BIMAL KISHORE PALIWAL . Vs COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX
Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK BHUSHAN
Judgment by: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI
Case number: C.A. No.-003836-003836 / 2011
Diary number: 2687 / 2006
Advocates: KAMLENDRA MISHRA Vs
ANIL KATIYAR
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1
CORRECTED REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3836 OF 2011
BIMAL KISHORE PALIWAL & ORS. ... APPELLANTS
VERSUS
COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX ... RESPONDENT WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3837 OF 2011
RENUKA AGARWAL ... APPELLANT
VERSUS
COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX ... RESPONDENT WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3838 OF 2011
MASTER RAHUL ... APPELLANT
VERSUS
COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX ... RESPONDENT WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3839 OF 2011
SURENDRA KUMAR ... APPELLANT
VERSUS
COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX ... RESPONDENT WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3840 OF 2011
JITENDRA KUMAR(HUF) ... APPELLANT
VERSUS
2
COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX ... RESPONDENT WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3841 OF 2011
SHYAMLAL(D) BY LRS. ... APPELLANT
VERSUS
COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX ... RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
All these appeals raising common questions of law
have been heard together and are being decided by
this common judgment. The High Court vide its
separate judgments dated 21.10.2005 decided six
Wealth Tax References aggrieved by which, the
assessees have come up in the appeal. All the
assessees are partners in a firm M/s. G.D. & Sons.
One of the assets of the partnership Firm is a Cinema
building known as “Alpana Cinema” situate at Model
Town, New Delhi. The question which was referred to
the High Court for answer relates to the correct
method of the valuation of the property that is
3
Alpana Cinema for assessment under Wealth Tax Act.
Reference of facts and proceedings in C.A. NO.3836 of
2011 shall be sufficient to decide all these appeals.
2. M/s. G.D. & Sons of which firm the appellants are
partners, purchased land and building in semi
constructed condition on 04.06.1965 for a sum of
Rs.8,00,000/. The construction was completed and
Cinema Theatre, Alpana started running in the
premises. The Alpana Cinema property was valued by
assessment books of accounts. On pending assessment
of Wealth Tax of one of the partners, the Wealth Tax
Officer made a reference for valuation of the Alpana
Cinema to Department Valuation Officer, New Delhi by
Reference dated 29.04.1976. Valuation Officer after
inspecting the site submitted its report dated
26.04.1977 valuing the property for assessment year
197071, 197172, 197273, 197374 and 197475.
Notices under Section 17 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957
were issued to the appellants on 30.03.1979.
Assessees got the property valued by an approved
Valuer adopting income capitalisation method. The
4
assessment order was passed by the Wealth Tax
Officer in March, 1983 making assessment for the
period from 197071 to 197475. The assessment was
completed as per percentage of the right of different
assessees which they have in the Firm. The Assessing
Officer relied on the Valuation Report submitted by
the Departmental Valuer. The assessee aggrieved by
the assessment order filed appeal before the
Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Wealth Tax. The
Appellate Authority by its detailed order dated
23.01.1986 affirmed the assessment made by the
Assessing Officer on the basis of valuation by land
and building method. The income capitalisation method
as was relied on by the assessee was not approved.
3. The aggrieved by the different assessment orders
the assessees filed Wealth Tax Appeal before the
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), Delhi Bench,
Delhi. The ITAT accepted the case of the assessee to
the effect that the proper basis for valuing the
Cinema building would be capitalisation of the
income. The ITAT held that since the building could
5
be used only for film exhibition and it cannot be
used for any other purpose the method of its
valuation has to be necessarily different from the
one normally adopted in the case of buildings which
are capable of being used as commercial buildings.
The Revenue aggrieved by the Tribunal's order filed
reference application through Department. Although,
initially the same was rejected by the Tribunal, on
the direction of the High Court following two
questions were referred to the High Court for
decision:
”1. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Income tax Appellate Tribunal was right in law for the purpose of Section 7(1) of the Wealth Tax Act in determining the assessee’s interest in the partnership firm by adopting the fair market value of the assets in question namely, the cinema building on the income mobilization basis instead of land and building method adopted by Wealth Tax Officer?
2. If the answer to the above question is in the negative and against the assessee then what ought to be the correct fair market value of assets in question?”
6
4. The High Court vide its judgment and order dated
21.10.2005 answered the questions in favour of
Revenue and against the assessee. The High Court held
that Wealth Tax Officer was justified in adopting
the land and building method. The High Court held
that yield/rent capitalisation method would not be
correct method of valuation of the property in
question. The High Court relied on its decision in
Wealth Tax Reference 39 of 1985, Commissioner of
Wealth Tax (Central) Kanpur vs. Bankey Lal and others
decided on the same day, i.e., 21.10.2005. The
assessee aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court
dated 21.10.2005 has come up in the appeal. As noted
above, in all Wealth Tax References question was
answered in favour of the Revenue.
5. We have heard Shri Rohit Amit Sthalekar, learned
counsel for the appellants and learned counsel for
the Department.
6. Shri Sthalekar, learned counsel for the
appellants submits that Section 7(2)(a) of the Wealth
Tax Act begins with non obstante clause which is
7
stand alone provision prescribing the income
capitalisation method for assessing value of the
assets of a running business which was applied by the
ITAT. He further submits that the High Court did not
controvert findings of the fact returned by the
Tribunal. The Tribunal being final fact finding
authority, the High Court ought not to have
interfered with the order of the Tribunal. Each case
is to be decided on its own facts and the valuation
of the property is a question of fact which having
been correctly determined by the ITAT, the High Court
erred in interfering with the said judgment. It is
further submitted by the learned counsel for the
appellant that in case there are more than one method
of valuing the property, the valuation which is in
favour of the assessee has to be adopted which is a
well settled rule of statutory interpretation.
