22 April 2014
Supreme Court
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BHUSHAN POWER & STEEL LTD. Vs RAJESH VERMA .

Bench: SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR,A.K. SIKRI
Case number: CONMT.PET.(C) No.-000374-000374 / 2012
Diary number: 32976 / 2012
Advocates: RANJEETA ROHATGI Vs SHIBASHISH MISRA


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CONMT. PET. (C) No. 374 of 2012 In C.A. No. 2790 of 2012

Bhushan Power & Steel Ltd. ..... Appellant(s)

Versus

Rajesh Verma & Ors.. ..... Respondent (s)

WITH  

W.P. (C) No. 60 of 2013 W.P. (C) No. 194 of 2013 W.P. (C) No. 837 of 2013 I.A. No. 14 & I.A. NO. 2 IN I.A. No. 14  IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2790 OF 2012

J U D G M E N T

A.K SIKRI, J.  

1.All  the aforesaid matters were heard analogously as they are  

inter-connected.  In  fact,  it  is  the  judgment  dated  14.3.2012  

passed in C.A. No. 2790 of 2012 which has become the trigger  

point of all other cases. C.A. No. 2790 of 2012 was filed by M/s.  

Bhushan  Power  and  Steel  Ltd.  (formerly  known  as  Bhushan  

Limited) (hereinafter referred to as 'BPSL').  That was an appeal  

against the judgment passed by High Court of Orissa whereby the  

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High Court had dismissed the writ  petition of the BPSL.  Before  

proceeding further, we would like to narrate the nature of different  

cases and the background in which they came to be filed.  

CCP No. 374 of 2012  

2.The erstwhile Bhushan Limited had proposed setting up of plant  

in some identified villages in the District of Sambalpur, Orissa. For  

this  purpose  it  had  made  a  request  for  acquisition  of  land,  

measuring 1250 acres, which was acquired for Bhushan Limited. It  

had also applied for grant of lease of mining of iron ore for use in  

the  proposed  plant.  These  applications  were  favourably  

considered by the State Government which agreed to accord due  

priority to Bhushan Limited for grant of suitable iron ore areas and  

also  agreed to  recommend the proposal  to  the Government  of  

India  for  grant  of  a  Coal  Block.  Even a  MOU was entered into  

between the State Government and Bhushan Limited containing  

the commitment of the State Government to recommend to the  

Central Government, grant of iron ore mines for its use in  the  

proposed  plant.  For  this  purpose  area  earmarked  for  

recommendation were Thakurani area with 96 million tonnes iron  

ore reserves and Keora Area,  District  Sundargarh for  additional  

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128 million tonnes of iron ore; both for 50 years requirement of  

the  plant.  Though  various  statutory  and  other  permissions  

required for setting up of the plant were granted and the plant  

was  also  set  up,  but  due to  some in-fight  between the  family  

members  who  owned  Bhushan  Limited, it  faced  difficulties  in  

getting the grant of iron ore lease.

3.In so far as granting of mining lease of iron ore reserves in the  

aforesaid areas is concerned, it fell into rough weather. It resulted  

into show cause notice dated 18.1..2006 by the State Government  

which led to the decision that mining lease over the Thakurani  

area could not be allowed on various grounds and the application  

made  by  Bhushan  Limited  was  premature.  Thereafter,  the  

Government  of  Orissa  made  a  recommendation  to  the  Central  

Government on 9.2.2006 to grant mining lease in favour of one  

M/s Neepaz Metallics (P)  Ltd. in relaxation of Rule 59(1) of the  

Mining Rules, for a period of 30 years. Challenging these orders,  

Bhushan  Limited  filed  the  writ  petition  in  the  High  Court  on  

8.5.2006. This Writ Petition was dismissed by the High Court on  

14.12.2007 and challenging this decision Special  Leave Petition  

was  filed  which  was  granted  converting  the  SLP  into  C.A.  No.  

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2790/2012. This appeal was allowed by this Court vide judgment  

dated 14.3.2012 with the following directions:

“Accordingly, we allow the appeal and set aside the  judgment and order of the High Court of Orissa and  also  the  decision  of  the  State  Government  dated  9.2.2006, rejecting the Appellant's claim for grant of  mining lease. During the course of hearing, we have  been  informed  that  Thakurani  Block  A  has  large  reserves of iron ore, in which the Appellants can also  be accommodated. We, accordingly, direct the State  of Orissa to take appropriate steps to act in terms of  the  MOU  dated  15.5.2002,  as  also  its  earlier  commitments  to  recommend  the  case  of  the  Appellants  to  the  Central  Government  for  grant  of  adequate iron ore reserves to meet the requirements  of the Appellants in their steel plant at Lapanga”.

