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the  award  passed  by  the  Labour  Court  which  

substituted  the  same  by  issuing  direction  to  the  

respondent-employer (for short “the employer”) to pay  

a  sum of  1,00,000/-  as damages  to the  appellant-

workman. The direction issued by the High Court in  

its  judgment  further  states  that  the  amount  shall  

either  be  paid  through  draft  to  the  workman  or  

deposited before the Labour Court within three months  

for  immediate  payment  to  the  workman.  In  case  of  

default, 12% interest per annum shall be payable on  

1,00,000/-  after  three  months  till  actual  

payment/deposit/realisation.

3.  However,  the  backdrop  of  industrial  dispute  

between the parties is briefly stated hereunder to  

find out whether the appellant is entitled for the  

relief as prayed in these appeals.

  It is the case of the appellant-workman that  

he  was  appointed  as  Labour  Supervisor  in  the  

employer’s  factory on  30.12.1992 and  he worked

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continuously   in  terms  of  Section  25B  of  the  

Industrial  Disputes  Act,  1947  (for  short  “the  

I.D. Act”) in the said post till 28.7.1998- the  

day on which his services were terminated. It is  

the  case  of  the  appellant-workman  that  he  has  

worked for six calendar years from the date of  

his  appointment  till  the  termination  of  his  

service and he has rendered more than 240 days of  

continuous service in every calendar year before  

his  termination.  The  respondent-employer  

terminated the services of appellant-workman on  

27.7.1998  as  per  practice  with  the  reason  

‘sanction  expired’.  The  respondent-employer  

neither paid retrenchment compensation nor issued  

any notice or paid wages in lieu of the same to  

the appellant-workman as mandated under Section  

6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act (for short  

“the  U.P.  I.D.  Act”).  The  respondent-employer  

engaged the appellant-workman for work against a  

post  which  was  permanent  in  nature  but  his

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appointment was made only for a temporary period  

from 1992 to 1998 with oblique motive  to deprive  

his statutory rights. At the end of every working  

year, the workman was handed over a receipt of  

‘relieved from work’ and after 4-6 days, he was  

again engaged for three or six months but without  

proper  procedure  and  in  this  manner,  he  was  

continuously made to work for full one year and  

each time the annual increase in wages was shown  

in  the  fresh  appointment  letter.  During  the  

entire period of service of the appellant-workman  

with  the  respondent-employer,  the  management  

followed the process of annually terminating him  

from service and again reappointing him in the  

same post by assigning the same Badge No., ID No.  

in the same department of Construction Division  

with the marginal increase of salary and dearness  

allowance per month.

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4.   It is the further case of the appellant-

workman that during the course of his employment  

with  the  respondent-  employer,  he  had  noticed  

that  very  few  workmen  were  actually  made  

permanent by the management and rest of the work  

force was deprived from the benefit of permanent  

post  by  being  kept  on  temporary  basis  or  

emergency  basis,  on  daily  wage  basis  or  on  

contract  basis.  Even  though  the  Construction  

Division of the employer has been in existence  

ever since the beginning of its establishment and  

is  necessary  for  continuous  productions  in  

factory, thousands of workmen are employed in the  

said division in the above mentioned manner and  

very few of them are made permanent. It is the  

further  case  of  the  appellant-workman  that  in  

accordance with the regular orders passed in the  

practice of the Company, the concerned workman  

always fell in the category of workman but due to  

the  improper  and  unfair  labour  practice  as

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mentioned in Schedule V under s. 2(ra) of the  

I.D. Act it has kept the appellant as temporary  

workman for the period of employment, which is  

opposed to law.

5.  It  is  the  further  case  of  the  appellant-

workman that he falls within the definition of  

workman under s. 2(s) of the I.D. Act and has  

been  rendering  service  since  the  day  of  his  

appointment on 30.12.1992. Therefore, termination  

of his contract is a clear case of retrenchment  

as opposed to the provision in Section 6N of the  

U.P. I.D. Act. The employer on the other hand,  

did not comply with the mandatory provision of s.  

6-N  of  the  U.P.  I.D.  Act  which  sets  the  

conditions  precedent  to  be  fulfilled  prior  to  

retrenchment of workmen which is in pari materia  

with  s.  25N  of  the  I.D.  Act.  The  respondent-

employer  neither  complied  with  the  aforesaid  

mandatory provisions nor did the respondent pay

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retrenchment compensation or issue three months  

notice  or  notice  pay  in  lieu  of  the  same.  

Therefore,  as  per  the  appellant-workman,  

termination from his service is in contravention  

of the provisions of the U.P. I.D. Act and the  

legal principle laid down by this Court in catena  

of cases in this regard which will be adverted  

into  the  reasoning  portion  of  the  judgment.  

Therefore,  the  appellant-workman  had  raised  an  

industrial dispute with a request to the state  

government to make reference for adjudication of  

existing  industrial  dispute  regarding  the  

termination of service of the appellant workman  

from his service by the employer. The Assistant  

Labour Commissioner made Reference Order No. 1454  

CP 15/98 dated 24.9.1999 to the Labour Court at  

Varanasi. The reference was registered in Case  

no. 59 of 1999 by the Labour Court, Varanasi,  

U.P. The Labour Court, after conducting enquiry  

has  adjudicated  the  industrial  dispute  between

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the parties by answering the points of dispute  

and passed an award in favour of the appellant-

workman  holding  that  the  termination  of  his  

service is not justified since the respondent has  

not produced any material evidence on record to  

justify the order of termination. Further, the  

Labour  Court  has  held  that  the  appellant  is  

entitled  to  reinstatement  with  back  wages  and  

other consequential benefits as if his services  

were never terminated.

6.  Aggrieved by the said award, the respondent-

employer filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 8784  

of 2002 before the learned single Judge of the  

High Court of Judicature at Allahabad questioning  

the  correctness,  legality  and  validity  of  the  

award  passed  by  the  Labour  Court  taking  the  

following pleas:  

(i) It is pleaded by the respondent that the  

appellant was employed purely on temporary basis

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in the project jobs in the Construction Division  

of the Company for specific periods and finally  

he was employed with effect from 23.1.1998 for  

six months and his services automatically came to  

an end as per terms of the contract of employment  

in  the  appointment  letter  with  effect  from  

28.7.1998  as  a  result  of  non  renewal  of  his  

contract of employment with the respondent.

(ii) It is further pleaded by the respondent  

that in the Construction Division of the Company,  

time bound specific project construction work was  

being undertaken from time to time and thus no  

regular work force could be maintained for such  

project work. However, as a gesture of goodwill  

and to maintain harmonious industrial relations,  

the employees who worked in a project work were  

given preference for employment in other project  

work on their own request. In the instant case,  

the service of the appellant came to an end as

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per  terms  of  his  employment  in  the  specific  

project  job  in  the  Construction  Division  and  

after  completion  of  the  term  of  aforesaid  

employment,  the  appellant  has  also  taken  

clearance of his dues.

(iii) It is further pleaded by the respondent  

that temporary workmen working in such specific  

projects are also given preference for employment  

in the main plant project subject to availability  

of  vacancies  and  their  suitability.  After  

completion  of  the  terms  of  contract  of  

employment,  the  appellant  was  offered  fresh  

employment as Badli worker against vacancies in  

Potroom Department of the Company. He applied for  

the same on 22.10.1998 and after completion of  

necessary formalities he was selected against the  

said  vacancy and  was issued  appointment letter  

dated 23.10.1998. He joined his duties in Potroom  

Plant-II Department as substitute workman but did

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not report to duty on his own and on the other  

hand  he raised  baseless industrial  dispute for  

unlawful gain.

