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PETITIONER: CHARAN LAL SAHU & OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: GIANI ZAIL SINGH & ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT13/12/1983

BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) BHAGWATI, P.N. SEN, AMARENDRA NATH (J) MADON, D.P. THAKKAR, M.P. (J)

CITATION:  1984 AIR  309            1984 SCR  (2)   6  1984 SCC  (1) 390        1983 SCALE  (2)961  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1986 SC1253  (20)  R          1986 SC1534  (4)  R          1987 SC1577  (10)  F          1987 SC2371  (10)

ACT:      Constitution of  India 1950,  Articles 71(1)  and 84(a) Sec. 18(1)  of Presidential  and Vice-Presidential Elections Act 1952-Whether ultra vires Article 71(1)      Presidential   election-Candidate    contesting    such election-Whether to take oath prescribed by Article 84(a).      Presidential and  Vice-Presidential Elections Act, 1952 Section 13(a)  read  with  section  14A  (1)-‘Candidate’  at presidential election-  Who is-One  duly nominated’-who  has locus standi to challenge election.      Section 18(1)  and 19-Elections  Act,  petition-Whether could be  filed on  ground  that  elected  candidate  not  a ‘suitable person’ for holding the office.      Section  18(2)-Undue   influence  and   bribery  at  an election-Canvassing for a candidate-Whether amounts to undue influence.      pleading  &   Practice:  Election  Petitions-Pleadings- Precise specific and unambiguous-Necessity for.      Indian  Penal   Code-Section  171C-Undue  influence  at elections Canvassing-Whether amounts to undue influence.      Words & Phrases-Meaning of.           "Connivance" whether means "consent".

HEADNOTE:      For the  election to  the office  of the  President  of India, the  Returning officer accepted the nomination papers of two  candidates only  viz.  Giani  Zail  Singh  and  Shri H.R.Khanna. The election was held on July 12,1982, and Giani Zail Singh was declared as the successful candidate.      The petitioners  in Election  Petition Nos.  2 and 3 of 1982 who  had filed  their nomination  papers, contested the election on  various grounds  and alleged that Respondent 1. Giani Zail  Singh exercised  undue influence over the voters through his confidants.

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7      A preliminary objection to the maintainability of these petitions was  raised on  behalf of Respondent no. 1 and the Attorney General.  It was  contended that neither of the two petitioners was  a ‘candidate’ within the meaning of section 13(a) of  the Presidential  and Vice-Presidential  Elections Act, 1952  and since under section 14A, an election petition can be  filed only  by a  person who  was a candidate at the election, the  petitioners  had  no  standing  to  file  the petitions.      This Court  framed  the  following  preliminary  issue: "Does the  petitioner have  no locus  standi to maintain the petition on  the ground that he was not a ‘candidate’ within the meaning  of section  13(a)  read  with  section  14A  of Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act 1952?      Election Petition No. 4 of 1982 was filed by 27 Members of Parliaments challenging the election of Respondent No. 1, Giani Zail  Singh as the President of India. contending that the petitioners  jointly sponsored  the candidature  of Shri Khanna, a  former Judge  and that Giani Zail Singh was not a "Suitable  person  "for  holding  the  high  office  of  the President of  India and  that Shri  M.H.  Beg  former  Chief Justice and  Chairman  of  the  Minorities  Commission,  was engaged by  Respondent I  and by  the  Prime  Minister  "for influencing the  votes of the Minority Communities";(2) that a Cabinet Minister of the Union Government, a ‘supporter and close associate  ’of Respondent 1, exercised undue influence over the  voters by  misusing the  Government machinery  and that a  statement was  issued by him through the Press Info- Bureau asking  the voters to vote for Respondent 1, (3) that the Prim,  Min ter  participated in the election campaign of Respondent 1  and misused  to  Government machinery for that purpose, (4)  that the Prime Minister made a communal appeal to the Akali Dal that its members should vote for Respondent 1, and (5) that Government helicopters and cars were misused for the  purpose of  the election  of Respondent 1, and that these  various   acts  were   committed  by   supporters  of Respondent 1 with his connivance.      It was  contended on  behalf of  Respondent I that even assuming that  the aforesaid  allegation were  true they did not disclose  any cause  of action  for  setting  aside  the election of respondent 1.      This Court  framed the  following issues : (1) "can the election of  a candidate  to the  office of the President of India be  challenged on the ground that he is not a suitable person for  holding that  office",(2) "whether the averments in the  Election Petition,  assuming them  to  be  true  and correct; disclose  any cause of action for setting aside the election of  the returned  candidate (Respondent  1) on  the grounds stated in section 18 (1) (a) of the Act".      Dismissing the election Petitions, ^ HELD:      Election Petitions Nos. 2&3 of 1982.      1. The  petitioners have  no locus  standi to  file the election petitions  since they  were neither  duly nominated nor can  they claim to have been duly ominated as candidates at the Presidential election.[16 H] 8      2. Three  pre-conditions govern an election petition by which a  Presidential election  is challanged.  In the first place such  a petition has to be filed in the Supreme Court. Secondly, the  petition must  disclose a  challange  to  the election on one or more grounds specified in sub-section (1) of section  18 or  section 19.  Thirdly an election petition

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can be presented only by a person who was a candidate at the presidential election  or by twenty or more electors. joined together as petitioners.[14 E-F]      3. The definition of the word ‘candidate’ in section 13 (a) of  the Act  consists of  two parts.‘Candidate’  means a person who  has either been duly nominated as a candidate at a Presidential  election or a person who claims to have been duly nominated.  Section 5B (1) (a) of the Act provides that on or before the date appointed for making nominations, each candidate  shall   deliver  to   the  Returning   Officer  a nomination  paper   completed  in   the   prescribed   form, subscribed by  the candidate as assenting to the nomination, and "in  the case of Presidential election, also by at least ten electors  as proposers  and at  least  ten  electors  as seconders".[14 G-H; 15 A]      In the instant case, neither of the two petitioners was duly nominated. The nomination papers filed by them were not subscribed by  ten electors as proposers and ten electors as seconders. It  was precisely  for  this  reason  that  their nomination papers  were rejected  by the  Returning Officer. Since the  nomination papers of the two petitioners were not subscribed as  required by section 5B (1) (a) of the Act, it follows that they were not duly nominated as "candidates" at the election. [15 A-B]      4. The  occasion for  a person  to make a claim that he was duly  nominated can  arise only  if the nomination paper complies with  the statutory  requirements which  govern the filing of  nomination papers  and not  otherwise. The  claim that  he   was  ‘duly’  nominated  necessarily  implies  and involves the  claim that  his nomination  paper conformed to the  requirements   of  the   statute.  A  contestant  whose nomination paper  is not subscribed by at least ten electors as proposers  and ten  electors as seconders, as required by s. 58  (1) (a)  of the  Act, cannot  therefore claim to have been duly  nominated, any more than a contestant who had not subscribed his  assent to  his own nomination can. The claim of a contestant that he was duly nominated must arise out of his compliance with provision of the Act, and not out of the violation of  the Act. Otherwise, a person who had not filed any nomination  paper at  all but  who had only informed the Returning Officer  orally that  he desired  to  contest  the election could  also contend  that he  "claims to  have been duly nominated as a candidate". [15 F-H; 16A]      In the  instant case,  the  nomination  papers  of  the petitioners were  rightly rejected  on the  ground  of  non- compliance with  the mandatory requirement of s.58 (1)(a) of the Act.  Their claim  that they have been duly nominated is not within  the framework  of the Act but is dehors the Act. It cannot therefore be entertained.[16 C]      Charan Lal  Sahu v.  Shri Fakruddin Ali Ahmed. (A.I.R.) 1975 S.C.  1288; Charan  Lal Sahuv.  Neelam Sanjeeva  Reddy, [1978] 3 SCR 1, referred to. 9      5. It  is of  the  essence  of  the  functioning  of  a democracy that  elections to  public offices must be open to the scrutiny of an independent Tribunal. [17 D]      In the  instant cases,  it is regrettable that election petitions challenging the election to the high office of the President of  India should  be filed  in a cavalier fashion. The petitions  have an  extempore. appearance and not even a second look,  appears to  have been  given to  the manner of drafting these  petitions or to the contents raised therein. The court  refrained from  passing any  order of  costs and, instead expressed  disapproval  of  the  light  hearted  and indifferent manner  in which these petitions were filed. [17

