CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION Vs JASMINE KAUR .
Bench: FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA,SHIVA KIRTI SINGH
Case number: C.A. No.-008377-008378 / 2014
Diary number: 18209 / 2014
Advocates: RITESH KHATRI Vs
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Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8377-8378 OF 2014 (@ SLP (C) NOS.18137-18138 OF 2014)
Chandigarh Administration & Another …Appellants
VERSUS
Jasmine Kaur & others …Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO.8376 OF 2014 (@ SLP (C) NO.18099 OF 2014)
Jessica Rehsi …Appellant
VERSUS
Chandigarh Administration & Ors. …..Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals have been preferred against the orders
passed by the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High
Court at Chandigarh in LPA No.2051 of 2013 dated 13.01.2014
and C.M. No.623 of 2014 in RA No.9 of 2014 in LPA No.2051 of
2013. The Appellants in SLP(C) No.18137-18138 of 2014 are the Civil Appeal Nos. of 2014 (@ SLP(C) Nos.18137-18138 of 2014) with connected appeal
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Chandigarh Administration and the Government Medical College
& Hospital, Chandigarh. The Appellant in SLP(C) No.18099 of
2014 has filed the Special Leave Petition with the permission of
this Court, who was not a party, either before the Single Judge or
before the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court.
3. Leave to file Special Leave Petition was granted in SLP(C)
No.18099/2014 considering the grievances expressed by the said
Appellant contending that in the event of the impugned orders of
the Division Bench being implemented, her chance of getting
admission to the course of M.B.B.S. for the academic year 2014-
15 under the Non-Resident Indian (NRI) category would be
impinged.
4. The present impugned orders of the Division Bench came
to be passed at the instance of the contesting Respondent in both
the Civil Appeals who was really aggrieved of a clause in the
prospectus issued by the Appellants in SLP(C) No.18137-18138 of
2014 (hereinafter called “the Chandigarh Administration and the
Government Medical College Chandigarh”), which according to
her was not valid. According to the contesting Respondent, she
being a Canadian Citizen is an NRI, that, therefore, she was
entitled to seek admission to the M.B.B.S. course in the NRI Civil Appeal Nos. of 2014 (@ SLP(C) Nos.18137-18138 of 2014) with connected appeal
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category quota but yet the definition of NRI as specified in the
prospectus issued by the Chandigarh Administration and the
Government Medical College, Chandigarh for the academic year
2014-15 would denude her of such status and, therefore, it was
liable to be struck down. The said definition, which was contained
in paragraph 2 of the prospectus of 2013-14, was as under:
“2. Eligibility and Merit for NRI seats (03 Seats) for MBBS Course:
In addition to the general conditions above, under the NRI Category 03 seats shall be filled up as per preference order of Category 1 and 2, given as under:-
First preference will be given to those NRI candidates who have ancestral background of Chandigarh (Category 1):
For ancestral background of Chandigarh, the grandparents/parents of the candidates should be resident of Chandigarh for a minimum period of 5 years at anytime since the origin of Chandigarh and should have immovable property in his/her name in Chandigarh for the last at least 5 years. A certificate to this effect is required from DC-cum-Estate Officer or Municipal Corporation of Chandigarh.
Second preference will be given to those NRI candidates who have ancestral background of States/UTs other than UT Chandigarh (Category 2). A certificate regarding ancestral background of the other State/UT from the competent authority is to be submitted in case of students with ancestral background of other States/UTs.
There will be no separate test/entrance test for the candidates applying for NRI/Foreign Indian Student. These candidates will have to obtain the eligibility &
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equivalence certificate for their qualifying examination from the Punjab University, Chandigarh. (as mentioned in general condition point no.f)”
5. The contesting Respondent claimed that her grand-father
retired as an Under Secretary in the year 1994, that when he was
in the services of the State of Chandigarh he resided in a
Government house from 1965 to 1984 and shifted to another
Government accommodation provided by the Chandigarh
Administration from 1984 to 1994, that third set of government
accommodation was provided by the Government to the father of
the contesting Respondent which was occupied till December
2003 and that thereafter, her father started living in the house of
her grandfather in Mohali. The contesting Respondent claimed
that she passed as a regular student from Mohali, that the
prescription contained in paragraph 2 of the prospectus providing
for eligibility and merit for NRI seats for M.B.B.S. course
stipulating that the grandparents/parents of the candidates
should be resident of Chandigarh for a minimum period of 5 years
at any time since the origin of Chandigarh and should have
immovable property in his/her name in Chandigarh for the last at
least 5 years and a certificate to that effect issued by DC- cum-
Estate Officer or Municipal Corporation of Chandigarh was not
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valid. It was on that footing that a challenge came to be made by
the contesting Respondent in the High Court in CWP No.14320 of
2013 (O&M). The learned Single Judge by order dated 27.09.2013
held that the impugned clause was totally impracticable, illegal,
illogical and declared as such. However, the learned Single Judge
went further into the question as to whether the contesting
Respondent can be granted admission at that stage when she
was already admitted into the B.D.S course in Chandigarh itself
and that when the contesting Respondent did not challenge the
eligibility criteria before submitting her application for the
M.B.B.S. course, ultimately held that the contesting Respondent
was not entitled to any relief for getting admission into M.B.B.S.
course.
6. The order of the learned Single Judge was not challenged
by the Chandigarh Administration or the Government Medical
College of Chandigarh. The contesting Respondent filed Letters
Patent Appeal in LPA No.2051 of 2013 as against that part of the
judgment by which she was denied admission to the M.B.B.S.
course. The Division Bench by its Order dated 13.01.2014 held
that when once the definition clause of NRI was found to be
invalid by the learned Single Judge, the contesting Respondent
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ought to have been granted admission into M.B.B.S. course. By
the time the Division Bench passed its order on 13.01.2014, since
the process of admission to the M.B.B.S. course had already
come to an end and all seats were filled up, the Division Bench
held that in order to do substantive justice to the contesting
Respondent and at the same time without causing any
disadvantage to the already admitted candidates under the NRI
category held that the contesting Respondent should, however,
be held to be entitled to admission in the M.B.B.S. course without
displacing any other candidate by stating that such admission
should be granted even if it required creation of an additional
seat and a direction to that effect was accordingly made.
