BIBI FATIMA Vs M. AHAMED HUSSAIN
Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RANJAN GOGOI, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE L. NAGESWARA RAO, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN SINHA
Judgment by: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE L. NAGESWARA RAO
Case number: C.A. No.-007023-007023 / 2012
Diary number: 6091 / 2006
Advocates: P. R. RAMASESH Vs
A. RAGHUNATH
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Non-Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No.7023 of 2012
BIBI FATIMA & ORS. .... Appellant(s)
Versus M. AHAMED HUSSAIN & ORS.
….Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.
The first Respondent-Plaintiff filed a suit for redemption of
a mortgage and for re-conveyance of the suit schedule
property which was decreed. The Appeal filed by the
Appellant-first Defendant in the suit was allowed and the
judgment and decree of the Trial Court were set aside. The
High Court reversed the judgment of the first Appellate Court
and restored the judgment of the Trial Court in favour of the
first Respondent-Plaintiff. Hence, this appeal.
2. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred to
as they were arrayed before the Trial Court. The father of the
Plaintiff, Mavada Mokthesar Ummar Saheb (hereinafter referred
to as Ummar Saheb), obtained a loan from Vijaya Bank and
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defaulted in repayment of the loan. The suit filed by Vijaya
Bank was decreed. In the execution petition filed by the Bank,
the land and building belonging to Ummar Saheb were brought
to sale. He approached his son-in-law, the first Defendant and
took Rs.5,900/- for which he executed a document on
02.07.1964, which was exhibited as P-1 in the suit. It was
stated therein that he needed the money for repayment of his
debts which were to the tune of Rs.5,900/-. The breakup of
Rs.5,900/- was also given in the document as Rs.4,577/- for
payment to the Bank and Rs.1,323/- for clearing other debts.
The suit schedule property was sold to the first Defendant who
was given an absolute right to enjoy the property and the
income realised therefrom. It was mentioned in the deed that
if the amount of Rs.5,900/- was repaid after two years and
within five years, the first Defendant would have to re-transfer
the property to Ummar Saheb and in case the re-transfer is not
made on payment of Rs.5,900/-, damages not exceeding
Rs.5,900/- would have to be paid.
3. Ummer Saheb died on 17.07.1978. Thereafter, the
Plaintiff requested for re-conveyance of the property which was
the subject matter of the document dated 02.07.1964. The
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first Defendant refused the request of the Plaintiff which led to
the filing of a suit for redemption and re-conveyance of the
property in dispute. Plaintiff asserted that the document was a
mortgage by conditional sale governed by Section 58 (c) of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the
Act’). He averred that his father took a loan of Rs.5,900/- from
the first Defendant to clear his debts. He further urged that the
property was worth more than Rs.10,000/-. Reliance was
placed on the condition pertaining to re-conveyance of the
property on payment of Rs.5,900/- which according to the
Plaintiff would show that the document was a mortgage by
conditional sale. It was also pleaded by the Plaintiff that his
father continued to be in possession of the property till the
date of his death i.e. 14.07.1978.
4. The first Defendant through a general power of attorney
filed a written statement in which he contended that the
document is a sale deed with a condition of re-purchase. The
first Defendant stated in the written statement that Ummar
Saheb requested him to purchase the property as he had to
clear his debts. He further submitted that the condition of
re-purchase by itself does not make the document a mortgage
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deed. Though Ummar Saheb offered to give possession of the
house, the first Defendant permitted him to continue in
possession. According to the first Defendant, a Badige Karar
(rental agreement) was executed by the first Defendant in
1969 pursuant to which Ummar Saheb resided in the house as
a tenant.
5. Amongst others, the Trial Court framed an issue as to
whether the transaction covered by the document dated
02.07.1964 is a mortgage by conditional sale or an outright
sale. After appreciating the evidence on record, the Trial Court
accepted the case of the Plaintiff and held that the condition of
re-conveyance of the property on payment of Rs.5,900/- by
Ummar Saheb created a relationship of debtor and creditor
between him and the first Defendant. The Trial Court held that
the transaction covered by document Exhibit P-1 dated
02.07.1964 was a mortgage by conditional sale and decreed
the suit.