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B-C]      Election petitions No. 4 of 1982.      1. The  rights arising  out of elections, including the right to  contest or  challenge an  election, are not common law rights.  They  are  creatures  of  the  statutes  which. create,  confer   or  limit  those  rights.  Therefore,  for deciding the  question whether  an election can be set aside on any  alleged ground,  the  courts  have  to  consult  the provisions of  law governing  the particular  election. They have to function within the framework of that law and cannot travel beyond  it. Only  those persons  on whom the right of franchise is  conferred by  the  statute  can  vote  at  the election. [19 F-G]      In  the  instant  case,  that  right  is  conferred  on every‘elector’ as  defined in  section 2(d) of the Act. Only those  person  who  are  qualified  to  be  elected  to  the particular office  can contest  the election.  That right is regulated by  section 5A  of the  Act. The  election can  be called into question in the manner prescribed by the statute and not  in any  other manner.  Section  14(1)  of  the  Act provides that no election shall be called in question except by  presenting   an  election   petition  to  the  authority specified in sub-section (2) which is the Supreme Court. The grounds for  setting aside the election to the office of the President or  the Vice-President  and the  ground on which a candidate other  than the returned candidate may be declared to have  been elected are laid down in sections 18 and 19 of the Act.  The election  can neither  be questioned  nor  set aside on  any other  ground. Therefore, the challenge to the election of the returned candidate on the ground of his want of suitability  to occupy the office of the President cannot be entertained and must be rejected.[20 D-E]      K.Venkateswara Rao  v. Bekkam  Narsimha Reddy  [1969] I SCR  679   at  684   and  Charan   Lal  sahu   v.Nandkishore Bhatt,[1974] 1 SCR 294 at 296 referred to.      2. Suitability  of a candidate is for the electorate to judge and  not for  the court  to decide.  The court  cannot substitute its  own  assessment  of  the  suitability  of  a candidate for  the verdict  returned by  the electorate. The verdict of  the electorate  is a verdict on the suitability’ of the  candidate.  ‘Suitability’  is  a  fluid  concept  of uncertain import. The ballot-box is, or has to be assumed to be its sole judge. [20 G-2 1 A]      3. It  is not  open to  a  petitioner  in  an  Election Petition  to   plead  in  terms  of  synonyms.  In  Election Petitions  pleadings   have  to  be  precise,  specific  and unambiguous so  as to put the respondent on notice. The rule of pleadings  that facts  constituting the  cause of  action must be  specifically pleaded  is as  fundamental as  it  is elementary. [23 A] 10      4.  Connivance   may  in   certain  situations   amount to‘consent’. Dictionaries  give  ‘consent’  as  one  of  the meanings of the word ‘connivance’. But it is not true to say that  ‘connivance’   invariably  and  necessarily  means  or amounts to  ‘consent’, that  is to  say, irrespective of the context of  the given  situation. The two cannot, therefore, be equated.  Consent  implies  that  parties  are  ad  idem. Connivance does  not necessarily  imply that  parties are of one mind.  They may  or may not be, depending upon the facts of the situation. [23 B-C]      5. Precision  in  pleadings  particularly  in  Election Petitions  is   necessary.  The  importance  of  a  specific pleading in election petitions can be appreciated only if it is realised  that the  absence of  a specific  plea puts the

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respondent at  a great  disadvantage. He must know what case he has  to meet.  He cannot  be kept  guessing  whether  the petitioner means  what he  says. The  petitioner  cannot  be allowed to  keep his options open until the trial and adduce such evidence  as seems  convenient and  comes handy.  It is therefore impermissible  to substitute  the word consent for the word  ‘connivance’ which  occurs in the pleadings of the petitioners. [23 F, D-E]      6. In  the absence  or a  pleading that  the offence of undue influence  was committed  with the  "consent"  of  the returned candidate,  one of  the main ingredients of section 18(1) (a) remains unsatisfied. [23 C]      7 When  the Act  was passed  in 1952,  section 18(1)(a) provided that  the Supreme  Court shall declare the election of the  returned candidate void if it is of opinion that the offence of  bribery or undue influence has been committed by the  returned   candidate  or   by  any   person  "with  the connivance" of  the returned candidate. This sub-section was amended  by   section  7   of  the  Presidential  and  Vice- Presidential Election  (Amendment) Act,  5 of 1974. The word ‘connivance’ was  substituted by  the word  ‘consent’ by the Amendment Act.  If ‘connivance’  carried the same meaning as consent and if one was the same as the other, the Parliament would not  have taken  the deliberate  step of  deleting the word connivance  a and substituting it by the word consent’. The Amendment  shows that  connivance  and  consent  connote distinct concepts  for the purpose of section 18 (I) (a).[23 G-24 B]      8. The  mere Act  of canvassing  for a candidate cannot amount to undue influence within the meaning of Section 171C of the Penal Code. [26 C]      Baburao patel  v. Dr.  Zakir Hussain  [1968] 2SCR  133; Shiv Kirpal  Singh v.  Shri V.V  Giri [1971]  2 SCR 197,320, 32]; and  Ram Dialy  santLal [1959] Suppl. 2 SCR 748 at 758, 759 referred to.      9. The  laws of  election are  self-contained codes and the rights  arising out  of elections are the off springs of those laws.  The provisions  of the  Representation  of  the People Act  1951 cannot  be engrafted  upon the Presidential and Vice-Presidential  Elections Act  1952, to  enlarge  the scope  of   an  election   petition  filed  to  challenge  a Presidential or Vice-Presidential election. Such an election can be set aside only on the grounds specified in section 18 (1) of the Act. [28 B-C]      10. The  use of Government machinery, abuse of official position and  appeal to  communal sentiments so long as such appeal does not amount to 11 undue influence, are not considered by the Legislature to be circumstances which  would invalidate  a Presidential  or  a Vice-Presidential election. [27 M; 28 A]      11. The  Act cannot  be held  to be unconstitutional on the ground  that it limits the challenge to the Presidential and Vice-Presidential  Election to  the grounds set forth in section 18  (1). While  enacting a  law in  pursuance of the power conferred by Article 71 (3), Parliament. is entitle to specify the  particular kind  of doubts  or  disputes  which shall be  inquired into and decided by the Supreme Court. If every kind of fanciful doubt or frivolous doubt will have to be inquire  into by  this  Court,  election  petitions  will became a  fertile ground for fighting political battles. [28 F; 28 G-H]      12. A  candidate who  wants to contest the election for the office  of the  President cannot take the oath in any of the  forms   prescribed  by   the  Third   Schedule  to  the

