Page 1

1

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.6018 OF 2014 (arising out of SLP (C) No.29807 of 2012)

CHHEL SINGH        … APPELLANT

VERSUS

M.G.B. GRAMIN BANK PALI & ORS.       … RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T  

Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, J.

Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order  

dated 10th May, 2012 passed by the Division Bench of the High  

Court  of  Judicature  for  Rajasthan  at  Jodhpur  whereby  the  

Division  Bench  allowed  the  appeal  preferred  by  the  

respondent-M.G.B. Gramin Bank,  Pali (hereinafter referred to  

as the “Bank”) and set aside the order passed by the learned  

Single Judge.

3. The factual matrix of the case is as follows:

The appellant was working with the respondent-Bank since  

17th February, 1984 as Clerk-cum-Cashier. While in service he  

remained absent from duty from 11th December, 1989 to 24th  

October,  1990  (approximately  10  and  1/2  months)  without  

obtaining prior permission of the competent authority.  For  

the  said  reason  he  was  served  with  a  memorandum  on  5th

Page 2

2

October, 1991 alleging contravention of the provisions of the  

Marwar Gramin Bank (Staff) Service Regulations, 1980, for the  

following charges:

i) He remained absent from duty from 11th  

December,  1989  to  24th October,  1990  

without obtaining prior permission from  

the competent authority;  

ii) He failed to comply with the orders and  

directions given to him which were the  

letters issued asking him to join duty;

iii) He remained absent from duty without any  

reason.   

iv) On  the  day  of  joining  he  failed  to  

submit medical certificate and submitted  

the same after much delay.

4. The  appellant  by  his  reply  dated  23rd November,  1991  

disputed the allegations and informed that he was seriously  

ill  between  11th December,  1989  and  24th October,  1990,  

therefore,  the  absence  was  beyond  his  control;  he  never  

intended to contravene any of the provisions of the service  

regulations. The explanation submitted by the appellant was  

not accepted by the Disciplinary Authority, who decided to  

inquire into the charges and appointed one Shri P.R. Agarwal  

as the Inquiry Officer.  

5. During the inquiry the appellant submitted list of seven  

defence witnesses.  However, Inquiry Officer called only two  

witnesses and refused to call rest of the five witnesses on

Page 3

3

the ground that the presenting officer of the Bank was ready  

to answer the questions on behalf of them as may be raised by  

the appellant. After inquiry the Inquiry Officer submitted  

report dated 3rd January, 1994, rejecting the testimony of two  

witnesses as “untrustworthy” and held the appellant guilty  

for the charges.   

6. The  Disciplinary  Authority,  having  gone  through  the  

report, issued a show cause notice enclosing the copy of the  

inquiry report as to why the appellant should not be punished  

for the charges mentioned therein. Finally, after hearing the  

appellant, the Disciplinary Authority held the charges to be  

proved and removed the appellant from service by order dated  

17th October, 1994. The appeal preferred against the order of  

the removal was dismissed by the Appellate Authority vide  

order dated 26th December, 1994.   

7. The  said  orders  of  the  Disciplinary  Authority  and  

Appellate Authority were challenged by the appellant before  

the High Court in Writ Petition No.1702/1995. One of the  

grounds  taken  was  that  the  entire  inquiry  stood  vitiated  

having  conducted  in  violation  of  principles  of  natural  

justice.  The Inquiry Officer without having any justifiable  

reason disallowed the prayer of the appellant to summon five  

important witnesses.  The other ground was that the penalty  

imposed was disproportionate to the gravity of charges.

Page 4

4

8. The learned Single Judge by judgment dated 31st March,  

2009 allowed the writ petition, quashed the order of removal  

and directed the respondent to reinstate the appellant in  

service  with  all  consequential  benefits  with  following  

observation:

“In the instant case the reason given for  not  calling  the  witnesses  named  by  the  delinquent employee is absolutely vague and  irrelevant. It does not and cannot appeal to  the  measures  and  standards  of  a  quasi  judicial  inquiry  that  ultimately  resulted  into removal of the delinquent employee from  service.  The  refusal  to  call  defence  witnesses in the manner existing in present  case  is  apparent  denial  of  reasonable  opportunity  to  the  charged  employee  for  defending  himself.  A  definite  prejudice,  therefore,  is  caused  by  not  calling  the  witnesses  named  by  the  petitioner  without  examining  their  relevance  and  ultimately  holding  him  guilty  for  the  charges  in  defence of which he indicated his desire to  examine those witnesses.”

