19 January 2016
Supreme Court
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BOBBILI RAMAKRISHNA RAJU YADAV Vs STATE OF A P REP. BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF A P HYDERBAD A P

Bench: T.S. THAKUR,A.K. SIKRI,R. BANUMATHI
Case number: Crl.A. No.-000045-000045 / 2016
Diary number: 33338 / 2014
Advocates: N. RAJARAMAN Vs


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 45  OF  2016 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9344 of 2014)

BOBBILI RAMAKRISHNA RAJU YADAV & ORS.              ….Appellants

Versus

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH REP. BY ITS  PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF A.P. HYDERABAD, A.P. & ANR.                          ...Respondents

J U D G M E N T

R. BANUMATHI, J.

Leave granted.  

2. The  present  appeal  assails  the  order  dated  

23.07.2014  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  

Hyderabad in Criminal  Petition No.1778 of  2010,  whereby the  

High Court declined to quash the proceedings against appellants  

No.1 to 6 in C.C. No. 532 of 2009 under Section 6 of the Dowry  

Prohibition  Act  1961  pending  before  Additional  Judicial  First  

Class Magistrate, Vizianagaram.

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3. Brief facts leading to the filing of this appeal are as  

follows:- First appellant is working as an Engineer in G.E. India  

Technology Company at Bangalore.  Appellants No.2 and 3 are  

the  parents,  appellant  No.4  is  widowed  sister  and  appellants  

No.5 and 6 are the sisters of  appellant No.1. Marriage of  first  

appellant and Syamala Rani was performed at Vizianagaram on  

04.05.2007 and after  marriage,  Syamala Rani  was residing at  

Bangalore with her husband-appellant No.1.  Syamala Rani died  

on 06.09.2008 under suspicious circumstances and a case was  

registered in FIR No.1492 of 2008 under Sections 304B, 498A  

IPC read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act at  

H.A.L.  Police  Station,  Bangalore  City.  On  completion  of  

investigation in the said case, chargesheet was filed against the  

appellants No.1 to 6 and the case was committed to Sessions  

Court vide committal order dated 29.12.2008 and was taken on  

file  as  S.C.  No.79 of  2009 in  the  Court  of  Principal  Sessions  

Judge,  Bangalore.  Second  respondent-father  of  Syamala  Rani  

filed a private complaint against the appellants under Section 6  

of  the  Dowry Prohibition Act  alleging  that  he  had paid dowry  

amount and other articles which were presented as dowry to the  

appellants  on their  demand and the  same were  not  returned.  

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The Magistrate took cognizance of the offence under Section 6 of  

the Dowry Prohibition Act in C.C. No.532 of 2009.

4. The  appellants  then  preferred  a  petition  under  

Section  482  Cr.P.C.  before  the  High  Court  to  quash  the  

complaint i.e. C.C.No.532 of 2009 contending that the complaint  

does not disclose an offence and that FIR No.1492 of 2008 was  

already registered against the appellants at Bangalore city. The  

High Court vide the impugned order dismissed the petition filed  

by  the  appellants  holding  that  the  offences  alleged  in  the  

previous  case   in  S.C.No.79  of  2009  emanating  from the  FIR  

No.1492 of 2008 and the subsequent complaint in C.C.No.532 of  

2009  are  not  one  and  the  same  as  the  previous  case  was  

registered under Sections 304B and 498A IPC read with Sections  

3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, whereas the subsequent  

case is registered under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act  

which is independent of the previous case.  Being aggrieved, the  

appellants have preferred this appeal.

5. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the  

Magistrate ought not to have taken cognizance of the complaint  

as  the  previous  case  was  already  registered  against  the  

appellants  in  FIR  No.1492  of  2008  under  Sections  304B and  

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498A IPC read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act  

and the same is pending trial in Sessions Case No.79 of 2009 at  

Bangalore  city  and  hence  the  subsequent  complaint  is  not  

sustainable.  It  was  further  submitted  that  the  subsequent  

complaint C.C.No.532 of 2009 emanates from the same cause of  

action and the allegations in the complaint do not constitute the  

alleged offence under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and  

the complaint is an afterthought for wrecking vengeance on the  

appellants.

6. Per  contra,  the  learned  counsel  for  respondent  

No.2 submitted that the complaint case in C.C. No.532 of 2009  

under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is independent of  

the previous case i.e. FIR No.1492 of 2008 and the pendency of  

the  said  case  before  the  Sessions  Court,  Bangalore  shall  not  

affect  the  complaint  filed  under  Section  6  of  the  Dowry  

Prohibition  Act.   It  was  submitted  that  even  after  death  of  

Syamala Rani,  the appellants  threatened the complainant and  

his family members and the complainant-respondent No.2 had  

led  several  mediations  with  the  appellant  No.1  for  return  of  

dowry amount and other articles which were presented as dowry  

on  demand  made  by  the  appellants  and  inspite  of  such  

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mediations, the appellants did not return the dowry amount and  

other articles and hence a  prima facie case is made out against  

the appellants and the High Court rightly declined to quash the  

proceedings.   

