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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.     9052            OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.20217 of 2011)

Bihar Public Service Commission    ...  Appellant

Versus

Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi & Anr.    ...  Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Swatanter Kumar, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The  Bihar  Public  Service  Commission  (for  short,  ‘the  

Commission) published advertisement No.6 of 2000 dated 10th  

May, 2000 in the local papers of the State of Bihar declaring its  

intention to fill up the posts of ‘State Examiner of Questioned  

Documents’,  in  Police  Laboratory  in  Crime  Investigation  

Department, Government of Bihar, Patna.  The advertisement,

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inter  alia,  stated  that  written  examination  would  be  held  if  

adequate  number  of  applications  were  received.   As  very  

limited number of applications were received, the Commission,  

in terms of the advertisement, decided against the holding of  

written  examination.   It  exercised  the  option  to  select  the  

candidates for appointment to the said post on the basis of viva  

voce test  alone.   The Commission completed the process  of  

selection and recommended the panel of selected candidates  

to the State of Bihar.

3. One Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi, respondent No.1 herein,  

claiming  to  be  a  public  spirited  citizen,  filed  an  application  

before the Commission (appellant herein) under the Right to  

Information Act, 2005 (for short “the Act”) on 16th December,  

2008 seeking information in relation to eight queries.  These  

queries  concerned  the  interview  which  was  held  on  30th  

September,  2002  and  1st October,  2002  by  the  Commission  

with regard to the above advertisement.  These queries,  inter  

alia, related to providing the names, designation and addresses  

of the subject experts present in the Interview Board, names  

and addresses of the candidates who appeared, the interview  

statement  with  certified  photocopies  of  the marks  of  all  the  

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candidates, criteria for  selection of the candidates, tabulated  

statement containing average marks allotted to the candidates  

from matriculation to M.Sc. during the selection process with  

the signatures of the members/officers and certified copy of the  

merit list.   This application remained pending with the Public  

Information Officer of the Commission for a considerable time  

that led to filing of an appeal by respondent No.1 before the  

State Information Commission.  When the appeal came up for  

hearing, the State Information Commission vide its order dated  

30th April, 2009 had directed the Public Information Officer-cum-

Officer on Special Duty of the Commission that the information  

sought for be made available and the case was fixed for 27th  

August, 2009 when the following order was passed :

“The applicant  is  present.   A letter  dated  12.08.2009  of  the  Public  Information  Officer,  Bihar  Public  Service  Commission,  Patna  has  been  received  whereby  the  required paragraph-wise information which  could  be supplied,  has  been given to  the  applicant.   Since  the  information  which  could  be  supplied  has  been  given  to  the  applicant, the proceedings of the case are  closed.”

4. At this  stage,  we may also notice that the Commission,  

vide  its  letter  dated  12th August,  2009,  had  furnished  the  

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information nearly to all the queries of respondent No.1.  It also  

stated that no written test had been conducted and that the  

name,  designation  and  addresses  of  the  members  of  the  

Interview  Board  could  not  be  furnished  as  they  were  not  

required to be supplied in  accordance with  the provisions  of  

Section 8(1)(g) of the Act.

5. Aggrieved  from  the  said  order  of  the  Information  

Commission  dated  27th August,  2009,  respondent  No.1  

challenged the same by filing a writ before the High Court of  

Judicature at Patna.  The matter came up for hearing before a  

learned  Judge  of  that  Court,  who,  vide  judgment  dated  27th  

November,  2009  made  the  following  observations  and  

dismissed the writ petition :

“If  information  with  regard  to  them  is  disclosed, the secrecy and the authenticity  of  the  process  itself  may  be  jeopardized  apart  from  that  information  would  be  an  unwarranted  invasion  into  privacy  of  the  individual.   Restricting  giving  this  information  has  a  larger  public  purpose  behind  it.   It  is  to  maintain  purity  of  the  process  of  selection.   Thus,  in  view  of  specific  provision in Section 8(1)(j),  in my  view,  the  information  could  not  be  demanded  as  matter  of  right.   The  designated  authority  in  that  organization  also did not consider it right to divulge the  

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information  in  larger  public  interest,  as  provided in the said provision.”

6. Feeling  aggrieved,  respondent  No.1  challenged  the  

judgment of the learned Single Judge before the Division Bench  

of that Court by filing a letters patent appeal being LPA No.102  

of  2010.   The  Division  Bench,  amongst  others,  noticed  the  

following contentions :

(i) that third party interest was involved in providing the  

information  asked  for  and,  therefore,  could  properly  be  

denied in terms of Section 2(n) read with Sections 8(1)(j)  

and 11 of the Act.   