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Constitution. That  Schedule does  not prescribe any form of oath for  a person  who desires  to contest  a  Presidential election. [29 E]      In the  instant case,  the averments  in  the  Election petition, assuming  them to  be true  and  correct,  do  not disclose any  cause of action for setting aside the election of the returned candidate on the ground stated in section 18 (1)(a) of the Act. [28 D]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Election Petition No. 2 of 1982       (Petition under Article 71 of the Constitution.)                             AND      Election Petition No. 3 of 1982.      (Petition under Article 71 of the Constitution.)                             WITH      Election Petition No. 4 of 1982.      (Petition under Article 71 of the Constitution.)      Petitioner in person in Election Petition No. 2/82.      Hari Shanker  Jain and K.K. Gupta for the Petitioner in Election Petition No.3/82.      Shujaatullah Khan  and K.K. Gupta for the Petitioner in Election Petition No.4/82.      O.P Sharma, R.C. Gubrele, K.R Gupta and R.C. Bhatia for the Respondents in Election Petition No.2/82.      P.R. Mridul,  A.K. Sen.  O.P. Sharma, R.C. Gubrele, K.R Gupta  and  R.C.  Bhatia  for  the  respondent  in  Election Petition No.3/82.      A.K. Sen,  J.S. Basu,  o.P. Sharma,  R.C. Gubrele,  K.R Gupta and R.C. Election Petition No. 4/82. 12      K Parasaran,  Att. General  and R.D.Agarwala in all the Election Petitions.      P.N Duda,  H.L Tikkum,  D.S. Narula,  Vijay Pandit  and B.C. Agarwala for the interveners.      A.S. Pundir for the Interveners.      D.B. Vohra for the Interveners.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered      CHANDRACHUD, C.J.:  These three  Election petitions are filed  under  section  14  of  the  Presidential  and  Vice- Presidential Elections  Act, 1952  to challenge the election of Respondent  1, Giani  Zail Singh,  as  the  President  of India. The  election to the office of the President of India was held  on July  12, 1982. In all, 36 candidates had filed nomination papers  including Shri Charan Lal Sahu who is the petitioner in  election Petition  No. 2 of 1982 and Shri Nem Chandra Jain who is the petitioner in election Petition No.3 of 1982.  The  Returning  Officer  accepted  the  nomination papers of  two candidates  only: Gaini  Zail Singh  and Shri H.R. Khanna,  a retired  Judge of  this Court. The result of the election  was published  in the Extraordinary Gazette of India on  July 15.  1982 declaring  Giani Zail  Singh as the successful candidate.  He took  oath of  office on  July 25, 1982.      We  will  first  take  up  for  consideration  Election Petitions 2  and 3  of 1982  which are filed respectively by Shri Charan Lal Sahu and Shri Nem Chandra Jain both of whom, incidentally, are Advocates.      Election Petitions Nos. 2 & 3 of 1982:      In Petition  No.2 of  1982, the petitioner asks for the following reliefs:      "(1) That the  Constitutional  Eleventh  Amendment  Act

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         1961 be declared ultra-vires of the Constitution.      (2)  That the  sections 5 (B) 6 and 5 (c) 21 (3) of the           Presidential and  Vice Presidential  Election  Act           1952  (Amended)   with  Election   Rules  1974  be           declared,  illegal,   void  and  unconstitutional,           under Article 58 of the Constitution. 13      (3)  That is  the post  of  Prime  Minister  and  other           Ministers be  declared that  they are in office of           profit hence  they have  played undue influence in           the election of the returned Candidate.      (4)  That the  election  of  the  (Returned  Candidate)           Respondent No.  1 be  declared void and nomination           of respondent No. 2 be declared illegally accepted           thus the  petitioner be  declared  as  elected  as           President under the Constitution, as stated in the           petition u/s 18 of the Act.      (5)  That the  above system of election of President is           bad and  unconstitutional therefore,  it should be           held directly  in future by all the electorals and           Union of  India be  directed to amend Articles 54,           55 and 56 of the Constitution of India.      (6)  That sections  4(1) (2),  5, 6,  7, &  11  of  the           Salaries and  Allowances, of  Ministers  Act  1952           (Act No.  58 of 1952) along with sections 3, 4, 5,           6, 7,  8, and  9 of the Salaries and Allowances of           Members of  Parliament Act,  1954 be declared void           and unconstitutional."  (Advisedly,  we  have  not           touched up the prayer-clauses.)      In Petition  No. 3  of 1982,  the petitioner prays that the election  of Respondent  1 be  set aside  on the various grounds mentioned in the petition.      Apart from  making several  vague,  loose  and  offhand allegations,  the   petitioners  allege  that  Respondent  1 exercised  undue  influence  over  the  voters  through  his confidants. We  do not  consider it  necessary to  reproduce those allegations  since we  are of  the opinion  that these petitions are not maintainable.      A preliminary objection is taken to the maintainability of these  petitions by  Shri Asoke Sen who appears on behalf of Respondent  1 and  by the  learned Attorney General. They contend  that   neither  of   the  two   petitioners  was  a ’candidate’ within  the meaning  of section 13(1) of the Act and since,  under section  14A, an  election petition can be filed only  by a person who was a candidate at the election, the petitioners  have no  standing to file the petitions and therefore,  the   petitions  must   be  dismissed   as   not maintainable. 14      Since the  petitioners contested  their alleged lack of locus to  file the petitions, the following issue was framed by us  a preliminary  issue in  each  of  the  two  election petitions:           "Does the  petitioner  have  no  locus  standi  to      maintain the  petition on  the ground that he was not a      ’candidate’ within  the meaning  of section  13(a) read      with  section   14A  of   the  Presidential  and  Vice-      Presidential Elections Act, 1952 ?"      Section 14  of the Act provides by sub-section (1) that no election shall be called in question except by presenting an election  petition to  the authority  specified  in  sub- section (2).  According to  sub-section (2),  the  authority having jurisdiction  to try  an  election  petition  is  the Supreme Court.  By section  14A(1) of  the Act,  an election petition may  be  presented  on  the  grounds  specified  in

