REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). 749 OF 2005

C. RONALD & ANR.        ..          Appellant (s)

                VERSUS

STATE, U.T. OF ANDAMAN  & NICOBAR ISLANDS   ..         Respondent(s)

O  R  D  E  R

1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. This  Appeal  has  been  filed  against  the  impugned  judgment  dated  

01.10.2004 passed by the Calcutta High Court, Circuit Bench at Port Blair,  

in Criminal Appeal No. 31 of 2002.

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3. The facts have been set out in great detail in the impugned judgment  

and hence we are not repeating the same here except wherever necessary.

4. It appears that on 26.11.1997 Sub Inspector Abdul Salam received a  

secret information that in the evening of 25.11.1997 C. Ronald, appellant  

No. 1 herein, participated in a gambling.  Some hundred rupees notes which  

were sought to be used by him in the gambling were not accepted by the co-

gamblers  on  the  ground  that  they  were  fake,  whereafter  Ronald  left  the  

place.  He was searched by S.I. Abdul Salam and fake currency notes of Rs.  

100 denomination were recovered from his chest pocket.  Panchnama was  

prepared and he was arrested.   During interrogation Ronald disclosed the  

name of other co-accused.  One Arun disclosed the name of  R. Anil Kumar,  

appellant No. 2 herein.

5. Disclosures made by Arun and Anil Kumar were also referred to in  

the  impugned  judgment.  During  the  investigation  42  fake  notes  were  

recovered from the house of Ronald wrapped in a red handkerchief from  

inside a shoe.  Each of these notes bore the same serial number.  Some fake  

currency notes were given by Anil to Arun, who tore them up and threw  

them into a toilet, where these torn pieces were recovered from the septic  

tank.    

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6. The trial court acquitted the accused persons, but the High Court has  

reversed that judgment and convicted the accused persons.

7. Mr.  Shanti  Bhushan,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  

appellants, contends that the trial court having taken a view and acquitted the  

appellants,  the High Court ought not to have reversed the same.  He has  

relied upon a decision of this Court in Shingara Singh  vs.  State of Haryana,  

(2003) 12 SCC 758 [para 26], wherein it was observed :-

“... It is well settled that in an appeal against acquittal the  High Court is entitled to re-appreciate the entire evidence  on record but having done so, if it  finds that the view  taken by the trial court is a possible reasonable view of  the evidence on record, it will not substitute its opinion  for that of the trial court.  Only in cases where the High  Court finds that the findings recorded by the trial court  are  unreasonable  or  perverse  or  that  the  court  has  committed a serious error of law, or where the trial court  had  recorded  its  findings  in  ignorance  of  relevant  material  on  record  or  by  taking  into  consideration  evidence which is not admissible, the High Court may be  justified in reversing the order of acquittal...”

8. Mr. Shanti Bhushan has also shown us some other decisions which  

have taken the same view.   

9. In this connection we would like to say that a judgment of a court of  

law should not be read as a Euclid’s theorem nor as a provision in a statute,  

vide Bharat Petroleum Corporation vs. N.R. Vairamani, AIR 2004 S.C. 4778  

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(vide paragraphs 9 to 12), Dr. Rajbir Singh Dalal vs. Chaudhary Devi Lal  

University J.T. 2008 (8) S.C. 621, etc.    

10. Section 386 (a) Cr.P.C. states that the appellate court may :

“in  an  appeal  from an order  of  acquittal,  reverse  such  order and direct that further inquiry be made, or that the  accused  be  re-tried  or  committed  for  trial,  as  the  case  may  be,  or  find  him guilty  and  pass  sentence  on  him  according to law”.

11. A perusal of Section 386(a) Cr.P.C. shows that no restrictions have  

been placed by the Statute on the power of the appellate court to reverse an  

order of acquittal and convict the accused.  

12. As observed by this court in Vemareddy Kumaraswamyreddy & Anr.  

vs. State of A.P. JT 2006(2) 361 (vide para 17) where the words were clear,  

there is no scope for the court to innovate or take upon itself the task of  

amending or altering the statutory provisions.

13. In Union of India & Anr. vs. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal 1992 Supp (1)  

SCC 323 (vide para 14), it was observed :

“It is not the duty of the court either to enlarge the scope  of the legislation or the intention of the legislature when  the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous.  The court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation  for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate.  The  power  to  legislate  has  not  been  conferred  on  the  courts.  The court cannot add words to a statute or read  words into it which are not there”.

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14. Since the language of Section 386(a) Cr.P.C. is clear and it places no  

restrictions  on  the  power  of  the  appellate  court  to  convert  an  order  of  

acquittal into a conviction, we cannot place restrictions on this power for  

that would really be amending the statute.   

15. No doubt, it has been held in certain decisions of this court that there  

should be good and compelling reasons for the appellate court to convert an  

order of acquittal into a conviction, but these decisions have been carefully  

considered in the three-Judge Bench of this court  in Sanwat Singh & Ors.  

vs.  State  of  Rajasthan AIR  1961  SC  715  (vide  para  9)  wherein  it  was  

observed:

“The foregoing discussion  yields  the  following results:  (1)  an  appellate  court  has  full  power  to  review  the  evidence upon which the order of acquittal  is founded;  (2) the principles laid down in Sheo Swarup’s cse 61 Ind  App 398: [(AIR 1934 PC 227 (2)] afford a correct guide  for the appellate court’s approach to a case in disposing  of such an appeal; and (3) the different phraseology used  in the judgments of this Court, such as, (i) “substantial  and  compelling  reasons”,  (ii)  “good  and  sufficiently  cogent  reasons”,  and  (iii)  “strong  reasons”,  are  not  intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate  court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire  evidence and to come to its own conclusion; but in doing  so  it  should  not  only  consider  every  matter  on  record  having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons  given  by  the  court  below  in  support  of  its  order  of  acquittal in its arriving at a conclusion on those facts, but  should also express those reasons in its judgment, which  lead it to hold that the acquittal was not justified”.