The Court also observed:

“In the instant matter the inquiry officer  simply mentioned that the defence witnesses  Kalyan  Singh  and  Ganpat  Singh  are  not  trustworthy.  No  reason  is  given  by  the  Inquiry Officer to disbelieve those persons.  Pertinent to note here that Ganpat Singh as  well  as  Kalyan  Singh  extensively  narrated  facts  about  serious  ailment  of  the  petitioner.  The  Inquiry  Officer  while  disbelieving those persons should have given  definite reasons to justify his conclusion.  Merely saying that the persons are not found  trustworthy, is not at all sufficient. The  basic principle is that every person coming  forward  as  a  witness  in  evidence  states  trust  except  proved  otherwise,  therefore,  onus  was  upon  the  Inquiry  Officer  to

Page 5

5

establish by adequate discussion relating to  conduct  and  character  of  Kalyan  Singh  and  Ganpat Singh to disbelieve them or to say  that they were not trustworthy.”

9. The  aforesaid  judgment  passed  by  the  learned  Single  

Judge  was  challenged  by  the  Bank  in  a  writ  appeal.  The  

Division  Bench  though  accepted  that  the  Inquiry  stood  

vitiated  but  set  aside  the  order  of  reinstatement  with  

following observation:

“Therefore,  we  are  of  the  consigned  opinion that even while the order as passed  by  the  learned  Single  Judge  quashing  the  orders of the Disciplinary Authority and the  Appellate Authority need not be interfered  with, the other part of the order calls for  interference and it appears in the interest  of justice that the matter be restored for  reconsideration of, and re-reporting by, the  Inquiry Officer after concluding the inquiry  proceedings  in  conformity  with  the  requirements  of  principles  of  natural  justice.

In  view  of  the  above,  this  appeal  succeeds and is allowed in the manner that  the order passed by the learned Single Judge  insofar  quashing  of  the  impugned  orders  dated 17.08.94 and 26.12.1994 is concerned,  the same is affirmed, but the other part of  the  order  of  the  learned  Single  Judge,  declaring  the  petitioner  entitled  to  be  reinstated in service with all consequential  benefits, is set aside. Instead, we consider  it proper and hence order that the report as  made by the Inquiry Officer dated 03.01.1994  shall stand annulled and the matter shall  stand restored for reconsideration of, and  re-reporting by, the Inquiry Officer.

It  goes  without  saying  that  if  the  Inquiry  Officer  who  had  earlier  conducted  the  inquiry  is  not  available,  or  for  any  other sufficient reason, it shall always be

Page 6

6

permissible for the Disciplinary Authority  to appoint any other officer to inquire into  the matter. For looking further instructions  in the matter, the parties shall stand at  noted  to  appear  before  the  Disciplinary  Authority on 18.06.2012.”

10. The  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  while  placing  

reliance on the Inquiry Report and finding of the learned  

Single  Judge  submitted  that  the  inquiry  was  conducted  in  

violation  of  principle  of  natural  justice  and  hence  the  

learned Single Judge rightly directed the reinstatement of  

the appellant. Whereas according to learned counsel for the  

respondent-Bank,  the Division  Bench rightly  set aside  the  

order  of  reinstatement  and  remitted  the  matter  for  fresh  

enquiry.  

11. After giving our careful consideration to the facts and  

circumstances of the case and the submission made by the  

learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the  

Division  Bench  was  wrong  in  setting  aside  the  order  of  

reinstatement.  

12. The Division Bench has accepted that the inquiry stood  

vitiated  by  disallowing  the  request  of  the  appellant  to  

summon the rest of the five witnesses.  For the said reason,  

the Division Bench has not interfered with such part of the  

finding and order passed by the learned Single Judge whereby  

the impugned order of termination dated 17th October, 1994 and

Page 7

7

the Appellate Authority order dated 26th December, 1994 were  

quashed.  

13. The  order  of  termination  being  quashed  by  the  High  

Court, in absence of any observation and grounds to refuse  

the  reinstatement,  the  appellant  automatically  stood  

reinstated.  Without reinstatement in service, the question  

of further inquiry does not arise.  There was no occasion for  

the  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  to  direct  further  

inquiry, without reinstatement of appellant.

14. The  following  charges  were  leveled  against  the  

appellant, as mentioned in the inquiry report:

“Charge No.1:

According  to  Rule  22(1)  of  Marwar  Gramin  Bank  Employee  Association  Rules,  1980  no  officer  or  employee would absent himself  without the prior  permission from competent authority and in case of  disease and accident no one would absent himself  without  providing  medical  certificate,  but  you  flouted the instructions of competent authority and  without  permission  you  remained  absent  from  11.12.89  to  24.10.90  and  you  got  the  medical  certificate issued in connection with your illness  you submitted the medical certificate on 20.10.90  with so much of delay.