7. Learned counsel for the Department refuting the
submission of the learned counsel for the appellants
contends that Wealth Tax Officer has rightly
followed land and building method for assessing the
8
property. He submits that the provision of Section
7(1)(a) is an enabling provision which gives
discretion to the Wealth Tax Officer to apply the
income capitalisation method in case of running
business, if he so decides. It is submitted that it
is not mandatory for the Wealth Tax Officer to apply
income capitalisation method in all cases. It is
submitted that Cinema building was in the ownership
and possession of the assessee which without being
any encumbrances could have easily obtained the best
price in the open market and in such cases the land
and building method is appropriate method to be
adopted for valuing the property.
8. Learned counsel for the parties have relied on
various judgments which shall be referred while
considering their respective submissions.
9. We need to first notice the provisions of
Section 7 which fall for consideration in the present
case. Section 7 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 as it
stood at the relevant time reads as follows:
9
“7(1)Subject to any rules made in this behalf, the value of any asset, other than cash, for the purposes of this Act, shall be estimated to be the price, which in the opinion of the Wealth Tax Officer it would fetch if sold in the open market on the valuation dated.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection(1)
(a) Where the assessee is carrying on a business for which accounts are maintained by him regularly, the Wealth Tax Officer may, instead of determining separately the value of each asset held by the assessee in such business, determine the net value of the assets of the business as a whole having regard to the balance sheet of such business as on the valuation date and making such adjustment therein as may be prescribed.
(b) Where the assessee carrying on the business is a company not resident in India and a computation in accordance with clause(a) cannot be made by reason of the absence of any separate balancesheet drawn up for the affairs of such business in India the Wealth Tax Officer may take the net value of the assets of the business in India to be that proportion of the net value of the assets of the business as a whole wherever carried on determined as
10
aforesaid as the income arising from the business in India during the year ending with the valuation date bears to the aggregate income from the business wherever arising during that year.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in subSection(1), where the valuation of any asset is referred by the Wealth Tax Officer to the Valuation Officer under Section 16A, the value of such asset shall be estimated to be the price which, in the opinion of the Valuation Officer, it would fetch if sold in the open market on the valuation date.”
10. The normal rule for valuing an asset for the
purposes of Wealth Tax Act is the estimated price
which in the opinion of Wealth Tax Officer, the
asset would fetch if sold in the open market. Sub
section (2) begins with non obstante clause. Sub
clause (a) of subsection (2) provides that where
the assessee is carrying on a business for which
accounts are maintained by him regularly, the Wealth
Tax Officer may, instead of determining separately
the value of each asset held by the assessee in such
11
business, determine the net value of the assets of
the business as a whole having regard to the balance
sheet of such business as on the valuation date and
making such adjustment therein as may be prescribed.
11. Further subsection (3) again begins with non
obstante clause providing that where the valuation of
any asset is referred under Section 16A, the value of
such asset shall be estimated to be the price which,
in the opinion of the Valuation Officer, it would
fetch if sold in the open market.
12. Under Section 16A Wealth Tax Officer can make a
reference to Valuation Officer for any asset for
valuation. Section 16A subclause (1) is as follows:
“16A Reference to Valuation Officer.
(1) For the purpose of making an assessment (including an assessment in respect of any assessment year commencing before the date of coming into force of this section) under this Act, where under the provisions of section 7 read with the rules made under this Act or, as the case may be, the rules made in Schedule III, the market value of any asset is to be taken into account in such assessment, the Assessing Officer may refer the valuation of any asset to a Valuation
12
Officer—
(a) in a case where the value of the asset as returned is in accordance with the estimate made by a registered
valuer, if the Assessing Officer is of opinion that the value so returned is less than its fair market value;
(b) in any other case, if the Assessing
Officer is of opinion—
(i) that the fair market value of the
asset exceeds the value of the asset as
returned by more than such percentage of
the value of the asset as returned or by
more than such amount as may be
prescribed in this behalf; or
(ii) that having regard to the nature of
the asset and other relevant
circumstances, it is necessary so to do.”
13. Present is a case where Assessing Officer has
made a reference for Alpana Cinema on 29.04.1976. It
has also come on the record that the order of
reference to the Valuation Officer was challenged by
the assessee by filing a writ petition in Delhi High
Court. The Appellate Authority in its order had noted
about the challenge to the reference made to the
13
Valuation Officer by the Assessing Officer. There is
nothing on record that the Delhi High Court
interfered with order of Assessing Officer referring
the Departmental Valuer to value the Alpana Cinema.
14. It is true that subsection (2) of Section 7
begins with non obstante clause which enables the
Wealth Tax Officer to determine the net value of the
assets of the business as a whole instead of
determining separately the value of each asset held
by the assessee in such business. The language of
subsection (2) provides overriding power to the
Wealth Tax Officer to adopt and determe the net value
of the business having regard to the balancesheet of
such business. The enabling power has been given to
Wealth Tax Officer to override the normal rule of
valuation of the properties that is the value which
it may fetch in open market, Wealth Tax Officer can
adopt in a case where he may think it fit to adopt
such methodology. The appellants' submission is that
the provision of Section 7(2)(a) is a stand alone
provision and is to be applied in all cases where
14
assessee is carrying on a business. We do not agree
with the above submission.
15. Overriding power has been provided to override
the normal method of valuation of property as given
by subsection 7(1) to arm the Wealth Tax Officer to
adopt the method of valuation as given in subsection
(2)(a). The purpose and object of giving overriding
power is not to fetter the discretion. The Wealth Tax
Officer is not obliged to mandatorily adopt the
method provided in Section 7(2)(a) in all cases where
assessee is carrying on a business. The language of
subsection (2)(a) does not indicate that the
provisions mandate the Wealth Tax Officer to adopt
the method in all cases of running business. Section
7 of the Act has also come for interpretation before
this Court in large number of cases. It is useful to
refer to some of the cases. In Commissioner of Wealth
Tax, Calcutta vs. Tungabadra Industries Ltd.,
Calcutta, 1969 (2) SCC 528, this Court had occasion
to consider Section 7 of the Act. In the aforesaid
case the following question came for consideration
15
before the Court:
“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, for the purpose of determining the net value of the assets of the assessee under Section 7(2) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 the Tribunal was right in directing that the written down value of the fixed assets of the assessee should be adopted as the value thereof, instead of their balance- sheet value?”