7. A review was filed at the instance of the Chandigarh
Administration contending that when the administration took
steps to implement the direction of the Division Bench by
approaching the Medical Council of India (MCI) for creating an
additional seat, the said requisition of the administration was
turned down by the MCI and, therefore, it was not in a position to
accommodate the contesting Respondent. The Chandigarh
Administration, therefore, sought for review of the order of the
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Division Bench, insofar as it related to the grant of admission to
the contesting Respondent by creating an additional seat.
8. The Division Bench realizing the predicament in which
the Chandigarh Administration was placed, felt that the case of
the contesting Respondent was a rarest of rare one in which the
relief of admission to the M.B.B.S. course should be provided to
her by relying upon the decisions of this Court in Asha v. PT.
B.D. Sharma University of Health Sciences and others
reported in 2012 (7) SCC 389 and Priya Gupta v. State of
Chhattisgarh and others reported in (2012) 7 SCC 433 and
directed that the contesting Respondent be accommodated in the
academic session 2014-15 instead of 2013-14, with a condition
that she should pursue her M.B.B.S. course right from the
beginning without claiming any advantage of the course which
she undertook in the B.D.S. in the year 2013-14. The Division
Bench was conscious of the fact that by issuing such a direction
to be implemented in the academic session 2014-15, it would
result in reduction of one seat for the applicants of that Academic
Session under the NRI category.
9. The Chandigarh Administration and the Government
Medical College, Chandigarh were aggrieved by the said direction Civil Appeal Nos. of 2014 (@ SLP(C) Nos.18137-18138 of 2014) with connected appeal
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and preferred SLP(C) No.18137-18138 of 2014. The Appellant in
SLP(C) No.18099 of 2014 was aggrieved inasmuch as she is an
applicant of the Academic Session 2014-2015 and but for the
direction issued by the Division Bench under the impugned order
dated 21.02.2014, she would get the admission in the M.B.B.S.
course, as she is ranked in the sixth place. Because of the
admission of the contesting Respondent by way of
implementation of the order of the Division Bench, the said
Appellant has been deprived of the seat.
10. One other candidate who got himself impleaded in I.A.
Nos.2-3 of 2014 who supported the stand of the Appellant in
SLP(C) No.18099 of 2014 is in the fifth place of the merit list of
NRI category. According to the said newly added Respondent,
after the decision of the Division Bench dated 21.02.2014, a
corrigendum came to be issued by the Chandigarh Administration
wherein a provision has been made to the effect that one NRI
seat is reserved for Scheduled Caste NRI and that if it could not
be filled up by a Scheduled Caste NRI, then only the said seat
would revert to the Scheduled Caste Union Territory Resident
Pool. The grievance of the said impleaded Respondent is that if
the said corrigendum is given effect to, the total number of seats
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under NRI quota for the open category would get reduced to five
and as a sequel to it, the implementation of the direction of the
Division Bench under the orders impugned in these appeals
would directly affect the said newly added Respondent. It is,
however, submitted that the said newly added Respondent has
challenged the corrigendum issued on 19.06.2014 before the
High Court and that the same has also been stayed by the High
Court by order dated 09.07.2014. It is further submitted that after
granting stay, the High Court also issued directions for the
admission of newly added Respondent as per the list of
successful candidates declared in the proceedings of the
Chandigarh Administration and the Government Medical College,
Chandigarh dated 23.06.2014, in which the name of the said
impleaded Respondent found place at serial No.5.
11. In the above stated background, we heard Mr. Nidhesh
Gupta, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant in SLP(C)
No.18099 of 2014, Mr. Shubham Bhalla, learned Counsel for the
Appellant in SLP(C) Nos.18137-18138 of 2014, Mr. Guru Krishna
Kumar, Senior Counsel for the contesting Respondent in SLP(C)
No.18137-18138 of 2014 & Respondent No.4 in SLP(C) No.18099
of 2014, Mr. Narender Hooda, learned Senior Counsel for
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Respondent No.2 in SLP(C) Nos.18137-18138 of 2014 &
Respondent No.5 in SLP(C) No.18099 of 2014, Mr. Gaurav
Sharma, Advocate-on-Record (AOR) for MCI and Mr. Ashok
Mahajan, AOR for the newly impleaded Respondents.
12. Mr. Nidhesh Gupta, learned Senior Counsel for the
Appellant in SLP(C) No.18099 of 2014 prefaced his submissions
by referring to the belated point of time at which the contesting
Respondent approached the High Court seeking for the relief and,
therefore, even though the learned Single Judge held that the
condition prescribed in paragraph 2 of the prospectus for the first
category of NRI quota was invalid, the relief was not rightly
granted. In fact, the entire submission of learned Senior Counsel
was mainly premised on the belated approach of the contesting
Respondent in seeking for the relief and that to knowing full well
that she was not entitled to seek for admission under the first
category of NRI. Based on the above submission, the learned
Senior Counsel by relying upon various decisions of this Court
contended that the principles laid down in those decisions
certainly did not entitle the contesting Respondent to get any
admission out of turn either in the relevant year in which she
applied, namely, 2013-14 or in the academic session 2014-15.