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section 18(1) and 19 "by any candidate at such election" or, "in the  case of  Presidential election,  by twenty  or more electors joined  together as  petitioners". Section 13(a) of the Act provides that unless the context otherwise requires, ’candidate’ means  a person  "who has been or claims to have been duly nominated as a candidate at an election".      These  provisions   show  that  there  are  three  pre- conditions which  govern an  election petition  by  which  a Presidential election  is challenged.  In the  first  place, such a  petition has  to be  filed  in  the  Supreme  Court. Secondly, the  petition must  disclose a  challenge  to  the election on  one or  more of  the grounds  specified in sub- section (1)  of section  18 or section 19. Thirdly, and that is important  for our  purpose, an  election petition can be presented only  by a  person who  was  a  candidate  at  the Presidential election  or by  twenty or more electors joined together as  petitioners. Since  the two  election  petition which are  at present  under our consideration have not been filed by  twenty or more electors, the question which arises for our  consideration is whether the two petitioners in the respective  election   petitions  were  ’candidate’  at  the election held to the office of the President of India.      The definition of the word ’candidate’ in section 13(a) of the Act consists of two parts. ’Candidate’ means a person who has  either been  duly nominated  as a  candidate  at  a presidential election  or a  person who  claims to have been duly nominated.  Neither of  the two  petitioners  was  duly nominated. This  is incontrovertible.  Section 5B (1) (a) of the Act  provides that  on or  before the date appointed for making nominations,  each candidate  shall  deliver  to  the Returning  Officer  a  nomination  paper  completed  in  the prescribed form, sub- 15 scribed by the candidate as assenting to the nomination, and "in the  case of Presidential election, also by at least ten electors  as   proposers  and   at  least  ten  electors  as seconders". It  is common  ground that the nomination papers filed by  the two  petitioners were  not subscribed  by  ten electors as  proposers and  ten electors  as  seconders.  In fact, it  is precisely  for that  reason that the nomination papers filed  by the  two petitioners  were rejected  by the Returning Officer.  Since the  nomination papers  of the two petitioners were  not subscribed  as required  by section 5B (1) (a)  of the  Act, it must follow that they were not duly nominated as candidate at the election.      The petitioners,  however, contend  that even  if it is held that  they were  not duly nominated as candidates their petitions cannot  be dismissed  on that  ground  since  they ’claim to  have been duly nominated’. It is true that in the matter of  claim to  candidacy, a  person who claims to have been duly  nominated is  on par  with a person who, in fact, was  duly  nominated.  But  the  claim  to  have  been  duly nominated cannot  be made by a person whose nomination paper does not  comply with  the mandatory requirements of section 58 (1)  (a) of  the Act.  That is  to  say  a  person  whose nomination paper,  admittedly, was  not  subscribed  by  the requisite number  of electors  as  proposers  and  seconders cannot claim  that he  was duly  nominated. Such a claim can only be  made by  a person  who can show that his nomination paper conformed  to the  provisions of section 58 and yet it was rejected,  that is,  wrongly rejected  by the  Returning Officer. To  illustrate, if  the Returning Officer rejects a nomination  paper   on  the  ground  that  one  of  the  ten subscribers who  had  proposed  the  nomination  is  not  an elector,  the   petitioner  can  claim  to  have  been  duly

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nominated if he proves that the said proposer was in fact an ’elector’.      Thus, the occasion for a person to make a claim that he was duly  nominated can  arise only  if his nomination paper complies with  the statutory  requirements which  govern the filling of  nomination papers  and not  otherwise. The claim that  he   was  ’duly’  nominated  necessarily  implies  and involves the  claim that  his nomination  paper conformed to the requirements  of the  statute. Therefore,  a  contestant whose nomination  paper is  not subscribed  by at  least ten electors as  proposers and  ten electors  as  seconders,  as required by  section 58(1)  (a) of  the Act, cannot claim to have been duly nominated, any more than a contestant who had not subscribed  his assent  to his  own nomination  can. The claim of  a contestant that he was duly nominated must arise out of  his compliance  with the  provisions of  the Act. It cannot arise  out of  the violation of the Act. Otherwise, a person who had not filed 16 any nomination  paper at  all but  who had only informed the Returning Officer  orally that  he desired  to  contest  the election could  also contend  that he  "claims to  have been duly nominated as a candidate".      It  is  not  the  case  of  the  petitioners  that  the Returning Officer  had  wrongly  rejected  their  nomination papers even  though they  were subscribed  by  ten  or  more electors as proposers and ten or more electors as seconders. Not only  were the nomination papers rightly rejected on the ground of  non-compliance with  the mandatory requirement of section 58(1)  (a) of  the Act,  but the  very case  of  the petitioners is  that their  nomination papers could not have been rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground of non- compliance with  the aforesaid  provision. Thus, their claim that they  have  been  duly  nominated  is  not  within  the framework of  the Act  but is  de hors the Act. It cannot be entertained.      In Charan  Lal Sahu  v. Shri  Fakruddin Ali  Ahmed, the petitioner  claimed   to  have  been  duly  nominated  as  a candidate though  his nomination  paper was rightly rejected on the  ground of  non-compliance  with  the  provisions  of sections 5B  and 5C  of the  Act. It  was held by this Court that merely  because a  candidate is qualified under Article 58 of the Constitution, it does not follow that he is exempt from compliance  with the  requirements  of  law  which  the Parliament has  enacted under  Article 71(3)  for regulating the mode  and the  manner in  which  nominations  should  be filed.  Since   the  petitioner  did  not  comply  with  the provisions of  the aforesaid  two sections, it was held that he could  not claim  to have  been duly  nominated  and  was therefore not  a "candidate".  In the  result, the  election petition was  dismissed by  the Court on the ground that the petitioner did not have the locus standi to maintain it.      The challenge  of  the  petitioners  to  the  provision contained in  section 5B (1) (a) of the Act on the ground of its alleged  unreasonableness has  no substance  in it.  The validity of  that provision  was upheld  by  this  Court  in Charan Lal  Sahu v.  Neelam Sanjeeva  Reddy. Besides, if the petitioners have  no locus  to file  the election petitions, they cannot  be heard  on any  of their contentions in these petitions.      Accordingly, our  finding on  the preliminary  issue is against the  petitioners. We  hold that  they have  no locus standi to file the election 17 petitions since  they were  neither duly  nominated nor  can