6. The First Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the
Trial Court by holding that Exhibit P-1 was a sale deed and not a
mortgage by conditional sale. The First Appellate Court held
that Ummar Saheb sold the property to the first Defendant to
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clear his debts. It was also held that the possession of Ummar
Saheb was pursuant to a rental agreement. The First Appellate
Court further held that the amount of consideration shown in
the sale deed was at par with the market price at the relevant
time. The Plaintiff filed a second appeal which was allowed by
the High Court. The High Court restored the findings of the
Trial Court and decreed the suit.
7. The question whether a transaction is a mortgage by
conditional sale or a sale with a condition of re-purchase has to
be decided on the basis of interpretation of the document itself.
The intention of the parties is the determining factor. The
intention has to be gathered, in the first place, from the
document. If the words are express and clear, effect must be
given to them and any extraneous enquiry into what was
thought or intended is ruled out. The real question in such a
case is not what the parties intended or meant but what is the
legal effect of the words which they used. If, however, there is
ambiguity in the language employed, then it is permissible to
look into the surrounding circumstances to determine what was
intended (See: Pandit Chunchun Jha v. Sheikh Ebadat Ali,
(1955) 1 SCR 174). The extrinsic evidence of surrounding
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circumstances, as may be required to show in what manner the
language of the document is relating to the existing facts, is a
relevant criteria. (See: Balkishen Das v. Legge [(1899) L.R.
27 IA 58]).
8. This Court in Pandit Chunchun Jha’s case (supra)
considered the background in which the amendment was made
to Section 58 (c) of the Act by the Transfer of Property
(Amendment) Act, 1929 and held as follows:
“Because of the welter of confusion caused by a multitude of conflicting decisions the legislature stepped in and amended Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act. Unfortunately that brought in its train a further conflict of authority. But this much is now clear. If the sale and agreement to repurchase are embodied in separate documents, then the transaction cannot be a mortgage whether the documents are contemporaneously executed or not. But the converse does not hold good, that is to say, the mere fact that there is only one document does not necessarily mean that it must be a mortgage and cannot be a sale. If the condition of repurchase is embodied in the document that effects or purports to effect the sale, then it is a matter for construction which was meant. The legislature has made a clear cut classification and excluded
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transactions embodied in more than one document from the category of mortgages, therefore it is reasonable to suppose that persons who, after the amendment, choose not to use two documents, do not intend the transaction to be a sale, unless they displace that presumption by clear and express words; and if the conditions of Section 58(c) are fulfilled, then we are of opinion that the deed should be construed as a mortgage”.
9. One circumstance which favours the document being read
as a mortgage by conditional sale is that the relationship
between the parties is of a debtor and creditor and the
transaction is a loan (See: Bhaskar Waman Joshi v. Narayan
Rambilas Agarwal, (1960) 2 SCR 117, at p.122-123). The
consideration amount being lesser than the market value is
another circumstance by which the document can be treated
as a mortgage by conditional sale. (See: P.L. Bapuswami v. N.
Pattay Gounder, (1966) 2 SCR 918 at p. 923). The mutation not
being done in favour of the transferee (See: Tulsi v. Chandrika
Prasad, (2006) 8 SCC 322 ¶9), the possession being with the
transferor and the length of the period for re-transfer of the
property (See: Indira Kaur v. Sheo Lal Kapoor, (1988) 2 SCC
488¶5), are all circumstances which are indicative of a
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document being a mortgage by conditional sale.
10. On the other hand, it is settled law that a mere condition
of repurchase will not make a document a mortgage by
conditional sale as there can be an absolute sale with a
condition for repurchase. It is also no more res integra that the
mere title of the document is not determinative of the nature of
the document and the document must be looked at in its
entirety. (See: P.L. Bapuswami v. N. Pattay Gounder (1966) 2
SCR 918 at p. 921).