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According to the learned Senior Counsel, when the contesting
Respondent knew full well that she did not satisfy the criteria
prescribed in relation to category I of NRI quota as stipulated in
paragraph 2 of the prospectus, which was published in April
2013, for no comprehensible reason she waited almost till the
last date for filing the application, whereas in actuality, to
challenge the stipulation contained in the said paragraph on the
ground of invalidity, there was no necessity to file the application
nor wait for any response from the Chandigarh Administration or
the Government Medical College. The contention of the learned
Senior Counsel was on the footing that since the contesting
Respondent did not display the required promptness in
approaching the Court, the various decisions of this Court by
which it has laid down that the schedule relating to admission to
the professional colleges, should be strictly adhered to and
should not be deviated under any circumstances had to be
scrupulously followed, which thereby persuaded the learned
Single Judge not to grant the relief of admission to the college
after 30.09.2013. The learned Senior Counsel, therefore,
contended that this was not a case where any of the situations
wherein admission to a candidate was directed to be given for
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certain stated reasons by this Court after the expiry of the
prescribed admission scheduled or for any admission which was
directed to be given in the subsequent academic year could be
followed. In other words, the learned Senior Counsel contended
that there was no exceptional circumstance that was existing in
the case of the contesting respondent in order to deviate from
the schedule fixed in the matter of admission to the professional
courses, which was time and again directed to be adhered to
scrupulously by this Court without any deviation. In support of the
above submissions learned Senior Counsel relied upon the
decisions in Parmender Kumar and others v. State of
Haryana and others – (2012) 1 SCC 177, Madan Lal and
Others v. State of J & K and others - (1995) 3 SCC 486,
Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority
of India and others - (1979) 3 SCC 489, Dr. Indu Kant v.
State of U.P. and others - (1993) Suppl. (2) SCC 71, Asha
(supra), Rajiv Kapoor and others v. State of Haryana and
others - (2000) 9 SCC 115, Aneesh D. Lawande and others v.
State of Goa and others - (2014) 1 SCC 554, Subhash
Chandra and another v. Delhi Subordinate Services
Selection Board and others - (2009) 15 SCC 458.
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13. As against the above submissions, Mr. Guru Krishna
Kumar, learned Senior Counsel who appeared for the contesting
Respondent in his submissions contended that the direction of
the Division Bench of the High Court has to be considered in light
of the principle of moulding of the relief when injustice was found.
According to him, a distinction must be drawn in the peculiar
undisputed facts of this case wherein, the challenge made by the
contesting Respondent was held to be valid in so far as the
prescription of the condition to seek admission under the first
category of NRI quota and, therefore, when the learned Single
Judge failed to grant the relief, the Division Bench took into
account the extraordinary circumstance which was prevailing in
the interest of justice and gave the directions without causing
any prejudice to other candidates of the relevant academic year,
as well as, in the present academic year where the merit of the
contesting Respondent was far superior to the candidates who
have been enlisted for admission under NRI quota of the first
category. It was then submitted that while issuing such
directions, the Division Bench ensured that there was no carry
forward nor any telescoping into the seats of the subsequent
year. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the question of
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telescoping would arise only if the unfilled seats of the previous
year are to be accommodated in the subsequent year and that in
the case on hand, it did not relate to any unfilled seat of the
previous year and, therefore, the direction of the Division Bench
cannot be held to fall under the category of telescoping into the
seats of the subsequent year. The learned Senior Counsel
contended that the same principle will apply even to the carry
forward principle and, therefore, when none of the said
allegations are levelled against the contesting Respondent or
directed against the judgment of the Division Bench, the Civil
Appeal does not merit any consideration. The learned Senior
Counsel pointed out that the decision of the learned Single Judge
in having declared the relevant clause as invalid has become final
and neither the Chandigarh Administration nor the Government
Medical College or for that matter the Appellant in SLP(C)
No.18099 of 2014 have raised any challenge. According to him,
the only other aspect to be examined was the entitlement of the
contesting Respondent for M.B.B.S. seat under the NRI quota
under which category the said contesting Respondent secured
the highest marks based on which her rank can be fixed in the
third place in the order of merit for the year 2014-15 and,
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therefore, allotment of seat ought to have been granted without
any hassle. The learned Senior Counsel further pointed out that
the contesting Respondent had the benefit of her application to
be entertained by way of an interim direction pending her writ
petition apart from permitting her to participate in the
counselling, though subject to the result of the writ petition. The
learned Senior Counsel, therefore, contended that when the
substantive challenge of the contesting Respondent was
accepted by the learned Single Judge, the only other order that
could have been passed was to direct the Chandigarh
Administration and the Government Medical College to consider
the claim of the contesting Respondent on merits for the grant of
the seat. The learned Senior Counsel, therefore, contended that
when the learned Single Judge committed a grave error in not
granting the relief, the Division Bench had to staple and issue
necessary directions.
14. In support of the above submissions, the learned Senior
Counsel relied upon the decisions reported in Faiza Choudhary
v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and another - (2012) 10 SCC
149, Madhu Singh (supra), Shafali Nandwani v. State of
Haryana and others - (2002) 8 SCC 152, Rajiv Kapoor
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(supra), Bhawna Garg & another v. University of Delhi &
others - (2012) 8 SCALE 504, Dwarkanath, Hindu Undivided
Family v. Income-Tax Officer, Special Circle, Kanpur and
another - (1965) 3 SCR 536, State of Punjab v. Salil Sabhlok
and others - (2013) 5 SCC 1, Miss Neelima Shangla, PH.D.
Candidate v. State of Haryana and others - (1986) 4 SCC
268 and Haryana Urban Development Authority and others
v. Sunita Rekhi - (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 169.
15. Having heard learned counsel for the respective
contesting parties, namely, the Appellant in SLP(C) No.18099 of
2014 and the contesting Respondent in both the Civil Appeals
who is the contesting Respondent, since heavy reliance was
placed upon by both the respective counsel on the earlier
decisions of this Court to support their respective contentions
that the case of the contesting Respondent would either fall
under one or the other principles laid down in those decisions or
that the facts of those cases are clearly distinguishable, we feel it
appropriate to refer to the relevant principles contained in those
decisions before venturing to express our decision as regards the
correctness or otherwise of the direction issued by the Division
Bench in favour of the contesting Respondent.
