REPORTABLE    

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.   158       OF 2012 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 72 of 2009)

C. Shakunthala & Ors.                    .... Appellant(s)

Versus

H.P. Udayakumar & Anr.              .... Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

P.Sathasivam,J.

1) Leave granted.

2) This  appeal  is  directed against  the final  judgment  and  

order dated 18.06.2008 passed by the Division Bench of the  

High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal CCC No. 32  

of 2005 whereby the High Court dismissed the petition of the  

appellants herein.   

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3) Brief facts:

(a) The  appellants  herein  are  the  children  and  legal  

representatives of  late  M. Channappa,  who was the original  

complainant/landlord  before  the  High  Court.   Late  M.  

Channappa was the owner of the property bearing Old Survey  

No. 39/2A, Yediur Village, Bangalore South Taluk.  He let out  

the  eastern  half  portion  of  the  said  property  to  one  Kachu  

Krishna Achari and western portion to one P.V. Lingaiah on  

rent.  In view of the extension of the City, the property fell into  

the Bangalore City limits and is presently situated on the K.R.  

Road and bears No. 2038/A.   

b) Late M. Channappa initiated eviction proceedings against  

both the said tenants and Kachu Krishna Achari came to be  

evicted  pursuant  to  the  decree  granted  by  the  competent  

court.  The order of eviction was challenged by P.V. Lingaiah in  

HRRP No.  559 of  1996 before  the High Court  of  Karnataka  

which came to be dismissed on 29.02.2000 granting two years  

time  to  vacate  the  tenanted  premises  subject  to  filing  an  

undertaking by him.   

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c) Pursuant to the said order, Lingaiah filed an undertaking  

to vacate the tenanted premises and deliver vacant possession  

to late M. Channappa.  In the meantime, Lingaiah approached  

this Court by way of a special leave petition which also came  

to be dismissed.   

d) Mr. Lingaiah failed to adhere to the undertaking given by  

him  to  vacate  the  premises  within  two  years,  instead  in  

collusion  with  his  son  L.  Suresh  and  H.P.  Udayakumar,  

respondent  No.1  herein,  he  created  a  sale  deed  dated  

22.02.2001  whereby  respondent  No.1  is  purported  to  have  

acquired  a  portion  of  the  tenanted  premises.   Significantly,  

respondent No.1 is the business partner of L. Suresh, son of  

Lingaiah.  

e) Thereafter,  late  M.  Channappa  initiated  contempt  

proceedings  against  Lingaiah,  his  son  Suresh  and  H.P.  

Udayakumar, respondent No.1 herein.  Since respondent No.1  

and Suresh were not parties to the earlier petition, contempt  

proceedings were dropped against them and the High Court by  

its  order  dated  06.02.2004  convicted  and  sentenced  Mr.  

Lingaiah  to  undergo  simple  imprisonment  for  three  days.  

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Being  aggrieved  with  the  order  of  the  High  Court,  late  

Channappa filed an appeal before this Court for enhancement  

of the sentence awarded to Mr. Lingaiah which is still pending.  

f) As Mr. Lingaiah failed to vacate the tenanted premises,  

late  Channappa  also  filed  execution  proceedings  before  the  

Court  of  Small  Causes,  Bangalore  under  Order  21  of  CPC.  

The Court of Small Causes issued delivery warrant for delivery  

of possession of the tenanted premises.

g) While  the  matter  was  pending,  on  18.12.2004,  the  

respondent No.1 herein filed an application under Order 21  

Rule  97  to  101  read  with  Section  151  CPC  in  Execution  

Petition No. 2658 of  2004 seeking adjudication of his right,  

title  and  interest  in  respect  of  the  property  in  question  

contending  that  he  was  the  absolute  owner  of  the  said  

property in terms of the sale deed dated 22.02.2001 and that  

late M. Channappa had no interest in the said property.  He  

also  contended  that  as  late  M.  Channappa  attempted  to  

interfere  with  the  property,  he  filed  O.S.No.  15265 of  2002  

before the Civil  Court for permanent injunction wherein the  

court had granted an ad interim order of status quo.