16. In paragraph 5 while considering Section 7
following was observed:
“5......In our opinion there is justification for this argument. Under sub-section(1) of Section 7 of the Act the Wealth-tax Officer is authorised to estimate for the purpose of determining the value of any asset, the price which it would fetch, if sold in the open market on the valuation date. But this rule in the case of a running business may often be inconvenient and may not yield a true estimate of the net value of the total assets of the business. The Legislature has, therefore, provided in sub-section(2) (a) that where the assessee is carrying on a business for which accounts are maintained by him regularly, the Wealth-tax Officer may determine the net value of the assets of the business as a whole, having regard to the balance-sheet of such business as on the valuation date and make such adjustments therein as the circumstances of the case may
16
require......”
17. Learned counsel for the appellants has placed
reliance on State of Kerala vs. P.P. Hassan Koya, AIR
1968 SC 1201. The above case was a case of valuation
of property in reference to Land Acquisition Act,
1894. In the aforesaid case following observation was
made in paragraphs 6 and 7:
“6......An instance of a sale which is proximate in time to the date of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of land similarly situate and with similar advantages and which is proved to be a transaction between a willing vendor and a willing purchaser would form a reliable guide for determining the market value. The value which a willing vendor might reasonably expect to receive from a willing purchaser in respect of a house generally depends upon a variety of circumstances including the nature of the construction, its age situation, the amenities available, its special advantages and a host of other circumstances. When the property sold is land with building, it is often difficult to secure reliable evidence of instances of sale of similar lands with buildings proximate in time to the date of the notification under Section 4. Therefore the method which is generally resorted to in determining the value of the land with buildings especially those used for
17
business purposes, is the method of capitalization of return actually received or which might reasonably be received from the land and the buildings.
7. That method was rightly adopted by the trial court and the High Court. The unit under acquisition is used for business purposes and has a prominent situation in the town of Calicut. There was clear evidence about the rental of the building, and the trial court proceeded to capitalize the net annual rental, having regard to the rate of return of 13 1/2 per cent from gilt-edged securities, by multiplying it by 35 times. The High Court has slightly reduced the multiple.”
18. The above observation made by the Court was
general observation not in the context of Section 7
of the Act. The method of valuing the building
property on the basis of rent capitalisation is no
doubt provided in various statutes especially in the
cases of rent fixation. The above observation does
not help the appellants in the present case.
19. More appropriate judgment of this Court which is
on the facts of the present case is the judgment in
Juggilal Kamlapat Bankers and another vs. WealthTax
Officer, Special Circle, CWard, Kanpur and others,
1984 (145) ITR 485. In the above, case this Court had
18
occasion to consider and interpret the provisions of
Section 7. The Wealth Tax Officer had made a
reference to Valuation Officer for valuing certain
buildings belonging to the appellant Firm. The
appellant by means of writ petition challenged the
reference made by the Assessing Officer to the
Departmental Valuer for valuing the property. Two of
the submissions which were made before the High Court
as quoted in the judgment are as below:
“......(3)the interest of appellant No.2 in appellant No.1firm had to be valued in accordance with r.2 of the W.T.Rules, 1957, and hence s.16A of the Act had no application; (4) the valuation of the concerned buildings forming part of the assets of the business of appellant No.1firm had to be determined in accordance with the commercial principles under s.7(2)(a) and not under s.7(1) of the Act, and .......”
20. The High Court considered the submissions
of the parties and by rejecting the above two
submissions held following:
“.......With regard to the third and fourth contentions the High Court held that r.2, s.7 and s.16A(1)(b) (ii) had to be read harmoniously and
19
r.2 did not exclude the application of ss.7 and 16A for valuing an asset of a partner in a partnership firm and that notwithstanding the non obstante clause contained in s.7(2) it was an enabling provision giving a discretion to the WTO either to value the assets of a business as a whole or valuing each asset thereof separately and in that behalf the WTO had the power to refer such valuation to the Valuation Officer under s.16A......”
21. Before this Court the appellants had raised two
submissions. The second submission as noticed by this
Court itself at page 490 of the judgment is as
follows:
“......Secondly, counsel has urged that assuming that appellant No.2’s interest(as a karta of his HUF) in appellant No.1’s firm is exigible to the wealthtax under the Act, the valuation of such interest being governed by s.7(2)(a) of the Act read with r.2A of the Wealthtax Rules, 1957, it is not open to the WTO to refer the valuation of specific house properties belonging to the firm to the Valuation Officers under s.16A of the Act; in fact, according to him, the valuation of the assets of the partnership business of appellant No.1 as a whole having regard to its balancesheets for the concerned years ought to have been undertaken by the WTO and as such the book values of the house properties as appearing in the balancesheets ought to have been accepted by him and,
20
therefore, the reference made by the WTO to Valuation Officers as well as the notices issued by the latter, being incompetent and unjustified in law, are liable to be quashed. For the reasons which we shall presently indicate neither of the contentions has any substance and both are liable to be rejected......”
22. This Court after considering the above submission
as well as provisions of the Act including Section 7
of Wealth Tax Act, 1957 laid down following at page
495:
“......On a fair reading of the aforesaid provisions it will appear clear that the primary method of determining the value of assets for the purposes of the Act is the one indicated in s.7(1), inasmuch as it provides that the value of any assets, other than cash, for the purposes of this Act shall be estimated to be its market price on the valuation date. Then comes subs. (2) which provides that in the case of a business for which accounts are maintained by the assessee regularly the WTO may, instead of determining separately the valuation of each asset held by the assessee in such business, determine the net value of the business as a whole having regard to the balance sheet of such business as on the valuation date and making such adjustment therein as may be prescribed. It is true that subs.(2)
21
commences with a non obstante clause, but even so, the provision itself is an enabling one conferring discretion on the WTO to determine the net value of the assets of the business as a whole having regard to its balance sheets as on the valuation date, instead of proceeding under subs. (1). In other words, it is optional for the WTO to resort to either of the methods even in the case where the net value of the business carried on by the assessee is to be determined......”