7. We have considered the rival contentions and perused  

the impugned judgment and material available on record.

8. Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act lays down that  

where the dowry is received by any person other than the bride,  

that person has to transfer the same to the woman in connection  

with whose marriage it is given and if he fails to do so within  

three months from the date of the marriage, he shall be punished  

for violation of Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.  Section 6  

reads as under:-

6. Dowry to be for  the benefit  of  the wife  or  her  heirs.-(1)  Where any dowry is received by any person other than the woman  in connection with whose marriage it is given, that person shall  transfer it to the woman-

(a) if the dowry was received before marriage, within [three months]  after the date of marriage; or

(b) if  the  dowry  was  received  at  the time of  or  after  the  marriage,  within [three months] after the date of its receipts; or

(c) if the dowry was received when the woman was a minor, within  [three months] after she has attained the age of eighteen years;  and pending such transfer, shall hold it in trust for the benefit of  the woman.

[(2) If any person fails to transfer any property as required by sub- section (1) within the time limit specified therefore, [or as required  by Sub-section (3),] he shall be punishable with imprisonment for  a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may  extend to two years or with fine [which shall not be less than five  

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thousand rupees, but which may extend to ten thousand rupees]  or with both.]

(3) Where the woman entitled to any property under sub-section (1)  dies before receiving it, the heirs of the woman shall be entitled to  claim it from the person holding it for the time being:   [Provided that where such woman dies within seven years of her  marriage,  otherwise  than due  to  natural  causes,  such property  shall,-

(a) if she has no children, be transferred to her parents; or (b) if  she has children, be transferred to such children and pending  

such transfer, be held in trust for such children.]

9. If the dowry amount or articles of married woman was  

placed in the custody of  his husband or in-laws, they would be  

deemed to be trustees of the same.  The person receiving dowry  

articles  or  the  person  who  is  dominion  over  the  same,  as  per  

Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, is bound to return the same  

within three months after the date of marriage to the woman in  

connection with whose marriage it is given.  If he does not do so, he  

will be guilty of a dowry offence under this Section.  The section  

further lays down that even after his conviction he must return the  

dowry to the woman within the time stipulated in the order.

10. In  Pratibha Rani vs. Suraj Kumar & Anr.  (1985) 2 SCC  

370, this Court observed as follows:-

“20. We  are  clearly  of  the  opinion  that  the  mere  factum of  the  husband and wife living together does not entitle either of them to  commit a breach of criminal law and if one does then he/she will be  liable for all  the consequences of such breach. Criminal law and  matrimonial  home  are  not  strangers.  Crimes  committed  in  matrimonial home are as much punishable as anywhere else. In the  

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case of stridhan property also,  the title  of  which always remains  with the wife though possession of the same may sometimes be with  the husband or other members of his family, if the husband or any  other member of his family commits such an offence, they will be  liable  to  punishment  for  the  offence  of  criminal  breach  of  trust  under Sections 405 and 406 of the IPC. 21. After  all  how  could  any  reasonable  person  expect  a  newly  married woman living in the same house and under the same roof  to keep her personal property or belongings like jewellery, clothing  etc., under her own lock and key, thus showing a spirit of distrust  to the husband at the very behest. We are surprised how could the  High Court permit the husband to cast his covetous eyes on the  absolute and personal property of his wife merely because it is kept  in his custody, thereby reducing the custody to a legal farce. On the  other hand, it seems to us that even if the personal property of the  wife is jointly kept, it would be deemed to be expressly or impliedly  kept  in  the  custody  of  the  husband  and  if  he  dishonestly  misappropriates or refuses to return the same, he is certainly guilty  of criminal breach of trust, and there can be no escape from this  legal consequence…..”

11. It is well-settled that power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.  

should be sparingly exercised in rare cases. As has been laid down  

by this Court in the case of Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Ors. vs.  

Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Ors.,  (1988) 1 SCC 692, that  

when a prosecution at the initial stage was asked to be quashed,  

the  test  to  be  applied  by  the  Court  was  as  to  whether  the  

uncontroverted allegations as made in the complaint  prima facie  

establish  the  offence.   It  was  also  for  the  Court  to  take  into  

consideration  any  special  feature  which  appears  in  a  particular  

case to consider whether it was expedient and in the interest of  

justice to permit a prosecution to continue.  This was so on the  

basis that the Court cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose and  

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where in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction  

are bleak and therefore, no useful purpose was likely to be served  

by  allowing  a  criminal  prosecution  to  continue,  the  Court  may  

while  taking  into  consideration  the  special  facts  of  a  case  also  

quash  the  proceedings  even  though  it  may  be  at  a  preliminary  

stage.   