(ii) that  respondent  No.1  (the  applicant)  was  a  mere  

busybody and not a candidate himself and was attempting  

to meddle with the affairs of the Commission needlessly.   

7.    The Division Bench took the view that the provisions of  

Section 8(1)(j)  were not attracted in the facts of the case in  

hand inasmuch as this provision had application in respect of  

law enforcement agency and for security purposes.  Since no  

such  consideration  arose  with  respect  to  the  affairs  of  the  

Commission and its function was in public domain, reliance on  

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the said provision for denying the information sought for was  

not  tenable  in  law.   Thus,  the  Court  in  its  order  dated  20 th  

January, 2011 accepted the appeal, set aside the order of the  

learned  Single  Judge  and  directed  the  Commission  to  

communicate the information sought  for  to  respondent  No.1.  

The Court directed the Commission to provide the names of the  

members of the Interview Board, while denying the disclosure  

of  and  providing  photocopies  of  the  papers  containing  the  

signatures  and  addresses  of  the  members  of  the  Interview  

Board.   

8. The Commission challenging the legality and correctness  

of the said judgment has filed the present appeal  by way of  

special leave.   

9. The question that arises for consideration in the present  

case  is  as  to  whether  the  Commission  was  duty  bound  to  

disclose the names of the members of the Interview Board to  

any  person  including  the  examinee.  Further,  when  the  

Commission  could  take  up  the  plea  of  exemption  from  

disclosure of information as contemplated under Section 8 of  

the Act in this regard.  

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10. Firstly, we must examine the purpose and scheme of this  

Act.   For  this  purpose,  suffice  would  it  be  to  refer  to  the  

judgment of this Court in the case of Namit Sharma v. Union of  

India  [2012  (8)  SCALE  593],  wherein  this  Court  has  held  as  

under :

“27.   In terms of the Statement of Objects  and  Reasons  of  the  Act  of  2002,  it  was  stated that this law was enacted in order to  make  the  government  more  transparent  and accountable to the public.  It was felt  that in the present democratic framework,  free  flow  of  information  for  citizens  and  non-Government  institutions  suffers  from  several  bottlenecks  including  the  existing  legal  framework,  lack  of  infrastructure  at  the  grass  root  level  and  an  attitude  of  secrecy within the Civil Services as a result  of the old framework of rules.  The Act was  to deal with all such aspects.  The purpose  and  object  was  to  make  the  government  more  transparent  and  accountable  to  the  public  and  to  provide  freedom  to  every  citizen  to  secure  access  to  information  under  the  control  of  public  authorities,  consistent with public interest, in order to  promote  openness,  transparency  and  accountability  in  administration  and  in  relation to matters connected therewith or  incidental thereto.”   

11. The scheme of the Act contemplates for setting out the  

practical  regime of right to information for  citizens to secure  

access to information under the control of public authorities, in  

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order  to  promote  transparency  and  accountability  in  the  

working of every public authority.   It  was aimed at providing  

free  access  to  information  with  the  object  of  making  

governance more transparent and accountable.  Another right  

of  a  citizen  protected  under  the  Constitution  is  the  right  to  

privacy.  This right is enshrined within the spirit of Article 21 of  

the  Constitution.   Thus,  the  right  to  information  has  to  be  

balanced with the right to privacy within the framework of law.

12. Where Section 3 of the Act grants right to citizens to have  

access to information, there Section 4 places an obligation upon  

the  public  authorities  to  maintain  records  and  provide  the  

prescribed  information.   Once  an  application  seeking  

information  is  made,  the  same  has  to  be  dealt  with  as  per  

Sections 6 and 7 of the Act.  The request for information is to be  

disposed of within the time postulated under the provisions of  

Section 7 of the Act.  Section 8 is one of the most important  

provisions of the Act as it is an exception to the general rule of  

obligation to furnish information.  It gives the category of cases  

where  the  public  authority  is  exempted  from  providing  the  

information.  To such exemptions, there are inbuilt exceptions  

under  some of  the provisions,  where despite  exemption,  the  

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Commission  may  call  upon  the  authority  to  furnish  the  

information in the larger public interest.   This shows the wide  

scope of these provisions as intended by the framers of law.  In  

such cases,  the Information Commission has to apply its mind  

whether it is a case of exemption within the provisions of the  

said section.  