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they claim  to have been duly nominated as candidates at the presidential election.  In view  of this  finding,  Election Petition Nos, 2 and 3 of 1982 are dismissed.      It is  regrettable that  election petitions challenging the election  to the  high Office  of the President of India should be  filed in  a fashion  as cavalier as the one which characterises these  two petitions.  The petitions  have  an extempore appearance and not even a second look, leave alone a second thought appears to have been given to the manner of drafting  these  petitions  or  to  the  contentions  raised therein.  In   order  to   discourage  the  filing  of  such petitions, we  would have  been justified in passing a heavy order of  costs against  the two  petitioners. But  that  is likely to  create a  needless misconception that this Court, which has been constituted by the Act as the exclusive forum for deciding  election petitions  whereby a  Presidential or Vice-Presidential  election  is  challenged,  is  loathe  to entertain such  petitions. It  is  of  the  essence  of  the functioning of  a democracy  that election to public offices must be  open to  the scrutiny of an independent tribunal. A heavy order  of costs  in  these  two  petitions,  howsoever justified on  their own  facts, should not result in nipping in the  bud a  well-founded  claim  on  a  future  occasion. Therefore, we  refrain from  passing any order of costs and, instead, express  our disapproval  of the  light-hearted and indifferent manner  in which these two petitions are drafted and filed.      Election Petition No. 4 of 1982      This Election  Petition is  filed by  27 Members of the Parliament to  challenge the election of Giani Zail Singh as the President  of India.  The  petitioners  belong  to  four Opposition Parties:  The Lok  Dal, The  Democratic Socialist Party of  India, the  Bharatiya Janata  Party and the Janata Party. These  parties had  jointly sponsored the candidature of Shri  H.R. Khanna,  a former  Judge of  this Court. Giani Zail Singh  was returned  as the  successful candidate  by a large margin of votes.      The petitioners,  being Members of the Parliament, were electors at  the Presidential  election. Their  standing  to file this petition is unquestioned.      One of  the principal  challenges of the petitioners to the election  of Giani  Zail Singh  is  that  he  is  not  a "suitable  person"  for  holding  the  high  office  of  the President of  India. The  petitioners have  given their  own reasons in support of this contention in paragraphs 5 to 8 18 of the  petition.  No  useful  purpose  will  be  served  by repeating those  reasons in  this judgment  since, we are of the opinion that the election to the office of the President of India  cannot  be  questioned  on  the  ground  that  the returned candidate is not a suitable person for holding that office.      The following  issue arises  on  the  above  contention raised by the petitioners:           "Can the  election of a candidate to the office of      the President of India be challenged on the ground that      he is not a suitable person for holding that office ?"      Section 18  of the  Presidential and  Vice-Presidential Elections  Act,  1952,  which  specifies  the  "grounds  for declaring the  election of a returned candidate to be void", reads thus:           "18. (1) If the Supreme Court is of opinion,-      (a)  that the  offence of bribery or undue influence at           the election  has been  committed by  the returned           candidate or by any person with the consent of the

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         returned candidate; or      (b)  that  the   result  of   the  election   has  been           materially affected-           (i) by  the improper  reception or  refusal  of  a           vote, or           (ii) by  any non-compliance with the provisions of           the Constitution or of this Act or of any rules or           orders made under this Act; or           (iii) by reason of the fact that the nomination of           any   candidate   (other   than   the   successful           candidate), who has not withdrawn his candidature,           has been wrongly accepted; or      (c)  that the  nomination of  any  candidate  has  been           wrongly  rejected   or  the   nomination  of   the           successful candidate has been wrongly accepted;      the Supreme  Court shall  declare the  election of  the      returned candidate to be void.      (2)  For the purposes of this section, the offences of 19           bribery and  undue influence  at an  election have           the same  meaning as  in Chapter IXA of the Indian           Penal Code,"      Section 19  of the Act which specifies the "grounds for which a  candidate other  than the returned candidate may be declared to have been elected" reads thus:           "If any person who has lodged an election petition      has, in addition to calling in question the election of      the returned  candidate, claimed  a declaration that he      himself or  any other  candidate has  been duly elected      and the  Supreme Court  is of  opinion that in fact the      petitioner or  such other candidate received a majority      of the  valid votes,  the Supreme  Court  shall,  after      declaring the  election of the returned candidate to be      void, declare  the petitioner  or such other candidate,      as the case may be, to have been duly elected:           Provided  that   the  petitioner   or  such  other      candidate shall  not be  declared to be duly elected if      it is  proved that the election of such candidate would      have been  void if  he had  been the returned candidate      and a  petition had  been presented calling in question      his election".      These being  the only provisions of the Act under which the election  of a  returned candidate can be declared void, the  question  as  to  whether  the  returned  candidate  is suitable  for   holding  the  office  of  the  President  is irrelevant for the purposes of this election petition. While dealing with  an election petition filed under section 14 of the Act, this Court cannot inquire into the question whether the returned  candidate is  suitable for the office to which he  is   elected.  The  rights  arising  out  of  elections, including the right to contest or challenge an election, are not common  law rights.  They are  creatures of the statutes which create,  confer or  limit those rights. Therefore, for deciding the  question whether  an election can be set aside on any  alleged ground,  the  courts  have  to  consult  the provisions of  law governing  the particular  election. They have to function within the framework of that law and cannot travel beyond  it. Only  those persons  on whom the right of franchise is  conferred by  the  statute  can  vote  at  the election. In  the instant  case, that  right is conferred on every ’elector’ as defined in section 2(d) of the Act, which provides:           "’elector’.  in   relation   to   a   presidential      election, means  a  member  of  the  electoral  college      referred to in article 54, and

