tribunal.   The  Tribunal  set  aside  the  cancellation  of  

candidature  of  the  respondent  and  the  rejection  of  his  

representation.  Aggrieved  by  this,  the  Commissioner  of  

Police  approached  this  Court.   This  Court  confirmed  the  

Tribunal’s  order  basically  on the ground that  the order  of  

cancellation  dated  20/11/1995  did  not  show  that  the  

information furnished by the respondent vide his letter dated  

15/11/1995  was  communicated  to  the  Commissioner  of  

Police.   There  was  no  indication  in  the  record  that  the  

competent authority had a look at the letter.  Therefore, the  

31

Page 32

cancellation  of  candidature  was  without  any  proper  

application of mind and without taking into consideration all  

relevant materials.  The Tribunal’s order was upheld on the  

ground of non-application of mind by the Commissioner of  

Police to  a vital  fact.   Besides,  this  Court  also noted that  

pursuant to the Tribunal’s order the respondent therein was  

already reinstated.   This decision will have no application to  

the  present  case.    Reliance  on  Ghurey  Lal is  also  

misplaced.   There can be no debate over the observation  

made by this Court in that case that an accused is presumed  

to be innocent till  proved guilty.  These observations were  

made while dealing with a reversal of acquittal by the High  

Court.  They are not relevant to the present case.  

26. So far as respondent - Mehar Singh is concerned, his  

case appears to have been compromised.  It was urged that  

acquittal recorded pursuant to a compromise should not be  

treated as a disqualification because that will frustrate the  

purpose of Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987.  We see no  

32

Page 33

merit in this submission.  Compromises or settlements have  

to  be  encouraged  to  bring  about  peaceful  and  amiable  

atmosphere  in  the  society  by  according  a  quietus  to  

disputes.   They  have  to  be  encouraged  also  to  reduce  

arrears of  cases and save the litigants from the agony of  

pending  litigation.   But  these  considerations  cannot  be  

brought  in  here.   In  order  to  maintain  integrity  and  high  

standard  of  police  force,  the  Screening  Committee  may  

decline to take cognizance of a compromise, if it appears to  

it to be dubious. The Screening Committee cannot be faulted  

for that.  

27. The respondents are trying to draw mileage from the  

fact  that  in  their  application  and/or  attestation  form they  

have disclosed their involvement in a criminal case.   We do  

not  see  how this  fact  improves  their  case.   Disclosure  of  

these facts in the application/attestation form is an essential  

requirement.  An  aspirant  is  expected to  state  these  facts  

honestly. Honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of  

the  police  force.   The  respondents  should  not,  therefore,  

expect  to  score  any  brownie  points  because  of  this  

33

Page 34

disclosure.   Besides, this has no relevance to the point in  

issue.   It  bears  repetition  to  state  that  while  deciding  

whether  a  person  against  whom  a  criminal  case  was  

registered and who was later acquitted or discharged should  

be appointed to a post in the police force,   what is relevant  

is the nature of the offence, the extent of his involvement,  

whether the acquittal was a clean acquittal or an acquittal by  

giving benefit of doubt because the witnesses turned hostile  

or because of some serious flaw in the prosecution, and the  

propensity of such person to indulge in similar activities in  

future.  This decision, in our opinion, can only be taken by  

the Screening Committee created for  that  purpose by the  

Delhi Police.  If  the Screening Committee’s decision is not  

mala fide or actuated by extraneous considerations, then, it  

cannot be questioned.

28. The police force is a disciplined force.  It shoulders the  

great responsibility of maintaining law and order and public  

order  in  the  society.    People  repose  great  faith  and  

34

Page 35

confidence in it.  It must be worthy of that confidence.  A  

candidate wishing to join the police force must be a person  

of  utmost  rectitude.   He must  have impeccable  character  

and integrity.  A person having criminal antecedents will not  

fit in this category.  Even if he is acquitted or discharged in  

the criminal case, that acquittal or discharge order will have  

to  be  examined  to  see  whether  he  has  been  completely  

exonerated  in  the  case  because  even  a  possibility  of  his  

taking to the life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of  

the  police  force.   The  Standing  Order,  therefore,  has  

entrusted the task of taking decisions in these matters to the  

Screening  Committee.   The  decision  of  the  Screening  

Committee must be taken as final unless it is mala fide.  In  

recent  times,  the  image  of  the  police  force  is  tarnished.  