13. Right  to  information  is  a  basic  and  celebrated  

fundamental/basic  right  but  is  not  uncontrolled.   It  has  its  

limitations.  The right is subject to a dual check.   Firstly, this  

right  is  subject  to  the  restrictions  inbuilt  within  the  Act  and  

secondly the constitutional limitations emerging from Article 21  

of  the  Constitution.   Thus,  wherever  in  response  to  an  

application  for  disclosure  of  information,  the  public  authority  

takes shelter under the provisions relating to exemption, non-

applicability or  infringement of Article 21 of the Constitution,  

the State Information Commission has to apply its  mind and  

form an opinion objectively if  the exemption claimed for was  

sustainable on facts of the case.   

14. Now, we have to examine whether the Commission is a  

public authority within the meaning of the Act. The expression  

‘public authority’ has been given an exhaustive definition under  

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section 2(h) of the Act as the Legislature has used the word  

‘means’  which  is  an  expression  of  wide  connotation.  Thus,  

‘public  authority’  is  defined  as  any  authority  or  body  or  

institution of the Government, established or constituted by the  

Government which falls in any of the stated categories under  

Section 2(h) of the Act.  In terms of Section 2(h)(a), a body or  

an institution which is established or constituted by or under  

the  Constitution would  be a  public  authority.   Public  Service  

Commission is established under Article 315 of the Constitution  

of  India  and  as  such  there  cannot  be  any  escape  from the  

conclusion  that  the  Commission  shall  be  a  public  authority  

within the scope of this section.

15. Section 2(f) again is exhaustive in nature.  The Legislature  

has  given  meaning  to  the  expression  ‘information’  and  has  

stated that  it  shall  mean any material  in  any form including  

papers,  samples,  data  material  held  in  electronic  form,  etc.  

Right  to  information  under  Section  2(j)  means  the  ‘right  to  

information’ accessible under this Act which is held by or under  

the  control  of  any public  authority  and includes  the right  to  

inspection of work, documents, records, taking notes, extracts,  

taking certified  sample  of  materials,  obtaining information  in  

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the form of diskettes, floppies and video cassettes,  etc.   The  

right sought to be exercised and information asked for should  

fall within the scope of ‘information’ and ‘right to information’  

as defined under the Act.   

16. Thus,  what  has  to  be  seen  is  whether  the  information  

sought  for  in  exercise  of  right  to  information  is  one  that  is  

permissible within the framework of law as prescribed under the  

Act.  If the information called for falls in any of the categories  

specified  under  Section  8  or  relates  to  the  organizations  to  

which the Act itself does not apply in terms of section 24 of the  

Act,  the  public  authority  can  take  such  stand  before  the  

commission and decline to furnish such information.  Another  

aspect of exercise of this right is that where the information  

asked for relates to third party information, the Commission is  

required to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 11 of  

the Act.

17. Before  the  High  Court,  reliance  had  been  placed  upon  

Section  8(1)(j)  and  Section  11  of  the  Act.   On  facts,  the  

controversy  in  the  present  case  falls  within  a  very  narrow  

compass.  Most of the details asked for by the applicant have  

already  been  furnished.   The  dispute  between  the  parties  

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related only  to  the first  query of  the  applicant,  that  is,  with  

regard  to  disclosure  of  the  names  and  addresses  of  the  

members of the Interview Board.   

18. On behalf  of  the Commission,  reliance was placed upon  

Section  8(1)(j)  and  Section  11  of  the  Act  to  contend  that  

disclosure  of  the  names  would  endanger  the  life  of  the  

members of the interview board and such disclosure would also  

cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the interviewers.  

Further, it was contended that this information related to third  

party interest. The expression ‘third party’ has been defined in  

Section 2(n) of the Act to mean a person other than the citizen  

making  a  request  for  information  and  includes  a  public  

authority.   For  these  reasons,  they  were  entitled  to  the  

exemption  contemplated  under  Section  8(1)(j)  and  were  not  

liable to disclose the required information.  It is also contended  

on behalf of the Commission that the Commission was entitled  

to exemption under Sections 8(1)(e) and 8(1)(g) read together.

19. On the contrary, the submission on behalf of the applicant  

was that it is an information which the applicant is entitled to  

receive.  The Commission was not entitled to any exemption  

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under any of the provisions of Section 8,  and therefore,  was  

obliged to disclose the said information to the applicant.

