28 September 2015
Supreme Court
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CHINTAMAN NAMDEV PATIL (DEAD) Vs SUKHDEV NAMDEV PATIL

Bench: J. CHELAMESWAR,ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE
Case number: C.A. No.-007991-007991 / 2015
Diary number: 16299 / 2014
Advocates: NISHANT RAMAKANTRAO KATNESHWARKAR Vs


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             (REPORTABLE) [

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No.  7991 OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No. 18029/2014)

Chintaman Namdev Patil (Dead) …..….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Sukhdev Namdev Patil & Anr. ……Respondent(s)

                 J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This  appeal  is  filed by the plaintiff  against  the

judgment and order dated 25.02.2014 passed by the

High  Court  of  Judicature  of  Bombay  Bench  at

Aurangabad in Second Appeal No. 332 of 2007 which

arises  out  of  judgment  and  order  dated  11.04.2007

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passed  by  the  District  Judge-3,  Aurabgabad  in

Regular Civil Appeal No. 43 of 2005.

3. By impugned judgment, the High Court allowed

the second appeal filed by the respondents herein.

4. In order to appreciate the issues involved in the

appeal  which lie  in a  narrow compass,  few relevant

facts need mention infra.

5. The appellant  (plaintiff)  filed a suit  against  the

respondents (defendants) herein in the Court of Civil

Judge (junior Division) Soyagaon being Regular Civil

Suit  No.  14  of  2001  for  declaration  and  perpetual

injunction.  The appellant sought a declaration that he

is  the  owner of  the  suit  land bearing no Gat No.  9

admeasuring  4  H 90 R situated  at  Village  Ghosala,

Taluka Soegaon, Dist. Aurangabad. The appellant also

sought injunction against the respondents restraining

them  from  interfering  in  his  possession.  The

respondents joined issues and contested the suit by

filing  written  statement.  The  Trial  Court  framed

several issues arising out of the pleadings and parties

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led  their  evidence.  The  Trial  Court  vide

judgment/decree dated 14.12.2004 dismissed the suit.

6. The appellant,  felt  aggrieved,  filed appeal  being

R.C.A.  No.  43  of  2005  before  the  District  Judge-3,

Aurangabad. Vide judgment/decree dated 11.04.2007,

the  first  appellate  Court  allowed  the  appeal  and

decreed the appellant's suit by granting the decree as

prayed by him.  

7. The  respondents,  felt  aggrieved,  filed  second

appeal  being  S.A.  No.  332  of  2007  before  the  High

Court.  

8. The High Court admitted the second appeal  on

two substantial questions of law arising in the case. By

impugned  judgment,  the  High  Court  allowed  the

second  appeal  and  in  consequence  dismissed  the

appellant's  suit.  It  is  against  this  judgment,  the

plaintiff has filed this appeal by way of special leave.

9. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

10. Learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  appellant

while  assailing  the  legality  and  correctness  of  the

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impugned order made twofold submissions. In the first

place, learned counsel contended that the High Court

while allowing the appeal did not give any reason and

nor dealt with the substantial questions of law framed

much  less  answered  them  on  their  merits  thereby

committed  a  jurisdictional  error  in  allowing

respondents  appeal  which  resulted  in  dismissal  of

appellants  suit.  It  was  his  submission  that  in  the

absence of  any discussion much less finding on the

two  substantial  questions  of  law  framed,  the  High

Court  failed  to  exercise  its  second  appellate

jurisdiction  under  Section  100  of  the  Code  of  Civil

Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”)

in  its  proper  perspective  and  hence  impugned

judgment  being  unsustainable,  deserves  to  be  set

aside  by  remanding  the  case  to  the  High  Court  for

deciding  the  second  appeal  afresh  on  merits  in

accordance with law.

11. In the second place, the learned counsel for the

appellant  contended  on  merits  that  the  impugned

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judgment  is  also  not  legally  sustainable.   Learned

counsel then made attempt to point out the errors of

the controversy on merits.  

12. In  reply,  learned  counsel  for  the  respondent

supported the impugned judgment contending that no

interference is called for in the impugned judgment.   

13. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties

and  on  perusal  of  the  record  of  the  case,  we  are

inclined to accept the first submission of the learned

counsel for the appellant finding force therein.

14. It  is  clear  that  the  High  Court  admitted  the

second appeal on following two substantial questions

of law:

“(i) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the first appellate Court was  right  in  holding  that  the  respondent No.1/plaintiff became exclusive owner of the suit land by virtue of the family arrangement shown in the document (Exh.101)? and that the  interpretation  of  the  said  document (Exh.136) is properly done by the said Court?