Instances of police personnel behaving in a wayward manner  

by misusing power are in public domain and are a matter of  

concern.   The  reputation  of  the  police  force  has  taken  a  

beating.  In such a situation, we would not like to dilute the  

importance and efficacy of a mechanism like the Screening  

Committee  created  by  the  Delhi  Police  to  ensure  that  

35

Page 36

persons who are likely to erode its credibility do not enter  

the  police  force.   At  the  same  time,  the  Screening  

Committee must be alive to the importance of trust reposed  

in it and must treat all candidates with even hand.  

29. The  Screening  Committee’s  proceedings  have  been  

assailed as being arbitrary, unguided and unfettered. But, in  

the present cases, we see no evidence of this.   However,  

certain  instances  have  been  pointed  out  where  allegedly  

persons  involved  in  serious  offences  have  been  

recommended for appointment by the Screening Committee.  

It is well settled that to such cases the doctrine of equality  

enshrined in  Article  14 of  the  Constitution  of  India  is  not  

attracted.  This doctrine does not envisage negative equality  

(Fuljit  Kaur).   It  is  not  meant  to  perpetuate  illegality  or  

fraud  because  it  embodies  a  positive  concept.   If  the  

Screening Committee which is constituted to carry out the  

object  of  the  comprehensive policy  to  ensure that  people  

with  doubtful  background  do  not  enter  the  police  force,  

deviates from the policy, makes exception and allows entry  

36

Page 37

of  undesirable  persons,  it  is  undoubtedly  guilty  of  

committing an act of grave disservice to the police force but  

we cannot allow that illegality to be perpetuated by allowing  

the  respondents  to  rely  on  such  cases.    It  is  for  the  

Commissioner  of  Police,  Delhi  to  examine  whether  the  

Screening Committee has compromised the interest of the  

police force in any case and to take remedial action if  he  

finds that it  has done so.   Public interest demands an in-

depth  examination  of  this  allegation  at  the  highest  level.  

Perhaps, such deviations from the policy are responsible for  

the spurt in police excesses.   We expect the Commissioner  

of  Police,  Delhi  to  look  into  the  matter  and  if  there  is  

substance  in  the  allegations  to  take  necessary  steps  

forthwith so that policy incorporated in the Standing Order is  

strictly implemented.   

30. Our attention is drawn to certain orders of this Court  

where, according to the respondents, special leave petitions  

filed by the State, arising out of similar fact situations, have  

been dismissed.  It is not necessary for us to state that in  

37

Page 38

limine dismissal of special leave petition does not mean that  

this Court has affirmed the judgment or the action impugned  

therein. The order rejecting the special leave petition at the  

threshold without detailed reasons does not constitute any  

declaration of law or a binding precedent.  This submission  

is, therefore, rejected.     

 31. In the ultimate analysis,  we are of the view that the  

opinion formed by the Screening Committee in both these  

cases  which  is  endorsed  by  the  Deputy  Commissioner  of  

Police (Recruitment),  Delhi,  that  both the respondents are  

not  suitable  for  being appointed in  the Delhi  Police Force  

does not merit any interference. It is legally sustainable.  The  

Tribunal  and the High Court,  in  our  view,  erred in  setting  

aside  the  order  of  cancellation  of  the  respondents’  

candidature. In the circumstances, the appeals are allowed.  

The orders of  the Delhi  High Court  impugned in  both the  

appeals are set aside.  The cancellation of candidature of the  

respondents - Mehar Singh and Shani Kumar is upheld.  

38

Page 39

………………………….J. (G.S. Singhvi]

………………………….J. (Ranjana Prakash Desai)

New Delhi July 02, 2013.

39