20. In  the  present  case,  we  are  not  concerned  with  the  

correctness or otherwise of the method adopted for selection of  

the candidates.  Thus, the fact that no written examination was  

held and the selections were made purely on the basis of viva  

voce, one of the options given in the advertisement itself, does  

not arise for our consideration.  We have to deal only with the  

plea as to whether the information asked for by the applicant  

should  be  directed  to  be  disclosed  by  the  Commission  or  

whether the Commission is entitled to the exemption under the  

stated provisions of Section 8 of the Act.   

21. Section 8 opens with the non obstante language and is an  

exception to the furnishing of information as is required under  

the relevant provisions of the Act.   During the course of the  

hearing, it was not pressed before us that the Commission is  

entitled to the exemption in terms of Section 8(1)(j) of the Act.  

In  view of  this,  we do not  propose to discuss this  issue any  

further nor would we deal with the correctness or otherwise of  

the impugned judgment of the High Court in that behalf.

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22. Section 8(1)(e) provides an exemption from furnishing of  

information, if  the information available to a person is in his  

fiduciary  relationship  unless  the  competent  authority  is  

satisfied that larger public interest warrants the disclosure of  

such  information.   In  terms  of  Section  8(1)(g),  the  public  

authority  is  not  obliged  to  furnish  any  such  information  the  

disclosure of which would endanger the life or physical safety of  

any person or identify the source of information or assistance  

given in confidence for law enforcement and security purposes.  

If  the  concerned  public  authority  holds  the  information  in  

fiduciary relationship, then the obligation to furnish information  

is obliterated.  But if the competent authority is still satisfied  

that in the larger public interest,  despite such objection, the  

information  should  be  furnished,  it  may so  direct  the  public  

authority.  The term ‘fiduciary’ refers to a person having a duty  

to  act  for  the  benefit  of  another,  showing  good  faith  and  

condour,  where such other  person reposes  trust  and special  

confidence in the person owing or discharging the duty. The  

term ‘fiduciary relationship’ is used to describe a situation or  

transaction where one person places complete confidence in  

another person in regard to his affairs, business or transactions.  

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This aspect has been discussed in some detail in the judgment  

of  this  Court  in  the  case  of  Central  Board  of  Secondary  

Education  (supra).   Section  8(1)(e),  therefore,  carves  out  a  

protection in favour of a person who possesses information in  

his fiduciary relationship.  This protection can be negated by  

the competent authority where larger public interest warrants  

the disclosure of such information, in which case, the authority  

is expected to record reasons for its satisfaction.  Another very  

significant  provision  of  the  Act  is  8(1)(j).   In  terms  of  this  

provision,  information  which  relates  to  personal  information,  

the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity  

or interest or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the  

privacy  of  the  individual  would  fall  within  the  exempted  

category, unless the authority concerned is satisfied that larger  

public interest justifies the disclosure of such information.  It is,  

therefore,  to  be  understood  clearly  that  it  is  a  statutory  

exemption  which  must  operate  as  a  rule  and  only  in  

exceptional cases would disclosure be permitted, that too, for  

reasons to be recorded demonstrating satisfaction to the test of  

larger  public  interest.   It  will  not  be in  consonance with the  

spirit of these provisions, if in a mechanical manner, directions  

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are passed by the appropriate authority to disclose information  

which may be protected in terms of the above provisions.  All  

information which has come to the notice of or on record of a  

person holding fiduciary relationship with another and but for  

such capacity, such information would not have been provided  

to  that  authority,  would  normally  need  to  be  protected  and  

would not be open to disclosure keeping the higher standards  

of  integrity  and  confidentiality   of  such  relationship.   Such  

exemption would be available to such authority or department.

23. The expression ‘public interest’ has to be understood in its  

true  connotation  so  as  to  give  complete  meaning  to  the  

relevant provisions of the Act.  The expression ‘public interest’  

must be viewed in its strict sense with all its exceptions so as to  

justify denial of a statutory exemption in terms of the Act.  In its  

common parlance, the expression ‘public interest’, like ‘public  

purpose’, is not capable of any precise definition . It does not  

have a rigid meaning, is elastic and takes its colour from the  

statute in which it occurs, the concept varying with time and  

state of society and its needs.  [State of Bihar v.  Kameshwar  

Singh (AIR 1952 SC 252)].  It also means the general welfare of  

the  public  that  warrants  recommendation  and  protection;  

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something in which the public as a whole has a stake [Black’s  

Law Dictionary (Eighth Edition)].