11. In the light of the principles laid down by this Court
regarding the resolution of a dispute as to whether a document
is a mortgage by conditional sale or a sale with a condition for
repurchase, we proceed to interpret the sale deed dated
02.07.1964 which is reproduced below:
“ABSOLUTE SALE DEED OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY AND BUILDINGS HELD ON MOOLY RIGHTS FOR RUPEES 5,900/-
This sale deed is executed on this the 2nd day of July 1964 by Moktesai Ummer Saheb, S/o. Mavada Koktesai Moidin Saheb, Farmer, Majkooru Taluk and Village,
In favour of
Mohammed Hussain Athra Miraja Saheb, S/o. Haji Borappa yane Ummer Saheb, Farmer, resident of No.2, Yedthare Village, Kundapur Taluk, WITNESSETH AS FOLLOWS: WHEREAS, myself and 4 others had obtained a loan from Vijaya Bank Ltd., Mangalore through its Byndoor Branch, AND WHEREAS, the said bank had obtained a money decree against us in O.S. No. 190 of 1961 on the file of the sub-ordinate Judge of Udupi and had also filed an execution petition in Ex. Case No. 45 of 1963 and in the said execution case, the lands and buildings mentioned below were brought for auction,
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And whereas out of the said sums, as I could not repay the amounts due by me namely Rs. 4577-00, I, after thought, in the interest of my family decided to sell the below mentioned land and buildings for payment of the debts of (Mavada Mattesra Ummer Saheb) upon receipt of Rs. 5900/- in the manner stated here below, hereby execute this sale deed in your favour in respect of the land and buildings mentioned hereinbelow. Hence hereafter you should hold and enjoy the property hereby sold and held Muli rights and also the income thereof from this Krodhi year and also to pay assessment to the Government from 1965 and also shall enjoy the profit and income thereof as well as land and the buildings sold hereby absolutely by you and your family from generation to generation. Hereafter I shall have no rights over the said land and buildings or over the produce or income thereof or over the land and buildings and neither myself nor my legal heirs shall have any right to make any claim demanding payment of any more sums for whatever reasons. Particulars of the receipt of consideration under this sale deed. I have received a consideration of Rs. 4577/- for payment of debts due in Ex. Case No. 190 of 1961 and another sum of Rs. 1323/- to pay off the debts arisen on account of the legal necessities of the family. Thus, in all I hereby acknowledge the receipt of a sum of Rs. 5900/- as consideration for this sale deed. Particulars of the property sold Immovable property situated in No. 2, Yothere Village, Kundapur Taluk within the registration sub-district of Byndoor sub-division of D.K. District held on absolute rights and comprised within the limits of Kundapur Taluk Development Board.
Boundaries East : Portion of Survey No. 77/1 West : Road North : Portion of Survey No. 75/12B Including the tree growth, right of way, water right, residential house, bathroom, toilet room etc. etc.
The sum of Rs. 5900/- which is the consideration of this sale deed if repaid after 2 years and within 5 years from this date in one lumpsum, you deserve to make a transfer deed to give the same to me. Thus, when the Vendor makes the repayment of Rs. 5900/-, if the PURCHASER fails to give back, the PURCHASER and his family members are liable to make good to the Vendor an amount of loss not exceeding the amount of consideration under this sale deed to the Vendor or his successors subject to which this sale deed of muli rights is executed.
Sd/- M.H.M. Mirana (M.H. Ahmed Mirana in Husain)
Witnesses
M. Mohammed Hussain, S/o. Mukta Ummer Saheb,
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Adthare Village.
Written by
Mary Muthu Shunge, S/o. S. Suhaya Shunge, H.O.S.O.R.P. Village, Book No.1, Volume No. 207, Pages 407 in the year 1964, Registered as No. 2531 16th July 1964
Sd/- Govindan Naidu
Sub-registrar” (Underlining supplied)
12. It is clear from a plain reading of the document that there
has been an absolute transfer of rights in the property by
Ummar Saheb in favour of the first Defendant for a
consideration of Rs.5,900/-, which was the exact amount he
required to clear his debts. There is a condition in the
document that the first Defendant had to transfer the property
back to Ummar Saheb on repayment of Rs.5,900/- after two
years and within five years from the date of execution of the
document i.e. from 02.07.1964.
