CHIEF REGIONAL MANAGER UNITED INDIA INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED Vs SIRAJ UDDIN KHAN
Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK BHUSHAN, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN SINHA
Judgment by: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK BHUSHAN
Case number: C.A. No.-005390-005390 / 2019
Diary number: 45106 / 2018
Advocates: MOHIT PAUL Vs
RESPONDENT-IN-PERSON
Page 1
Page 2
Page 3
Page 4
Page 5
Page 6
Page 7
Page 8
Page 9
Page 10
Page 11
Page 12
Page 13
Page 14
Page 15
Page 16
Page 17
Page 18
Page 19
Page 20
Page 21
Page 22
Page 23
Page 24
Page 25
Page 26
Page 27
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5390 OF 2019 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 174 of 2019)
CHIEF REGIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED ...APPELLANT
VERSUS
SIRAJ UDDIN KHAN ...RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN,J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal has been filed challenging the
judgment dated 03.07.2018 of Allahabad High Court,
partly allowing the writ petition of the respondent,
wherein direction has been issued by the High Court
for payment of arrears of salary and other benefits.
3. By our order dated 02.01.2019, limited notice was
issued to the question as to whether the respondent
was entitled for payment of salary after 14.05.2009
to 20.06.2012. The respondent has filed a counter
affidavit and appeared in person when the matter was
heard on 01.07.2019.
1
4. We have heard Mr. P.P. Malhotra, learned senior
counsel for the appellant and the respondent
appearing in-person.
5. The brief facts of the case necessary to be
noticed for deciding the limited issue as entertained
by this Court in this appeal are: -
5.1 The respondent was appointed by the appellant
company on the post of assistant/typist. The
respondent was transferred by order dated
18.08.2006 from Allahabad branch of the
company to Jaunpur branch in pursuance of
which he was relieved on 01.02.2007 from
Allahabad to join at Branch Office, Jaunpur.
The respondent did not join and was
unauthorizedly absent from 02.02.2007. A
charge sheet dated 07.06.2007 was issued with
regard to his unauthorised absence from
02.02.2007 to 07.06.2007, for which
disciplinary proceedings were initiated, Writ
petition No.11840 of 2008 was filed by the
respondent praying for expeditious disposal
of the departmental inquiry and further
2
direction to the appellant for payment of
salary w.e.f. 23.07.2007.
5.2 Learned Single Judge of the High Court vide
its order dated 05.03.2008 disposed of the
writ petition directing for expeditious
disposal of the proceedings and with regard
to claim of the salary of the respondent,
direction was issued to consider and decide
the representation of the respondent dated
11.11.2007. The disciplinary proceedings
with regard to unauthorised absence resulted
in order dated 14.05.2009 of the disciplinary
authority holding the respondent guilty of
charge of unauthorised absence and awarding
punishment of “reduction of basic pay by two
steps” under Rule 23(a) of the General
Insurance (Conduct, Discipline & Appeal)
Rules, 1975. The respondent filed an appeal,
which too was rejected.
5.3 A second charge sheet was issued alleging
unauthorised absence of 663 days. Charge
3
sheet was sent to the respondent but he did
not receive the same. The inquiry was
conducted ex-parte. The respondent, in the
meantime, attained the age of superannuation
on 20.06.2012. An order dated 26.06.2012 was
passed by the disciplinary authority
terminating his services. A departmental
appeal against the order dated 26.06.2012 was
also dismissed on 18.07.2014. A Writ petition
No. 59041 of 2014 was filed by the respondent
praying for quashing the orders dated
14.05.2009, 26.06.2012 and 18.07.2014. The
learned Single Judge decided the writ
petition filed by the respondent vide its
judgment dated 29.05.2015. The order dated
26.06.2012 terminating his services was set
aside on two grounds, firstly, the inquiry
proceedings are vitiated since the charge
sheet was never served upon the respondent
and secondly, the respondent having already
retired on 20.06.2012, he could not have been
terminated on 26.06.2012. Insofar as the
challenge to order dated 14.05.2009 was
4
concerned, awarding punishment of reduction
of basic pay by two steps, writ petition was
dismissed on the ground that the same is
barred by laches and the relief to that
extent was denied.