(iv) It is further pleaded by the respondent  

that the service of the appellant has not been  

terminated  by  the  Company  but  because  the  

appellant  did  not  report  for  duty  on  his  own  

after joining duty as mentioned above. Therefore,  

there  is  no  industrial  dispute  between  the  

parties and the reference made by the appropriate  

authorities at the instance of the workman to the  

Labour  Court  is  bad  in  law.  However,  the  

respondent craves leave of the Labour Court  to  

add,  amend,  alter  and  rescind  its  written  

statement  and  to  produce  evidence  oral  or  

documentary, if found expedient at the relevant  

stages of the hearing. However, no plea was made  

by  the  respondent  in  written  form  on  the  

provision of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the I.D. Act

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that the termination of the appellant from his  

service falls within this provision. Nonetheless,  

this legal ground without any factual foundation  

was  pressed  into  operation  before  the  Labour  

Court at the time of addressing its rights. The  

same  has  been  addressed  by  the  Labour  Court  

rejecting  the  contention  on  the  basis  of  

recording its reasons which will be dealt with in  

the reasoning portion of this judgment.

7.  On the other hand, the appellant, by filing a  

detailed counter statement before the High Court  

has sought to justify the finding and reasons  

recorded by the Labour Court contending that the  

Labour  Court,  being  a  fact  finding  court,  on  

appreciation  of  all  pleadings  and  undisputed  

facts regarding the periodical years of service  

rendered by the appellant with the respondent,  

held that he had rendered continuous service of  

240 days in 12 calendar months. Therefore, the

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Labour Court has held that the termination order  

was issued by the respondent without complying  

with  the  mandatory  statutory  provisions  of  

Section  6-N  of  U.P.  I.D.  Act.  The  appellant  

pleaded  that  neither  the  compensation  for  

retrenchment was given to him nor was he issued  

the three months notice nor notice pay in lieu of  

the same as mandated under Section 6-N of the  

U.P. I.D. Act. The appellant further sought to  

justify  the  finding  of  the  Labour  Court  that  

periodical appointment of the appellant for the  

very same post in the Construction Division of  

the respondent’s Plant with the same Badge Number  

and marginal increase of basic pay and D.A. is  

unfair labour practice in terms of Section 25-T  

of the I.D. which is punishable under section 25-

U of the I.D. Act. The High Court concurred with  

the finding of the Labour Court wherein it has  

held  that  the  respondent’s  action  is  in

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contravention of Section 6-N of the U.P. I.D.  

Act.

8. The respondent, on the other hand, contends  

that the finding on the question of retrenchment  

is factual and legally not correct in view of  

the fact that the termination of the service of  

the  appellant  falls  within  the  provision  of  

Section 2(oo) (bb) of the I.D. Act. The High  Court has exercised  its  judicial  review  power  under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution  

of India and also referred to the facts that  

after  termination  of  the  service  of  the  

appellant from the post of Labour Supervisor, he  

was  offered  with  employment  in  the  Potroom  

department  w.e.f.  23.10.1998,  which  he  joined  

and later resigned  from that post. Therefore,  

though the Labour Court came to the conclusion  

on facts, evidence on record and law on this  

aspect that keeping the workman as Badli worker

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was unfair labour practice, the High Court has  

erroneously  held  that   engagement  of  some  

workers as Badli workers is a standard practice  

in  several  establishments  and   is  quiet  

permissible  under  law.  The  High  Court  further  

came to erroneous  conclusion that the appellant  

did resign and having stated so, the High Court  

further  made  observation  that  the  least  which  

was  required  from  the  respondent  under  such  

circumstance,  was  to  pay  retrenchment  

compensation  to  the  appellant  in  terms  of  

Section  6-N  of  the  U.P.  I.D.  Act  which  was  

admittedly not done. It was further held by the  

High  Court  that  an  employee  engaged  for  a  

particular  project  cannot  be  directed  to  be  

retained  after  the  completion  of  the  project.  

However,  since  it  was  not  stated  by  the  

respondent that for which particular project or  

projects the appellant was employed, despite the  

fact that he had been continuously working for

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six years on different projects, the appellant  

was conferred with some rights since he had been  

rendering permanent nature of work.

9.  The  High  Court  also  referred  to  the  

resignation  of  the  appellant  from  the  job  of  

Badli  worker  and  held  that  the  same  mitigates  

against his claim. If he wanted permanent job and  

had been assured the same, he should not have  

first applied to be selected as Badli worker and  

then resigned just after selection. Having said  

so, the High Court with reference to the facts  

and circumstances of the case, opined that it was  

not a case of reinstatement with full back wages.  

However, by placing reliance upon the judgment of  

this  Court  in  the  case  of  Harjinder  Singh v.  

Punjab  State  Warehousing  Corporation1,  the  

correctness of the said substituted award by the  

High Court is challenged in this appeal by the  

1  (2010) 3 SCC 192

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appellant  urging  various  facts  and  legal  

contentions.

10.  The  learned  counsel  Mr.  Abdhesh  Chaudhary  

appearing  on  behalf  of  the  appellant-workman  

submits that the finding and reasons recorded by  

the High Court in reversing and setting aside the  

award of reinstatement with back wages and other  

consequential benefits and substituting its award  

with award of 1,00,000/- as damages is erroneous  

in  law  since  the  action  of  the  respondent  in  

terminating the services of the appellant is in  

contravention  of  Section  6-N  of  the  U.P.  I.D.  

Act. While exercising judicial review power by  

the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the  

Constitution of India, though it has concluded on  

the points of dispute in favour of the workman it  

has  erroneously  interfered  with  the  award  of  

reinstatement with back wages and consequential  

benefits which by the Labour Court. This finding

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by High Court is in violation of the decision of  

this Court in the case of Harjinder Singh (supra)  

in  which   this  Court  after  adverting  to  the  

entire case law on the question of social justice  

has  examined  the  conferment  of  power  upon  the  

High  Court  and  held  that  the  Labour  Court  in  

exercise  of  its  original  jurisdiction  is  the  

final court of facts and  grants of relief and  

the same cannot be interfered with in  exercise  

of its supervisory jurisdiction unless the award  

is  shown  to  be  vitiated  as  erroneous  in  law.  

Therefore,  the  impugned  judgment  and  order  is  

vitiated in law and is liable to be set aside.

11. Further, it is contended that the High Court  

has further failed to take into consideration the  

relevant aspect of the matter namely, that the  

Labour  Court  on  appreciation  of  pleadings  and  

evidence on record with reference to undisputed  

fact of non-payment on retrenchment compensation

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recorded  that  the  Company  neither  obtained  

permission  from  the  appropriate  Government  to  

retrench the appellant from his services nor did  

it issue any notice or wages in lieu of the same  

to him. The action of termination of the service  

of the appellant on the ground that it is an  

automatic termination for non-renewal of contract  

of  the  employment  is  in  contravention  to  the  

statutory provisions of the U.P. I.D. Act and the  

law laid down by this Court in catena of cases,  

the relevant paragraphs of which will be adverted  

to in the reasoning portion of this judgment. On  

this ground also the impugned judgment is liable  

to be set aside and the impugned award of the  

Labour Court is entitled to be restored.

12. It is further urged that the High Court has  

further failed to take into consideration  the  

fact  that  the  award  of  damages  as  against  

reinstatement without consequential benefits to

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the  appellant  while  having  concurred  with  the  

finding of fact recorded by Labour Court after  

adjudication of the dispute and also the holding  

by the Labour Cthat the order of termination is a  

case  of  retrenchment  and  is  done  in  non-

compliance  of  the  mandatory  requirements  as  

provided under the statute  of U.P. I.D. Act is  

erroneous  in  law.  Therefore,  the  impugned  

judgment of the High Court is liable to be set  

aside.

13.  Mr.  Chander  Udai  Singh,  the  learned  senior  

Counsel  for  the  respondent-employer  sought  to  

justify the award of damages and setting aside the  

order of reinstatement with consequential benefits  

by the High Court by contending that the appellant  

is not a permanent workman. He was engaged on a  

temporary  basis  periodically  and  he  had  no  

permanent status as worker and his services could  

not be continued by the employer. His termination

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from  service  from  the  respondent  Company  was  on  

account of the condition of automatic termination  

w.e.f. 28.7.1998, whereby the contract employment  

has come to an end. Therefore, according to the  

learned senior counsel for the respondent, no order  

of termination was passed by the respondent. On the  

other hand, the present case was a situation of  

automatic  termination  due  to  non-renewal  of  

contract which is covered under Section 2(oo) (bb)  

of the I.D. Act and the same is an exception to  

retrenchment. This legal aspect, according to the  

learned senior counsel has not been appropriately  

appreciated by the Labour Court.  The same has not  

been accepted by the Division Bench of High Court  

in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226  

and 227 of the Constitution of India. Therefore,  

the award of damages could not have been awarded by  

the Labour Court. However, the same has been paid  

to  the  appellant  and  which  is  accepted  by  him.  

