CHAMAN LAL (D) THR. LRS. Vs KAMLAWATI (D) THR. L.RS.
Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.M. JOSEPH
Judgment by: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL
Case number: C.A. No.-002633-002633 / 2012
Diary number: 21517 / 2008
Advocates: Vs
NIKILESH RAMACHANDRAN
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 2633 OF 2012
CHAMAN LAL (D) THR. LRS. Appellant(s)
VERSUS
KAMLAWATI (D) THR. LRS. Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL,J.
1. The subject matter of dispute is half of the land
measuring 3 Biswas and 11 Bighas out of Khasra No. 1252,
Khata No. 318/563 in Dholewal, Ludhiana. The land was
purchased by Chaman Lal (late appellant) from one Mansa
Ram on 30.7.1949. A gift deed was executed on 10.3.1958
by Chaman Lal in favour of late Smt. Gurdev Kaur, his
stepmother. The controversy relates to the fact whether
suit was in respect of half portion of the total land or
the whole land was gifted to late Smt. Gurdev Kaur.
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2. It cannot really be disputed that the possession
of the land remained with late Smt. Gurdev Kaur. It
appears that no mutation was made till the jamabandi of
1969-70 when the whole land was mutated in the name of
Smt. Gurdev Kaur, who soon thereafter, sold the land to
Smt. Kamla Wati on 15.3.1971. The consequent mutation
was made on 24.10.1972.
4. The dispute arose from the filing of suit for
partition by late Sh. Chaman Lal on 22.08.1987. In the
suit claim was sought to be laid that what was gifted
was only half of the total land. Late Smt. Gurdev Kaur
was arrayed as the 1st defendant and Smt. Leelawati as
the IInd defendant.
5. Pendente lite the land was re sold by defendant
No.2 to defendant Nos. 3 & 4, on 4.1.1995 and 6.1.1995
who were thus impleaded as the defendants. It is these
defendants who are respondents 1 & 2 before us and are
really contesting parties.
6. The trial court in terms of judgment and decree
dated 20.11.1998 decreed the suit directing the
partition into half share each. The first appellate
court affirmed the decree vide judgment and order dated
28.8.1999. However, the second appellate court being
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the Punjab and Haryana High Court interfered with these
concurrent findings in terms of judgment dated
02.04.2002. Late Chaman Lal preferred a special leave
petition against the said order being SLP(C) No. 2713 of
2003. The appeal was allowed on 6.10.2003 on the short
ground that the Second Appeal has been decided without
framing any substantial question of law as was mandatory
requirement under Section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908. The matter was thus remitted back to
the High Court which has again allowed the appeal in
terms of the impugned judgment dated 23.01.2008.
7. We may notice prior to proceeding on merits of
the matter that the order of this Court dated 6.10.2003
was predicated on a legal position which stands
subsequently clarified by a Constitution Bench judgment
of this Court in Pankajakshi (D) through Lrs. & Ors. vs.
Chandrika & Ors. (2016 (6) SCC 157) opining that insofar
as the Punjab and Haryana High Court is concerned, a
different legal position would prevail and a substantial
question of law is not to be determined, in view of the
State amendments, as a pre-requisite before interfering
with the orders of the trial court.
8. Be that as it may, the aforesaid is being
referred to, so as to complete the facts as also by
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reason of the learned counsel for respondent nos. 1 & 2
drawing our attention to certain facts recorded in the
earlier Second Appeal order dated 02.04.2002 which may
be somewhat germane to the controversy in question. We
may notice that crucial development during the pendency
of the Second Appeal, prior even to first order, was
that a translation was got done from the concerned
branch of the High Court of the document in question
being the gift deed. A transliteration was also got
done of this document. In that context it has been
observed in the order dated 02.04.2002 that the
concerned learned judge had summoned the person who had
translated the document being gift deed(Exh. P1) in the
Court and had read the document in open court in the
presence of learned counsel for the parties. This was
compared with the punjabi version of the document. It
was thus opined that the translation effected by the
translation branch is absolutely correct, resulting in a
finding that late Sh. Chaman Lal did make a gift of the
entire land. In the same proceeding it is also recorded
that the correctness of the version of this document’s
translation is not disputed.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant has sought to
contend that it was not within the domain of the power
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of the Second appeal judge, who has interfered with the
concurrent findings given the narrow scope in which such
a second appeal has to be examined more so in the
context of Section 41 of the Punjab Court Act,
1918(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Punjab Court Act’)
read with Section 42 of the Punjab Court Act. The said
provisions read as under:
“41. Second appeals-(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court on any of the following grounds, namely :
(a) the decision being contrary to law or to some custom or usage having the force of law : (b) the decision having failed to determine some material issue of law or custom or usage having the force of law : (c) a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 [V of 1908], or by any other law for the time being in force which may possibly have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits;
Explanation-A question relating to the existence or validity of a custom or usage shall be deemed to be a question of law within the meaning of his section:
(2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. (3) [Repealed by Section 2B of Punjab Act 6 of 1941]
42. Second appeal on no other ground- (1) No second appeal shall lie except on the grounds mentioned in Section 41.
2.No second appeal shall lie in any suit of the nature cognizable by Courts of small Causes when the amount or value of the subject matter
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of the original suit does not exceed five hundred rupees.”