5.4 The appellant aggrieved by the order of the
learned Single Judge dated 29.05.2015 had
filed a Special Leave Petition (C) No.26395
of 2015, which was dismissed by this Court on
18.09.2015. The respondent, aggrieved by
order of learned Single Judge insofar as it
has dismissed the writ petition challenging
the order dated 14.05.2009, filed a special
appeal before Division Bench of the High
Court. The Division Bench proceeded to
consider the challenge to the order dated
14.05.2009 and allowed the special appeal
setting aside the order rejecting the
challenge to the order dated 14.05.2009. The
order dated 14.05.2009 was quashed and it was
held that appellant shall be entitled to all
consequential benefits. The order dated
15.02.2016 passed by the Division Bench in
5
the special appeal was not challenged and has
become final.
5.5 A contempt application was filed by the
respondent being Contempt Application No.
2680 of 2016 alleging disobedience of
judgment of learned Single Judge dated
29.05.2015 as well as contempt of the
Division Bench order dated 15.02.2016.
5.6 The respondent filed another writ petition
being Writ Petition No. 61102 of 2017 praying
for salary for the period from January, 2007
to June, 2012 with interest and all
consequential benefits, such as, promotion
arrears, medical bills, lump sum medical
reimbursement and re-fixation of pension.
The said writ petition has been partly
allowed by impugned judgment dated
03.07.2018.
5.7 The learned Single Judge held that the order
dated 14.05.2009 awarding punishment having
been set aside by Division Bench of the High
Court by order dated 15.02.2016, the
appellant is entitled for salary w.e.f.
6
02.02.2007 upto 14.05.2009. The contention
regarding non-payment of salary by the
appellant from 02.02.2007 to 20.06.2012 was
noticed in paragraph No.16 of the impugned
judgment, to the effect that respondent
having been relieved from Branch Office,
Allahabad by relieving order dated 01.02.2007
and he having not joined the Branch Office,
Jaunpur, he was not entitled for any salary.
Insofar as entitlement of salary from
02.02.2007 to 14.05.2009 is concerned
following directions were issued by learned
Single Judge in paragraph Nos. 17 and 19,
which is to the following effect: -
“17. However, this Court in Special Appeal Defective No. 87 of 2016 by its order dated 15.02.2016 had set aside the punishment order dated 14.05.2009 and directed that the appellant shall be entitled to consequential reliefs. This Court having directed the petitioner to be given all consequential benefits and the order dated 14th of May, 2009 being quashed, the petitioner was entitled to salary w.e.f. 02.02.2007 up to 14.05.2009, the date, the punishment order was passed of reduction in basic pay by two stages. This payment of salary
7
has apparently not been made by the respondent on the ground of "No Work No Pay".
19. The petitioner is entitled to salary w.e.f. 02.02.2007 up to 14.05.2009 along with interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum.”
5.8 With regard to claim of salary of the
appellant after 14.05.2009, learned Single
Judge took the view that the order dated
26.06.2012 having been set aside by learned
Single Judge on 29.05.2015, which judgment
was unsuccessfully challenged in this Court
and has attained finality, hence salary
w.e.f. 14.05.2009 to 20.06.2012 cannot be
denied and direction was issued to pay salary
with 18% interest. With regard to other
claims, the High Court noticed the payments
made to the respondent towards provident
fund, gratuity fund, GSLI Claim, Leave
Encashment and other payments totalling
Rs.25,73,830/-.
5.9 There is no other issue in the present appeal
except direction for payment of salary after
14.05.2009 to 20.06.2012.
8
6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that
High Court committed error in directing for payment
of salary after 14.05.2009 to 20.06.2012, whereas the
respondent absented from work during the period and
was clearly not entitled for payment of salary on the
principle of “No Work No Pay”. It is submitted that
present is not a case where by virtue of any order
terminating the services of the respondent, he could
not work. With regard to salary after 14.05.2009
till 20.06.2012, learned Single Judge has not
adjudicated the claim except observing that in view
of the judgment of High Court dated 29.05.2015
against which special leave petition was dismissed,
respondent was entitled for arrears of salary. He
further submits that the fact that by virtue of the
judgment of learned Single Judge dated 29.05.2015,
respondent has to be treated in service does not
automatically result in any direction to pay the
salary, since no such direction was issued in the
judgment of learned Single Judge dated 29.05.2015.
The payment of salary for the aforesaid period does
not automatically flow from the judgment of learned
9
Single Judge. He submits that the fund of the
appellant company being public fund, the payment of
salary cannot be made when the respondent kept
himself away from the work.