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20      in relation  to a  Vice-Presidential election,  means a      member of  the electoral college referred to in article      66".      Only those  persons who  are qualified to be elected to the particular  office can  contest  the  election.  In  the instant case,  that right  is regulated by section 5A of the Act which provides:           "Any person  may be  nominated as  a candidate for      election to  the office  of President or Vice-President      if he  is qualified  to be  by elected  to that  office      under the Constitution".      The election  can be called into question in the manner prescribed by  the statute  and not  in any other manner. In the instant  case, section 14(1) of the Act provides that no election shall be called in question except by presenting an election petition  to the authority specified in sub-section (2). By  sub-section (2) of section 14, the Supreme Court is constituted  the  sole  authority  for  trying  an  election petition. Finally,  an election  can be called into question and set  aside on those grounds only which are prescribed by the statute.  In the  instant case,  the grounds for setting aside the  election to  the office  of the  President or the Vice President  and the  grounds on  which a candidate other than the  returned candidate  may be  declared to  have been elected are  laid down in sections 18 and 19 of the Act. The election can  neither be  questioned nor  set aside  on  any other ground.  Therefore, the  challenge to  the election of the  returned  candidate  on  the  ground  of  his  want  of suitability to  occupy the office of the President cannot be entertained and  must be  rejected  out  of  hand.  (See  K. Venkateswara Rao  v. Bekkam Narsimha Reddy & Charan Lal Sahu v. Nandkishore Bhatt.      Apart from  the legal  position that the rights flowing out of  an election are statutory and not common law rights, it is  impossible to  conceive that  any court  of  law  can arrogate to  itself the power to declare an election void on the ground  that the  returned candidate  is not  a suitable person  to   hold  the   office  to  which  he  is  elected. Suitability of  a candidate  is for  the electorate to judge and not for the court to decide. The Court cannot substitute its own assessment of the suitability of a candidate for the verdict returned  by the  electorate.  The  verdict  of  the electorate is a verdict on the suitability of the 21 candidate. ’Suitability’  is a  fluid concept  of  uncertain import. The  ballot-box is,  or has to be assumed to be, its sole judge.  Were the  Court to  exercise the  power to  set aside an  election on  the ground  that, in its opinion, the returned candidate  is not  a suitable person for the office to which  he is  elected, the  statute will  stand radically amended so  as to  give to the Court a virtual right of veto on the  question of suitability of the rival candidates. And then, an  unsuccessful candidate will challenge the election of the  successful candidate  on the  ground that he is more suitable than the latter. That is an impossible task for the Courts to  undertake and  indeed, far  beyond the  limits of judicial review by the most liberal standard.      Accordingly, the  challenge  to  the  election  of  the returned candidate on the ground that he is not suitable for holding the  office of  the President  of India fails and is rejected. Our finding on the issue is in the negative.      The  other   grounds  on  which  the  petitioners  have challenged the  election of Respondent 1 are these; (1) That Shri M.H. Beg, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and

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now Chairman  of the  Minorities Commission,  was engaged by Respondent 1  and by  the Prime  Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi "for influencing the votes of the Minority communities"; (2) that  Rao   Birendra  Singh,   a  cabinet  Minister  of  the Government of  India,  who  is  a  "supporter  and  a  close associate" of  Respondent 1,  exercised undue influence over the voters  by misusing  the Government machinery in that, a statement issued  by him  asking  the  voters  to  vote  for Respondent 1  was published by the Press Information Bureau, Government of India;(3) that the Prime Minister participated in the  election campaign  of Respondent  I and  misused the Government machinery  for that  purpose; (4)  that the Prime Minister made  a communal  appeal to  the Akali Dal that its members  should   vote  for   Respondent  1;  and  (5)  that Government helicopters  and cars belonging to the Government were misused for the purpose of election of Respondent 1. It is alleged  by the  petitioners that these various acts were committed by the well-wishers and supporters of Respondent 1 with his connivance.      It was  contended by Shri Asoke Sen that, even assuming that these  allegations are  true, they  do not disclose any cause of action for setting aside the election of Respondent 1. In  view  of  these  rival  contentions,  we  framed  the following issue for consideration:           "Whether the  averments in  the Election Petition,      assum- 22      ing them  to be true and correct, disclose any cause of      action for  setting aside  the election of the returned      candidate  (Respondent  1)  on  the  ground  stated  in      section  18(1)   (a)  of  the  Presidential  and  Vice-      Presidential Elections Act, 1952?"      Section 18(1)  (a) of the Act which we have already set out, provides  that the  Supreme  Court  shall  declare  the election of  the returned  candidate to  be void if it is of opinion-           "that the  offence of  bribery and undue influence      at the  election has  been committed  by  the  returned      candidate or  by any  person with  the consent  of  the      returned candidate."                                         (emphasis supplied).      We may  keep aside  the question of bribery since there is no  allegation in that behalf. Nor is it alleged that the offence of  undue influence  was committed  by the  returned candidate himself. The allegation of the petitioners is that the offence  of undue  influence was  committed  by  certain supporters and  close associates  of Respondent  1 with  his connivance. It is patent that this allegation, even if it is true, is  not enough  to fulfil  the requirements of section 18(1) (a).  What  that  section,  to  the  extent  relevant, requires is  that the  offence of  undue influence  must  be committed by  some other  person with  the "consent"  of the returned candidate.  There in  no  plea  whatsoever  in  the petition that  undue influence  was exercised by those other persons with the consent of Respondent 1.      It is contended by Shri Shujatullah Khan who appears on behalf of  the petitioners,  that connivance and consent are one  and  the  same  thing  and  that,  there  is  no  legal distinction between  the two  concepts. In  support of  this contention, learned  counsel relies  upon the meaning of the word ’connivance’  as given  in Webster’s  Dictionary (Third Edition, Volume  1, p.  481); Random  House  Dictionary  (p. 311); Black’s  Law Dictionary  (p. 274);  Words and  Phrases (Permanent Edition,  Volume 8A,  p. 173);  and Corpus  Juris Secundum  (Volume  15A,  p.  567).  The  reliance  on  these

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dictionaries and  texts cannot  carry the point at issue any further. The  relevant question  for consideration  for  the decision of  the issue  is whether  there is any pleading in the petition  to  the  effect  that  the  offence  of  undue influence was  committed with  the consent  of the  returned candidate. Admittedly,  there is  no pleading of consent. It is then  no answer  to say that the petitioners have pleaded connivance and,  according to dictionaries, connivance means consent. The plea of 23 consent is one thing: the fact that connivance means consent (assuming that  it does) is quite another. It is not open to a petitioner  in an  Election Petition  to plead in terms of synonyms. In  these petitions, pleadings have to be precise, specific and  unambiguous so  as to  put the  respondent  on notice. The  rule of  pleadings that  facts constituting the cause  of   action  must   be  specifically  pleaded  is  as fundamental as it is elementary. ’Connivance’ may in certain situations  amount   to  consent,  which  explains  why  the dictionaries give  ’consent’ as  one of  the meanings of the word  ’connivance’.   But  it   is  not  true  to  say  that ’connivance’ invariably  and necessarily means or amounts to consent, that  is to say, irrespective of the context of the given situation.  The two  cannot,  therefore,  be  equated. Consent implies  that parties  are ad  idem. Connivance does not necessarily imply that parties are of one mind. They may or may  not be,  depending upon  the facts of the situation. That is  why, in  the absence of a pleading that the offence of undue  influence was  committed with  the consent  of the returned candidate,  one of  the main ingredients of section 18(1) (a) remains unsatisfied.      The importance  of a specific pleading in these matters can be  appreciated only  if it is realised that the absence of  a   specific  plea   puts  the  respondent  at  a  great disadvantage. He  must know  what case  he has  to meet.  He cannot be kept guessing whether the petitioner means what he says, ’connivance’  here, or whether the petitioner has used expression as  meaning ’consent’.  It is remarkable that, in their  petition,   the   petitioners   have   furnished   no particulars of  the alleged consent, if what is meant by the use of  the word  connivance  is  consent.  They  cannot  be allowed to  keep their  options open  until  the  trial  and adduce such  evidence of  consent as  seems  convenient  and comes  handy.   That  is  the  importance  of  precision  in pleadings, particularly  in election petitions. Accordingly, it is impermissible to substitute the word ’consent’ for the word ’connivance’  which occurs  in  the  pleadings  of  the petitioners.      The legislative history of the statute lends support to our view  that  for  the  purposes  of  section  18(1)  (a), connivance is  not the  same thing  as consent.  Originally, when the  Act was  passed in 1952, section 18(1)(a) provided that the  Supreme Court  shall declare  the election  of the returned candidate void if it is of opinion that the offence of bribery  or undue  influence has  been committed  by  the returned candidate or by any person ’with the connivance’ of the returned  candidate. This  sub-section  was  amended  by section  7   of  the   Presidential  and   Vice-Presidential Elections (Amendment) Act, 5 of 1974, which came 24 into force  on March  23, 1974.  The word  ’connivance’  was substituted by  the word  ’consent’ by the Amendment Act. If connivance carried  the same  meaning as  consent and if one was the  same as  the other. Parliament would not have taken the deliberate  step of  deleting the  word ’connivance’ and