Therefore, he would submit that the appellant is

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not entitled to the relief as prayed in this appeal  

for  the  reason  that  if  automatic  termination  of  

services  on  account  of  the  operation  of  the  

contract of employment Clause is contained in the  

appointment order, then the claim of the appellant  

is not a case of retrenchment and compliance of the  

requirement under Section 6-N of the U.P. Act does  

not arise. The same aspect has not been taken into  

proper perspective both by the Labour Court as well  

as the High Court. Though the appellant has not  

challenged separately by filing SLP the correctness  

of the impugned judgment can be challenged by the  

respondent  as  it  has  got  the  right  under  the  

provisions of Order 41 Rule 33 CPC to question the  

correctness of the finding recorded on the question  

of the termination by the Labour Court and the High  

Court which made concurrent finding  holding that  

it is a case of retrenchment and the same is in  

contravention of Section 6-N of the U.P. I.D. Act.

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The High Court while passing the judgment and order  

and substituting the award of the Labour Court has  

already  granted  damages  of  1,00,000/-  as  

retrenchment  compensation.  The  appellant  is  not  

entitled to the relief as prayed for in this appeal  

for another reason namely, that he had accepted the  

damages  awarded  in  the  impugned  judgment  by  the  

High  Court.  Therefore,  this  Court  need  not  

interfere with the impugned judgment.

14. Another legal contention urged by the learned  

senior  counsel  for  the  respondent  is  that  the  

appellant is not entitled to back wages since he is  

not  employed  with  the  respondent-Company  and  has  

not even filed application under Section 17B before  

the High Court when the award passed by the Labour  

Court  was  challenged  by  the  respondent.  Further,  

the appellant admitted that he did not claim wages  

under the Act which would clearly go on to show  

that the appellant was not employed and therefore,

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he is not entitled to back wages as awarded by the  

Labour Court. Hence, the award of the back wages by  

the Labour Court is bad in law and the same has  

been modified by the High Court having regard to  

the facts of the case which need not be interfered  

with by this Court in exercise of its power under  

Article 136 of the Constitution of India.  

15. With reference to the above legal contentions  

the  following  points  would  arise  for  our  

consideration :-

(1) Whether the exercise of power by the  

High Court under Articles 226 and 227  

of the Constitution and setting aside  

the award of reinstatement, back wages  

and other consequential reliefs  and  

awarding  1,00,000/-  towards  damages  

is legal and valid?

(2) Whether  the  concurrent  finding  

recorded by the Labour Court and High

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Court on the question of termination  

of  services  of  the  workman  holding  

that  the  case  of  retrenchment  falls  

under Section 6-N of the U.P. I.D. Act  

is  void  ab  initio  and  not  accepting  

the  legal  plea  that  the  case  falls  

under Section 2 (oo) (bb) of the Act  

is correct, legal and valid?

(3) Whether  the  workman  is  entitled  for  

reinstatement with full back wages and  

other consequential reliefs ?

(4) What Award?

Answer to point No. 1 16. The appellant has claimed that the High Court  

has modified the award passed by the Labour Court  

which  has  awarded  reinstatement  of  the  appellant  

with  full  back  wages  and  other  consequential  

benefits  to  simply  awarding  compensation  to  the  

tune of  1,00,000/- by the High Court  in lieu of

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reinstatement  with  back  wages  and  consequential  

benefits which order is bad in law in the light of  

the legal principles laid down by this Court in the  

catena of cases. In the case of  Heinz India (P)  

Ltd. v. Union of India2, this Court, on the issue of  

the power of the High Court for judicial review  

under Article 226, held as under:

“60.  The  power  of  judicial  review  is  neither unqualified nor unlimited. It has  its own limitations. The scope and extent  of the power that is so very often invoked  has  been  the  subject-matter  of  several  judicial pronouncements within and outside  the country. When one talks of 'judicial  review' one is instantly reminded of the  classic  and  oft  quoted  passage  from  Council of Civil Service Unions (CCSU) v.  Minister  for  the  Civil  Service  [1984]  3  All ER 935, where Lord Diplock summed up  the permissible grounds of judicial review  thus: Judicial Review has I think developed to a  stage today when, without reiterating any  analysis  of  the  steps  by  which  the  development  has  come  about,  one  can  conveniently  classify  under  three  heads  the grounds on which administrative action  is subject to control by judicial review.  The  first  ground  I  would  call  'illegality',  the  second  'irrationality'  and the third 'procedural impropriety'.

2 (2012) 5 SCC 443

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By 'illegality' as a ground for judicial  review I mean that the decision-maker must  understand  correctly  the  law  that  regulates  his  decision-making  power  and  must give effect to it. Whether he has or  not  is  par  excellence  a  justiciable  question to be decided, in the event of  dispute, by those persons, the judges, by  whom the judicial power of the State is  exercisable. By 'irrationality' I mean what can by now  be succinctly referred to as 'Wednesbury  unreasonableness'.  It  applies  to  a  decision  which  is  so  outrageous  in  its  defiance  of  logic  or  of  accepted  moral  standards that no sensible person who had  applied  his  mind  to  the  question  to  be  decided could have arrived at it. Whether  a decision falls within this category is a  question that judges by their training and  experience  should  be  well  equipped  to  answer  or  else  there  would  be  something  badly  wrong  with  our  judicial  system... ... I  have  described  the  third  head  as  'procedural  impropriety'  rather  than  failure to observe basic rules of natural  justice or failure to act with procedural  fairness  towards  the  person  who  will  be  affected by the decision. This is because  susceptibility  to  judicial  review  under  this  head  covers  also  failure  by  an  administrative  tribunal  to  observe  procedural rules that are expressly laid  down  in  the  legislative  instrument  by  which its jurisdiction is conferred, even  where  such  failure  does  not  involve  any  denial of natural justice.”

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Further, in the case of Devinder Singh v. Municipal  

Council, Sanaur3, it was held that :  

“22. ……A careful analysis thereof reveals  that  the  High  Court  neither  found  any  jurisdictional infirmity in the award of  the  Labour  Court  nor  it  came  to  the  conclusion that the same was vitiated by  an error of law apparent on the face of  the record. Notwithstanding this, the High  Court set aside the direction given by the  Labour  Court  for  reinstatement  of  the  Appellant  by  assuming  that  his  initial  appointment/engagement was contrary to law  and  that  it  would  not  be  in  public  interest  to  approve  the  award  of  reinstatement after long lapse of time. In  our view, the approach adopted by the High  Court  in  dealing  with  the  award  of  the  Labour  Court  was  ex  facie  erroneous  and  contrary  to  the  law  laid  down  in Syed  Yakoob  v.  K.S.  Radhakrishnan  AIR  (1964)  SC  477, Swaran  Singh  v.  State  of  Punjab  (1976)  2  SCC  868 P.G.I.  of  Medical  Education  &  Research,  Chandigarh  v.  Raj  Kumar  (2001) 2 SCC 54, Surya Dev Rai v.  Ram  Chander  Rai  (2003)  6  SCC  675  and Shalini Shyam v. Rajendra Shankar Path  (2010) 8 SCC 329.