7. The respondent appearing in person refuted the
submissions of the appellant and submits that he was
entitled for salary since his dismissal order dated
26.06.2012 was set aside on 29.05.2015, against which
special leave petition filed by the company had been
dismissed by this Court on 18.09.2015. He submits
that he went to join the Branch Office at Allahabad
on 23.07.2007 but he was not permitted to take charge
by Branch Manager of Branch Office-1, Allahabad. He
has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in
Shobha Ram Raturi Vs. Haryana Vidyut Prasaran Nigam
Limited and Others, (2016) 16 SCC 663. He submits
that the principle of “No Work No Pay” does not apply
in the facts of the present case and learned Single
Judge has rightly directed for payment of salary
after 14.05.2009 to 20.06.2012.
10
8. We have considered the submissions of the learned
counsel for the parties and have perused the records.
9. In Writ Petition No. 59041 of 2014, two set of
orders were challenged namely the order dated
14.05.2009, by which for unauthorised absence for the
period 02.02.2007 to 07.06.2007, he was awarded
punishment of reduction of basic pay by two steps and
secondly, the order dated 26.06.2012 terminating his
services and order dated 18.07.2014 dismissing his
departmental appeal. Learned Single Judge has set
aside the order dated 26.06.2012 vide its judgment
dated 29.05.2015 as noted above. The learned Single
Judge quashed the order dated 26.06.2012 on following
two grounds – one, second charge sheet alleging
unauthorised absence for 663 days was never served on
the respondent and second, the respondent having
retired from service on 20.06.2012, no order
terminating his services could have been passed on
26.06.2012. The relevant discussion and order of the
learned Single Judge with regard to order dated
26.06.2012 is as follows:-
“There is nothing on record to show that the chargesheet was ever sought to be
11
served upon the petitioner through registered post and it is not known as to from where this endorsement has come and to who wrote the remark “GHAR BAND RAHTA HAI” or “not met”. Even, if it is assumed that the petitioner was not at his house and therefore the house was closed, it was expected of the respondents to have taken steps to notify the petitioner about the chargesheet through newspaper publication. Nothing has been mentioned in the counter affidavit as to whether this procedure was adopted. Therefore, it is quite clear that the chargesheet was never served upon the petitioner till 20.06.2012 and thereafter the order of removal from service was passed on 26.06.2012. In this view of the matter, the petitioner cannot be said to have had notice of the enquiry proceedings and therefore if the respondents proceeded to hold enquiry ex parte, such proceedings are clearly vitiated and it must be held that the petitioner has been denied reasonable and adequate opportunity of hearing.
There is another aspect of the matter. The petitioner's case is that he retired from service on 20.06.2012 and the order of termination was passed on 26.06.2012. The averments in paragraph 39 of the counter affidavit are also to the effect that the petitioner retired from service and even on the date of retirement he had refused to accept the chargesheet and absconded from office. This being so once the petitioner retired from service on 20.06.2012 no order terminating his services could have been passed on 26.06.2012 as he ceased to be in service of the respondents w.e.f. 20.06.2012. A person cannot be removed from
12
service after he has already retired from service.
In this view of the matter, the impugned orders dated 26.06.2012 and 18.07.2014 cannot survive and are accordingly quashed.
The writ petition is allowed.”
10. As noted above, learned Single Judge dismissed
the writ petition insofar as order dated 14.05.2009
is concerned, challenge to which order stood accepted
by Division Bench in Special Appeal No. 87 of 2016,
where Division Bench has set aside the order dated
14.05.2009 and directed for payment with
consequential benefits. In pursuance of the order of
the Division Bench dated 15.02.2016, the respondent
is entitled to receive salary from 02.02.2007 to
14.05.2009 with regard to which we have not
entertained the appeal.
11. Now, the issue, which has to be answered by us is
as to whether by setting aside of the order dated
26.06.2012, the respondent was automatically entitled
for back wages. A perusal of the judgment of learned
Single Judge dated 29.05.2015 indicates that although
learned Single Judge has set aside the order dated 13
26.06.2012, but there was no order for payment of
back wages or consequential benefits. Learned Single
Judge has set aside the order dated 26.06.2012 and
has left the matter there.