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16. In the decision reported in Parmender Kumar (supra),
it was held that once the process of selection of candidates for
admission had commenced on the basis of the prospectus, no
change could thereafter be effected by government orders to
alter the provisions contained in the prospectus. In the decision
reported in Madan Lal (supra), it was held that if a candidate
takes a calculated chance and appears at the interview then only
because the result of the interview is not palatable to him he
cannot turn around and subsequently contend that the process of
interview was unfair and the selection committee was not
properly constituted. By relying upon the above referred to
decisions, the contention raised on behalf of the Appellant in
SLP(C) No.18099 of 2014 was that the condition relating to the
NRI quota under the first category was prevalent at the time
when the contesting Respondent submitted her application and
having submitted the said application and participated in the
selection process, merely because the said clause was
subsequently found to be not valid, would not, on that ground,
validate the contesting respondent’s right to claim admission.
17. In fact, the other decisions, namely, Om Prakash
Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla and others - (1986) Suppl.
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SCC 285, Vijendra Kumar Verma v. Public Service
Commission, Uttarakhand and others - (2011) 1 SCC 150,
K.A. Nagamani v. Indian Airlines and others - (2009) 5 SCC
515, Dhananjay Malik and others v. State of Uttaranchal
and others - (2008) 4 SCC 171 and Chandra Prakash Tiwari
and others v. Shankuntala Shukla and others - (2002) 6
SCC 127 were all referred to by the learned Senior Counsel for
the Appellant in SLP(C) No.18099 of 2014 to show that the
statement made in Madan Lal was relied upon in those
decisions.
18. Mr. Nidhesh Gupta, learned Senior Counsel, therefore,
contended that the effect of the directions of the Division Bench
was that the contesting Respondent was to be admitted into the
M.B.B.S. course in the academic year 2014-15 without competing
with the claims of the other candidates who applied for the said
course in the said academic year. It was also contended that
even in the academic year 2013-14, she did not compete along
with the other similarly placed candidates but was allowed to
participate in the counselling pursuant to the interim direction
issued by the learned Single Judge during the pendency of the
writ petition and that to was subject to the outcome of the writ
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petition. The learned senior counsel, therefore, contended that
the contesting Respondent was not entitled for any equitable
relief. The learned Senior Counsel, therefore, contended that the
direction of the Division Bench cannot be sustained.
19. In this context, reliance was placed upon the three-Judge
Bench decision of this Court reported in Rajiv Kapoor (supra),
wherein in paragraph 16 this Court has held as under:
“16. The dispute relates to the academic session of the year 1997 and we are in 2000. To utilise the seats meant for the next academic year by accommodating those candidates of 1997 vintage would amount to deprivation of the legitimate rights of those who would be in the fray of contest for selection, on the basis of their inter se merit for the session of 2000, taking into account the performance of the candidates of 1997 in that year……”
20. It was submitted that the selection of candidates should
be based on the inter se merits of the candidates of that year
and, therefore, entertaining the claim of a candidate who applied
in any previous year would cause grave injustice, as those who
were not in the fray of competence would thus be permitted to
compete with the lawfully eligible applicants of the subsequent
years, which would certainly cause serious prejudice to those
candidates.
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21. To the very same effect was the decision reported in
Neelu Arora (Ms) and another v. Union of India and others
- (2003) 3 SCC 366, which was also by a three Judge Bench of
this Court. The learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant in SLP(C)
No.18099 of 2014 sought to distinguish the decision relied upon
by the Division Bench reported in Asha (supra) by pointing out
that the said decision turns upon the special facts of that case,
where this Court reached a finding of fact that the candidate
concerned was not at fault and the whole fault was on the
authorities concerned in not allowing the said candidate to
participate in the counselling for admission to the M.B.B.S. course
in spite of the fact that her merit as compared to other
candidates who were granted admission was far superior and that
she approached the Court for the redressal of her grievance at
the earliest. The learned Senior Counsel by drawing our attention
to paragraphs 32, 34 and 37 of the decision submitted that the
said decision cannot be simply followed as a matter of course as
has been done by the Division Bench in the case on hand. The
learned Senior Counsel also once again brought to our notice the
manner in which the contesting Respondent herein approached
the Court, made the application and filed the writ petition after a
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considerable length of delay and thereby disentitled her to seek
for any relief much less there was any scope for moulding the
relief as had been done by the Division Bench by the impugned
order.
22. The recent decision of this Court reported in Aneesh D.
Lawande (supra) was relied upon by the learned counsel for the
Appellant wherein this Court has culled out two main principles to
be kept in mind in such cases. In paragraph 30, the said
principles have been laid down and in paragraph 35, this Court
has reiterated as to why it will not be proper to issue directions to
adjust the students of one academic year in any subsequent
academic year by pointing out that such a course would affect
the other meritorious candidates who would be aspiring to get
admissions in the subsequent years. It was stated that for
bringing equity to some in praesenti, this Court cannot afford to
do injustice to others in future. The said paragraph 35 can be
usefully referred to which reads as under:
“35. The next submission relates to the issue whether the students who cannot be adjusted in the seats of All-India quota that have been transferred to the State quota of this year can be adjusted next year. During the course of hearing though there was some debate with regard to giving of admissions to such students in the academic year 2014-2015, Mr. Amit Kumar,
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learned counsel for the Medical Council of India, has seriously opposed the same and, thereafter, has cited the authorities which we have referred to hereinbefore. We are bound by the said precedents. In certain individual cases where there is defective counselling and merit has become a casualty, this Court has directed for adjustment in the next academic session but in the case at hand, it is not exactly so. Though we are at pains, yet we must express that it will not be appropriate to issue directions to adjust them in respect of the subsequent academic year, for taking recourse to the same would affect the other meritorious candidates who would be aspirant to get admissions next year. For doing equity to some in praesenti we cannot afford to do injustice to others in future. Therefore, the submission stands repelled.”