12. In the light of the well settled principles, it is to be seen  

whether the allegations in the complaint in the present case and  

other materials accompanying the complaint disclose the offence  

punishable under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.  Marriage  

of  first  appellant  and  Syamala  Rani  was  solemnized  in  

Vizianagaram  on  04.05.2007  and  the  couple  was  living  in  

Bangalore. Appellants 2 to 6–the parents and sisters of appellant  

No.1  were  living  in  Vizianagaram.   It  is  the  contention  of  the  

appellants that there are no allegations in the complaint that the  

‘stridhana articles’ were given to appellants 2 to 6  and that they  

failed to return the same to Syamala Rani.  In paras (3) and (4) of  

the complaint filed by the second respondent, it is alleged that he  

paid  the  dowry  amount  “to  the  accused  and  some  ‘stridhana  

articles’ like double cot and other furniture and utensils required to  

set up a family”.  In the complaint, it is vaguely alleged that even  

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after  death  of  deceased-Syamala  Rani,  the  accused  started  

threatening the complainant and that the accused offered to pay an  

amount  of  Rs.10,000/-  towards  full  and  final  settlement.  The  

relevant averments in the complaint in paragraphs (5) and (6) read  

as under:-   

“5. The complainant submits that even after the death of  the deceased the accused by keeping the dead body on one  side,  started  threatening the  complainant  and his  family  members that if they give any report to the police, they will  be killed then and there only and they offered to pay an  amount of Rs.10,000/- towards full  and final  settlement.  There the complainant, who was in deep shock at the death  of  his  daughter  could  not  answer  anything  but  gave  a  report to the police. 6. The  complainant  submits  that  he  lead  several  mediations with the accused through his colleagues, whose  names are mentioned below for return of the dowry, but the  accused  did  not  return  the  amount  and  other  amounts,  given under different heads.  A duty cast upon the accused  to return those articles and amount, which were presented  as  dowry  on  demand  made  by  the  accused.   The  complainant  reserves his right  to file a fresh complaint  against all  the accused for return of the dowry.”  

By  reading  of  the  above,  it  is  seen  that  there  are  no  specific  

allegations against appellants 2 to 6 that the dowry articles were  

entrusted  to  them  and  that  they  have  not  returned  the  dowry  

amount and the articles to Syamala Rani.  Equally, there are no  

allegations that those dowry articles were kept in Vizianagaram and  

used by appellants 2 to 6 who were separately living away from the  

couple in Bangalore.   Even though complainant has alleged that  

the  dowry  amount  was  paid  at  the  house  of  the  accused  at  

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Gajapathinagaram, there are no specific allegations of entrustment  

of the dowry amount and articles to appellants 2 to 6.   

13. Giving of dowry and the traditional presents at or about  

the time of wedding does not in any way raise a presumption that  

such a property was thereby entrusted and put under the dominion  

of the parents-in-law of the bride or other close relations so as to  

attract ingredients of Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.  As  

noticed earlier,  after  marriage,  Syamala Rani  and first  appellant  

were living in Bangalore at their matrimonial house. In respect of  

‘stridhana  articles’  given  to  the  bride,  one  has  to  take  into  

consideration  the  common  practice  that  these  articles  are  sent  

along with the bride to her matrimonial house.  It is a matter of  

common knowledge that these articles are kept by the woman in  

connection with whose marriage it was given and used by her in  

her  matrimonial  house  when  the  appellants  2  to  6  have  been  

residing  separately  in  Vizianagaram,  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  

dowry was given to them and that they were duty bound to return  

the same to Syamala Rani. Facts and circumstances of the case  

and also the uncontroverted allegations made in the complaint do  

not constitute an offence under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition  

Act against appellants 2 to 6 and there is no sufficient ground for  

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proceeding  against  the  appellants  2  to  6.  Be  it  noted  that  

appellants  2  to  6  are  also  facing  criminal  prosecution  for  the  

offence under Sections 498A, 304B IPC and under Sections 3 and 4  

of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Even though the criminal proceeding  

under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is independent of the  

criminal prosecution under Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition  

Act,  in  the absence of  specific  allegations of  entrustment  of  the  

dowry  amount  and  articles  to  appellants  2  to  6,  in  our  view,  

continuation of the criminal proceeding against appellants 2 to 6 is  

not just and proper and the same is liable to be quashed.

14. The  impugned  order  in  Criminal  Petition  No.1778  of  

2010 is set aside qua the appellants 2 to 6 and the appeal is partly  

allowed.

…………………….…CJI.         (T.S. THAKUR)

………………………….J.  (A.K. SIKRI)

                                                                   ..………………………..J.                                                                      (R. BANUMATHI)     New Delhi; January 19, 2016

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