24. The satisfaction has to  be arrived at  by the  authorities  

objectively and the consequences of such disclosure have to be  

weighed with regard to circumstances of a given case.   The  

decision has to be based on objective satisfaction recorded for  

ensuring  that  larger  public  interest  outweighs  unwarranted  

invasion  of  privacy  or  other  factors  stated  in  the  provision.  

Certain  matters,  particularly  in  relation  to  appointment,  are  

required to be dealt with great confidentiality.  The information  

may  come  to  knowledge  of  the  authority  as  a  result  of  

disclosure by others who give that information in confidence  

and with complete faith, integrity and fidelity.  Secrecy of such  

information  shall  be  maintained,  thus,  bringing  it  within  the  

ambit  of  fiduciary  capacity.   Similarly,  there  may  be  cases  

where the disclosure has no relationship to any public activity  

or  interest  or  it  may  even  cause  unwarranted  invasion  of  

privacy of the individual.  All these protections have to be given  

their  due  implementation  as  they  spring  from  statutory  

exemptions.   It  is  not  a  decision simpliciter  between private  

interest  and  public  interest.   It  is  a  matter  where  a  

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constitutional protection is available to a person with regard to  

the  right  to  privacy.   Thus,  the  public  interest  has  to  be  

construed while keeping in mind the balance factor between  

right  to  privacy  and  right  to  information  with  the  purpose  

sought to be achieved and the purpose that would be served in  

the larger public interest, particularly when both these rights  

emerge from the constitutional values under the Constitution of  

India.

25. First of all, the Court has to decide whether in the facts of  

the  present  case,  the  Commission  holds  any  fiduciary  

relationship with the examinee or the interviewers.  Discussion  

on this question need not detain us any further as it stands fully  

answered by a judgment of this Court in the case of  Central  

Board of Secondary Education & Anr. v.  Aditya Bandopadhyay  

& Ors. [(2011) 8 SCC 497] wherein the Court held as under :

“40. There  are  also  certain  relationships  where  both  the  parties  have  to  act  in  a  fiduciary capacity treating the other as the  beneficiary.  Examples  of  these  are:  a  partner  vis-à-vis  another  partner  and  an  employer vis-à-vis employee. An employee  who comes into possession of business or  trade  secrets  or  confidential  information  relating to the employer in the course of his  employment,  is  expected  to  act  as  a  fiduciary and cannot disclose it  to  others.  

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Similarly, if on the request of the employer  or  official  superior  or  the  head  of  a  department,  an  employee  furnishes  his  personal  details  and  information,  to  be  retained in  confidence,  the  employer,  the  official  superior  or  departmental  head  is  expected to hold such personal information  in  confidence  as  a  fiduciary,  to  be  made  use of or disclosed only if the employee’s  conduct or acts are found to be prejudicial  to the employer.

41. In a philosophical and very wide sense,  examining bodies can be said to act  in  a  fiduciary  capacity,  with  reference  to  the  students who participate in an examination,  as a Government does while governing its  citizens or as the present generation does  with  reference  to  the  future  generation  while preserving the environment. But the  words “information available to a person in  his  fiduciary  relationship”  are  used  in  Section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act in its normal  and well-recognised sense, that is, to refer  to persons who act in a fiduciary capacity,  with reference to a specific  beneficiary or  beneficiaries who are to be expected to be  protected or benefited by the actions of the  fiduciary—a  trustee  with  reference  to  the  beneficiary  of  the  trust,  a  guardian  with  reference  to  a  minor/physically  infirm/  mentally  challenged,  a  parent  with  reference to a child, a lawyer or a chartered  accountant  with  reference  to  a  client,  a  doctor or nurse with reference to a patient,  an  agent  with  reference  to  a  principal,  a  partner with reference to another partner, a  Director of a company with reference to a  shareholder, an executor with reference to  a legatee, a Receiver with reference to the  parties to a lis, an employer with reference  to  the  confidential  information  relating  to  the  employee,  and  an  employee  with  

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reference  to  business  dealings/transaction  of the employer. We do not find that kind of  fiduciary  relationship  between  the  examining  body  and  the  examinee,  with  reference to the evaluated answer books,  that  come  into  the  custody  of  the  examining body.