12. It is further relevant to notice that when
contempt application was filed by the respondent
being Contempt Application No. 2680 of 2016, the
High Court observed that there has been no
adjudication by the Writ Court on the question as to
whether the respondent was entitled to payment of
salary for the period 2007 to 2012. The observations
of the Contempt Court in last two paragraph is as
follows:-
“From the materials brought on record, it transpires that there is no adjudication by the writ court on the question as to whether the applicant is entitled to payment of salary for the period 2007 to 2012, particularly as he had not worked during that period. There is also no adjudication of his right to claim promotion or to receive medical bills. The issues therefore as are being raised by the applicant in this petition need not be entertained by this Court, at this stage. It transpires that on account of setting aside of the dismissal order the petitioner has been paid all his retiral dues.
14
Leaving it open for the applicant to seek appropriate adjudication in respect of his entitlement to receive salary for the period 2007 to 2012 as well as other benefits including promotional pay scale, medical bills and re-fixation of his pension, in appropriate proceedings, this contempt petition is consigned to records.”
13. It was after 15.11.2017 that Writ Petition
No.61102 of 2017 was filed by the respondent. Thus,
in the Writ Petition No.61102 of 2017, the learned
Single Judge was required to adjudicate on the
entitlement of respondent for payment of salary.
Learned Single Judge has adjudicated with regard to
entitlement of salary from 02.02.2007 to 14.05.2009
and issued directions thereunder. We may notice that
the Division Bench while setting aside the order
dated 14.05.2009 has directed for payment of
consequential benefits. It is useful to extract the
operative portion of the said Appellate Court
judgment dated 15.02.2016, which is to the following
effect:-
“We accordingly allow the special appeal. The judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 29 May, 2015 and 2 December, 2015 insofar as it rejects the challenge laid by the appellant to the order dated 14 May, 2009 is hereby set aside. Consequently, the order dated 14
15
May, 2009 is also quashed. The appellant shall be entitled to all consequential benefits.”
14. There is clear difference between the direction
of the High Court insofar as setting aside the order
dated 14.05.2009 is concerned and insofar as setting
aside the order dated 26.06.2012 is concerned,
whereas there is a clear direction for payment of
consequential reliefs while setting aside the order
dated 14.05.2009 there is no direction with regard
to payment of salary while setting aside the order
dated 26.06.2012, hence the question was required to
be gone into by learned Single Judge while deciding
the Writ Petition No.61102 of 2017. We may also
notice the consideration of learned Single Judge
while noticing the claim of the respondent for
quashing and setting aside the order dated
26.06.2012. In paragraph Nos. 20 and 21, entire
discussion regarding setting aside the order dated
26.06.2012 is contained, which is to the following
effect:-
“20. With regard to the absence of the petitioner thereafter, the petitioner was subjected to disciplinary proceeding and a charge sheet was issued to him alleging the
16
absence of 663 days. The inquiry proceeded ex-parte against him and ultimately the dismissal order was passed on the ground of unauthorised absence on 26.06.2012. The petitioner had in the meantime been retired on 20.06.2012 and this Court in its judgment and order dated 29.05.2015 in Writ - A No. 59041 of 2014 set aside the dismissal order and the appellate order. This judgment of this Court was challenged by the respondent in Special Leave Petition which was dismissed on 18.09.2015 and the judgment and order dated 29.05.2015 attained finality.
21. The respondent cannot therefore say that the petitioner was unauthorisedly absent for the said period now at this late stage. The petitioner is entitled to the arrears of salary w.e.f. 14.05.2009 up to 20.06.2012, the date of his retirement, along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date when it became due till the date of its actual payment.”
15. There is no adjudication regarding claim of
salary or back wages to the respondent in the
impugned judgment of learned Single Judge for the
period 15.05.2009 to 20.06.2012. Learned Single
Judge was of the opinion that in view of the setting
aside of the order dated 26.06.2012, payment of
salary is automatic, which view of the Single Judge
is not correct. The present is not a case where the
respondent was dismissed from the service and
consequent to dismissal, he could not work and when
17
dismissal was set aside, he will be automatically
entitled for back wages.
16. We may notice some of the judgments of this Court
where issue of back wages has been considered by this
Court. This Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase Vs.
Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mhavidyalaya (D.Ed.) And
Others, (2013) 10 SCC 324 was considering a case
where the question was considered as to whether the
appellant was entitled to wages for the period she
was kept out of service forcibly by the management of
school. In paragraph No. 22, following was laid
down:-
“22. The very idea of restoring an employee to the position which he held before dismissal or removal or termination of service implies that the employee will be put in the same position in which he would have been but for the illegal action taken by the employer. The injury suffered by a person, who is dismissed or removed or is otherwise terminated from service cannot easily be measured in terms of money. With the passing of an order which has the effect of severing the employer-employee relationship, the latter’s source of income gets dried up. Not only the employee concerned, but his entire family suffers grave adversities. They are deprived of the source of sustenance. The children are deprived of nutritious food and all opportunities of education and advancement in life. At times, the family has to borrow from the relatives and other acquaintance
18
to avoid starvation. These sufferings continue till the competent adjudicatory forum decides on the legality of the action taken by the employer. The reinstatement of such an employee, which is preceded by a finding of the competent judicial/quasi- judicial body or court that the action taken by the employer is ultra vires the relevant statutory provisions or the principles of natural justice, entitles the employee to claim full back wages. If the employer wants to deny back wages to the employee or contest his entitlement to get consequential benefits, then it is for him/her to specifically plead and prove that during the intervening period the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same emoluments. The denial of back wages to an employee, who has suffered due to an illegal act of the employer would amount to indirectly punishing the employee concerned and rewarding the employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay back wages including the emoluments.”
17. We may hasten to add that present is not a case
where respondent was kept away from the work on
account of dismissal. Admittedly, the respondent
attained the age of retirement on 20.06.2012 and
order terminating his services was passed only on
26.06.2012, which was rightly held to be ineffective.
18. We may notice another judgment of this Court in
Airports Authority of India and Others Vs. Shambhu
Nath Das alias S.N. Das, (2008) 11 SCC 498. In the
19
above case, the respondent did not join after expiry
of the leave. The respondent was issued a warning
that unless he joins on or before 30.10.1985, failing
which it would be presumed that he had voluntarily
abandoned his service with the consequence that his
name would be struck off the rolls with effect from
01.11.1985. The said order was challenged by the
respondent and learned Sigle Judge on 10.11.1995
directed the Airports Authority of India to allow the
respondent to join duty but it was held that he shall
not be entitled for the arrears of pay for the period
he was absent. The order of learned Single Judge was
again challenged by the respondent without joining.
The Division Bench set aside the order of the learned
Single Judge and remanded the matter back to the
learned Single Judge. Learned Single Judge directed
the appellant to reinstate the respondent and further
directed that insofar as the salary of the writ
petitioner is concerned, during the period he stayed
away from the work, Airports Authority of India, is
directed to consider the matter sympathetically and,
if it is permissible under its rules, allow to him
half of the salary and other benefits during the
20
period from 17.10.1985 till 10.11.1995. The Airports
Authority of India accepted the judgment and allowed
him to join w.e.f. 01.11.1999 and passed an order on
14.05.2002 holding that the period of unauthorised
absence was to be treated as dies-non and the claim
for back wages was accordingly disallowed on the
principle of "no work no pay". The order dated
14.05.2002 was once again challenged by the
respondent claiming back wages, which was allowed by
the learned Single Judge. On further denial of
claim, matter was taken by respondent to learned
Single Judge to issue certain directions. Against the
learned Single Judge’s Order, matter was taken in
appeal before Division Bench, where direction to pay
50% of back wages was issued. Allowing the appeal,
this Court stated following in paragraph Nos. 8 to
11:-
“8. This order of the learned Single Judge has been set aside by the Division Bench vide the impugned order dated 21-3-2007 with the observations that the order of the High Court in CR (W) No. 5715 of 1986 which had directed that the respondent be paid 50% of the back wages for the period from 17-10-1985 to 10-11-1995 should be complied with.
21
9. The learned counsel for the appellant has pointed out that as the respondent had not attended to his duties for almost 15 years despite having been called upon to do so repeatedly, the direction of the Division Bench to grant him back wages from 17-10-1985 to 10-11-1995 was clearly not justified on the principle of “no work no pay”. She has pointed out that the appellant Authority would have been fully justified even if it had dismissed the respondent from service, but on the contrary, a huge benefit had already been given to him as he had been taken back in service despite having remained absent for almost fifteen years.
10. The learned counsel for the respondent has, however, supported the judgment of the Division Bench. We are of the opinion that in the light of the fact that the respondent did not report for duty for 15 years, there was no justification whatsoever to grant him any back wages on the general principle that nobody could be directed to claim wages for the period that he remained absent without leave or without justification. We also find that the judgment dated 13-8-1999 which had attained finality had directed as under:
“(a) Insofar as the salary of the writ petitioner is concerned during the period he stayed away from the work, the respondent Airports Authority of India, is directed to consider the matter sympathetically and, if it is permissible under its rules, allow to him half of the salary and other benefits.”