23. Further it was laid down by this Court that “this
is apart from the position that the resort to Section
7(2) itself is discretionary and optional, the
provision being an enabling one”. This Court thus has
categorically laid down that resort to Section 7(2)
(a) is discretionary and enabling provision to Wealth
Tax Officer to adopt the method as laid down in
Section 7(2)(a) for a running business but the above
enabling power cannot be held as obligation or
shackles on right of Assessing Officer to adopt an
appropriate method. In the present case reference was
made to the Departmental Valuer by Assessing Officer
under Section 7(3). Thus there is a conscious
22
decision of the Assessing Officer to obtain the
report from the Departmental Valuer. The above
conscious decision itself contains the decision of
Assessing Officer not to resort to Section 7(2)(a).
The Valuation report of Departmental Valuer has been
received which has been relied by the Assessing
Officer for assessing the assessee in the relevant
year. We, thus, do not find any error in the order of
the Assessing Officer in adopting the land and
building method by making a reference to Departmental
Valuer to value the property on the said method. The
Appellate Authority has considered in paragraph 17 of
the judgment the objection of assessee against the
land and building method and repelled the same by the
following reasons:
"17.i) The other objection which has been vehemently stressed is against the valuation of Alpana Theatre by applying land and building method. In this connection, it may not be an unwarranted repetition to state that Alpana Cinema was purchased by the firm M/S G.D. & Sons in semi finished condition from M/s Gill and Bros. Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi and thereafter it has been
23
uninterruptedly used by the firm for film exhibition. What has, therefore, to be appreciated is that the property in question has been used by the owners without any adverse riders which enjoin a property if it is let out. It has thus to be taken into account that the firm owning this theatre had no encumbrances in case it decided to dispose it off at any moment. This factor is of great consequence while arriving at fair Market value. At one point, it has also been agitated by the appellant that the land over which the Cinema building is situated could not be used for any purpose other than as Cinema Building, hence it was not proper for the Valuation Officer to consider it as an open piece of land and value it likewise. This objection if of no avail because the appellant's claim beaten from the very reasoning he has given. To make the matter more than clear, it may be remarked that it is a privilege to get a licence for film exhibition on an urban land. Such land use is only conducive to raise the value and odes not in any way depreciate its value as has been wrongly assumed by the appellant.”
24. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that
reasons given by ITAT for holding that income
capitalisation method is a more appropriate method
has not been adverted to by the High Court. We have
24
perused the order of the Tribunal. The Tribunal has
observed that once it is accepted that the property
is useable only as Cinema building then its method of
valuation has to be necessarily different from the
one normally adopted in the case of buildings which
are capable of being used for other commercial
purposes. The mere fact that the building is only
for the use of Cinema exhibition does not in any
manner diminish the marketable price. At the relevant
period uses of building as running Cinema were no
less valuable. The finding has been returned by the
Appellate Authority that it has not been further
challenged that the building was selfoccupied and in
possession of assessee with no encumbrances.
25. It is true that the High Court in so many words
had not adverted to the reasons given by the ITAT.
However, the High Court has expressed opinion that
Wealth Tax Officer was justified in adopting the land
and building method. One of the reasons given by the
High Court is that if there is loss in the business
or in other words there is negative income, it cannot
25
be possible to say that the property in question has
no marketable value. Learned counsel for the
appellants has submitted that in the relevant year
the income was earned.
26. It is relevant to point out that the Appellate
Authority in its judgment has observed that there was
loss shown by assessee himself in the year 196970.
In paragraph 17 subparagraph (iv) following has been
observed by the Appellate Authority:
"iv)....Even in the case of the appellant there is a returned loss of Rs.1,16,845/ in the first assessment year i.e. 196970. Thus if income capitalisation method is applied in such cases where the assessee may have unfortunately suffered losses in the initial years, the valuation of an asset will workout to a negative figure. This will be certainly a situation far from reality and not in any way the intention of the legislature while directing in Section 7 of the W.T. Act for taking the fair market value of an asset.”
27. The above circumstances taken by the High Court
cannot be said to be irrelevant which apprehensions
were duly found proved by the facts as noticed by the
Appellate Authority.
26
28. Learned counsel for the appellants has further
submitted that in the event there are more than one
methods of valuation of an asset of an assessee, the
method under which the valuation is in favour of
assessee has to be accepted. He has relied on the
judgment of this Court in The Commissioner of Income
Tax, West Bengal, Calcutta vs. M/s. Vegetables
Products Ltd., (1973) 1 SCC 442. This Court in
paragraph 6 of the judgment has laid down the
following:
“6. There is no doubt that the acceptance of one or the other interpretation sought to be placed on Section 271(1)(a)(i) by the parties would lead to some inconvenient result, but the duty of the court is to read the section, understand its language and give effect to the same. If the language is plain, the fact that the consequence of giving effect to it may lead to some absurd result is not a factor to be taken into account in interpreting a provision. It is for the Legislature to step in and remove the absurdity. On the other hand, if two reasonable constructions of a taxing provision are possible that construction which favours the assessee must be adopted. This is a well accepted rule of construction recognised by this Court in several of its decisions. Hence all that we have
27
to see is, what is the true effect of the language employed in Section 271(1) (a)(i). If we find that language to be ambiguous or capable of more meanings than one, then we have to adopt that interpretation which favours the assessee, more particularly so because the provision relates to imposition of penalty.”
29. The proposition which was laid down by this Court
was that if two reasonable constructions of taxing
statute are possible, that construction which favours
the assessee must be adopted. The above proposition
cannot be read to mean that under two methods of
valuation if the value which is favourable to
assessee should be adopted. Here in the present case,
the provisions of Section 7 are neither ambiguous nor
lead to two constructions. The construction of
Section 7 is clear as has already been elaborately
considered by this Court in the judgment of this
Court in Juggilal Kamlapat Bankers (supra).
30. The Wealth Tax Officer having referred the
Departmental Valuer to value the property, in
consequent to which reference for valuation report
having already been received on 26.07.1977 which has
28
relied in the assessment. Objections to the valuation
report were considered by the Appellate Authority and
having been rejected, we do not find any fault with
the assessment made by the Wealth Tax Officer. We are
of the view that the High Court did not commit any
error in interfering with the order of ITAT.