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h) It is evident that respondent No.1 is the business partner  

of  the  son  of  Lingaiah  and  he  has  been  set  up  to  file  

application to protract the proceedings.

i) In  the  light  of  the  stand  taken  by  respondent  No.1,  

Channappa filed O.S.  No.  3814 of  2005 against  respondent  

No.1 for delivery of the vacant possession of the property.

j) The  Executing  Court  vide  judgment  dated  08.06.2005  

dismissed  the  application  filed  by  respondent  No.1  after  

adverting  to  the  material  on  record.   Respondent  No.1  

questioned the said order before the High Court by filing HRRP  

No. 285 of 2005.   

k) The High Court by judgment dated 30.06.2005 dismissed  

the  said  petition  on  the  ground  that  eviction  order  having  

passed  in  the  year  1996,  respondent  No.1  who  was  

obstructing the execution of the decree having purchased the  

property  subsequently  in  the  year  2001 interfered  with  the  

order of the Executing Court which is not warranted.  

l) On  26.09.2005,  respondent  No.1  and  his  brother  H.P.  

Ashok Kumar, respondent No.2 filed another application in the  

said Execution Petition opposing the same.           

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m) In the circumstances, late M. Channappa filed a petition  

under  Section  11(2)  of  the  Contempt  of  Courts  Act,  1971  

before the High Court.  After hearing both the parties, the High  

Court  by its  order  dated  09.06.2006 held  that  there  was a  

prima facie case against the respondents to proceed further  

and  frame  charge  and  try  them  for  criminal  contempt  for  

abuse  of  the  process  of  the  law.   On  17.01.2008  M.  

Channappa passed away and the  High Court  permitted the  

petitioners therein to come on record.   

n) The  High  Court,  by  final  impugned  judgment  dated  

18.06.2008 dismissed Crl. CCC No. 32 of 2005 and acquitted  

the respondents by holding that the grounds made out in the  

second  application  is  under  different  circumstances,  the  

identity of the property is disputed and that the respondents  

cannot be attributed with unlawful intention for abuse of the  

process of the court.     

o) Being  aggrieved,  the  appellants  herein  preferred  this  

appeal by way of special leave.  

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4) Heard Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned senior counsel  

for the petitioners and none appeared for the respondents.   

5) The  point  for  consideration  is  whether  the  impugned  

judgment  of  the  High Court  dismissing  Crl.  CCC No.  32 of  

2005 after recording that  prima facie case was made against  

the  respondents,  thereafter  framing  charges  and  recording  

evidence of the parties, without adverting to the plea of the  

parties and evidence on record, by concluding that the second  

application was under different circumstance being contrary to  

Rule 13 of the High Court of Karnataka (Contempt of Court  

Proceedings)  Rules  1981  (in  short  ‘the  Rules’)  read  with  

Section 264 occurring in Chapter XXI of the Code of Criminal  

Procedure, 1973 (in short ‘the Code) is legally sustainable.

6) Since  we  have  already  narrated  the  facts  of  the  case,  

there is no need to refer the same once again.  Mr. Basava  

Prabhu  S.  Patil.  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  appellants  

submitted that even as early as on 09.06.2006, the Division  

Bench  of  the  High  Court  based  on  the  materials  placed  

concluded  that  a  prima  facie case  against  the  

respondents/accused  have  been  made  out  for  proceeding  

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further and directed framing of charge to try them for criminal  

contempt  for  abuse  of  process  of  law,  another  coordinate  

Bench while passing the impugned order dated 18.06.2008,  

without reference to any of the materials, simply dismissed the  

petition  filed  by  the  petitioners  therein-appellants  herein.  

Perusal of the initial order dated 09.06.2006 shows that the  

Division Bench considered the contempt petition filed against  

the  accused  after  obtaining  the  consent  of  the  learned  

Advocate General in writing under Section 15-1(a) of Contempt  

of  Courts  Act,  1971.   Pursuant  to  service  of  notice  on the  

respondents,  they  submitted  their  objections  along  with  

certain  documents  in  support  of  their  defence.   It  was  

contended  that  the  action  complained  of  do  not  constitute  

abuse  of  process  of  the  Court  for  taking  cognizance  in  the  

matter and to proceed further for framing the charge.   

7) As rightly pointed out by the Division Bench in the order  

dated  09.06.2006  in  terms  of  Rule  8(ii)(a)  of  Contempt  of  

Courts Rules, 1981, the matter was heard initially to find out  

whether there is a prima facie case to frame the charge against  

the accused persons.  The complainant placed strong reliance  

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on the allegations made in the complaint and also the order  