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substituting it by the word ’consent’. The amendment made by the Amendment  Act of 1947 shows that connivance and consent connote distinct  concepts for  the purpose of section 18(1) (a) of the Act,      Since, admittedly, there is no pleading in the Election Petition that  the offence  of undue influence was committed with the  consent of  the returned  candidate, the  petition must be  held to  disclose no  cause of  action for  setting aside the  election of  the returned candidate under section 18(1) (a) of the Act.      Apart from  this, Shri Asoke Sen is right that granting everything in  favour of  the petitioners  and assuming that all that  they have  alleged is true and correct, no case is made out  for setting  aside the  election of  the  returned candidate under  section 18(1) (a) of the Act. We will first take up  the allegation  of the  petitioners that  Shri M.H. Beg,  Chairman   of  the  Minorities  Commission,  canvassed support for  Respondent 1.  The question  which we  have  to consider is  whether, in doing so, Shri Beg is guilty of the offence  of  undue  influence.  Section  18(2)  of  the  Act provides that  for purposes  of section  18, the offences of bribery and  undue influence  at an  election have  the same meaning as  in Chapter  IXA of  the Penal Code. That Chapter which was  introduced into the Penal Code by Act 39 of 1920, deals with  "Offences relating  to Elections". Sections 171B and 171C  of the  Penal Code  define the offences of bribery and undue influence respectively, Section 171C reads thus:      "Undue influence at elections:           171C.  (1)   Whoever  voluntarily   interferes  or      attempts to  interfere with  the free  exercise of  any      electoral right  commits the offence of undue influence      at an election.           (2) Without  prejudice to  the generality  of  the      provisions of sub-section (1), whoever-           (a)  threatens any  candidate  or  voter,  or  any                person  in  whom  a  candidate  or  voter  is                interested, with injury of any kind, or 25           (b)  induces or  attempts to induce a candidate or                voter to  believe that  he or  any person  in                whom he  is interested will become or will be                rendered an  object of  Divine displeasure or                of spiritual censure,      shall be  deemed to interfere with the free exercise of      the electoral  right of such candidate or voter, within      the meaning of sub-section (1).           (3) A declaration of public policy or a promise of      public action  or the  mere exercise  of a  legal right      without intent  to interfere  with an  electoral right,      shall not  be deemed  to  be  interference  within  the      meaning of this section."      The gravamen  of this  section is  that there  must  be interference  or   attempted  interference  with  the  ’free exercise’ of  any  electoral  right.  ’Electoral  right’  is defined by  section 171A(b) to mean the right of a person to stand, or  not to  stand as,  or to  withdraw from  being, a candidate or  to vote refrain from voting at an election. In so far as is relevant for our purpose, the election petition must show that Shri Beg interfered with the free exercise of the voters’  right to vote at the Presidential election. The petition does not allege or show that Shri Beg interfered in any manner with the free exercise of the right of the voters to  vote  according  to  their  choice  or  conscience.  The petition alleges  that Shri  Beg commented severely upon the suitability of  the rival  candidate  Shri  H.R.  Khanna  by

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pointing out  the so-called  infirmities in  his judgment in the Fundamental  Rights case. On the supposition that Judges constitute  brotherhood   and   are   bound   by   ties   of institutional loyalty,  one may  not approve of the tone and temper of  the personal attack made by Shri Beg on Shri H.R. Khanna. But  that  is  beside  the  point.  We  are  neither concerned with  the propriety  of the statement made by Shri Beg nor  with the  question  as  to  who,  out  of  the  two candidates, is  more suitable  to be the President of India. The point  of the  matter is that by conveying to the voters that Respondent  1 was  a much  safer  candidate  than  Shri Khanna  and  that  Shri  Khanna  would  not  be  a  suitable candidate to  hold the  office of  the President of India by reason of  a judgment  of his, Shri Beg could not be said to have interfered  with the  free exercise of the right of the voters  to  vote  at  the  election.  If  the  mere  act  of canvassing in  favour of  one candidate  as against  another were to  amount to  undue influence,  the very  process of a democratic election  shall have  been stifled  because,  the right  to  canvass  support  for  a  candidate  is  as  much important as the 26 right to vote for a candidate of one’s choice. Therefore, in order that  the offence  of undue  influence can  be said to have been made out within the meaning of section 171C of the Penal Code,  something more  than the mere act of canvassing for a  candidate must  be shown  to have  been done  by  the offender. That  something more  may, for  example, be in the nature of a threat of an injury to a candidate or a voter as stated in sub-section 2(a) of section 171C af the Penal Code or,  it   may  consist   of  inducing  a  belief  of  divine displeasure in  the mind of a candidate or a voter as stated in sub-section  2(b). The  act alleged as constituting undue influence must  be in the nature of a pressure or tyranny on the mind  of the  candidate or the voter. It is not possible to enumerate  exhaustively the  diverse categorise  of  acts which fall  within the  definition of undue influence. It is enough for  our purpose  to say, that of one thing there can be no  doubt: The  mere act  of canvassing  for a  candidate cannot amount  to undue  influence  within  the  meaning  of section 171C of the Penal Code.      In Baburao  Patel v. Dr. Zakir Husain, this Court while emphasising the  distinction between mere canvassing and the exercise of undue influence, observed:           "It is  difficult to  lay down  in  general  terms      where mere  canvassing ends and interference or attempt      at interference with the free exercise of any electoral      right begins. That is a matter to be determined in each      case; but  there can  be no doubt that, if what is done      is merely  canvassing, it would not be undue influence.      As sub-section  (3) of  section 171C  shows,  the  mere      exercise of  a legal  right without intent to interfere      with an electoral right would not be undue influence".      In Shiv  Kirpal Singh  v. Shri  V.V.  Giri,  the  Court observed that  "if any  acts are done which merely influence the voter  in making  his choice  between one  candidate  or another, they  will not amount to interference with the free exercise of  the electoral right", that the expression ’free exercise’ of the electoral right must be read in the context of an  election in  a  democratic  society  and,  therefore, candidates and  their supporters  must be allowed to canvass support by  all legal and legitimate means. Accordingly, the offence  of  undue  influence  can  be  said  to  have  been committed only if the voter is put under a 27