4.It would be pertinent to mention that State of Orissa had filed  

Review Petition seeking review of this judgment but the same was  

rejected.  Pursuant to  the aforesaid directions,  though the BPSL  

has  been  given  Thakurani  Block  A,  the  order  has  not  been  

implemented qua Keora, District Sundargarh. That is precisely the  

cause for filing Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 374 of 2012 by BPSL.  

I.A. No. 14 of 2013  5. The State of Orissa and its officials who are impleaded as  

Contemners  in  the  CCP  have  filed  their  replies  to  the  CCP  

expressing certain difficulties because of which they claim that  

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the  directions  given  in  the  judgment  are  incapable  of  

enforcement. Simultaneously, Respondent No. 1/ State of Orissa  

has  filed  instant  I.A.  No.  14  of  2013  as  well,  in  which  certain  

subsequent  developments  which  have  taken  place  after  the  

passing  of  the  judgment  dated  12.3.2012  are  traversed.  It  is  

highlighted  that  there  are  certain  other  and  legal  proceedings  

filed by them are pending at various stages in the High Court or in  

this  Court  and  the  area  claimed  by  them  in  those  legal  

proceedings overlap with the area which is the subject matter of  

grant to BPSL. A reference is also made to subsequent judgment  

in the case of Sandur Manganese & Iron Ore v. State of Karnataka;  

(2010) 13 SCC 1 which has changed the legal position thereby  

making it  difficult  for  the State to recommend the case of  the  

petitioner. It is also stated that the issue which is dealt with by  

this Court in Sandur Manganese (Supra) was not raised in the Writ  

proceedings/  Civil  Appeal  of  the  BPSL.  On  the  basis  of  the  

aforesaid averment prayer made in the I.A. reads as under:-

“Pass  appropriate  directions  with  regard  to  implementation  of  the  directions  contained  in  final  order and judgment dated 14.3.2012 passed by this  Hon'ble Court in Civil Appeal No. 2790 of 2012 in so  far as it relates to the mining lease applications of the  

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petitioner for an additional 128 million tonnes of iron  ore over lands in Keora area of Sundergarh District”.

I.A. NO. 2 OF 2013 IN I.A. NO. 14 OF 2013  6. In  I.A.  No.  14  of  2013,  this  I.A.  is  preferred  by  M/s.  Shri  

Mahavir Ferro Alloys Pvt. Ltd. The grievance of this applicant is  

against  the  status  quo  order  dated  21.4.2008  passed  in  the  

applications filed by the BPSL. It is alleged that the applicant has  

filed 9 applications for grant of Iron Ore Mining Lease of different  

areas,  notified  as  well  as  non-notified,  including  the  Thakurani  

area. However, because of the status quo order the applications  

of the applicant not being considered by the State Government  

which is adversely affecting the interest of the applicant.  

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 60 OF 2013

7. While narrating the facts of C.A. No. 2790 of 2012 in brief,  

we had mentioned about the inter se disputes between the family  

members  of  erstwhile  Bhushan Limited because of  which BPSL  

faced  difficulties  in  getting  the  grant  of  iron  ore  lease.  It  so  

happened that during the pendency of the aforesaid appeal, the  

family members resolved their disputes. On 28.2.2006, Bhushan  

Limited altered its name to BPSL. Other group got incorporated a  

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company named as M/s. Bhushan Steel Limited (BSL). BSL is the  

petitioner in the instant petition. This significant development was  

taken note of in the judgment dated 14.3.2012 in the following  

manner:-

“As indicated hereinbefore, on 21st April,  2008, this  Court  passed an interim order  in  the Special  Leave  Petition filed by Bhushan Limited directing the parties  to  maintain  status  quo  with  regard  to  the  lands  indicated in the application filed by the appellants for  grant  of  mining  lease.  However,  one  of  the  most  significant  developments  that  subsequently  took  place  was  that  on  25th  November,  2011,  Shri  B.B.  Singhal  and Shri  Neeraj  Singhal,  Vice-Chairman and  Managing Director  of  Bhushan Steel  and Strips  Ltd.  filed affidavits withdrawing all their claims and rights  in the MOU dated 15th May, 2002, executed between  the  State  Government  and  Bhushan  Limited  and  declaring that the said MOU was and had always been  in favour of Bhushan power & Steel Ltd. The above  named  persons  also  prayed  for  deletion  of  their  names from the array of parties.”