23.  In Syed  Yakoob  v.  K.S.  Radhakrishnan (supra),  this  Court  identified  the  limitations  of  certiorari  jurisdiction  of  the  High  Court  under  Article 226 of  the  Constitution  in  the  following words:

3 (2011) 6 SCC 584

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The  question  about  the  limits  of  the  jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a  writ  of  certiorari  under  Article 226 has  been frequently considered by this Court  and the true legal position in that behalf  is  no  longer  in  doubt.  A  writ  of  certiorari  can  be  issued  for  correcting  errors  of  jurisdiction  committed  by  inferior  courts  or  tribunals:  these  are  cases where orders are passed by inferior  courts or tribunals without jurisdiction,  or is in excess of it, or as a result of  failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ  can similarly be issued where in exercise  of jurisdiction conferred on it, the court  or tribunal acts illegally or improperly,  as  for  instance,  it  decides  a  question  without giving an opportunity to be heard  to  the  party  affected  by  the  order,  or  where  the  procedure  adopted  in  dealing  with the dispute is opposed to principles  of natural justice. There is, however, no  doubt  that  the  jurisdiction  to  issue  a  writ  of  certiorari  is  a  supervisory  jurisdiction and the court exercising it  is  not  entitled  to  act  as  an  appellate  court.  This  limitation  necessarily  means  that  findings  of  fact  reached  by  the  inferior  court  or  tribunal  as  result  of  the  appreciation  of  evidence  cannot  be  reopened  or  questioned  in  writ  proceedings.  An  error  of  law  which  is  apparent on the face of the record can be  corrected by a writ, but not an error of  fact, however grave it may appear to be.  In regard to a finding of fact recorded by  the tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be  issued if it is shown that in recording  the  said  finding,  the  tribunal  had

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erroneously  refused  to  admit  admissible  and material evidence, or had erroneously  admitted  inadmissible  evidence  which  has  influenced  the  impugned  finding.  Similarly, if a finding of fact is based  on no evidence, that would be regarded as  an error of law which can be corrected by  a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this  category of cases, however, we must always  bear  in  mind  that  a  finding  of  fact  recorded  by  the  tribunal  cannot  be  challenged  in  proceedings  for  a  writ  of  certiorari on the ground that the relevant  and material evidence adduced before the  tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to  sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy  or sufficiency of evidence led on a point  and the inference of fact to be drawn from  the said finding are within the exclusive  jurisdiction of the tribunal, and the said  points  cannot  be  agitated  before  a  writ  court. It is within these limits that the  jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts  under  Article 226 to  issue  a  writ  of  certiorari can be legitimately exercised.

In the second judgment - Swaran Singh v.  State  of  Punjab (supra),  this  Court  reiterated  the  limitations  of  certiorari  jurisdiction  indicated  in Syed  Yakoob  v.  Radhakrishnan (supra) and observed: In regard to a finding of fact recorded by  an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari  can be issued only if in recording such a  finding,  the  tribunal  has  acted  on  evidence which is legally inadmissible, or  has refused to admit admissible evidence,  or if the finding is not supported by any

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evidence at all, because in such cases the  error amounts to an error of law. The writ  jurisdiction extends only to cases where  orders  are  passed  by  inferior  courts  or  tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction  or  as  a  result  of  their  refusal  to  exercise  jurisdiction  vested  in  them  or  they  act  illegally  or  improperly  in  the  exercise  of  their  jurisdiction  causing  grave miscarriage of justice.”

17. The judgments mentioned above can be read with  

the  judgment  of  this  court  in  Harjinder  Singh’s  

case (supra), the relevant paragraph of which reads  

as under:

“21. Before concluding, we consider it necessary  to  observe  that  while  exercising  jurisdiction  under  Articles  226  and/or  227  of  the  Constitution in matters like the present one,  the High Courts are duty-bound to keep in mind  that  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act  and  other  similar  legislative  instruments  are  social  welfare legislations and the same are required  to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set  out in the Preamble of the Constitution and the  provisions  contained  in  Part  IV  thereof  in  general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and  43-A in particular, which mandate that the State  should secure a social order for the promotion  of  welfare  of  the  people,  ensure  equality  between men and women and equitable distribution  of  material  resources  of  the  community  to  subserve the common good and also ensure that

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the workers get their dues. More than 41 years  ago, Gajendragadkar, J. opined that:

“10. … The concept of social and economic  justice  is  a  living  concept  of  revolutionary import; it gives sustenance  to  the  rule  of  law  and  meaning  and  significance  to  the  ideal  of  welfare  State.”

(State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold   Mines13,  AIR p. 928, para 10.)

18. A careful reading of the judgments reveals  that  

the High Court can interfere with an Order of the  

Tribunal only on the procedural level and in cases,  

where  the  decision  of  the  lower  courts  has  been  

arrived  at  in  gross  violation  of  the  legal  

principles.  The  High  Court  shall  interfere  with  

factual aspect placed before the Labour Courts only  

when it is convinced that the Labour Court has made  

patent mistakes in admitting evidence illegally or  

have  made  grave  errors  in  law  in  coming  to  the  

conclusion  on  facts.  The  High  Court  granting  

contrary relief under Articles 226 and 227 of the  

Constitution amounts to exceeding its jurisdiction

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conferred upon it. Therefore, we accordingly answer  

the point No. 1 in favour of the appellant.  

Answer to point No. 2 19.  No  plea  was  made  by  the  respondent  in  its  

written statement filed before the Labour Court with  

regard to the provision of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the  

I.D. Act. Nonetheless, this legal ground without any  

factual foundation was pressed into operation before  

the  Labour  Court  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

respondent.  The  same  has  been  addressed  by  the  

Labour  Court  by  rejecting  the  said  contention  by  

assigning  its  own  reasons.  Before  we  record  our  

finding  on  this  contention,  it  is  pertinent  to  

mention the provision of Section 2 (oo) (bb) of the  

I.D. Act, which reads thus:

“2  (oo)  “retrenchment”  means  the  termination by the employer of the service  of  a  workman  for  any  reason  whatsoever,  otherwise than as a punishment inflicted  by  way  of  disciplinary  action,  but  does  not include-

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[(bb)  termination  of  the  service  of  the  workman as a result of the non-renewal of  the  contract  of  employment  between  the  employer and the workman concerned on its  expiry  or  of  such  contract  being  terminated under the stipulation in that  behalf contained therein; or]”  

20.  It  is  argued  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellant that there is no provision in pari materia  

to this provision in the U.P. I.D. Act. Therefore,  

even if the service of the appellant is terminated  

on  expiry  of  the  contract  period  of  service,  it  

would  fall  within  the  definition  of  retrenchment  

under the U.P. I.D. Act for non compliance of the  

mandatory requirement under Section 6-N of the U.P.  

I.D.  Act.  The  order  of  termination  against  the  

appellant  is  rendered  void  ab  initio  in  law,  

therefore,  the  appellant  is  entitled  to  be  

reinstated  with  back  wages  and  consequential  

benefits. In support of this contention, the learned  

counsel has aptly relied upon the decision of this  

Court in  U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd.  v. Om

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Prakash Upadhyay4, with regard to the applicability  

of the provision of Section 2(oo) (bb) of the I.D.  

Act which was amended provision after the U.P. I.D.  