passed by the trial Court in the earlier application filed by the  

first  accused-Udaya  Kumar  in  respect  of  property  against  

which a decree is sought to be executed by the complainant in  

the execution proceedings.  In the preliminary order, the Court  

had also referred to the observation of  the Executing Court  

dated  08.01.2005.   Ultimately,  the  Executing  Court  has  

convicted the judgment debtor and others.  The matter is still  

pending before this Court.  The complainant has also alleged  

that after the order passed on the application filed by the first  

accused became final, a decree was sought to be executed to  

take  the  possession  of  the  premises.   At  this  juncture,  the  

second accused has filed another application taking another  

plea and according to his counsel, the subject matter covered  

in the application is different from the earlier one and that the  

identity covered in the eviction petition and the claim made in  

the application filed by the first accused before the Executing  

Court is entirely different.  In other words, it is the defence  

that the order passed on the earlier application filed by the  

first accused does not come in the way of Executing Court to  

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independently consider the application of the second accused  

in  order  to  determine  the  rights  of  the  parties.   In  the  

preliminary  order,  the  Division  Bench  rejected  the  said  

contention and prima facie found that it is untenable in law in  

view of the earlier application filed under Order XXI Rule 9 of  

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 by the first accused and concluded  

that the earlier application and the present application have to  

be  treated  as  one  and  the  same.   After  adverting  to  the  

respective stand of the parties, various decisions of this Court,  

in the preliminary order dated 09.06.2006, the Division Bench  

has concluded thus:

“10. We  have  carefully  perused  the  record  and  the  documents  produced  by  the  complainant  and  also  the  accused  persons.   After  careful  perusal  of  the  averments  made in the complaint and the statement of objections and  the orders passed by this court in the eviction proceedings  and also the order passed in the proceedings and the law  laid  down by the Supreme Court  in  the  cases referred  to  supra, upon which strong reliance is rightly placed by the  complainant, we feel that there is prima facie case against  the accused to proceed further, frame charge and to try them  for criminal contempt for abuse of the process of law.

11.  Call  after  two  weeks  for  framing  charges  against  the  accused.”

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That  was  the  position  on  09.06.2006.   Meanwhile,  Mr.  M.  

Channappa, who was the complainant in CCC No. 32 of 2005  

passed away and his children were brought on record as his  

legal representatives.  Inasmuch as the impugned order does  

not contain adequate reasons and materials as found in the  

preliminary  order  by  another  coordinate  Bench  dated  

09.06.2006, it is useful to extract the exact impugned order of  

the Division Bench which is as follows:   

“Without  reference  to  merit  of  the  contents  taken  in  the  second application, we hold to suffice that the grounds made  out  in  the  second  application  is  under  different  circumstances.   The  identity  of  the  property  is  disputed.  Factually, we find that the accused cannot be attributed with  unlawful intention of abuse of process of the court.  In the  view of the matter we do not find any good ground to hold  the  contempt  u/s  2(e)  of  the  Contempt  of  Courts  Act.  Accordingly,  petition  is  dismissed  and  the  accused  is  acquitted.”

8) We have already referred to the stand of the complainant,  

his specific assertion with reference to earlier orders and the  

defence of the respondents/accused as well as the prima facie  

conclusion by the Division Bench that the complainant has  

made out a case against the accused to proceed further and  

adjourned  the  matter  for  two  weeks  for  framing  charges.  

When  such  is  the  position,  it  is  not  understandable  how  

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another  coordinate  Bench  after  two  years  without  any  

discussion and adverting to the relevant materials relied on by  

earlier coordinate Bench passed a cryptic order by dismissing  

the  contempt  petition.   We  are  satisfied  that  when  the  

coordinate Bench on earlier occasion, that is, on 09.06.2006,  

based on the acceptable materials  prima facie concluded that  

charges  have to  be framed,  it  is  but  proper  by the present  

Bench to arrive and take a final decision in the light of the  

materials formulated by the earlier Bench.  We are not saying  

that  the  complainant   has  made  out  a  case  for  guilty  of  

contempt of courts but the  prima facie conclusion arrived by  

the earlier Bench in the year 2006, based on the acceptable  

materials, cannot be ignored by another Bench at the time of  

the passing the final order as if it is an Appellate Court.  In  

view of the same, we have no other option except setting aside  

the  impugned  order  and  remitting  the  matter  to  the  High  

Court for passing fresh order.   

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9) In the light of what is stated above, the impugned order  

of the High Court dated 18.06.2008 made in Crl. CCC No. 32  

of 2005 is set aside and the matter is remitted to it for fresh  

disposal.  We request the High Court to restore Crl. CCC No.  

32 of 2005 on its file and dispose of the same on merits in  

accordance  with  law  by  passing  a  speaking  order  after  

affording  opportunity  to  both  the  parties.   The  appeal  is  

allowed to this extent.         

………….…………………………J.                  (P. SATHASIVAM)                                  

       ………….…………………………J.                 (J. CHELAMESWAR)                                   

NEW DELHI; JANUARY 16, 2012.

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