42. The  duty  of  examining  bodies  is  to  subject the candidates who have completed  a course of study or a period of training in  accordance with its curricula, to a process  of  verification/examination/testing  of  their  knowledge,  ability  or  skill,  or  to  ascertain  whether  they  can  be  said  to  have  successfully  completed  or  passed  the  course  of  study  or  training.  Other  specialised  examining  bodies  may  simply  subject  the  candidates  to  a  process  of  verification by an examination, to find out  whether  such  person  is  suitable  for  a  particular  post,  job  or  assignment.  An  examining body,  if  it  is  a public  authority  entrusted with public functions, is required  to  act  fairly,  reasonably,  uniformly  and  consistently  for  public  good and in  public  interest.

43. This Court has explained the role of an  examining body in regard to the process of  holding  examination  in  the  context  of  examining whether it amounts to “service”  to a consumer, in Bihar School Examination  Board v.  Suresh  Prasad  Sinha in  the  following manner:  (SCC p.  487,  paras  11- 13)

“11.  …  The  process  of  holding  examinations,  evaluating  answer  scripts,  declaring  results  and  issuing  certificates  are  different  stages  of  a  single  statutory  non-commercial  function.  It  is  not  possible  to  divide  

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this  function  as  partly  statutory  and  partly administrative.

12. When the Examination Board  conducts an examination in discharge  of  its  statutory  function,  it  does  not  offer  its  ‘services’  to  any  candidate.  Nor does a student who participates in  the  examination  conducted  by  the  Board, hire or avail of any service from  the Board for a consideration. On the  other  hand,  a  candidate  who  participates  in  the  examination  conducted by the Board,  is  a  person  who has undergone a course of study  and  who  requests  the  Board  to  test  him  as  to  whether  he  has  imbibed  sufficient  knowledge  to  be  fit  to  be  declared  as  having  successfully  completed  the  said  course  of  education;  and  if  so,  determine  his  position or rank or competence vis-à- vis  other  examinees.  The  process  is  not, therefore, availment of a service  by  a  student,  but  participation  in  a  general examination conducted by the  Board  to  ascertain  whether  he  is  eligible  and  fit  to  be  considered  as  having  successfully  completed  the  secondary  education  course.  The  examination fee paid by the student is  not the consideration for availment of  any  service,  but  the  charge  paid  for  the  privilege  of  participation  in  the  examination.

13. … The fact that in the course  of  conduct  of  the  examination,  or  evaluation  of  answer  scripts,  or  furnishing  of  marksheets  or  certificates,  there  may  be  some  negligence,  omission  or  deficiency,  does  not  convert  the  Board  into  a  

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service  provider  for  a  consideration,  nor  convert  the  examinee  into  a  consumer….”

It  cannot  therefore  be  said  that  the  examining  body  is  in  a  fiduciary  relationship  either  with  reference  to  the  examinee  who  participates  in  the  examination and whose answer books are  evaluated by the examining body.

XXX XXX XXX

49. The  examining  body  entrusts  the  answer books to an examiner for evaluation  and  pays  the  examiner  for  his  expert  service.  The  work  of  evaluation  and  marking the answer book is an assignment  given  by  the  examining  body  to  the  examiner  which  he  discharges  for  a  consideration.  Sometimes,  an  examiner  may assess answer books, in the course of  his  employment,  as  a  part  of  his  duties  without  any  specific  or  special  remuneration.  In  other  words,  the  examining body is the “principal” and the  examiner is the “agent” entrusted with the  work,  that  is,  the  evaluation  of  answer  books. Therefore, the examining body is not  in the position of a fiduciary with reference  to the examiner.”

(emphasis supplied)

26. We, with respect, would follow the above reasoning of the  

Bench and, thus, would have no hesitation in holding that in the  

present case, the examining body (the Commission),  is in no  

fiduciary relationship with the examinee (interviewers)  or the  

candidate interviewed.  Once the fiduciary relationship is not  

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established, the obvious consequence is that the Commission  

cannot claim exemption as contemplated under Section 8(1)(e)  

of  the Act.   The question of  directing disclosure for  a  larger  

public interest, therefore, would not arise at all.

27. In  CBSE  case (supra),  this  Court  had  clearly  stated  the  

view that an examiner who examines the answer sheets holds  

the relationship of principal and agent with the examining body.  