10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the
respondent nos. 1 & 2 seeks to contend that the High
Court was well within its jurisdiction to have a genuine
translation done of the document, being the gift deed,
that being the real bone of contention. The
proceedings, as referred to above, have been relied upon
for the purposes of the acknowledgment of both the
parties that the translation is accurate. In this
context, reference has been made to the provisions of
clauses (a) & (c) of sub section 1 of Section 41 of the
Punjab Court Act to contend that the exercise of power
would fall within the said jurisdiction.
11. On consideration of the matter, we find that the
High Court cannot be said to have exceeded its
jurisdiction, as has to be exercised within the ambit of
Section 41 of the Punjab Court Act. We say so as the
fulcrum of the dispute was the gift deed itself being
the document in question. The document was originally
penned down in Urdu with the Persian dialect and was
thereafter translated to the Punjabi language. The next
translation was done in English as also the
transliteration. Thus there would be a reliance on an
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inaccurate document if the translation and the
transliteration was not accurate. This is the objective
which was sought to be subserved by getting an
authenticated translation done in the High Court and the
concession/submission of the appellants herein recorded
in order dated 02.04.2002 in respect of the translation,
albeit the order being set aside. The acknowledgment of
both the parties to the accuracy of the translation and
the transliteration could not be doubted thereafter. If
the substratum being the document has been inaccurately
translated then there would be a fundamental legal
infirmity in the interpretation to be given and in
determining the controversy in question. We are thus
not inclined to accept this preliminary objection sought
to be raised by learned senior counsel for the appellant
on the right of the High Court to look into the question
on merits.
12. We are fortified in our aforesaid view by earlier
judicial pronouncements. We may note that these
judgments are in the context of the provisions for
second appeal under Section 100 of the said Code as it
existed prior to the amendment of 1976, which is almost
pari materia to the existing provision which applies to
Punjab (as noticed in Pankajakshi (D) through LRs & Ors.1
1 (supra)
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in para 24). Per se construction of documents (unless
documents of title) to prove a question of fact do not
involve an issue of law unless it can be shown that the
material evidence contained in that was misunderstood by
the court of fact.2 In the facts of the present case we
are, in fact, dealing with a document of title, i.e.,
the Gift Deed. Thus, there can be little doubt that if
the translation of the document itself is not correctly
done, an aspect which was addressed to by the High Court
by getting the translation done, which was accepted,
then the correct translation would have to be re-
construed. It is this principle, which was recognized
in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Shipping
and Manufacturing Co. Ltd.3 while observing in para 2 as
under:
“2. ….Indeed it is well settled that the construction of
a document of title or of a document which is the
foundation of the rights of parties necessarily raises a
question of law.”
13. Returning to the factual controversy in issue and
the analysis of the same by the High Court, the perusal
of the gift deed shows that what is sought to be gifted
2 (1963) 2 SCR 208 3 1962 Supp (3) SCR 549
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does not mention any lesser land than the whole land. If
the plea of the appellant was to be accepted, then there
should have been some area stated to have been gifted
while the other would have been held back. This is not
so. Of course, the submission of the learned senior
counsel for the appellant is that the area remained
undivided and that is why the partition was being
sought.
14. We may also notice that when the reference is made
to Rs.800/-, it is in the context of half the value of
Rs.1600/-, a methodology adopted which is prevalent in
this part of the country while recording such
translation wherefor accuracy of the figures, half the
amount is mentioned to ensure that the actual figure is
correctly reflected. Not only that the translation
would show that the donee is “deemed to be the owner in
possession of my gifted land”. Thus, whatever land was
gifted, the possession was handed over. In the facts of
the present case the possession of the complete land is
undisputedly initially with the Ist defendant then with
the IInd defendant and thereafter with the IIIrd and
IVth defendants.
15. We may also take note of the fact that jamabandi
for the first time was done in the name of late Gurdev
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Kaur for 1969-70. Prior to that the whole land remained
in the name of late Chaman Lal, the original owner. It
is not as if the jamabandi was done for half the land in
favour of late Chaman Lal and half in favour of late
Gurdev Kaur. If at all a grievance would have arisen on
behalf of late Chaman Lal that could have been an
occasion for it. The first time the matter is sought to
be raised is 17 years later and after about 16 years of
the land in question being sold to the IInd defendant.
Thus, the conduct of the parties also suggests that the
parties understood that whole land was gifted and the
possession of the whole land was handed over.
16. Learned counsel for the appellant also sought to
draw an inference in favour of the appellant by
submitting that what had weighed with the trial court
and the first appellate court was that the document of
gift was stamped on the basis that the value of the gift
was Rs.800/- and not Rs.1600/-.
17. In this behalf learned senior counsel for the
respondent has pointed out to us that the Indian Stamp
(Punjab Amendment) Act, 1958 received the assent of the
Governor of Punjab on 23.04.1958 and was published in
the Gazette on 25.4.1958. Transaction in question was
prior to that date. That plea will thus not hold much
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water.
18. We are, thus, unequivocally of the view that the
status of the property is not liable to be disturbed
after such a prolong period of time in the context of
the facts and the legal position which has emerged since
10.3.1958. The gift deed can be read in one manner, and
only in one manner.
19. We are thus not inclined to entertain the present
appeal.
20. The appeal is dismissed. Parties to bear their
own costs.
................J. (SANJAY KISHAN KAUL)
................J. (K.M. JOSEPH)
NEW DELHI; JULY 16, 2019