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threat or  fear of  some adverse  consequence, or  if he  is induced to  believe that  he will become an object of divine displeasure or  spiritual censure  if he  casts or  does not cast a  vote in accordance with his decision: "But, in cases where the only act done is for the purpose of convincing the voter  that   a  particular  candidate  is  not  the  proper candidate to  whom the vote should be given, that act cannot be held to be one which interferes with the free exercise of the electoral right",      Ram Dial  v. Sant  Lal was  a case  of undue  influence under   proviso(a)   (ii)   to   section   123(2)   of   the Representation of the People Act, 1951 The appellant therein had circulated  a poster  under the authority of the supreme religious leader  of the  Namdhari Sikhs  in a  constituency where a  large number  of voters  were Namdhari  Sikhs. This Court observed  that there  cannot be  the least  doubt that even a  religious leader has the right freely to express his opinion  on   the  comparative   merits  of  the  contesting candidates and  to canvass  for such of them as he considers worthy of  the confidence  of the electors. Such a course of conduct on  his part  will  only  be  a  use  of  his  great influence amongst  a particular section of the voters in the constituency and  that, it  will amount  to an  abuse of his great influence  only if  the words which he utters leave no choice to  the persons  addressed by  him in the exercise of their electoral rights. On the facts of the case it was held that the  religious leader, by his exhortations and warnings to the  Namdhari eletors,  that disobedience  of his mandate will carry  divine displeasure and spiritual censure left no choice to them to exercise their right of voting freely.      Thus, the  allegation of the pestitioners that Shri Beg asked the voters to cast their votes in favour of Respondent 1 and  not to  cast them  for Shri H.R. Khanna on the ground that the  latter was  not a  safe or  suitable candidate  as compared with Respondent 1, does not make out the offence of undue influence  as defined  in Section  171C of  the  Penal Code. It  must follow  that the  Election Petition  does not disclose any  cause of action for setting aside the election of  Respondent  1  on  the  ground  of  undue  influence  as specified in section 18(1) (a) of the Act.      The remaining  grounds alleged  by the  petitioners for invalidating the  election of Respondent 1 are misconceived. The use  of Government machinery, abuse of official position and appeal  to communal  sentiments so  long as  such appeal does not amount to 28 undue influence, are not considered by the Legislature to be circumstances which  would invalidate  a Presidential  or  a Vice-Presidential election.  Assuming, therefore,  that  any such  acts  were  done,  they  cannot  be  relied  upon  for declaring the election of Respondent 1 void. As we have said already, the  laws of  election are self-contained codes and the rights  arising out  of elections are the off-springs of those  laws.   We  cannot  engraft  the  provisions  of  the Representation of  the People  Act, 1951  upon  the  statute under consideration  and thereby  enlarge the  scope  of  an election petition filed to challenge a Presidential or Vice- Presidential election.  Such an election can be set aside on the grounds  specified in  section 18(1)  of the  Act  only. Since the  other allegations  made by the petitioners do not fall within  the scope  of that  provision, they  have to be rejected.      For these  reasons, our  finding  on  the  issue  under consideration  is   that  the   averments  in  the  Election Petition, assuming  them to  be true  and  correct,  do  not

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disclose any  cause of action for setting aside the election of the  returned candidate  on the grounds stated in section 18(1)(a) of the Act.      It was  contended on behalf of the petitioners that the Act would  be  unconstitutional  if  it  is  interpreted  as limiting  the   challenge  to   the  Presidential  or  Vice- Presidential election  to the  grounds set  forth in section 18(1). In  support of  this argument  reliance is  placed by learned  counsel  for  the  petitioners  on  the  provisions contained in  Article 71(1)  of the Constitution which says: "All doubts  and disputes  arising out  of or  in connection with the  election of a President or Vice-President shall be inquired  into  and  decided  by  the  Supreme  Court  whose decision shall  be final". It is urged that the Constitution has conferred  upon the  Supreme Court  the power to inquire into and  decide upon every kind of doubt or dispute arising out of  or in  connection with  a Presidential  election and since, section  18(1) restricts  that power  to the  grounds stated therein.  it  is  ultra  vires  Article  71(1).  This argument overlooks  that clause (3) of Art. 71 confers power upon the  Parliament,  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the Constitution, to  make a law for regulating matters relating to or  connected with  the election  of the President or the Vice-President. While  enacting a  law in  pursuance of  the power conferred by Article 71(3), the Parliament is entitled to specify  the particular  kind of doubts or disputes which shall be  inquired into and decided by the Supreme Court. If the petitioners  were right  in their contention, every kind of fanciful  doubt or  frivolous dispute  under the sun will have  to  be  inquired  into  by  this  Court  and  election petitions 29 will become a fertile ground for fighting political battles.      That leaves  for consideration  one  other  contention. Article 58(1)  of the  Constitution provides  that no person shall be eligible for election as President unless he (a) is a citizen  of India, (b) has completed the age of thiry-five years, and  (c) is qualified for election as a member of the House of  the People.  Article 84(a)  provides that a person shall not  be qualified  to be  chosen to  fill  a  seat  in Parliament unless,  inter alia  he makes  and subscribes  an oath or  affirmation set  out for  the purpose  in the Third Schedule.  The   argument  of  the  petitioners  is  that  a candidate contesting  a Presidential  election must take the oath as  prescribed by  Article 84(a) and since Respondent 1 had not  taken such  oath, his election is unconstitutional. This argument  is untenable.  Article  58  which  prescribes "Qualifications for  elections as President", provides three conditions of  eligibility for  contesting the  Presidential election. One of these conditions is that the candidate must be qualified  for election  as a  member of the House of the People. Article  84 speaks of "qualifications for membership of Parliament".  No person can fill a seat in the Parliament unless, inter alia, he subscribes to the oath or affirmation according to  the form  set out  in the  Third Schedule. The form prescribed  by the  Third Schedule  shows  that  it  is restricted to  candidates who desire to contest the election to the Parliament. In the very nature of things, a candidate who wants  to contest  the election  for the  office of  the President  cannot   take  the  oath  in  any  of  the  forms prescribed by  the Third  Schedule. That  Schedule does  not prescribe any  form of  oath for  a person  who  desires  to contest a Presidential election.      In the  result, Election Petition No. 4 of 1982 is also dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

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N.V.K.                                  Petitions dismissed. 30