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16. In Salim Zia vs.  State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1979 SC 391 (vide para  

12)  it was observed by this Court:

“1.  The  High  Court  in  an  appeal  against  an  order  of  acquittal under S.417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,  1898 has full power to review at large the evidence on  which the order of acquittal was founded and to reach the  conclusion that upon the evidence, the order of acquittal  should be reversed.

2.  The different phraseology used in the judgments of  this Court such as --

(a) ‘substantial and compelling reasons’;

(b)  ‘good and sufficiently cogent reasons’;

(cc) ‘strong reasons’,

are not intended to curtail or place any limitation on the  undoubted  power  of  an  appellate  court  in  an  appeal  against  acquittal  to  review the  entire  evidence  and  to  come to its own conclusion as stated above but in doing  so it should give proper consideration to such matters as  (i) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the  witnesses; (ii) the presumption of innocence in favour of  the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by  the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial;  (ii) the  right  of  the  accused  to  the  benefit  of  any  real  and  reasonable doubt; and (iv) the slowness of an appellate  Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge  who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.”   

17. Moreover, in the present case, it has been observed by the High Court  

in the impugned judgment that :-

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“We have already demonstrated that the view taken by  the learned Sessions Judge is not a possible view on the  state  of  evidence.  On  the  contrary,  we  have  amply  demonstrated  above  that  the  learned  Sessions  Judge  excluded  from  consideration  the  evidence  which  was  there.   He fell into grievous error in appreciation of the  evidence and misdirected himself; entertained a doubt for  which  there  was  no  foundation  and  expressed  his  helplessness  because  the  witnesses  particularly  the  seizure  witnesses  turned hostile  and refused to tell  the  court  the  truth.   Attempt  on  his  part  was  lacking  to  marshal the evidence; to remove the grain from chaff; to  take the help of that part of the evidence of the hostile  witnesses which support the case of the prosecution.  He  commented upon insincerity of the investigating agency  but did not put to use the material which was before him.  We feel no hesitation in holding that the learned Sessions  Judge was wrong and therefore we have reappraised the  evidence and come to the conclusion indicated above.”

18. Hence,  we  do  not  agree  with  submission  advanced  by  Mr.  Shanti  

Bhushan.

19. Mr. Shanti Bhushan then submitted that the statement under Section  

164 Code of Criminal Procedure was wrongly taken into consideration.   

20. In the present case, the person who made the statement under Section  

164  Cr.P.C.  also  gave  evidence  before  the  trial  court  and  was  declared  

hostile.   He was confronted with his statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C.  

only to show that his turning hostile was not bona fide.   However, even if  

we ignore the statement  under Section 164 Cr.P.C.,  we see no reason to  

disbelieve the police witnesses.

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21. There is no principle of law that a statement made in court by a police  

personnel has to be disbelieved. It may or may not be believed.  It is not that  

all policemen will tell lies. There are good and bad people in all walks of  

life. There are good and bad police men as well.  We cannot assume that  

every statement of a policeman is necessarily false.

22. In the present case, there is nothing to show that the policemen were  

making false statements in the court.  They had no enmity with the accused.  

23. Mr. Shanti Bhushan  submitted that it is possible that these policemen  

demanded some money from the accused which they did not give and hence  

they were falsely implicated.

24. This case was not set up by the accused at any point of time and no  

such suggestion was even made in the cross-examination.

25. It is next submitted by Mr. Shanti Bhushan that evidence adverse to  

the appellants was not put to them in their examination under Section 313  

Cr.P.C.

26. This aspect has been considered by the High Court which has held  

that no prejudice has been caused to the accused on this account.  

27. It  is  on  record  that  fake  currency  notes  are  in  wide  circulation  in  

Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The banks have stated that common people  

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have  often  complained  in  this  connection  vide Exts.  21,  22  and  11.  

Witnesses have also been examined on that account.

28. There is sufficient evidence on record (discussed in detail by the High  

Court) to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

29. Making or circulating fake currency is a serious offence.  We see no  

reason to take a lenient view in the matter.

30. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, while upholding  

the conviction of the appellants  we reduce the period of sentence to five  

years rigorous imprisonment.  

31. By  order  dated  18.03.2005  this  Court  has  granted  bail  to  the  

appellants.

32. If the appellants have not served out sentence of five years rigorous  

imprisonment as awarded by us, then their bail bonds shall stand cancelled  

and they shall be taken into custody forthwith to complete the sentence of  

five  years  rigorous  imprisonment  as  awarded  by  us.  Any  period  of  

incarceration in jail which the appellants have already undergone shall be  

deducted from the aforesaid period of five years rigorous imprisonment.    

33. If  the  appellants  have  already  served  out  sentence  of  five  years  

rigorous  imprisonment,  then  their  bail  bonds  shall  stand  discharged  

accordingly.

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34. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is disposed of accordingly.  

………................................... J.

(Markandey Katju)

   ...............................................J.     (Chandramauli Kr. Prasad)

New Delhi; 10 August, 2011

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