XXXXXXX The mutual  settlement of the disputes between the  members  of  the  Bhushan  Group  has  altered  the  situation considerably, since BSSL has withdrawn its  claim under the MOU dated 15th May, 2002 and has  declared that the said MOU was and had always been  executed  by  the  State  Government  in  favour  of  Bhushan Power & Steel Ltd., which had set up its steel  plant at Lapanga. As indicated hereinbefore, although,  the MOU was entered into by the State Government  with the Bhushan Group for setting up a steel plant at  Lapanga, at a later stage, BSSL also laid claim under  the  MOU  for  setting  up  a  separate  steel  plant  at  

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Mehramandali  and a  suggestion  was  also  made for  execution  of  a  fresh  MOU  between  the  State  Government and BSSL to this effect.”

8. It is the case of the BSL in the present Writ Petition that BSL  

was a part of the then Bhushan Group. It executed a MOU dated  

15.5.2002  with  the  State  of  Orissa.  Consequent  to  a  family  

settlement, M/s. Bhushan Steel and Strips Ltd. (BSSL) executed a  

separate MOA dated 3.11.2005 in which the State of Orissa had  

identical duties and obligations as those contained in 2002 MOU.  

On  12.4.2007,  BSSL  was  re-named  as  BSL  herein.  It  is  thus  

claimed that BSL is identically situated as BPSL and, therefore, the  

benefit given to BPSL vide judgment dated 14.3.2012 needs to be  

extended  to  the  BSL  as  well.  The  direction  in  the  nature  of  

mandamus  is  sought  to  implement  the  decision  of  12th  IIAC  

Meeting  dated  27.8.2003  and  terms  of  MOA  dated  3.11.2005  

against  the  State  Government  by  making  appropriate  

recommendation to the Central Government for allotment of the  

remaining portion in Thakurani RF Block A, District Keonjhar i.e.  

601.500 hectares applied while ML Application No. 882 and the  

areas applied vide ML Application No. 1079 i.e. 722.30 hectares  

approximately in village Kadalia, Kuriyakudar, Mithirda etc. under  

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Bonai  sub-division,  District  Sundegarh  to  meet  the  captive  

requirements of BSL plants.  

9. In essence, the petitioner wants same treatment as is given  

to BPSL and, therefore, has prayed for the extension of the benefit  

of judgment dated 12.3.2012 to BSL as well.  

WRIT PETITION (C) NO.  194 OF 2013 10. This Writ Petition is filed by Jindal Steel and Power Limited  

(hereinafter referred to as 'Jindal Steel'). It had entered into MOU  

with  the  State  of  Orissa  on  8.5.2002.  It  is  stated  in  the  writ  

petition that this petitioner became an intervenor in C.A. No. 2790  

of 2012 to protect its interest which has been duly taken note of in  

the judgment dated 14.3.2012 in the following manner:-

“Appearing for the Intervener, M/s. Jindal Steels Ltd.,  Mr.  K.V.  Vishwanathan,  learned  Senior  Advocate,  submitted  that  so  long  as  any  allotment  made  in  favour  of  the  Appellants  did  not  impinge  on  the  allotment made in favour of M/s. Jindal Steels Ltd;, it  could have no grievance against a separate allotment  being made in favour of the Appellants.”  

11.It is pleaded that the case of Jindal Steel is even on a better  

footing for grant of mining lease, application for which purpose  

are pending with the State of Orissa. It had also signed the MOU  

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for setting up an integrated Steel Plant wherein similar promise  

was made by the State Government for grant of a mining lease.  