Act, the relevant paragraphs of which read as under:

“3. On the application of the State Act  or the Central Act to the case on hand,  the High Court followed the Division Bench  ruling in  Jai Kishun v. U.P. Coop. Bank  Ltd. and made it plain that the provision  of  Section  2  (oo)(bb)  of  the  Central  Industrial Dispuutes Act would not apply  in  respect  of  proceedings  arising  under  the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. The High  Court  also  noticed  the  contrary  view  in  this regard in the case of Pushpa Agarwal  v. Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools,  Meerut but held that in  Jai Kishun case  the  relevant  provisions  had  been  duly  considered which are not taken note of in  Pushpa Agarwal case and on that basis, it  followed the decision in  Jai Kishun case.  It  is  this  judgment  that  is  brought  in  appeal before us in these proceedings.  …….. 5.  The  law  is  settled  that  under  the  Central  Act  every  case  of  retrenchment  would  not  include  a  case  of  contractual  termination  which  came  to  be  introduced  under the Central Act by amending Act 49  of 1984 which purports to exclude from the  ambit  of  definition  “retrenchment”  inter  alia:  (i)  termination  of  service  of  a  workman as a result of the non- renewal of  contract  of  employment  between  the  

4 (2002) 10 SCC 89

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employer and the workman concerned on its  expiry,  or  (ii)  termination  of  the  contract  of  employment  in  terms  of  a  stipulation contained in the contract of  employment in that behalf. Such a case is  not  available  under  the  U.P.  Industrial  Disputes  Act.  If  the  U.P.  Industrial  Disputes Act covers the present case then  termination  of  the  services  of  the  respondent  would  certainly  result  in  retrenchment while it is not so under the  Central Industrial Disputes Act in view of  the exceptional clauses referred to above.  While  the  former  situation  results  in  retrenchment,  the  latter  situation  does  not  amount  to  retrenchment  if  the  same  case  would  arise  under  the  State  Industrial Disputes Act. Thus operation of  the  two  enactments  would  bring  to  the  forefront  the  obvious  repugnancy  between  them.  In  such  a  case  as  to  how  the  question  is  to  be  resolved  needs  to  be  considered in the present case. 6. Inasmuch as the enactments, both by the  State  and  the  Centre,  are  under  the  Concurrent List, we are urged to look to  Article  254(2)  of  the  Constitution  of  India.  If  we  view  from  that  angle,  the  U.P. Industrial Disputes Act also covers  the same field as the Central Industrial  Disputes Act. However, Section 2 (oo) (bb)  is obviously a special provision enacted  under in order to understand the meaning  of “retrenchment” and that is the law made  by  Parliament  subsequent  to  State  enactment and naturally falls within the  proviso to Article 254(2). If that is so,  the  Central  Industrial  Disputes  Act.  Therefore, we would have taken that view

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but  for  the  special  provisions  in  the  Central  Act  which  we  will  advert  to  hereinafter.   7.  Section  1(2)  of  the  Central  Act  provides  that  the  Act  ‘extends  to  the  whole of India’ and this sub-section was  substituted for the original sub- section  (2) by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment  and  Miscellaneous  Provisions)  Act,  1956  (36 of 1956) with effect from 29-8-1956.  Under  that  Act,  Section  31  (which  came  into  force  from  7-10-1956)  has  been  introduced which reads as follows:

’31.Act not to override State laws.- (1)  If, immediately before the commencement of  this Act, there is in force in any State  any Provincial Act or State Act relating  to  the  settlement  or  adjudication  of  disputes, the operation of such an Act in  that State in relation to matters covered  by that Act shall not be affected by the  Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as amended  by this Act’.  Sub- section (1) of the said section makes  it clear that the operation of the State  Act will not be affected by the Central  Act…”

21. The learned counsel for the appellant therefore,  

rightly submitted that Section 2 (oo) (bb) of the  

I.D. Act will not be attracted in the present case  

and on the other hand, the provision of Section 6-N

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of the U.P. I.D. Act is required to be fulfilled  

mandatorily  by  the  respondent  to  retrench  the  

appellant from his service.

 22. The learned senior counsel for the respondent  

has not brought in his argument to counter the above  

legal  contention  except  contending  that  the  

provision  of  Section  2(oo)  (bb)  of  the  I.D.  Act  

would be applicable to the fact situation of the  

case  as  the  appellant  has  been  in  contract  

employment in the project. But, we are inclined to  

hold that s. 2 (oo) (bb) of the I.D. Act is not  

attracted in the present case on two grounds:

Firstly, in the light of the legal principle  

laid down by this Court in the case of  U.P. State  

Sugar Corporation Ltd.  (supra), the provisions of  

the U.P. I.D. Act remain unaffected by the provision  

of the I.D. Act because of the provision in s. 31 of  

the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous

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Provisions) Act, 1956. Hence, s. 2 (oo) (bb) is not  

attracted in the present case.  

Secondly, the claim of the respondent that the  

appellant was a temporary worker is not acceptable  

to us. On perusal of facts, it is revealed that his  

service has been terminated several times and he was  

subsequently  employed  again  till  his  service  was  

finally terminated on 27.7.1998. His brief periods  

of  contracts  with  the  respondent  have  been  from  

28.12.1992 to 28.12. 1993 for the first time, from  

3.4.1994  to  29.12.1994  for  the  second  time,  from  

10.1.1995  to  5.1.1996  for  the  third  time,  from  

16.1.1996  to  11.1.1997  for  the  fourth  time,  from  

20.1.1997 to 21.1.1998 for the fifth time and from  

27.1.1998 to 27.7.1998 for a final time at the end  

of which his service was terminated.

 23.  Very  interestingly,  the  periods  of  service  

extends  to  close  to  6  years  save  the  artificial  

breaks made by the respondent with an oblique motive

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so as to retain the appellant as a temporary worker  

and deprive the appellant of his statutory right of  

permanent worker status. The aforesaid conduct of  

the respondent perpetuates ‘unfair labour practice  

as  defined  under  Section  2(ra)  of  the  I.D.  Act,  

which is not permissible in view of  Sections 25T  

and 25U of the I.D. Act read with entry at Serial  

No. 10 in the Vth Schedule to the I.D. Act regarding  

unfair labour practices.  

Section 2 (ra) reads thus:

“unfair labour practice” means any of the  practices mentioned in the Vth Schedule.

Further, Entry 10 of Vth Schedule reads as under:

“5. To discharge or dismiss workmen- ….    (10). To employ workmen as ‘badlis’,  casuals  or  temporaries  and  to  continue  them as such for years, with the object of  depriving  them  of  the  status  and  privileges of permanent workmen.”  

24. The respondent, in order to mitigate its conduct  

towards the appellant has claimed that the appellant

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was  appointed  solely  on  contract  basis,  and  his  

service  has  been  terminated  in  the  manner  

permissible under Section 2 (oo) (bb) of the I.D.  

Act. However, we shall not accept this contention of  

the respondent for the following reasons:-

(i) Firstly, the respondent has not produced any  

material evidence on record before the Labour  

Court to prove that it meets all the required  

criteria under the Contract Labour (Regulation  

and  Abolition)  Act,  1970,  to  be  eligible  to  

employ  employees  on  contractual  basis  which  

includes license number etc.  

(ii) Secondly, the respondent could not produce  

any  material  evidence  on  record  before  the  

Labour  Court  to  show  that  the  appellant  was  

employed for any particular project(s) on the  

completion  of  which  his  service  has  been  

terminated through non-renewal of his contract  

of employment.

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25. Therefore, we deem it fit to construe that the  

appellant has rendered continuous service for six  

continuous  years  (save  the  artificially  imposed  

break) as provided under Section 25B of the I.D. Act  

and can therefore be subjected to retrenchment only  

through the procedure mentioned in the I.D. Act or  

the state Act in pari materia.

 26. Therefore, we answer the point No. 2 in favour  

of the appellant holding that the Labour Court was  

correct  in  holding  that  the  action  of  the  

respondent/employer is a clear case of retrenchment  

of the appellant, which action requires to comply  

with the mandatory requirement of the provision of  

Section 6-N of the U.P. I.D. Act. Undisputedly, the  

same has not been complied with and therefore, the  

order of retrenchment has rendered  void ab initio  

in law.

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Answer to Point No.3   27. Having answered point No. 2 in favour of the  

appellant, we also answer the point No. 3 in his  

favour since we construe that the appellant is a  

worker  of  the  respondent  Company  providing  

continuous  service  for  6  years  except  for  the  

artificial breaks imposed upon him with an oblique  

motive by the respondent Company. We hold that the  

termination of service of the appellant amounts to  

“retrenchment” in the light of the principle laid  

down by three judge bench decision of this Court in  

State Bank of India v.  Shri N. Sundara Money5 and  

attracts the provision of S. 6-N of the U.P. I.D.  