Applying  the  same  principle,  it  has  to  be  held  that  the  

interviewers  hold  the  position  of  an  ‘agent’  vis-a-vis  the  

examining body which is the ‘principal’.  This relationship per se  

is not relatable to any of the exemption clauses but there are  

some clauses of exemption, the foundation of which is not a  

particular relationship like fiduciary relationship.  Clause 8(1)(g)  

can come into play with any kind of relationship.  It  requires  

that where the disclosure of information would endanger the life  

or  physical  safety  of  any  person  or  identify  the  source  of  

information  or  assistance  given  in  confidence  for  law  

enforcement or security purposes, the information need not be  

provided.   The  High  Court  has  rejected  the  application  of  

Section 8(1)(g) on the ground that it applies only with regard to  

law  enforcement  or  security  purposes  and  does  not  have  

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general  application.   This  reasoning  of  the  High  Court  is  

contrary to the very language of Section 8(1)(g).  Section 8(1)

(g) has various clauses in itself.   

28. Now, let us examine the provisions of Section 8(1)(g) with  

greater emphasis on the expressions that are relevant to the  

present case.  This section concerns with the cases where no  

obligation  is  cast  upon  the  public  authority  to  furnish  

information, the disclosure of which would endanger (a) the life  

(b) physical safety of any person.  The legislature, in its wisdom,  

has  used  two distinct  expressions.   They  cannot  be  read  or  

construed as being synonymous.  Every expression used by the  

Legislature must be given its intended meaning and, in fact, a  

purposeful  interpretation.   The  expression  ‘life’  has  to  be  

construed liberally.  ‘Physical safety’ is a restricted term while  

life is a term of wide connotation.  ‘Life’ includes reputation of  

an individual  as well  as the right  to  live with freedom.  The  

expression ‘ life’ also appears in Article 21 of the Constitution  

and  has  been  provided  a  wide  meaning  so  as  to  inter  alia  

include within its ambit the right to live with dignity, right to  

shelter, right to basic needs and even the right to reputation.  

The expression life under section 8(1(g) the Act, thus, has to be  

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understood  in  somewhat  similar  dimensions.   The  term  

‘endanger’ or ‘endangerment’ means the act or an instance of  

putting someone or something in danger; exposure to peril or  

such  situation  which  would  hurt  the  concept  of  life  as  

understood  in  its  wider  sense  [refer  Black’s  Law  Dictionary  

(Eighth  Edition)].  Of  course,  physical  safety  would  mean  the  

likelihood of assault to physical existence of a person.  If in the  

opinion of  the concerned authority  there is  danger  to  life  or  

possibility of danger to physical safety,  the State Information  

Commission  would  be  entitled  to  bring  such  case within  the  

exemption  of  Section  8(1)(g)  of  the  Act.   The  disclosure  of  

information which would endanger the life or physical safety of  

any person is one category and identification of the source of  

information  or  assistance  given  in  confidence  for  law  

enforcement  or  security  purposes  is  another  category.   The  

expression ‘for law enforcement or security purposes’ is to be  

read ejusdem generis only to the expression ‘assistance given  

in confidence’ and not to any other clause of the section.  On  

the plain reading of Section 8(1)(g), it becomes clear that the  

said clause is complete in itself.  It cannot be said to have any  

reference to the expression ‘assistance given in confidence for  

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law enforcement or security purposes’.  Neither the language of  

the  Section  nor  the  object  of  the  Section  requires  such  

interpretation.  It would not further the cause of this section.  

Section  8  attempts  to  provide  exemptions  and  once  the  

language  of  the  Section  is  unambiguous  and  squarely  deals  

with  every  situation,  there  is  no  occasion  for  the  Court  to  

frustrate  the  very  object  of  the  Section.   It  will  amount  to  

misconstruing the provisions of the Act.  The High Court though  

has referred to Section 8(1)(j) but has, in fact, dealt with the  

language of Section 8(1)(g).  The reasoning of the High Court,  

therefore,  is  neither  clear  in  reference  to  provision  of  the  

Section nor in terms of the language thereof.   

29. Now,  the  ancillary  question  that  arises  is  as  to  the  

consequences  that  the  interviewers  or  the  members  of  the  

interview board would be exposed to in the event their names  

and addresses or individual marks given by them are directed  

to be disclosed.  Firstly, the members of the Board are likely to  

be  exposed  to  danger  to  their  lives  or  physical  safety.  

Secondly, it will hamper effective performance and discharge of  

their duties as examiners.  This is the information available with  

the  examining  body  in  confidence  with  the  interviewers.  