Additionally,  Jindal  Steel  had the advantage of being an earlier  

applicant for the mining lease in regard to Thakurani RF Block A  

area  which  was  also  a  part  of  an  MOU by  BPSL.  It  is  further  

mentioned  that  16  mining  lease  applications  were  received  in  

respect of the said area and the Director of Mines vide his report  

dated  8.11.2002  rejected  all  other  applications  except  that  of  

Jindal Steel herein, BPSL and three other applicants. In the case of  

Jindal Steel, recommendation was for 264 hectares in Thakurani  

RF Block A as against 383 Hectare in respect of BPSL. It is also  

stated  that  even  when  recommendation  in  respect  of  BPSL  in  

Thakurani area is made by the State Government and approved  

by  the  Union  of  India,  recommendation  of  Jindal  Steel  is  still  

pending with the State Government. It is thus, pleaded that the  

case  of  the  petitioner,  Jindal  Steel,  is  squarely  covered  by  

judgment dated 14.3.2012 passed in C.A. NO. 2790 of 2012 and  

benefit thereof be extended to this petitioner as well.

WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 837 OF 2013

12. This Writ Petition is filed by Shri Mahavir Ferro Alloys Pvt.  

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Ltd. It has also proposed to set up a 0.35 MTPA Captive Integrated  

Steel  Plant  with  additional  facilities  and 60 MW Captive  Power  

Plant in Sundargarh district had an overall investment of Rs. 435  

crores. This petitioner claims that pursuant to MOU entered into  

with  the  State  Government  for  grant  of  mining  leases,  it  had  

submitted its application in this behalf.  However, more than 10  

years  have  elapsed  but  the  State  Government  has  not  

recommended its  case,  primarily  because of  status  quo orders  

passed by this Court in C.A. NO. 2790 of 2012. It is pointed out  

that for this reason this petitioner has already filed I.A. No. 2 in I.A.  

NO. 14 of 2013 in C.A. NO. 290 of 2012. Case of this petitioner,  

again, is that it is equally circumscribed and placed as BPSL as  

well as Jindal Steel and, therefore, entitled to the grant of mining  

lease as done in favour of BPSL by this Court vide judgment dated  

14.3.2012.  

13.We have reproduced,  hereinabove gist  of  the cases filed by  

different parties to get the favour of the proceedings. It becomes  

obvious and can be readily understood that in so far as BPSL is  

concerned,  by  means  of  Contempt  Petition,  it  is  seeking  the  

enforcement  of  the  directions  contained  in  its  favour  in  the  

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judgment dated 14.3.2012 passed in C.A. NO. 2790 of 2012. Three  

other parties namely BSL, Jindal Steel and Mahavir Ferro Alloys (P)  

Ltd. have filed Writ Petitions claiming same relief as given to the  

BPSL vide judgment dated 14.3.2012 on the ground that they are  

placed  in  the  similar  or  even  better  position  than  BPSL  and,  

therefore, entitled to same treatment. Further, as already pointed  

out  above,  the  State  Government  has  ventured  to  exhibit  its  

helplessness  in  carrying  out  the  directions  contained  in  the  

judgment dated 14.3.2012 even qua the beneficiary of the said  

judgment namely BPSL. In so far as other three writ petitioners  

are  concerned,  not  only  same  difficulties  are  sought  to  be  

projected, it is also mentioned that are precluded from seeking  

same relief as given to BPSL for various reasons. That apart, even  

the maintainability of the writ  petitions under Article 32 of the  

Constitution  filed  by  these petitioners  is  questioned.  In  such  a  

scenario it is apposite to first deal with the CCP filed by BPSL.

CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO. 374 OF 2012 In  C.A. No. 2790 OF 2012

14. We have already narrated the gist of factual background in  

which BPSL approached the High Court and thereafter this Court  

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for grant of mining leases of iron ore. As already mentioned, in the  

MOU entered into between the parties, the State Government had  

committed to recommend to the Central Government, for grant of  

iron ore mines to the BPSL for its use in the plant to be set up at  

Lapanga.  In  this  behalf  it  was  agreed  to  make  the  following  

recommendations to the Central Government:-

(a) For grant of 96 million tonnes iron ore reserves in  Joda Barbil Sector of Keonjhar (Thakurani area)   for 50 years requirement of the plant.

(b) For  additional  128  million  tonnes  of  iron  ore   reserves in Keora, District Sundergarh, to meet a  requirement of 1.6. million tonnes for 50 years.  