Act.  The  case  mentioned  above  illustrates  the  

elements which constitute retrenchment. The relevant  

paragraphs read as under:

“9.  A  break-down  of  Section 2(oo) unmistakably  expands  the  semantics  of  retrenchment.  'Termination...for  any  reason  whatsoever'  are  the  keywords.  Whatever  the  reason,  every termination spells retrenchment. So  

5 AIR 1976 SC 1111

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the  sole  question  is  has  the  employee's  service  been  terminated?  Verbal  apparel  apart,  the  substance  is  decisive.  A  termination  takes  place  where  a  term  expires either by the active step of the  master  or  the  running  out  of  the  stipulated  term.  To  protect  the  weak  against  the  strong  this  policy  of  comprehensive  definition  has  been  effectuated.  Termination  embraces  not  merely  the  act  of  termination  by  the  employer,  but  the  fact  of  termination  howsoever  produced.  May  be,  the  present  may be a hard case, but we can visualise  abuses  by  employers,  by  suitable  verbal  devices,  circumventing  the  armour  of  Section 25F and  Section 2(00).  Without  speculating on possibilities, we may agree  that  'retrenchment'  is  no  longer  terra  incognita but area covered by an expansive  definition.  It  meats  'to  end,  conclude,  cease'. In the present case the employment  ceased, concluded, ended on the expiration  of  nine  days  automatically  maybe,  but  cessation all the same. That to write into  the  order  of  appointment  the  date  of  termination  confers  no  moksha  from  Section 25F(b) is  inferable  from  the  proviso  to  Section 25F(1).  True,  the  section  speaks  of  retrenchment  by  the  employer and it is urged that some act of  volition  by  the  employer  to  bring  about  the  termination  is  essential  to  attract  Section 25F and  automatic  extinguishment  of service by effluxion of time cannot be  sufficient. An English case R.V. Secretary  of State (1973) 2 ALL E.R. 103; was relied  on, where Lord Denning, MR observed:

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I  think  the  word  'terminate'  or  'termination' is by itself ambiguous. It  can refer to either of two things-either  to termination by notice or termination by  effluxion of time It is often used in that  dual sense in landlord and tenant and in  master  and  servant  cases.  But  there  are  several indications in this paragraph to  show  that  it  refers  here  only  to  termination by notice. Buckley L. J, concurred and said: In my judgment the words are not capable  of  bearing  that  meaning.  As  counsel  for  the  Secretary  of  State  has  pointed  out,  the  verb  'terminate'  can  be  used  either  transitively or intransitively. A contract  may be said to terminate when it comes to  an end by effluxion of time, or it may be  said  to  be  terminated  when  it  is  determined at notice or otherwise by some  act  of  one  of  the  parties.  Here  in  my  judgment the word 'terminated' is used in  this passage in para 190 in the transitive  sense,  and  it  postulates  some  act  by  somebody which is to bring the appointment  to an end, and is not applicable to a case  in which the appointment comes to an end  merely by effluxion of time Words  of  multiple  import  have  to  be  winnowed  judicially  to  suit  the  social  philosophy of the statute. So screened, we  hold that the transitive and intransitive  senses are covered in the current context.  Moreover,  an  employer  terminates  employment not merely by passing an order  as  the  service  runs.  He  can  do  so  by  writing  a  composite  order  one  giving  employment  and  the  other  ending  or  limiting  it.  A  separate,  subsequent

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determination  is  not  the  sole  magnetic  pull  of  the  provision.  A  preemptive  provision  to  terminate  is  struck  by  the  same  vice  as  the  post-appointment  termination.  Dexterity  of  diction  cannot  defeat the articulated conscience of the  provision.”

 28. Section 6N of the U.P. I.D. Act which is in pari  

materia to s. 25N of the I.D. Act reads thus:

“[6-N. Condition precedent to retrenchment of  workmen.- No workman employed in any industry  who has been in continuous service for not  less than one year under an employer shall be  retrenched by that employer until,-

(a) the  workman  has  been  given  one  month’s notice in writing indicating  the reasons for retrenchment and the  period of notice has expired or the  workman  has  been  paid  in  lieu  of  such notice wages for the period of  the notice;

Provided that no such notice shall be necessary if  the  retrenchment  is  under  an  agreement  which  specifies the date of termination of service;

(b) the workman has been paid, at the  time  of  retrenchment,  compensation  which shall be equivalent to fifteen  days’  average  pay  for  every  completed  year  of  service  or  any  part  thereof  in  excess  of  six  months; and

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(c) notice in the prescribed manner is  served on the State Government]”  

Evidently, the above said mandatory procedure has  

not been followed in the present case. Further, it  

has been held by this Court in the case of  Anoop  

Sharma v. Executive Engineer, Public Health Division  

No. 1 Panipat6 as under:

“13….. no workman employed in any industry  who has been in continuous service for not  less than one year under an employer can  be retrenched by that employer until the  conditions enumerated in Clauses (a) and  (b)  of  Section 25F of  the  Act  are  satisfied.  In  terms  of  Clause  (a),  the  employer  is  required  to  give  to  the  workman  one  month's  notice  in  writing  indicating the reasons for retrenchment or  pay  him  wages  in  lieu  of  the  notice.  Clause (b) casts a duty upon the employer  to  pay  to  the  workman at  the  time  of  retrenchment,  compensation  equivalent  to  fifteen  days'  average  pay  for  every  completed  year  of  continuous  service  or  any part thereof in excess of six months.  This  Court  has  repeatedly  held  that  Section 25F(a) and  (b)  of  the  Act  is  mandatory  and  non-compliance  thereof  renders  the  retrenchment  of  an  employee  nullity  - State  of  Bombay  v.  Hospital  Mazdoor  Sabha  AIR  1960  SC  610, Bombay  Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay   

6 (2010) 5 SCC 497

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(1964) 6 SCR 22, State Bank of India v. N.  Sundara Money  (1976) 1 SCC 822, Santosh  Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala  (1980) 3  SCC 340, Mohan Lal v. Management of M/s.  Bharat  Electronics  Ltd. (1981)  3  SCC  225, L.  Robert  D'Souza  v.  Executive  Engineer, Southern Railway  (1982) 1 SCC  645, Surendra  Kumar  Verma  v.  Industrial  Tribunal  (1980) 4 SCC 443, Gammon India  Ltd.  v.  Niranjan  Das (1984)  1  SCC  509, Gurmail  Singh  v.  State  of  Punjab   (1991) 1 SCC 189 and Pramod Jha v. State  of Bihar  (2003) 4 SCC 619. This Court has  used different expressions for describing  the consequence of terminating a workman's  service/employment/  engagement  by  way  of  retrenchment  without  complying  with  the  mandate  of  Section 25F of  the  Act.  Sometimes it has been termed as ab initio  void,  sometimes  as  illegal  per  se,  sometimes as nullity and sometimes as non  est. Leaving aside the legal semantics, we  have  no  hesitation  to  hold  that  termination of service of an employee by  way of retrenchment without complying with  the  requirement  of  giving  one  month's  notice  or  pay  in  lieu  thereof  and  compensation  in  terms  of  Section     25F(a)     and (b) has the effect of    rendering  the  action  of  the  employer  as  nullity  and  the  employee  is  entitled  to  continue in employment as if his service  was not terminated.               (Emphasis laid by this Court)

Therefore, in the light of the law provided in  

the I.D. Act and its state counterpart through the

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U.P. I.D. Act and also on the basis of the legal  

principle laid down by this Court, we hold that the  

termination of service of the appellant was illegal  

and void ab initio.

 29.  Therefore,  the  Labour  Court  was  correct  on  

factual evidence on record and legal principles laid  

down by this Court in catena of cases in holding  

that the appellant is entitled to reinstatement with  

all consequential benefits. Therefore, we set aside  

the Order of the High Court and uphold the order of  

the Labour Court by holding that the appellant is  

entitled to reinstatement in the respondent-Company.