31. In view of the foregoing discussions all the
appeals are dismissed.
..........................J. ( A.K. SIKRI )
..........................J. ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
NEW DELHI, OCTOBER 13, 2017.
29
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3836 OF 2011
BIMAL KISHORE PALIWAL & ORS. ... APPELLANTS
VERSUS
COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX ... RESPONDENT WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3837 OF 2011
RENUKA AGARWAL ... APPELLANT
VERSUS
COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX ... RESPONDENT WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3838 OF 2011
MASTER RAHUL ... APPELLANT
VERSUS
COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX ... RESPONDENT WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3839 OF 2011
SURENDRA KUMAR ... APPELLANT
VERSUS
COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX ... RESPONDENT WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3840 OF 2011
JITENDRA KUMAR(HUF) ... APPELLANT
VERSUS
30
COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX ... RESPONDENT WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3841 OF 2011
SHYAMLAL(D) BY LRS. ... APPELLANT
VERSUS
COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX ... RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
All these appeals raising common questions of law
have been heard together and are being decided by
this common judgment. The High Court vide its
separate judgments dated 21.10.2005 decided six
Wealth Tax References aggrieved by which, the
assessees have come up in the appeal. All the
assessees are partners in a firm M/s. G.D. & Sons.
One of the assets of the partnership Firm is a Cinema
building known as “Alpana Cinema” situate at Model
Town, New Delhi. The question which was referred to
the High Court for answer relates to the correct
method of the valuation of the property that is
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Alpana Cinema for assessment under Wealth Tax Act.
Reference of facts and proceedings in C.A. NO.3836 of
2011 shall be sufficient to decide all these appeals.
2. M/s. G.D. & Sons of which firm the appellants are
partners, purchased land and building in semi
constructed condition on 04.06.1965 for a sum of
Rs.8,00,000/. The construction was completed and
Cinema Theatre, Alpana started running in the
premises. The Alpana Cinema property was valued by
assessment books of accounts. On pending assessment
of Wealth Tax of one of the partners, the Wealth Tax
Officer made a reference for valuation of the Alpana
Cinema to Department Valuation Officer, New Delhi by
Reference dated 29.04.1976. Valuation Officer after
inspecting the site submitted its report dated
26.04.1977 valuing the property for assessment year
197071, 197172, 197273, 197374 and 197475.
Notices under Section 17 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957
were issued to the appellants on 30.03.1979.
Assessees got the property valued by an approved
Valuer adopting income capitalisation method. The
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assessment order was passed by the Wealth Tax
Officer in March, 1983 making assessment for the
period from 197071 to 197475. The assessment was
completed as per percentage of the right of different
assessees which they have in the Firm. The Assessing
Officer relied on the Valuation Report submitted by
the Departmental Valuer. The assessee aggrieved by
the assessment order filed appeal before the
Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Wealth Tax. The
Appellate Authority by its detailed order dated
23.01.1986 affirmed the assessment made by the
Assessing Officer on the basis of valuation by land
and building method. The income capitalisation method
as was relied on by the assessee was not approved.
3. The aggrieved by the different assessment orders
the assessees filed Wealth Tax Appeal before the
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), Delhi Bench,
Delhi. The ITAT accepted the case of the assessee to
the effect that the proper basis for valuing the
Cinema building would be capitalisation of the
income. The ITAT held that since the building could
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be used only for film exhibition and it cannot be
used for any other purpose the method of its
valuation has to be necessarily different from the
one normally adopted in the case of buildings which
are capable of being used as commercial buildings.
The Revenue aggrieved by the Tribunal's order filed
reference application through Department. Although,
initially the same was rejected by the Tribunal, on
the direction of the High Court following two
questions were referred to the High Court for
decision:
”1. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Income tax Appellate Tribunal was right in law for the purpose of Section 7(1) of the Wealth Tax Act in determining the assessee’s interest in the partnership firm by adopting the fair market value of the assets in question namely, the cinema building on the income mobilization basis instead of land and building method adopted by Wealth Tax Officer?
2. If the answer to the above question is in the negative and against the assessee then what ought to be the correct fair market value of assets in question?”
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4. The High Court vide its judgment and order dated
21.10.2005 answered the questions in favour of
Revenue and against the assessee. The High Court held
that Wealth Tax Officer was justified in adopting
the land and building method. The High Court held
that yield/rent capitalisation method would not be
correct method of valuation of the property in
question. The High Court relied on its decision in
Wealth Tax Reference 39 of 1985, Commissioner of
Wealth Tax (Central) Kanpur vs. Bankey Lal and others
decided on the same day, i.e., 21.10.2005. The
assessee aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court
dated 21.10.2005 has come up in the appeal. As noted
above, in all Wealth Tax References question was
answered in favour of the Revenue.
5. We have heard Shri Rohit Amit Sthalekar, learned
counsel for the appellants and learned counsel for
the Department.
6. Shri Sthalekar, learned counsel for the
appellants submits that Section 7(2)(a) of the Wealth
Tax Act begins with non obstante clause which is
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stand alone provision prescribing the income
capitalisation method for assessing value of the
assets of a running business which was applied by the
ITAT. He further submits that the High Court did not
controvert findings of the fact returned by the
Tribunal. The Tribunal being final fact finding
authority, the High Court ought not to have
interfered with the order of the Tribunal. Each case
is to be decided on its own facts and the valuation
of the property is a question of fact which having
been correctly determined by the ITAT, the High Court
erred in interfering with the said judgment. It is
further submitted by the learned counsel for the
appellant that in case there are more than one method
of valuing the property, the valuation which is in
favour of the assessee has to be adopted which is a
well settled rule of statutory interpretation.
7. Learned counsel for the Department refuting the
submission of the learned counsel for the appellants
contends that Wealth Tax Officer has rightly
followed land and building method for assessing the
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property. He submits that the provision of Section
7(1)(a) is an enabling provision which gives
discretion to the Wealth Tax Officer to apply the
income capitalisation method in case of running
business, if he so decides. It is submitted that it
is not mandatory for the Wealth Tax Officer to apply
income capitalisation method in all cases. It is
submitted that Cinema building was in the ownership
and possession of the assessee which without being
any encumbrances could have easily obtained the best
price in the open market and in such cases the land
and building method is appropriate method to be
adopted for valuing the property.