15. It is not necessary to set out the detailed facts which have  

been noted in judgment dated 14.3.2012, pertaining to the grant  

of  permissions by various  authorities  enabling BPSL to  get  the  

land,  electricity,  permission  for  installation  of  a  Captive  Power  

Plant etc. etc. Armed with those permission, the BPSL set up the  

plant in Lapanga in the district of Sambalpur, Orissa. BPSL claims  

that is has invested Rs. 25,000 crores in this project. It is further  

mentioned  that  for  running  of  this  steel  plant,  uninterrupted  

supply of iron ore is essential. This plant was set up in a backward  

area of Orissa persuant to the scheme of the State Government. It  

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is  for  this  reason  that  the  State  Government  agreed  to  grant  

mining  rights  of  iron  ore  reserves,  keeping  in  view  a  total  

requirement of 200 million tonnes over a period of 50 years for  

the smooth running of the said plant. For this reason MOU dated  

15.5.2002 was entered into. Since the grant of mining lease is by  

the Central Government under the Mining Act, State Government  

which is a recommendatory authority had agreed to recommend  

the  case  of  the  BPSL.  There  was  deadlock  for  some  period  

because of infight within  Bhushan family. However, this impasse  

came to be resolved. Taking note of these developments the Court  

was of  the opinion that  there were two issues which arose for  

considerations namely:

(a) Whether  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding   dated 15th May,  2002 continues to  subsist  in   favour of the appellants?

(b) Whether  the  State  Government  is  obliged  to  make recommendations for the grant of iron ore  mines in terms of the stipulations contained in the  

aforesaid MOU  dated  15th  May,  2002  and   whether in respect of the areas which had not   been  notified  under  Rule  59(1),  the  State   Government  can  make  a  recommendation  for   relaxation of Rule 59(1) under Rule 59(2).

16. The Court deliberated at length on these issues and decided  

in favour of BPSL holding that MOU dated 15.5.2002 still subsisted  14

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in favour of the BPSL and also that State Government was under  

obligation to make recommendations as per the said MOU. The  

most relevant part of discussion, in this behalf, reads as under:

“Pursuant  to  the  MOU  with  Bhushan  Limited,  the  State Government had not only allotted land for the  setting up of the steel plant at Lapanga, it had even  extended all help for the commissioning of the plant,  which,  in  fact,  had  already  started  functioning.  However, it is the claim made by BSSL under the MOU  executed  on  15th  May,  2002,  that  had  created  obstructions  in  the setting up of  the steel  plant  at  Lapanga.  Despite  having  allotted  land  and  granted  sanction  to  Bhushan  Limited  to  take  steps  for  construction  of  the  said  plant,  it  was  subsequently  contended  that  the  application  filed  by  Bhushan  Limited was premature and could not, therefore, be  acted upon. Specific instances have been mentioned  hereinabove  of  the  steps  taken  by  the  various  departments  in  extending  cooperation  to  Bhushan  Limited to set up its steel plant at Lapanga. To now  turn  around  and  take  a  stand  that  the  application  made by Bhushan Limited was premature, is not only  unreasonable,  but  completely  unfair  to  Bhushan  Limited,  who  have  already  invested  large  sums  of  money in setting up the plant. The State Government  had, on its own  ,  entered  into  the  MOU  with  Bhushan Limited on 15th May, 2002, and had even  agreed  to  request  the  Central  Government  to  allot  mining areas and coal blocks for operating the steel  plant.  Whatever differences that may have resulted  on account of the dispute within the Bhushan Group,  which could have led to the rethinking on the part of  the State Government, have now been laid to rest by  virtue  of  the  settlement  arrived  at  between  the  Bhushan  Limited  (now  BPSL)  and  BSSL.  The  State  Government has also accepted the said position. In  

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addition to the above, the action taken by the State  Government appears to us to be highly unreasonable  and  arbitrary  and  also  attracts  the  doctrine  of  legitimate expectation. There is no denying the fact  that the Appellants have altered their position to their  detriment  in  accordance  with  the  MOU dated  15th  May,  2002.  whatever  may  have  been  the  arrangement  subsequently  arrived  at  between  the  State Government and BSSL, the original MOU dated  15th  May,  2002,  continued  to  be  in  existence  and  remained operative”.   

17. In  so  far  as  reserve  of  96  million  tonnes  of  iron  ore  in  

Thakurani mines are concerned, the State Government had made  

the recommendation to the Central Government, which has also  

approved the same in favour of the BPSL. The dispute now relates  

to Keora mines for a reserve of 128 million tonnes.  