(ii) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the judgment of the first appellate Court is against the spirit of Order 41  Rule  31  of  C.P.C.  is  unsustainable  and deserves to be interfered with?”

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15. The  High  Court  then  discussed  the  issues  in

paras 5, 6 and 7 which read as under:  

“5.   In  view  of  analysis  of  the  facts mentioned above,  the only question that is required  to  be  decided  is,  whether plaintiff-Chintaman has fulfilled his terms of contract?

6.      On perusal of the evidence, I found that the finding recorded in this regard by learned Judge of the trial Court is correct.  Learned Judge of the lower appellate Court, however, did not record proper finding on the factual aspect of the case.  Because of his failure to do  so,  the  entire  judgment  went  haywire. Learned  counsel  for  the  parties  fairly admitted that at least, document Exhibit 136 is  binding  on  the  parties.   Document  116, which  is  not  signed  by  the plaintiff-Chintaman, is not admitted by him, but  in  view  of  his  admission  of  document Exhibit 136, it is clear that he admitted the agreement.  On perusal of this agreement, it is  clear  that  he  had  agreed  to  repay  the entire loan mentioned above for getting clear title to the land Gat No. 9.  He also admitted that in case of his failure to do so, he would accept the partition of the land amongst the three brothers.

7. In view of the finding of facts that the plaintiff did not repay the loan amount and that he had committed default, he would not be able to claim ownership to the entire land Gat  No.9.   The  suit  should,  therefore,  fail. The  Second  Appeal  is  allowed.   The  suit stands dismissed.”

16. On perusal of the judgment it clearly shows that

the High Court neither set out the case of the parties

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from  their  pleadings  properly  nor  mentioned  the

findings recorded by the Trial  Court  and nor  of  the

first  appellate  court.  The  High  Court  also  did  not

examine  the  case  in  the  context  of  legal  provisions

governing  the  issues  and  nor  dealt  with  any

submissions urged by the parties much less to record

categorical finding on the questions framed.

17. On the contrary, we notice that the High Court in

para  5  formulated  another  question  as  the  only

question arising in the case for decision which was not

formulated as substantial  question of law along with

two questions already framed.

18. In  our  considered  opinion,  it  was  legally

obligatory upon the High Court to properly set out the

case  of  the  parties,  findings  recorded  by  the  Trial

Court and the first Appellate Court, arguments of the

parties  on  the  questions  of  law  framed  and  then

answer  the  questions  framed  in  the  light  of  law

applicable  to  the  controversy  involved  by  giving  its

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reasoning.  Order 20 Rule 4(2) and Rule 5 read with

Order 41 Rule 31 provides for this requirement.

19. We may also consider apposite to mention that

this Court had the occasion to examine the scope of

Section  100  of  the  Code  in  Santosh  Hazaro  vs.

Purushottam Tiwari  (deceased)  by  LRs.,  [(2001)  3

SCC  179],  wherein  Justice  R.C.  Lahoti  (as  His

Lordship then was and later became CJI) speaking for

the  three-judge  Bench  explained  the  scope  and

jurisdiction  of  the  High  Court  while  deciding  the

second  appeal  under  Section  100  of  the  Code.  The

High  Court,  in  our  opinion,  should  have  kept  in

consideration  the  law  laid  down  in  this  case  while

deciding the second appeal.

20.  We cannot, therefore, subscribe to the manner in

which the High Court cursorily decided the appeal as

we find that the impugned judgment does not satisfy

the  requirement  mentioned  above.   In  such

circumstances,  the  remand  of  the  case  to  the  High

Court appears to be proper.

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21.  The  appeal  thus  succeeds  and  is  accordingly

allowed.  The  impugned  judgment  is  set  aside.   The

matter is remanded to the High Court for deciding the

second  appeal  afresh  on  merits  in  accordance  with

law.

22. We,  however,  make  it  clear  that  we  have  not

examined on the merits of the issues involved in this

case  and  hence  the  High  Court  would  decide  the

appeal  without  being  influenced  by  any  observation

made in this judgment.

23. Since the case is quite old, we request the High

Court to expedite its hearing and dispose of the case

preferably within six months.

                               ……...................................J. [J. CHELAMESWAR]

                                  ..……..................................J.

       [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]

New Delhi; September 28, 2015.   

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