8. Learned counsel for the parties have relied on
various judgments which shall be referred while
considering their respective submissions.
9. We need to first notice the provisions of
Section 7 which fall for consideration in the present
case. Section 7 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 as it
stood at the relevant time reads as follows:
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“7(1)Subject to any rules made in this behalf, the value of any asset, other than cash, for the purposes of this Act, shall be estimated to be the price, which in the opinion of the Wealth Tax Officer it would fetch if sold in the open market on the valuation dated.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection(1)
(c) Where the assessee is carrying on a business for which accounts are maintained by him regularly, the Wealth Tax Officer may, instead of determining separately the value of each asset held by the assessee in such business, determine the net value of the assets of the business as a whole having regard to the balance sheet of such business as on the valuation date and making such adjustment therein as may be prescribed.
(d) Where the assessee carrying on the business is a company not resident in India and a computation in accordance with clause(a) cannot be made by reason of the absence of any separate balancesheet drawn up for the affairs of such business in India the Wealth Tax Officer may take the net value of the assets of the business in India to be that proportion of the net value of the assets of the business as a whole wherever carried on determined as
38
aforesaid as the income arising from the business in India during the year ending with the valuation date bears to the aggregate income from the business wherever arising during that year.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in subSection(1), where the valuation of any asset is referred by the Wealth Tax Officer to the Valuation Officer under Section 16A, the value of such asset shall be estimated to be the price which, in the opinion of the Valuation Officer, it would fetch if sold in the open market on the valuation date.”
10. The normal rule for valuing an asset for the
purposes of Wealth Tax Act is the estimated price
which in the opinion of Wealth Tax Officer, the
asset would fetch if sold in the open market. Sub
section (2) begins with non obstante clause. Sub
clause (a) of subsection (2) provides that where
the assessee is carrying on a business for which
accounts are maintained by him regularly, the Wealth
Tax Officer may, instead of determining separately
the value of each asset held by the assessee in such
39
business, determine the net value of the assets of
the business as a whole having regard to the balance
sheet of such business as on the valuation date and
making such adjustment therein as may be prescribed.
11. Further subsection (3) again begins with non
obstante clause providing that where the valuation of
any asset is referred under Section 16A, the value of
such asset shall be estimated to be the price which,
in the opinion of the Valuation Officer, it would
fetch if sold in the open market.
12. Under Section 16A Wealth Tax Officer can make a
reference to Valuation Officer for any asset for
valuation. Section 16A subclause (1) is as follows:
“16A Reference to Valuation Officer.
(1) For the purpose of making an assessment (including an assessment in respect of any assessment year commencing before the date of coming into force of this section) under this Act, where under the provisions of section 7 read with the rules made under this Act or, as the case may be, the rules made in Schedule III, the market value of any asset is to be taken into account in such assessment, the Assessing Officer may refer the valuation of any asset to a Valuation
40
Officer—
(a) in a case where the value of the asset as returned is in accordance with the estimate made by a registered
valuer, if the Assessing Officer is of opinion that the value so returned is less than its fair market value;
(b) in any other case, if the Assessing
Officer is of opinion—
(i) that the fair market value of the
asset exceeds the value of the asset as
returned by more than such percentage of
the value of the asset as returned or by
more than such amount as may be
prescribed in this behalf; or
(ii) that having regard to the nature of
the asset and other relevant
circumstances, it is necessary so to do.”
13. Present is a case where Assessing Officer has
made a reference for Alpana Cinema on 29.04.1976. It
has also come on the record that the order of
reference to the Valuation Officer was challenged by
the assessee by filing a writ petition in Delhi High
Court. The Appellate Authority in its order had noted
about the challenge to the reference made to the
Valuation Officer by the Assessing Officer. There is
nothing on record that the Delhi High Court
interfered with order of Assessing Officer referring
the Departmental Valuer to value the Alpana Cinema.
14. It is true that subsection (2) of Section 7
begins with non obstante clause which enables the
Wealth Tax Officer to determine the net value of the
assets of the business as a whole instead of
determining separately the value of each asset held
by the assessee in such business. The language of
subsection (2) which provides overriding power to
the Wealth Tax Officer to adopt and determining the
net value of the business having regard to the
balancesheet of such business. The enabling power
has been given to Wealth Tax Officer to override the
normal rule of valuation of the properties that is
the value which it may fetch in open market, Wealth
Tax Officer can adopt in a case where he may think it
fit to adopt such methodology. The appellants'
submission is that the provision of Section 7(2)(a)
is a stand alone provision and is to be applied in
all cases where assessee is carrying on a business.
We do not agree with the above submission.
15. Overriding power has been provided to override
the normal method of valuation of property as given
by subsection 7(1) to arm the Wealth Tax Officer to
adopt the method of valuation as given in subsection
(2)(a). The purpose and object of giving overriding
power is not to fetter the discretion. The Wealth Tax
Officer is not obliged to mandatorily adopt the
method provided in Section 7(2)(a) in all cases where
assessee is carrying on a business. The language of
subsection (2)(a) does not indicate that the
provisions mandate the Wealth Tax Officer to adopt
the method in all cases of running business. Section
7 of the Act has also come for interpretation before
this Court in large number of cases. It is useful to
refer to some of the cases. In Commissioner of Wealth
Tax, Calcutta vs. Tungabadra Industries Ltd.,
Calcutta, 1969 (2) SCC 528, this Court had occasion
to consider Section 7 of the Act. In the aforesaid
case the following question came for consideration
before the Court:
“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, for the purpose of determining the net value of the assets of the assessee under Section 7(2) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 the Tribunal was right in directing that the written down value of the fixed assets of the assessee should be adopted as the value thereof, instead of their balance- sheet value?”