18. Respondents/ Contemners do not dispute (and in fact there  

is  no  scope  for  any  dispute)  that  the  aforesaid  directions  

contained in the judgment have become final. Review Petition was  

filed  by  the  State  Government  but  unsuccessfully.  One  would,  

therefore,  command for obeying these directions.  However,  the  

State Government/ Contemners have pleaded their helplessness  

by  narrating  certain  circumstances  which  are  captured  herein  

below.  

“(a) These areas fall almost entirely within the areas  16

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notified  on  23.8.1991  under  Rule  59(1)  of  the   Mineral Concession Rules,  1960. The validity of  

the  notification  dated  23.8.1991  is  an  issue  in  SLP(c)No. 31593 of 2010 and connected cases which  are  now  listed  for  hearing  on  17.01.2013  before  another Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court.  

(b) Further,  it  is  seen  that  the  applied  area  is  overlapping  with  the  applied  area  of  several  other  applicants, including M/s. Larsen & Toubro Limited and  M/s. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Limited.  (c) It is also pointed out that earlier on 21.10.1997  an area of 998.93 hectares overlapping with applied

area of the BPSL, was recommended in favour of  M/s Larsen & Toubro Ltd. in puruance with the said  company. However, this recommendation  was  withdrawn for certain reasons.  Thereafter,  even  revised ML/ PL application of M/s. Larsen and Toubro  Ltd. Were rejected. The said company challenged the  order of rejection before the Revisional Authority i.e.

Central Government which passed orders dated 10.7.2003 wherein direction is given to consider  

application  of  M/s.  Larsen  &  Toubro  Ltd.  Alongwith  about 196 applications for grant of mining lease and  after  granting  an  opportunity  of  hearing  to  all  the  applicants.  However,  BPSL  is  outside  the  196  applications that were to be considered afresh.  (d) M/s.  Larsen and Toubro Ltd has challenged the  aforesaid orders of the Central Government by filing  Writ Petition in the High Court which was dismissed by  the  Single  Judge  of  Delhi  High  Court.  Appeal  thereagainst was dismissed by the Division Bench on  3.7.2012. Order of the Division Bench of the  High  Court is challenged by filing SLP (C) NO. 33812  of  2012  in  which  notice  has  been  issued  and  as  the  matter is sub-judice in those proceedings it is difficult  to pass any orders qua BPSL at this stage.  

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(e) It  is  further  pointed  out  that  in  the  case  of  Sandur Mangnese (Supra) this Court has considered  the provisions of Section 11(4) of the MMDR Act and

has  concluded  that  all  applications  filed  over  areas   notified  under  Rule  59(1)  of  the  Mineral  Concession  Rules,  1960  deserve  simultaneous  consideration. As per the mandate of Section 11(4)   

of  the  MMDR  Act,  the  State  Government  may  grant a mining lease over a notified area to such one  of the simultaneous applicants after considering the  matters specified in sub-section (3)  of  Section  11.  The  process  of  simultaneous  consideration  of  the  applications filed over Khajhurdihi R.F. In Sundergarh  and  Rakma,  Marsuanand  Tiriba  of  Keonjhar  district  had remained stalled due to the various stay orders  passed in litigations concerning such area.  Subject   

to  the  orders,  if  any,  passed  by  this  Hon'ble  Court in  this  application,  the  process  of  simultaneous consideration of  applications will  take  considerable time in view of the large number of  overlapping applications over the areas in question.  Each of these applicants is required to be given an  opportunity  of  personal  hearing  and  credentials  of  these  applicants  are  required  to  be  evaluated  for  assessment of relative merits in terms  of  Section  11(3) of the MMDR Act.”

19. It is thus, argued that the developments narrated above and  

the statutory mandate embodied in Section 11(4) of the MMDR  

Act,  1957  have  come  in  the  way  of  the  Respondent  State  in  

implementing the final order and judgment dated 14.3.2012 in so  

far it  relates to the Keora area of Sundergarh district.  It  is also  

sought  to  be  argued  that  the  question  of  entitlement  of  the  

petitioner  to  the  recommendation  of  mines  in  the  Keora  area,  

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which are almost entirely covered under notification issued under  

Rule 59(1) of MC Rules, 1960 with specific reference to Sections  

11(4)  and  11(3)  of  the  MMDR  Act  was  not  raised  in  the  Writ  

Proceedings/  Civil  Appeal.   During  the  course  of  the  

implementation of the order of this Hon'ble Court dated 14.3.2012  

passed in Civil Appeal No. 2790 of 2012, the Respondent No. 1 is  

faced  with  the  difficulties  with  regard  to  the  Keora  area  as  

enumerated  above.  Hence,  this  application  for  appropriate  

directions.