30. On the issue of back wages to be awarded in  

favour of the appellant, it has been held by this  

Court in the case of Shiv Nandan Mahto v. State of  

Bihar  &  Ors.7 that  if  a  workman  is  kept  out  of  

service  due  to  the  fault  or  mistake  of  the  

establishment/ company he was working in, then the  

7 (2013) 11 SCC 626

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workman  is  entitled  to  full  back  wages  for  the  

period he was illegally kept out of service. The  

relevant paragraph of the judgment reads as under:

“5. …. In fact, a perusal of the aforesaid  short order passed by the Division Bench  would clearly show that the High Court had  not even acquainted itself with the fact  that the Appellant was kept out of service  due to a mistake. He was not kept out of  service  on  account  of  suspension,  as  wrongly recorded by the High Court. The  conclusion is, therefore, obvious that the  Appellant could not have been denied the  benefit of backwages on the ground that he  had not worked for the period when he was  illegally  kept  out  of  service.  In  our  opinion, the Appellant was entitled to be  paid full backwages for the period he was  kept out of service.”

31. Further, in General Manager, Haryana Roadways v.  

Rudhan Singh8, the three Judge Bench of this Court  

considered the question whether back wages should be  

awarded to the workman in each and every case of  

illegal retrenchment. The relevant paragraph reads  

as under:

8 (2005) 5 SCC 591

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“There is no rule of thumb that in every case  where the Industrial Tribunal gives a finding  that  the  termination  of  service  was  in  violation of Section 25-F of the Act, entire  back  wages  should  be  awarded.  A  host  of  factors  like  the  manner  and  method  of  selection and appointment i.e. whether after  proper  advertisement  of  the  vacancy  or  inviting  applications  from  the  employment  exchange,  nature  of  appointment,  namely,  whether  ad  hoc,  short  term,  daily  wage,  temporary  or  permanent  in  character,  any  special qualification required for the job  and the like should be weighed and balanced  in taking a decision regarding award of back  wages. One of the important factors, which  has to be taken into consideration, is the  length  of  service,  which  the  workman  had  rendered with the employer. If the workman  has rendered a considerable period of service  and his services are wrongfully terminated,  he may be awarded full or partial back wages  keeping in view the fact that at his age and  the qualification possessed by him he may not  be in a position to get another employment.  However, where the total length of service  rendered  by  a  workman  is  very  small,  the  award of back wages for the complete period  i.e. from the date of termination till the  date of the award, which our experience shows  is  often  quite  large,  would  be  wholly  inappropriate.  Another important factor, which requires to  be taken into consideration is the nature of  employment. A regular service of permanent  character  cannot  be  compared  to  short  or  intermittent daily-wage employment though it  may be for 240 days in a calendar year.”

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32.  Subsequently,  in  the  case  of  Deepali  Gundu  

Surwase  v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya9 it  

was held by this Court as under:

“The  propositions  which  can  be  culled  out  from the aforementioned judgments are:  i)  In  cases  of  wrongful  termination  of  service,  reinstatement  with  continuity  of  service and back wages is the normal rule.  iii) Ordinarily, an employee or workman whose  services are terminated and who is desirous  of getting back wages is required to either  plead or at least make a statement before the  adjudicating authority or the Court of first  instance  that  he/she  was  not  gainfully  employed or was employed on lesser wages. If  the employer wants to avoid payment of full  back wages, then it has to plead and also  lead  cogent  evidence  to  prove  that  the  employee/workman was gainfully employed and  was getting wages equal to the wages he/she  was  drawing  prior  to  the  termination  of  service. This is so because it is settled law  that the burden of proof of the existence of  a  particular  fact  lies  on  the  person  who  makes  a  positive  averments  about  its  existence. It is always easier to prove a  positive fact than to  prove a negative fact. Therefore, once the  employee shows that he was not employed, the  onus  lies  on  the  employer  to  specifically  plead  and  prove  that  the  employee  was  gainfully employed and was getting the same  or substantially similar emoluments.  ……..

9 (2013) 10 SCC 324

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vi) In a number of cases, the superior Courts  have interfered with the award of the primary  adjudicatory authority on the premise that  finalization  of  litigation  has  taken  long  time ignoring that in majority of cases the  parties are not responsible for such delays.  Lack of infrastructure and manpower is the  principal cause for delay in the disposal of  cases.  For  this  the  litigants  cannot  be  blamed or penalised.  It  would  amount  to  grave  injustice  to  an  employee  or  workman  if  he  is  denied  back  wages simply because there is long lapse of  time between the termination of his service  and  finality  given  to  the  order  of  reinstatement. The Courts should bear in mind  that in most of these cases, the employer is  in  an  advantageous  position  vis-à-vis  the  employee  or  workman.  He  can  avail  the  services of best legal brain for prolonging  the agony of the sufferer, i.e., the employee  or workman, who can ill afford the luxury of  spending  money  on  a  lawyer  with  certain  amount of fame. Therefore, in such cases it  would  be  prudent  to  adopt  the  course  suggested  in  Hindustan  Tin  Works  Private  Limited v. Employees of Hindustan Tin Works  Private Limited (supra).….”

                 (Emphasis laid by this Court)

33. In the present case, the respondent has made a  

vague submission to the extent that:

“the conduct of the workman throughout  the proceedings before the High Court  during 2002 to 2011 shows that he is  continuously  gainfully  employed

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somewhere.  Admittedly  even  in  the  counter  affidavit  in  the  said  Writ  Petition, it has not been stated that  the workman was not employed”

Therefore, on the basis of the legal principle laid  

down by this Court in the Deepali Gundu Surwase case  

(supra), the submission of the respondent that the  

appellant did not aver in his plaint of not being  

employed, does not hold since the burden of proof  

that  the  appellant  is  gainfully  employed  post  

termination of his service is on the respondent. The  

claim  of  the  respondent  that  the  appellant  is  

gainfully employed somewhere is vague and cannot be  

considered and accepted. Therefore, we hold that the  

appellant is entitled to full back wages from the  

date of termination of his service till the date of  

his reinstatement.

Answer to point No.4 34. The present case is a clear case of violation  

of  the  constitutional  principles  expressly

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mentioned  in  the  text.  Before  we  make  our  

concluding findings and reasons, we wish to revisit  

the  Harjinder Singh case (supra) which made some  

pertinent points as under:

“22. In  Y.A. Mamarde v.  Authority under the  Minimum  Wages  Act,  this  Court,  while  interpreting  the  provisions  of  the  Minimum  Wages Act, 1948, observed: (SCC pp. 109-10)

“The anxiety on the part of the society  for  improving  the  general  economic  condition of some of its less favoured  members appears to be in supersession  of  the  old  principle  of  absolute  freedom of contract and the doctrine of  laissez faire and in recognition of the  new  principles  of  social  welfare  and  common good. Prior to our Constitution  this  principle  was  advocated  by  the  movement  for  liberal  employment  in  civilised countries and the Act which  is a pre-Constitution measure was the  offspring of that movement. Under our  present Constitution the State is now  expressly  directed  to  endeavour  to  secure  to  all  workers  (whether  agricultural, industrial or otherwise)  not only bare physical subsistence but  a  living  wage  and  conditions  of  work  ensuring a decent standard of life and  full  enjoyment  of  leisure.  This  directive  principle  of  State  policy  being conducive to the general interest  of the nation as a whole, merely lays  down  the  foundation  for  appropriate

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social  structure  in  which  the  labour  will  find  its  place  of  dignity,  legitimately due to it in lieu of its  contribution  to  the  progress  of  national economic prosperity.”