(underlining is ours)
23. The decision relied upon by the contesting Respondent
reported in Faiza Choudhary (supra), rather than supporting
the case of the said contesting Respondent only clarifies the legal
position without any ambiguity. The principles have been
succinctly explained in paragraphs 14 and 15 to the effect that
there cannot be any telescoping of unfilled seats of one year with
the permitted seats of the subsequent year. It was also
highlighted that a medical seat has life only in the year it falls
that to only till the cut-off date fixed by this Court i.e. 30th
September in the respective year and carry forward principle is
unknown to the professional courses like medical, engineering,
dental etc. It was also stated that there is no power with the Civil Appeal Nos. of 2014 (@ SLP(C) Nos.18137-18138 of 2014) with connected appeal
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Board to carry forward a vacancy to a succeeding year and that if
the Board or the Court indulges in such an exercise, in the
absence of any rule or regulation, that will be at the expense of
other meritorious candidates waiting for admissions in the
succeeding years. The principles laid down in the said decisions
have to be, therefore, understood in the abovesaid manner and
those principles can be applied to the facts of this case while
examining the correctness of the impugned judgment of the
Division Bench.
24. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the
Appellant upon the decision reported in Madhu Singh (supra)
apparently to draw our attention to the effect that even if the
course adopted by the High Court while directing admission to
the unfilled seats after the last scheduled date for admission, this
Court directed that such admission granted to a candidate will
not be affected even if this Court were to set at naught the
direction given by the High Court. We do not find any ratio or
principle to be followed based on the said fact noted in paragraph
8 of the judgment, but in paragraph 23 this Court made it clear
that a necessity for specifically providing for a time schedule for
the course and fixing the period during which admissions can
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take place in order to ensure that no admission can be granted
after the scheduled date, essentially should be the date for
commencement of the course. By stating the said principle in no
uncertain terms, this Court has reiterated the position that there
should be strict adherence to the schedule of dates relating to
admission and there cannot be any deviation in adhering to the
said schedule.
25. Mr. Guru Krishna Kumar, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the contesting Respondent submitted that the
direction issued by the Division Bench to admit the contesting
respondent in the academic session 2014-15, does not in any
way violate the principles laid down in the decision reported in
Aneesh D. Lawande (supra) wherein, in paragraph 30 this
Court has laid down the principles to the effect that there cannot
be direction for increase of seats or telescoping of unfilled seats
of one year with the permitted seats of the subsequent years.
According to the learned Senior Counsel, by implementing the
directions of the Division Bench, there is not going to be an
increase of the seats for the academic session 2013-14 and since
the admission of the Respondent would be based on her merits in
the academic session 2014-15, the same will not amount to
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telescoping of unfilled seats of the previous year. We will
examine the correctness of the said submission while dealing
with the respective submissions of the learned Senior Counsel.
26. The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the
decision reported in Rajiv Kapoor (supra) is distinguishable
since in that case this Court was concerned with the candidates
of the year 1997 whose admissions were directed to be made in
the academic session 2000. The learned Senior Counsel,
therefore, contended that having regard to the enormous time
gap between 1997 and 2000, the principles stated therein,
cannot be applied to the case of the contesting Respondent. The
learned Senior Counsel would, therefore, contend that as we are
concerned with the case of the contesting Respondent whose
admission related to the immediate preceding year, namely,
2013-14 and whose legitimate rights were unlawfully denied in
that year, the direction for her admission in the immediate next
academic session 2014-15 and that to based on her merits
following the decision of this Court in Asha (supra) was well
justified.
27. The learned Senior Counsel, therefore, contended that
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Court would not in any way dilute the decision in Asha (supra)
on the principles of per incuriam where the facts of the three
Judge Bench decision are clearly distinguishable.
28. While strongly relying upon the decision reported in
Asha (supra), the learned Senior Counsel after referring to the
question framed in paragraph 4(c) wherein this Court posed the
question as to what relief the Courts can grant and to what
extent they can mould it while ensuring adherence to the rule of
merit, fairness and transparency in the matter of admission in
terms of rules and regulations, drew our attention to paragraphs
25 and 32. In paragraph 25, this Court has held as under:
“25. Strict adherence to the time schedule has again been a matter of controversy before the courts. The courts have consistently taken the view that the schedule is sacrosanct like the rule of merit and all the stakeholders including the authorities concerned should adhere to it and should in no circumstances permit its violation. This, in our opinion, gives rise to dual problem. Firstly, it jeopardizes the interest and future of the students. Secondly, which is more serious, is that such action would be ex facie in violation of the orders of the court, and therefore, would invite wrath of the courts under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. In this regard, we may appropriately refer to the judgments of this Court in Priya Gupta, State of Bihar v. Sanjay Kumar Sinho, Medical Council of India v. Madhu Singh, GSF Medical and Paramedical Assn. v. Assn. of Self Financing Technical Institutes and Christian Medical College v. State of Punjab.”
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29. In paragraph 32, the exceptional circumstances which
can be examined have been quoted in order to ensure that when
any deviation is to be made from the normal rule, such similar
principles should be kept in mind by the Courts. In paragraph 32,
it was highlighted that in the rarest of rare case or exceptional
circumstances, the Courts may have to mould the reliefs and
make an exception to the cut-off date of 30th September but in
those cases the Court must first return a finding that no fault was
attributable to the candidate, that the candidate pursued her
rights and legal remedies expeditiously without any delay and
that there was no fault on the part of the authorities and that
there was no apparent breach of the rules, regulations and
principles in the process of the selection and grant of admission.
It was also highlighted that where denial of admission would
violate the right to equality and equal treatment of the candidate,
it would be completely unjust and unfair to deny such exceptional
relief to the candidate. By relying upon the said part of the
decision, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the case of
the contesting Respondent was squarely covered by the principle
of an exceptional case and, therefore, the direction of the
Division Bench was well justified. The learned Senior Counsel also
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relied upon the decisions in Dwarkanath (supra) and Salil
Sabhlok (supra) on the principle of moulding of the relief to be
made. Reliance was placed upon the decisions in Miss Neelima
Shangla (supra) and Haryana Urban Development
Authority (supra) to support the stand that a candidate who
approached the Court diligently deserved different treatment.