16. In paragraph 5 while considering Section 7
following was observed:
“5......In our opinion there is justification for this argument. Under sub-section(1) of Section 7 of the Act the Wealth-tax Officer is
authorised to estimate for the purpose of determining the value of any asset, the price which it would fetch, if sold in the open market on the valuation date. But this rule in the case of a running business may often be inconvenient and may not yield a true estimate of the net value of the total assets of the business. The Legislature has, therefore, provided in sub-section(2) (a) that where the assessee is carrying on a business for which accounts are maintained by him regularly, the Wealth-tax Officer may determine the net value of the assets of the business as a whole, having regard to the balance-sheet of such business as on the valuation date and make such adjustments therein as the circumstances of the case may require......”
17. Learned counsel for the appellants has placed
reliance on State of Kerala vs. P.P. Hassan Koya, AIR
1968 SC 1201. The above case was a case of valuation
of property in reference to Land Acquisition Act,
1894. In the aforesaid case following observation was
made in paragraphs 6 and 7:
“6......An instance of a sale which is proximate in time to the date of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of land similarly situate and with similar advantages and which is proved to be a transaction between a willing
vendor and a willing purchaser would form a reliable guide for determining the market value. The value which a willing vendor might reasonably expect to receive from a willing purchaser in respect of a house generally depends upon a variety of circumstances including the nature of the construction, its age situation, the amenities available, its special advantages and a host of other circumstances. When the property sold is land with building, it is often difficult to secure reliable evidence of instances of sale of similar lands with buildings proximate in time to the date of the notification under Section 4. Therefore the method which is generally resorted to in determining the value of the land with buildings especially those used for business purposes, is the method of capitalization of return actually received or which might reasonably be received from the land and the buildings.
7. That method was rightly adopted by the trial court and the High Court. The unit under acquisition is used for business purposes and has a prominent situation in the town of Calicut. There was clear evidence about the rental of the building, and the trial court proceeded to capitalize the net annual rental, having regard to the rate of return of 13 1/2 per cent from gilt-edged securities, by multiplying it by 35 times. The High Court has slightly reduced the multiple.”
18. The above observation made by the Court was
general observation not in the context of Section 7
of the Act. The method of valuing the building
property on the basis of rent capitalisation is no
doubt provided in various statutes especially in the
cases of rent fixation. The above observation does
not help the appellants in the present case.
19. More appropriate judgment of this Court which is
on the facts of the present case is the judgment in
Juggilal Kamlapat Bankers and another vs. WealthTax
Officer, Special Circle, CWard, Kanpur and others,
1984 (145) ITR 485. In the above, case this Court had
occasion to consider and interpret the provisions of
Section 7. The Wealth Tax Officer had made a
reference to Valuation Officer for valuing certain
buildings belonging to the appellant Firm. The
appellant by means of writ petition challenged the
reference made by the Assessing Officer to the
Departmental Valuer for valuing the property. Two of
the submissions which were made before the High Court
as quoted in the judgment are as below:
“......(3)the interest of appellant No.2 in appellant No.1firm had to be valued in accordance with r.2 of the W.T.Rules, 1957, and hence s.16A of
the Act had no application; (4) the valuation of the concerned buildings forming part of the assets of the business of appellant No.1firm had to be determined in accordance with the commercial principles under s.7(2)(a) and not under s.7(1) of the Act, and .......”
20. The High Court considered the submissions
of the parties and by rejecting the above two
submissions held following:
“.......With regard to the third and fourth contentions the High Court held that r.2, s.7 and s.16A(1)(b) (ii) had to be read harmoniously and r.2 did not exclude the application of ss.7 and 16A for valuing an asset of a partner in a partnership firm and that notwithstanding the non obstante clause contained in s.7(2) it was an enabling provision giving a discretion to the WTO either to value the assets of a business as a whole or valuing each asset thereof separately and in that behalf the WTO had the power to refer such valuation to the Valuation Officer under s.16A......”
21. Before this Court the appellants had raised two
submissions. The second submission as noticed by this
Court itself at page 490 of the judgment is as
follows:
“......Secondly, counsel has urged that assuming that appellant No.2’s
interest(as a karta of his HUF) in appellant No.1’s firm is exigible to the wealthtax under the Act, the valuation of such interest being governed by s.7(2)(a) of the Act read with r.2A of the Wealthtax Rules, 1957, it is not open to the WTO to refer the valuation of specific house properties belonging to the firm to the Valuation Officers under s.16A of the Act; in fact, according to him, the valuation of the assets of the partnership business of appellant No.1 as a whole having regard to its balancesheets for the concerned years ought to have been undertaken by the WTO and as such the book values of the house properties as appearing in the balancesheets ought to have been accepted by him and, therefore, the reference made by the WTO to Valuation Officers as well as the notices issued by the latter, being incompetent and unjustified in law, are liable to be quashed. For the reasons which we shall presently indicate neither of the contentions has any substance and both are liable to be rejected......”
22. This Court after considering the above submission
as well as provisions of the Act including Section 7
of Wealth Tax Act, 1957 laid down following at page
495:
“......On a fair reading of the aforesaid provisions it will appear clear that the primary method of
determining the value of assets for the purposes of the Act is the one indicated in s.7(1), inasmuch as it provides that the value of any assets, other than cash, for the purposes of this Act shall be estimated to be its market price on the valuation date. Then comes subs. (2) which provides that in the case of a business for which accounts are maintained by the assessee regularly the WTO may, instead of determining separately the valuation of each asset held by the assessee in such business, determine the net value of the business as a whole having regard to the balance sheet of such business as on the valuation date and making such adjustment therein as may be prescribed. It is true that subs.(2) commences with a non obstante clause, but even so, the provision itself is an enabling one conferring discretion on the WTO to determine the net value of the assets of the business as a whole having regard to its balance sheets as on the valuation date, instead of proceeding under subs. (1). In other words, it is optional for the WTO to resort to either of the methods even in the case where the net value of the business carried on by the assessee is to be determined......”