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Declaration of collective marks to the candidate is  one thing  

and that, in fact, has been permitted by the authorities as well  

as the High Court.  We see no error of jurisdiction or reasoning  

in  this  regard.   But  direction  to  furnish  the  names  and  

addresses of the interviewers would certainly be opposed to the  

very spirit of Section 8(1)(g) of the Act.  CBSE case (supra) has  

given sufficient reasoning in this regard and at this stage, we  

may refer to paragraphs 52 and 53 of the said judgment which  

read as under :

“52. When an examining body engages the  services  of  an  examiner  to  evaluate  the  answer books, the examining body expects  the  examiner  not  to  disclose  the  information regarding evaluation to anyone  other  than  the  examining  body.  Similarly  the  examiner  also  expects  that  his  name  and particulars  would  not  be disclosed to  the  candidates  whose  answer  books  are  evaluated  by  him.  In  the  event  of  such  information  being  made  known,  a  disgruntled examinee who is  not  satisfied  with  the  evaluation  of  the  answer  books,  may act to the prejudice of the examiner by  attempting to endanger his physical safety.  Further,  any  apprehension  on  the  part  of  the examiner that there may be danger to  his physical safety, if his identity becomes  known to the examinees, may come in the  way of effective discharge of his duties. The  above applies not only to the examiner, but  also  to  the  scrutiniser,  co-ordinator  and  

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head examiner  who deal  with the answer  book.

53. The answer book usually contains not  only the signature and code number of the  examiner, but also the signatures and code  number of the scrutiniser/co-ordinator/head  examiner. The information as to the names  or  particulars  of  the  examiners/co- ordinators/scrutinisers/head  examiners  are  therefore exempted from disclosure under  Section  8(1)(g)  of  the  RTI  Act,  on  the  ground that if such information is disclosed,  it  may  endanger  their  physical  safety.  Therefore, if the examinees are to be given  access to evaluated answer books either by  permitting  inspection  or  by  granting  certified copies, such access will have to be  given only to that part of the answer book  which does not contain any information or  signature  of  the  examiners/co- ordinators/scrutinisers/head  examiners,  exempted  from  disclosure  under  Section  8(1)(g) of the RTI Act. Those portions of the  answer  books  which  contain  information  regarding  the  examiners/co- ordinators/scrutinisers/head  examiners  or  which  may  disclose  their  identity  with  reference to signature or initials, shall have  to  be  removed,  covered,  or  otherwise  severed from the non-exempted part of the  answer books, under Section 10 of the RTI  Act.”

30. The above reasoning of the Bench squarely applies to the  

present case as well.  The disclosure of names and addresses of  

the members of the Interview Board would  ex facie endanger  

their  lives  or  physical  safety.   The  possibility  of  a  failed  

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candidate  attempting  to  take  revenge  from  such  persons  

cannot be ruled out.  On the one hand, it is likely to expose the  

members  of  the Interview Board to  harm and,  on the other,  

such disclosure would  serve no fruitful  much less any public  

purpose.   Furthermore,  the  view  of  the  High  Court  in  the  

judgment under appeal that element of bias can be traced and  

would be crystallized only if the names and addresses of the  

examiners/interviewers are furnished is without any substance.  

The element of bias can hardly be co-related with the disclosure  

of the names and addresses of the interviewers.  Bias is not a  

ground which can be considered for or against a party making  

an application to which exemption under Section 8 is pleaded  

as a defence.  We are unable to accept this reasoning of the  

High Court.  Suffice it to note that the reasoning of the High  

Court  is  not  in  conformity  with  the  principles  stated  by  this  

Court  in  the  CBSE  case (supra).   The  transparency  that  is  

expected  to  be  maintained  in  such  process  would  not  take  

within  its  ambit  the  disclosure  of  the  information  called  for  

under  query  No.1  of  the  application.   Transparency  in  such  

cases is relatable to the process where selection is based on  

collective wisdom and collective marking.  Marks are required  

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to be disclosed but disclosure of individual names would hardly  

hold  relevancy  either  to  the  concept  of  transparency  or  for  

proper exercise of the right to information within the limitation  

of the Act.

31. For  the  reasons  afore-stated,  we  accept  the  present  

appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and hold that  

the Commission is not bound to disclose the information asked  

for by the applicant under Query No.1 of the application.

………...….………….......................J.                                      (Swatanter Kumar)

…..…………...................................J.                              (Sudhansu Jyoti  

Mukhopadhaya)

New Delhi, December 13, 2012  

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