13. It is the admitted case of both sides before us that the
transaction was entered into by Ummar Saheb for clearing his
existing dues, which were to the tune of Rs.5,900/-. A breakup
of the said dues was also mentioned in the sale deed dated
02.07.1964. It is apparent from the document that there has
been an absolute sale. It is also clear that there is a condition
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for transfer of the property in favour of the transferor on
repayment of Rs.5,900/-. It is very difficult to decide the
present dispute only on the basis of the aforesaid two facts.
14. As it is very difficult to find out the intention of the parties
on a plain reading, it is necessary to look into the surrounding
circumstances for the purpose of determining whether the
document dated 02.07.1964 was intended to be a genuine sale
deed or was merely an ostensible sale.
15. The Defendant, who appeared through his general power
of attorney, contended that the transaction was an outright
sale. According to the first Defendant, Rs.5,900/- represented
the then existing market value of the schedule property.
Though the First Appellate Court found this point in favour of
the first Defendant, the Trial Court and the High Court did not
accept the submission of the first Defendant.
16. We are unable to accept the submission on behalf of the
first Defendant that Rs.5,900/- was the market value of the
property in 1964. It is clear from the sale deed dated
02.07.1964 that there was a decree obtained by the Bank
against Ummar Saheb for Rs.4,577/-. Ummar Saheb also
required Rs. 1,323/- on account of debts incurred for domestic
purpose. The amount of Rs.5,900/- was the exact amount
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which Ummar Saheb needed to repay his creditors. By no
stretch of imagination can it be said that the parties even
considered the market value of the property at the time of
execution of the document in 1964.
17. The first Defendant further submitted that he permitted
Ummar Saheb to continue in possession of the property after
execution of the sale deed dated 02.07.1964. He further urged
that Ummar Saheb continued in the property as a tenant. In
support of this contention, the first Defendant relied upon a
Badige Karar (rental agreement) executed by Ummar Saheb.
Though the First Appellate Court placed heavy reliance on this
document, the Trial Court and the High Court held that the first
Defendant could not prove the Badige Karar. After a detailed
examination of the record, we are unable to find any evidence
regarding the actual amount of rent or the details of payment
of such rent by Ummar Saheb. Hence this submission of the
first Defendant also deserves to be rejected.
18. Having rejected the submissions of the first Defendant, we
have to examine the points urged on behalf of the Plaintiff to
find out whether the document is a mortgage by conditional
sale. There is no dispute that there is only one document
which was executed on 02.07.1964 which, according to the
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presumption postulated in Section 58 (c) of the Act should be
construed as a mortgage. Undisputedly, Ummar Saheb
continued to be in possession from 02.07.1964 till the date of
his death i.e. 17.07.1978. Evidence was adduced by the
Plaintiff to show that notices from the Electricity Department,
etc. were received in the name of Ummar Saheb. The mutation
was also not affected by the first Defendant in his name till
17.07.1978. In light of the above, the Plaintiff’s case that his
father raised a loan to discharge his debts for which purpose he
executed the mortgage dated 02.07.1964, merits acceptance.
The Plaintiff is also right in submitting that there is no condition
in the deed that the sale will become absolute after the expiry
of five years’ period. Ummar Saheb’s continuance in
possession until the time of his death, payment of statutory
dues and absence of mutation by the first Defendant of the
property during Ummar Saheb’s lifetime would all point to the
document being a mortgage by conditional sale. One of the
conditions of sale was that the transferor would be entitled for
the loss incurred, not exceeding Rs. 5,900/-, in the event of the
first Defendant not re-transferring the property after the
re-payment by the transferor. It is evident from this condition
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that Rs. 5,900/- is a debt and a relationship of debtor and
creditor existed between the parties. In view of the above, we
hold that the document dated 02.07.1964 is a mortgage by
conditional sale.
19. For the aforesaid reasons, we uphold the judgment of the
High Court and dismiss the appeal.
.…...............................J [L. NAGESWARA RAO]
.....................................J [NAVIN SINHA]
New Delhi, August 01, 2017
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