Charge No.2:

According  to  Rule  22(2)  of  Marwar  Gramin  Bank  Employee Association Rules, 1980 if any officer or  employee remains absent without leave or remains  absent  after  the  expiry  of  leave,  (leaving  the  circumstances which is beyond their control and for  that he has to give satisfactory clarification),  then he would not be entitled for payment of such  absence or the period after the absence and would  be liable for such action which would be charged by

Page 8

8

competent  authority.  But  you  violated  these  instructions:

(D) You remained on medical leave from 11.12.89 to  24.10.90 and you did not submit leave application  as per rule.

(E) You had been instructed by the head office by  its  letter  no.K/7901  dated  23.08.90  to  present  yourself on duty within 7 days and also to give  clarification for being absent without leave but  you did not submit any reply.  Thereafter also, you  were again given instruction by head quarter letter  no.K/10076  dated  22.9.90  you  were  instructed  to  present on duty by 05.10.90 and also to submit the  clarification.  The said letter was received by you  on  4.10.90.   Then  also  you  did  not  send  any  information to bank about your absence.

(F) In your clarification you have stated that you  could not give information since you were suffering  from incurable disease but in medical certificate  submitted  by  you  there  is  no  mention  of  any  incurable disease, where it was not possible for  you to send the leave information.  Thus, you gave  wrong information to bank.

Charge No.3:

You not being seriously ill, produced the evidence  of illness from various doctors whereas:   (A)  You  travelled  during  your  alleged  serious  illness.  According to medical certificate issued  by  Dr.  S.S.  Purohit,  Navdeep  Hospital  Palanpur  issued on 25.10.90, you got treatment from him from  13.8.90 to 24.10.90 and rest has been prescribed  whereas  during  that  period  you  were  on  your  permanent residence at Chitalwana.  You yourself  received the  registered letter  no.K/1-0078 dated  22.9.90 and K/11211 dated 11.10.90 at Chitalwana.

(B)  In  the  letter  K/11211  dated  11.10.90  the  instruction given was very clear that join the duty  by 27.10.90 and it was stated in that letter that  if  you  do  not  join  the  duty  then  it  would  be  presumed that you are not interested to work in the  bank.  Then you had shown yourself to be healthy  and you joined duty on 25.10.90

Page 9

9

Charge No.4:

In  Circular  no.21/78  dated  22.6.78  it  has  been  instructed that the employees on leave on health  reason  would  submit  medical  certificate  while  joining on duty.  You violated these instructions  and did not present the medical certificate while  joining duty.  You submitted the said certificate  on 20.10.90 with delay.”

15. From the plain reading of the charges we find that the  

main  allegation  is  absence  from  duty  from  11.12.89  to  

24.10.90 (approximately 10 and ½ months), for which no prior  

permission was obtained from the competent authority.  In his  

reply, the appellant has taken the plea that he was seriously  

ill  between  11.12.89  and  24.10.90,  which  was  beyond  his  

control;  he  never  intended  to  contravene  any  of  the  

provisions  of  the  service  regulations.  He  submitted  the  

copies of medical certificates issued by Doctors in support  

of his claim after rejoining the post.  The medical reports  

were submitted after about 24 days.  There was no allegation  

that  the  appellant’s  unauthorized  absence  from  duty  was  

willful and deliberate.  The Inquiry Officer has also not  

held  that  appellant’s  absence  from  duty  was  willful  and  

deliberate. It is neither case of the Disciplinary Authority  

nor the Inquiry Officer that the medical reports submitted by  

the appellant were forged or fabricated or obtained for any  

consideration though he was not ill during the said period.  

In absence of such evidence and finding, it was not open to

Page 10

10

the  Inquiry  Officer  or  the  Disciplinary  Authority  to  

disbelieve  the medical  certificates issued  by the  Doctors  

without any valid reason and on the ground of 24 days delay.  

16. In view of the observation made above, the order passed  

by the Division Bench of the High Court cannot be upheld.  

We, accordingly, set aside the impugned judgment and order  

dated 10th May, 2012 passed by the Division Bench of the High  

Court in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 850 of 2009 and  

upheld the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 31st  

March, 2009 in S.B. Civil Appeal Writ Petition No. 1702 of  

1995.   The  respondents  are  directed  to  implement  the  

direction  and  order  dated  31st March,  2009  issued  by  the  

learned  Single  Judge  within  four  weeks  from  the  date  of  

receipt of copy of this judgment.

17. The appeal is allowed with aforesaid observations and  

directions.  No costs.

…………………………………………………………………….J.                  (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)

………………………………………………………………….J.                (V. GOPALA GOWDA)

NEW DELHI, JULY 07, 2014.