30. Having noted the various decisions relied upon by the
Appellant in SLP (C) No.18099 of 2014 and the contesting
Respondent, we are able to discern the following principles:
(1) The schedule relating to admissions to the professional colleges should be strictly and scrupulously adhered to and shall not be deviated under any circumstance either by the courts or the Board and midstream admission should not be permitted. (2) Under exceptional circumstances, if the court finds that there is no fault attributable to the candidate i.e., the candidate has pursued his or her legal right expeditiously without any delay and that there is fault only on the part of the authorities or there is an apparent breach of rules and regulations as well as related principles in the process of grant of admission which would violate the right to equality and equal treatment to the competing candidates and the relief of
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admission can be directed within the time schedule prescribed, it would be completely just and fair to provide exceptional reliefs to the candidate under such circumstance alone.
(3) If a candidate is not selected during a particular academic year due to the fault of the Institutions/Authorities and in this process if the seats are filled up and the scope for granting admission is lost due to eclipse of time schedule, then under such circumstances, the candidate should not be victimised for no fault of his/her and the Court may consider grant of appropriate compensation to offset the loss caused, if any. (4) When a candidate does not exercise or pursue his/her rights or legal remedies against his/her non-selection expeditiously and promptly, then the Courts cannot grant any relief to the candidate in the form of securing an admission. (5) If the candidate takes a calculated risk/chance by subjecting himself/herself to the selection process and after knowing his/her non- selection, he/she cannot subsequently turn around and contend that the process of selection was unfair. (6) If it is found that the candidate acquiesces or waives his/her right to claim relief before the Court promptly, then in such cases, the legal maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas
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subvenit, which means that equity aids only the vigilant and not the ones who sleep over their rights, will be highly appropriate. (7) No relief can be granted even though the prospectus is declared illegal or invalid if the same is not challenged promptly. Once the candidate is aware that he/she does not fulfil the criteria of the prospectus he/she cannot be heard to state that, he/she chose to challenge the same only after preferring the application and after the same is refused on the ground of eligibility. (8) There cannot be telescoping of unfilled seats of one year with permitted seats of the subsequent year i.e., carry forward of seats cannot be permitted how much ever meritorious a candidate is and deserved admission. In such circumstances, the Courts cannot grant any relief to the candidate but it is up to the candidate to re-apply next academic year. (9) There cannot be at any point of time a direction given either by the Court or the Board to increase the number of seats which is exclusively in the realm of the Medical Council of India. (10) Each of these above mentioned principles should be applied based on the unique and distinguishable facts and circumstances of each
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case and no two cases can be held to be identical.
31. Having culled out the above broad principles from the
various decisions of this Court and before examining the
correctness of the judgments impugned in these appeals, it is
necessary to note down certain vital facts relating to the case of
the contesting Respondent in order to find out whether there was
any scope at all for granting the relief as has been done by the
Division Bench by the impugned orders. Admittedly, the
contesting Respondent was not eligible under the first category of
the NRI quota prescribed under paragraph 2 of the prospectus for
academic session of 2013-14. She was, however, eligible under
the second category of NRI quota. At this juncture, it must be
stated that under the second category though her name was first
in the list, as the eligible candidates in the first category got
selected for all the seats under NRI quota, she did not get the
opportunity. The prospectus was issued by the Chandigarh
Administration and the Government Medical College as early as in
the month of April, 2013. The contesting Respondent filed the
application before the last date, namely, 24.06.2013 claiming
admission under the first category or in the alternate, in the
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second category. The Chandigarh Administration, by letter dated
02.07.2013, informed the contesting Respondent that unless she
enclosed a certificate issued by the DC-cum-Estate Officer or
Municipal Corporation of Chandigarh about the fulfillment of the
condition relating to ownership of immovable property, her
application cannot be considered under the first category of NRI
quota. The writ petition was filed by her on 05.07.2013. A list of
eligible candidates was finalized on 12.07.2013. The first
counselling was scheduled on 19.07.2013 insofar as NRI
candidates were concerned. There was an interim order of the
High Court passed on 29.07.2013 directing the administration to
receive the contesting Respondent’s application under the first
category of NRI quota, making it clear that at a later point of
time, she cannot claim any equity on that basis. Subsequently, by
another order dated 08.08.2013, the High Court directed the
administration to permit her to participate in the second
counselling. The writ petition was ultimately disposed of by the
learned Single Judge on 27.09.2013. As was noted earlier, the
learned Single Judge while upholding the challenge made by the
contesting Respondent as to the validity of the condition imposed
in order to be eligible to fall under the first category of NRI quota,
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declined to grant any relief to the contesting Respondent holding
that she failed to challenge the eligibility criteria before
submitting her application for M.B.B.S. course after taking note of
the fact that she secured admission in the Dental course.
32. After the learned Single Judge delivered the judgment on
27.09.2013, the contesting Respondent filed the Letters Patent
Appeal on 15.11.2013 and after rectification of certain defects it
was re-filed on 06.12.2013. The Letters Patent Appeal was heard
by the Division Bench and was disposed of by order dated
13.01.2014. As the direction issued by the Division Bench for
creation of an additional seat could not be complied with by the
Chandigarh Administration and the Government Medical College
on the ground that the MCI declined to grant permission for
creation of an additional seat, at the instance of Chandigarh
Administration, the review came to be filed in which the present
impugned order came to be passed by the Division Bench on
21.02.2014.
33. When we analyze the above sequence of events, we find
that the contesting Respondent knew full well when the
prospectus was issued in April 2013 that she did not fulfill the
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quota as prescribed in paragraph 2 of the prospectus. But yet
there was no immediate challenge to the said provision before
the High Court. Knowing full well that she was ineligible under the
said category after waiting almost till the last date for filing the
application, namely, 24.06.2013, she filed the application on
21.06.2013 claiming admission under the first category and
thereafter, waited till the Chandigarh Administration called upon
her to fulfill the criteria of submitting a certificate for proof of
ownership of immovable property by the DC-cum-Estate Officer,
which she could not have produced even as on April, 2013.