27. In  70s,  80s  and  early  90s,  the  courts  repeatedly  negated  the  doctrine  of  laissez  faire and the theory of hire and fire. In his  treatise:  Democracy,  Equality  and  Freedom,  Justice Mathew wrote:

“The original concept of employment was  that  of  master  and  servant.  It  was  therefore  held  that  a  court  will  not  specifically  enforce  a  contract  of  employment. The law has adhered to the  age-old  rule  that  an  employer  may  dismiss the employee at will. Certainly,  an  employee  can  never  expect  to  be  completely free to do what he likes to  do.  He  must  face  the  prospect  of  discharge for failing or refusing to do  his  work  in  accordance  with  his  employer’s  directions.  Such  control  by  the  employer  over  the  employee  is  fundamental  to  the  employment  relationship. But there are innumerable  facets of the employee’s life that have  little or no relevance to the employment  relationship and over which the employer  should  not  be  allowed  to  exercise  control.  It  is  no  doubt  difficult  to  draw a line between reasonable demands  of  an  employer  and  those  which  are  unreasonable  as  having  no  relation  to  the employment itself. The rule that an  employer  can  arbitrarily  discharge  an  employee with or without regard to the

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actuating  motive  is  a  rule  settled  beyond  doubt.  But  the  rule  became  settled  at  a  time  when  the  words  ‘master’ and ‘servant’ were taken more  literally than they are now and when, as  in early Roman Law, the rights of the  servant,  like  the  rights  of  any  other  member  of  the  household,  were  not  his  own, but those of his paterfamilias. The  overtones of this ancient doctrine are  discernible  in  the  judicial  opinion  which  rationalised  the  employer’s  absolute  right  to  discharge  the  employee.  Such  a  philosophy  of  the  employer’s  dominion  over  his  employee  may have been in tune with the rustic  simplicity  of  bygone  days.  But  that  philosophy  is  incompatible  with  these  days  of  large,  impersonal,  corporate  employers.  The  conditions  have  now  vastly  changed  and  it  is  difficult  to  regard the contract of employment with  large-scale  industries  and  government  enterprises  conducted  by  bodies  which  are  created  under  special  statutes  as  mere contract of personal service. Where  large  number  of  people  are  unemployed  and it is extremely difficult to find  employment,  an  employee  who  is  discharged  from  service  might  have  to  remain without means of subsistence for  a considerably long time and damages in  the shape of wages for a certain period  may not be an adequate compensation to  the  employee  for  non-employment.  In  other  words,  damages  would  be  a  poor  substitute  for  reinstatement.  The  traditional rule has survived because of  the sustenance it received from the law

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of  contracts.  From  the  contractual  principle of mutuality of obligation, it  was  reasoned  that  if  the  employee  can  quit his job at will, then so too must  the employer have the right to terminate  the relationship for any or no reason.  And there are a number of cases in which  even contracts for permanent employment  i.e.  for  indefinite  terms,  have  been  held  unenforceable  on  the  ground  that  they lack mutuality of obligation. But  these  cases  demonstrate  that  mutuality  is a high-sounding phrase of little use  as an analytical tool and it would seem  clear  that  mutuality  of  obligation  is  not an inexorable requirement and that  lack  of  mutuality  is  simply,  as  many  courts  have  come  to  recognise,  an  imperfect way of referring to the real  obstacle  to  enforcing  any  kind  of  contractual limitation on the employer’s  right  of  discharge  i.e.  lack  of  consideration. If there is anything in  contract  law  which  seems  likely  to  advance the present inquiry, it is the  growing tendency to protect individuals  from  contracts  of  adhesion  from  overreaching  terms  often  found  in  standard forms of contract used by large  commercial  establishments.  Judicial  disfavour of contracts of adhesion has  been said to reflect the assumed need to  protect  the  weaker  contracting  part  against the harshness of the common law  and the abuses of freedom of contract.  The same philosophy seems to provide an  appropriate  answer  to  the  argument,  which still seems to have some vitality,  that the servant cannot complain, as he

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takes the employment on the terms which  are offered to him.”                       (emphasis added)

28. In  Govt.  Branch  Press v.  D.B.  Belliappa, the employer invoked the theory  of hire and fire by contending that the  respondent’s  appointment  was  purely  temporary  and  his  service  could  be  terminated at any time in accordance with  the  terms  and  conditions  of  appointment  which he had voluntarily accepted. While  rejecting  this  plea  as  wholly  misconceived, the Court observed: (SCC p.  486, para 25)

“25.  …  It  is  borrowed  from  the  archaic  common  law  concept  that  employment was a matter between the  master  and  servant  only.  In  the  first  place,  this  rule  in  its  original  absolute  form  is  not  applicable  to  government  servants.  Secondly,  even  with  regard  to  private employment, much of it has  passed  into  the  fossils  of  time.  ‘This  rule  held  the  field  at  the  time  when  the  master  and  servant  were taken more literally than they  are now and when, as in early Roman  law, the rights of the servant, like  the  rights  of  any  other  member  of  the household, were not his own, but  those  of  his  paterfamilias.’  The  overtones  of  this  ancient  doctrine  are  discernible  in  the  Anglo- American  jurisprudence  of  the  18th  century  and  the  first  half  of  the  20th century, which rationalised the

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employer’s  absolute  right  to  discharge  the  employee.  ‘Such  a  philosophy’, as pointed out by K.K.  Mathew,  J.  (vide his  treatise:  Democracy, Equality and Freedom, p.  326),  ‘of  the  employer’s  dominion  over his employee may have been in  tune with the rustic simplicity of  bygone days. But that philosophy is  incompatible  with  these  days  of  large,  impersonal,  corporate  employers.’ To bring it in tune with  vastly  changed  and  changing  socio- economic conditions and mores of the  day,  much  of  this  old,  antiquated  and unjust doctrine has been eroded  by  judicial  decisions  and  legislation,  particularly  in  its  application  to  persons  in  public  employment,  to  whom  the  constitutional  protection  of  Articles  14,  15,  16  and  311  is  available. The argument is therefore  overruled.”

29. The  doctrine  of  laissez  faire was  again rejected in  Glaxo Laboratories (I)  Ltd. v.  Presiding  Officer,  in  the  following words:  

“12. In the days of  laissez faire  when  industrial  relation  was  governed by the harsh weighted law  of hire and fire the management was  the supreme master, the relationship  being referable to contract between  unequals  and  the  action  of  the  management  treated  almost  sacrosanct.  The  developing  notions

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of social justice and the expanding  horizon  of  socio-economic  justice  necessitated statutory protection to  the unequal partner in the industry,  namely, those who invest blood and  flesh  against  those  who  bring  in  capital. Moving from the days when  whim  of  the  employer  was  suprema  lex, the Act took a modest step to  compel  by  statute  the  employer  to  prescribe  minimum  conditions  of  service subject to which employment  is given. The Act was enacted as its  long  title  shows  to  require  employers  in  industrial  establishments  to  define  with  sufficient precision the conditions  of employment under them and to make  the said conditions known to workmen  employed by them. The movement was  from  status  to  contract,  the  contract  being  not  left  to  be  negotiated  by  two  unequal  persons  but  statutorily  imposed.  If  this  socially beneficial Act was enacted  for  ameliorating  the  conditions  of  the  weaker  partner,  conditions  of  service  prescribed  thereunder  must  receive  such  interpretation  as  to  advance  the  intendment  underlying  the Act and defeat the mischief.”

35. We therefore conclude and hold that the Labour  

Court was correct on legal and factual principles  

in reinstating the appellant along with full back  

wages after setting aside the order of termination.

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The High Court on the other hand, has erred by  

exceeding its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the  

Constitution of India in holding that the appellant  

has in fact, resigned by not joining his duty as a  

Badly worker and also awarding that retrenchment  

compensation to the tune of  1,00,000/- will do  

justice to the appellant without assigning reasons  

which is wholly unsustainable in law.  

36.  The  learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  had  

mentioned  before  this  Court  about  a  settlement  

between  the  parties  in  this  matter  after  the  

judgment was reserved. Therefore, we have not taken  

into  consideration  such  plea  from  the  learned  

counsel of the respondent since it was taken up  

after the hearing was over. Also the documentary  

evidence on record produced by the parties required  

us  to  reject  the  subsequent  plea  made  by  the  

respondent in this case.  We therefore set aside  

the  finding  of  the  High  Court  in  the  impugned

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judgment and hold that the appellant is entitled to  

reinstatement with full back wages from the date of  

the termination of his service till the date of his  

reinstatement  and  other  consequential  benefits  

which accrue to him by virtue of his employment  

with  the  respondent  company.  The  appeals  are  

allowed, with no order as to costs.

………………………………………………………………J.              [GYAN SUDHA MISRA]                                                       

 ………………………………………………………………J.

             [V. GOPALA GOWDA]

New Delhi, April 25, 2014.