23. Further it was laid down by this Court that “this
is apart from the position that the resort to Section
7(2) itself is discretionary and optional, the
provision being an enabling one”. This Court thus has
categorically laid down that resort to Section 7(2)
(a) is discretionary and enabling provision to Wealth
Tax Officer to adopt the method as laid down in
Section 7(2)(a) for a running business but the above
enabling power cannot be held as obligation or
shackles on right of Assessing Officer to adopt an
appropriate method. In the present case reference was
made to the Departmental Valuer by Assessing Officer
under Section 7(3). Thus there is a conscious
decision of the Assessing Officer to obtain the
report from the Departmental Valuer. The above
conscious decision itself contains the decision of
Assessing Officer not to resort to Section 7(2)(a).
The Valuation report of Departmental Valuer has been
received which has been relied by the Assessing
Officer for assessing the assessee in the relevant
year. We, thus, do not find any error in the order of
the Assessing Officer in adopting the land and
building method by making a reference to Departmental
Valuer to value the property on the said method. The
Appellate Authority has considered in paragraph 17 of
the judgment the objection of assessee against the
land and building method and repelled the same by the
following reasons:
"17.i) The other objection which has been vehemently stressed is against the valuation of Alpana Theatre by applying land and building method. In this connection, it may not be an unwarranted repetition to state that Alpana Cinema was purchased by the firm M/S G.D. & Sons in semi finished condition from M/s Gill and Bros. Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi and thereafter it has been uninterruptedly used by the firm for film exhibition. What has, therefore, to be appreciated is that the property in question has been used by the owners without any adverse riders which enjoin a property if it is let out. It has thus to be taken into account that the firm owning this theatre had no encumbrances in case it decided to dispose it off at any moment. This factor is of great consequence while arriving at fair Market value. At one point, it has also been agitated by the appellant that the land over which the Cinema building is situated could not be used for any purpose other than as Cinema Building, hence it was not proper for the Valuation Officer to consider it as an open piece of land and value it likewise. This
objection if of no avail because the appellant's claim beaten from the very reasoning he has given. To make the matter more than clear, it may be remarked that it is a privilege to get a licence for film exhibition on an urban land. Such land use is only conducive to raise the value and odes not in any way depreciate its value as has been wrongly assumed by the appellant.”
24. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that
reasons given by ITAT for holding that income
capitalisation method is a more appropriate method
has not been adverted to by the High Court. We have
perused the order of the Tribunal. The Tribunal has
observed that once it is accepted that the property
is useable only as Cinema building then its method of
valuation has to be necessarily different from the
one normally adopted in the case of buildings which
are capable of being used for other commercial
purposes. The mere fact that the building is only
for the use of Cinema exhibition does not in any
manner diminish the marketable price. At the relevant
period uses of building as running Cinema were no
less valuable. The finding has been returned by the
Appellate Authority that it has not been further
challenged that the building was selfoccupied and in
possession of assessee with no encumbrances.
25. It is true that the High Court in so many words
had not adverted to the reasons given by the ITAT.
However, the High Court has expressed opinion that
Wealth Tax Officer was justified in adopting the land
and building method. One of the reasons given by the
High Court is that if there is loss in the business
or in other words there is negative income, it cannot
be possible to say that the property in question has
no marketable value. Learned counsel for the
appellants has submitted that in the relevant year
the income was earned.
26. It is relevant to point out that the Appellate
Authority in its judgment has observed that there was
loss shown by assessee himself in the year 196970.
In paragraph 17 subparagraph (iv) following has been
observed by the Appellate Authority:
"iv)....Even in the case of the appellant there is a returned loss of Rs.1,16,845/ in the first assessment year i.e. 196970. Thus
if income capitalisation method is applied in such cases where the assessee may have unfortunately suffered losses in the initial years, the valuation of an asset will workout to a negative figure. This will be certainly a situation far from reality and not in any way the intention of the legislature while directing in Section 7 of the W.T. Act for taking the fair market value of an asset.”
27. The above circumstances taken by the High Court
cannot be said to be irrelevant which apprehensions
were duly found proved by the facts as noticed by the
Appellate Authority.
28. Learned counsel for the appellants has further
submitted that in the event there are more than one
methods of valuation of an asset of an assessee, the
method under which the valuation is in favour of
assessee has to be accepted. He has relied on the
judgment of this Court in The Commissioner of Income
Tax, West Bengal, Calcutta vs. M/s. Vegetables
Products Ltd., (1973) 1 SCC 442. This Court in
paragraph 6 of the judgment has laid down the
following:
“6. There is no doubt that the
acceptance of one or the other interpretation sought to be placed on Section 271(1)(a)(i) by the parties would lead to some inconvenient result, but the duty of the court is to read the section, understand its language and give effect to the same. If the language is plain, the fact that the consequence of giving effect to it may lead to some absurd result is not a factor to be taken into account in interpreting a provision. It is for the Legislature to step in and remove the absurdity. On the other hand, if two reasonable constructions of a taxing provision are possible that construction which favours the assessee must be adopted. This is a well accepted rule of construction recognised by this Court in several of its decisions. Hence all that we have to see is, what is the true effect of the language employed in Section 271(1)(a)(i). If we find that language to be ambiguous or capable of more meanings than one, then we have to adopt that interpretation which favours the assessee, more particularly so because the provision relates to imposition of penalty.”
29. The proposition which was laid down by this Court
was that if two reasonable constructions of taxing
statute are possible, that construction which favours
the assessee must be adopted. The above proposition
cannot be read to mean that under two methods of
valuation if the value which is favourable to
assessee should be adopted. Here in the present case,
the provisions of Section 7 are neither unambiguous
nor lead to two constructions. The construction of
Section 7 is clear as has already been elaborately
considered by this Court in the judgment of this
Court in Juggilal Kamlapat Bankers (supra).
30. The Wealth Tax Officer having referred the
Departmental Valuer to value the property, in
consequent to which reference for valuation report
having already been received on 26.07.1977 which has
relied in the assessment. Objections to the valuation
report were considered by the Appellate Authority and
having been rejected, we do not find any fault with
the assessment made by the Wealth Tax Officer. We are
of the view that the High Court did not commit any
error in interfering with the order of ITAT.
31. In view of the foregoing discussions all the
appeals are dismissed.
..........................J. ( A.K. SIKRI )
..........................J. ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
NEW DELHI, OCTOBER 13, 2017.