Therefore, the contesting Respondent cannot be heard to say
that the filing of the writ petition on 05.07.2013, challenging the
validity of the prescription contained in paragraph 2 of the
prospectus relating to the first category of NRI quota was made
diligently or atleast within a reasonable time. When we test the
said conduct of the contesting Respondent in not having
approached the Court at the appropriate time in challenging the
said provision, it will have to be stated that the Chandigarh
Administration and the Government Medical College having
received the applications for admissions for different categories
including the category under the NRI quota was processing the
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applications segregating the different categories and by the time
the writ petition filed on 05.07.2013, the process of finalizing the
eligible candidates was also nearing completion and by
12.07.2013 the same was also concluded. If the said factor is
noted, it should be stated that the conduct of the contesting
Respondent in having fixed her own time limit for approaching
the Court, in particular, with reference to the challenge to the
eligibility criteria with which she had every grievance right from
the very first date when the prospectus was issued in April, 2013,
it will have to be stated that there was total lack of diligence on
the part of the contesting Respondent in her decision to work out
her remedies in the Court of law.
34. Keeping the said factor in mind, when we examine the
subsequent development that had taken place, it is true that the
relevant criteria prescribed for claiming admission under the first
category of NRI quota was held to be wholly unreasonable and on
that ground the learned Single Judge struck out the said clause.
Thereafter, since the learned Single Judge found that there was
total lack of diligence displayed on the part of the contesting
Respondent, he expressed his inability to grant the relief to the
contesting Respondent. After the said decision was rendered by
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the learned Single Judge on 27.09.2013, when we analyze the
subsequent conduct of the contesting Respondent, we find that
she applied for the copy of the judgment of the learned Single
Judge on 19.10.2013 and the Letters Patent Appeal came to be
filed only on 15.11.2013. The Letters Patent Appeal was defective
and it was re-filed only on 06.12.2013. Ultimately, the appeal
came before the Division Bench on 13.01.2014, when the Division
Bench took the view that the learned Single Judge ought to have
moulded the relief and on that footing directed that the
Chandigarh Administration to create a seat for admitting the
contesting Respondent to the M.B.B.S. course. Thereafter, by the
impugned order dated 21.02.2014, the Division Bench held that
when creation of the seat was impossible of compliance as the
MCI was not inclined to grant permission, issued a direction that
the contesting Respondent should be admitted in the academic
year 2014-15 in the NRI quota meant for admission.
35. When we note the above dates, it will have to be stated
that the compliance of the direction of the Division Bench would
certainly cause serious prejudice to the Appellant in SLP(C)
No.18099 of 2014, as the said Appellant is stated to have been
ranked in the sixth place, i.e. in the sixth vacancy meant for NRI
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category candidates for admission for the academic year 2014-
15. It is common ground that the contesting Respondent was not
an applicant for the year 2014-15 under the NRI category. If we
consider the claim of the contesting Respondent as to whether
her claim can be brought under the category of exceptional case,
the various factors noted above, namely, failure to challenge the
relevant provision immediately after the issuance of the
prospectus in the April, 2013 would loom large before the Court.
There was no justifiable reason stated on behalf of the contesting
Respondent as to why the challenge was not made promptly
knowing full well that the said provision disentitled her to claim
under the said category. It is needless to state that if the
challenge had been made diligently and immediately after the
issuance of the prospectus in April, 2013 itself, it would have
enabled the Court to examine the said challenge at the earliest
point of time and in the event of finding good grounds to accept
the challenge, there would have been no difficulty for the Court
to issue appropriate directions not only for accepting the
application of the contesting Respondent under the first category
of NRI quota, but in the event of her scoring the requisite marks
on merits, the grant of admission could have been worked out
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without infringing the rights of any other candidate under the
said category. It is relevant to note that the invalidity of the
relevant clause as declared by the learned Single Judge, which
has become final and conclusive, would have benefitted all other
candidates who are similarly placed like that of the contesting
Respondent, had it been challenged at the earliest point of time,
as that would have provided adequate scope for considering the
relative merits of all those candidates who are similarly placed
like that of the contesting Respondent.
36. The time gap between April, 2013 and July, 2013 nearly
three months is certainly a long period as the process of
admission to professional courses are regulated by the Selection
Authorities such as the Medical Council of India, All India Council
for Technical Education, National Council for Teacher Education,
State Government Authorities as well as the concerned affiliated
universities each one of whom have got to play their
corresponding roles in regulating the admissions and also
monitoring the subsequent course of study for the purpose of
ultimately granting the degrees of successful candidates after the
completion of the course. As the process being a continuous one,
any delay in working out the remedies promptly will have to be
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viewed very seriously or otherwise the same would impinge upon
the rights of other candidates apart from causing unnecessary
administrative hardship to the regulatory bodies. When the said
factors are kept in mind while analyzing the case on hand, it will
have to be stated that even though the contesting Respondent
was successful in her challenge to the concerned provision
relating to the NRI quota in the prospectus of 2013-14, on that
sole ground it cannot be held that every other factor should be
kept aside and her claim for admission to M.B.B.S. course should
be ensured by issuing directions unmindful of the infringement of
rights of other candidates and the other statutory bodies. We are,
therefore, of the view that the conduct of the contesting
Respondent in having fixed her own time limit in making the
challenge, namely, after three months of the issuance of the
prospectus and thereafter, in filing the Letters Patent Appeal
which process resulted in the Division Bench in deciding the
appeal only in the month of January, 2014 by which time the
substantial part of the academic year had been crossed, the
question remained as to whether the Division Bench was justified
in directing the admission of the contesting Respondent to the
M.B.B.S. course in the academic year 2014-15 by merely stating
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that she was already undergoing the B.D.S. course and that the
course content of the first six months of B.D.S and M.B.B.S. are
more or less identical. Beyond that we do not find any other
good grounds which weighed with the Division Bench in issuing
the direction for creating an additional seat.