11. This claim was considered by the competent authority and rejected for valid reasons. We are, thus, unable to endorse the High Court’s order for payment of 50%
22
back wages for the period from 17-10-1985 to 10-11-1995 which are far in excess of the directions in the order dated 13-8- 1999. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the order of the Division Bench and restore the order of the learned Single Judge dated 15-4-2004.”
19. This Court held that there was no justification
whatsoever to grant any back wages to the respondent
on the general principle that nobody could be
directed to claim wages for the period that he
remained absent without leave or without
justification.
20. We may further notice the judgment of this Court,
which has also been relied on by the respondent in
his counter affidavit, i.e., judgment of this Court
in Shobha Ram Raturi Vs. Haryana Vidyut Prasaran
Nigam Limited and Others (supra). In the above case,
the appellant was retired from service on 31.12.2002,
even though he would have, in the ordinary course,
attained his date of retirement on superannuation,
only on 31.12.2005. The appellant assailed the order
of retirement, which was allowed by learned Single
Judge. Learned Single Judge has denied the back
23
wages to the appellant on the principle of “no work
no pay”. The order of learned Single Judge was
assailed by the appellant by filing a Letters Patent
Appeal, which too was dismissed. This Court allowed
the appeal of the appellant and made following
observations in paragraph Nos. 3 and 4:-
“3. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the controversy, we are satisfied, that after the impugned order of retirement dated 31-12-2002 was set aside, the appellant was entitled to all consequential benefits. The fault lies with the respondents in not having utilised the services of the appellant for the period from 1-1-2003 to 31-12-2005. Had the appellant been allowed to continue in service, he would have readily discharged his duties. Having restrained him from rendering his services with effect from 1- 1-2003 to 31-12-2005, the respondent cannot be allowed to press the self-serving plea of denying him wages for the period in question, on the plea of the principle of “no work no pay”.
4. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we are satisfied, that the impugned order passed by the High Court, to the limited extent of denying wages to the appellant, for the period from 1-1-2003 to 31-12-2005 deserves to be set aside. The same is accordingly hereby set aside.”
21. This Court held in the above case that; having
restrained the appellant from rendering his services
24
with effect from 1-1-2003 to 31-12-2005, the
respondent cannot be allowed to press the plea of the
principle of “no work no pay” for denying the wages.
In the above case, the appellant was restrained from
working due to order of retirement dated 31.12.2002,
due to which he could not work till his normal
retirement. When the order dated 31.12.2002 was set
aside, automatically, he became entitled for back
wages and the principle of “no work no pay” was not
attracted.
22. In the present case, as noted above, the
respondent was not kept away from work by any order
of the appellant. The order of termination of his
services/dismissal was passed on 26.06.2012, after
his retirement on 20.06.2012, which in no manner
prohibited the respondent from working. The
respondent during submission has submitted that he
was illegally transferred to Branch Office, Jaunpur
from Allahabad. He was suffering from a disability
of more than 40% and he could not have been
transferred to another place. There is nothing on
record to indicate that transfer of respondent from
25
Branch Office, Allahabad to Branch Office, Jaunpur
was at any time set aside or withdrawn. The salary
upto 14.05.2009 was allowed to the respondent on
account of setting aside of the order dated
14.05.2009, which was with all consequential benefits
but with regard to entitlement of salary after
14.05.2009 to 20.06.2012, there has been no
adjudication by the High Court, which is apparent
from judgment of the High Court dated 03.07.2018, as
extracted above.
23. Learned Single Judge having itself not determined
the entitlement of respondent to receive salary after
14.05.2009 to 20.06.2012, it ought to have directed
the appellant to consider the entitlement and take a
decision thereon. We are of the view that ends of
justice be served in setting aside the direction of
the High Court directing the appellant to make
payment of salary after 14.05.2009 till 20.06.2012,
with a direction to the appellant to consider the
claim of respondent for back wages after 14.05.2009
to 20.06.2012 and pass appropriate orders giving
reasons within three months from today. It shall
26
also be open for the respondent to submit an
appropriate representation alongwith relevant
materials regarding his entitlement for salary for
the period 15.05.2009 to 20.06.2012 to the appellant
within a period of one month from today.
24. The appeal is partly allowed to the extent as
indicated above. The parties shall bear their own
costs.
......................J. (ASHOK BHUSHAN)
......................J. (NAVIN SINHA)
New Delhi, July 11, 2019.
27