37. The Division Bench did rely upon the decision of this
Court in Asha (supra) and Priya Gupta (supra). Subsequently,
when it came to light that the direction for admission by creation
of an additional seat was impossible of compliance, the impugned
order came to be issued by the Division Bench on 21.02.2014 by
which time half of the academic year had almost come to an end.
In our considered view, at least at that stage since the process of
issuance of the prospectus for 2014-15 was on the anvil, the
contesting Respondent ought to have been allowed to work out
and claim under the NRI quota in the said academic year. Since
by the order of learned Single Judge the restriction in claiming
admission under the first category of NRI quota having been
removed, there would have been no impediment for the
contesting Respondent to apply under the said category and
staked her claim along with the other competing candidates. It
was unfortunate that the case of the contesting Respondent was
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considered to be rarest of rare case, which in our considered
opinion, does not have the required support. As was noted by us
earlier, the contesting Respondent did not display due diligence
in making a challenge to the relevant clause relating to first
category of NRI quota of the 2013-14 prospectus. Further, as she
had already secured a seat in the Dental course and the creation
of an additional seat was consistently not encouraged by this
Court, the direction for creation of an additional seat in the month
of January, 2014 for the academic year 2014-15 by the Division
Bench could not be implemented. Therefore, the ultimate
direction of the Division Bench in having directed the Chandigarh
Administration and the Government Medical College to provide
admission to the contesting Respondent without her participation
in the admission process of the year 2014-15 and thereby
causing prejudice to the rightful claims of the candidates who
validly made their applications in the said academic year cannot
be countenanced as that would amount to setting up a bad
precedent in all future cases.
38. As time and again such instances of claiming admission
into such professional courses are brought before the Court, and
on every such occasion, reliance is placed upon the various
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decisions of this Court for issuing necessary directions for
accommodating the students to various courses claiming parity,
we feel it appropriate to state that unless such claims of
exceptional nature are brought before the Court within the time
schedule fixed by this Court, Court or Board should not pass
orders for granting admission into any particular course out of
time. In this context, it will have to be stated that in whatever
earlier decisions of this Court such out of time admissions were
granted, the same cannot be quoted as a precedent in any other
case, as such directions were issued after due consideration of
the peculiar facts involved in those cases. No two cases can be
held to be similar in all respects. Therefore, in such of those
cases where the Court or Board is not in a position to grant the
relief within the time schedule due to the fault attributable to the
candidate concerned, like the case on hand, there should be no
hesitation to deny the relief as was done by the learned Single
Judge. If for any reason, such grant of relief is not possible within
the time schedule, due to reasons attributable to other parties,
and such reasons are found to be deliberate or mala fide the
Court should only consider any other relief other than direction
for admission, such as compensation, etc. In such situations, the
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Court should ensure that those who were at fault are
appropriately proceeded against and punished in order to ensure
that such deliberate or malicious acts do not recur.
39. We are, therefore, convinced that the impugned orders of
the Division Bench in having issued such a direction cannot be
approved by this Court. When we apply the various principles
which we have culled out to the case on hand, we find that each
one of the principle has been violated by the contesting
Respondent. As stated by us earlier, there was total lack of
diligence displayed by the contesting Respondent right from the
stage when the submission of the application was made. We have
noted that the prospectus which was issued in April, 2013 and
the offending clause in the prospectus was not challenged
promptly while knowing full well that under the said clause the
candidate was not eligible, but yet for reason best known to her,
an application was filed and that to three days prior to the last
date notified for submission of such application. There was no
reason, much less justifiable reason, for not challenging the
relevant clause before the filing of the application. There was no
reason for the contesting Respondent to wait for any reply from
the Chandigarh Administration. After the order of the learned
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Single Judge also, the contesting Respondent took her own time
to approach the Division Bench for preferring the Letters Patent
Appeal. A cumulative effect of the conduct of the contesting
Respondent has only resulted in disentitling her to claim any
equitable relief prejudicial to the interest of other eligible
candidates of the year 2014-15 and whose rights came to be
crystallized based on the process of selection made for the
academic year 2014-15. If the direction of the Division Bench in
the above stated background is allowed to operate, it would
amount to paying a premium for the contesting Respondent’s
inexplicable delay in working out her remedies.
40. We are, therefore, convinced that such a recalcitrant
attitude displayed by the contesting Respondent should not be
encouraged at the cost of the rights of the other candidates for
the year 2014-15 against whom the contesting Respondent had
no axe to grind. Therefore, while setting aside the orders
impugned in these appeals, we issue the following directions:
(11) Since the contesting Respondent pursued her B.D.S. course till this date though she has secured her admission pursuant to the direction of the Division Bench to M.B.B.S. course in the year 2014-15 and as we have found no
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justification for the direction issued by the Division Bench which we are setting aside, we direct the Chandigarh Administration and the Government Medical College to restore the contesting Respondent’s admission to the B.D.S. course of the academic year 2013-14 and allow her to pursue the said course, if she so chooses. (12) The admission granted to the contesting Respondent in the M.B.B.S. course of 2014-15 under the NRI category stands cancelled and the selection of candidates who applied for the said course in the said category in the academic year 2014-15 shall be finalized by the Chandigarh Administration and the Government Medical College and on that basis proceed with the admission as per the schedule. (13) As far as the claim relating to the impleaded Respondent in I.A. No.2-3 of 2014 is concerned, since his claim is subject matter of consideration before the High Court, the same would be subject to the outcome of those proceedings which is left open for consideration by the High Court.
41. The interim direction issued by this Court on 11.07.2014
is vacated and the seats left vacant in B.D.S. and M.B.B.S.
courses shall be filled up on merits.
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42. With the above directions, the appeals filed by
Chandigarh Administration and the Government Medical College
as well as by Jessica Rehsi stand allowed.
…...…..……….…………………………...J. [Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla]
………………. ………………………………J.
[Shiva Kirti Singh]
New Delhi; September 01, 2014.
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