20.The question is  as to whether such a plea can be raised to  

avoid implementation of the directions contained in the judgment?  

Our answer is in the negative, having regard to the categorical  

and  authoritative  principle  of  law  enunciated  by  various  

judgments of this Court. From the reading of these judgments one  

can comfortably get a complete answer to the so-called difficulties  

feigned by the State Government/ Contemners.

21. First judgment which needs to be noticed is in the case of  

T.R.  Dhananjaya  v.  J.  Vasudevan;  (1995)  5  SCC  619.  The  

following  discussion  contained  in  the  said  judgment  squarely  

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applies here:-

“10. When this order was passed, what remained for  the respondent was only implementation of the order  passed by this Court in furtherance of the action taken  thereunder  by  the  Corporation.  It  is  now clear  that  instead  of  implementing  the  order,  an  attempt  has  been  made  to  circumvent  the  same  and  deny  the  benefits  to  the  petitioner.  As  stated  earlier,  the  petitioner is a Corporation employee and the stand of  the Government appears to be to give benefit to their  employees. So, an attempt has now been made to get  into  the  rule  position  and  to  find  whether  the  petitioner is eligible to be considered for promotion to  the  post  of  Executive  Engineer,  Superintending  Engineer  and  Chief  Engineer.  It  is  now  stated  that  according to the rules the petitioner would be eligible  only  as  superintending  engineer  and  not  as  Chief  Engineer. When direction was given in LA. 3 of 1993,  Government was a party to the proceedings and it was  never brought to our notice that the petitioner was not  eligible.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Division  Bench  of  Karnataka High Court upheld the right of the petitioner  which became final.  11. Question is whether it is open to the respondent  to take at this stage this volte-face step. It is seen that  all  through  Government  was  a  party,  when  the  direction was given in LA. No. 3 filed by the petitioner,  it was not brought to out notice that the petitioner was  not  eligible  for  promotion,  in  contradiction  with  Dasegowda, or any other. When the claim inter se had  been adjudicated and the claim of the petitioner had  become final and that of Dasegowda was negatived, it  is no longer open to the Government to go behind the  order and truncate the effect of the orders passed by  this Court by hovering over the rules to get round the  result, to legitimise legal alibi to circumvent the orders  passed  by  this  Court.  Thus,  it  is  clear  that  the  

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concerned officers have deliberately made concerted  effort  to disobey the orders passed by this court to  deny the benefits to the petitioner. So, we are left with  no  option  but  to  hold  that  the  respondent  has  deliberately and wilfully,  with an intention to defeat  the orders of this Court, passed the impugned order.”

22. Another judgment cited at the bar is  Prithawi Nath Ram v.  

State of Jharkhand and Others; (2004) 7 SCC 261. Para 8 of the  

said judgment makes the following reading:

“8. If any party concerned is aggrieved by the order  which in its  opinion is  wrong or against rules or  its  implementation is neither practicable nor feasible, it  should always either approach the court that passed  the order or invoke jurisdiction of the appellate court.  Rightness or wrongness of the order cannot be  urged in contempt proceedings. Right or wrong,  the order has to be obeyed. Flouting an order of  the  court  would  render  the  party  liable  for  contempt. While dealing with an application for  contempt the court cannot traverse beyond the  order, non-compliance with which is alleged. In  other words, it cannot say what should not have been  done  or  what  should  have  been  done.  In  cannot  traverse beyond the order. It cannot test correctness  or otherwise of the order or give additional direction  or  delete  any  direction.  That  would  be  exercising  review jurisdiction while  dealing with an application  for  initiation  of  contempt  proceedings.  The  same  would be impermissible and indefensible. In that view  of the matter, the order of the High Court is set aside  and the matter is remitted for fresh consideration. It  shall  deal  with  the  application  in  its  proper  perspective in accordance with law afresh. We make it  clear  that  we  have  not  expressed  any  opinion  regarding acceptability or otherwise of the application  

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for initiation of contempt proceedings”. 23. This very principle has been reiterated by in  Bihar Finance  

Service H.C. Coop. Soc. Ltd. v. Gautam Goswami and Ors.; (2008)  

5 SCC 339 in the following words:

“32. While  exercising  the  said  jurisdiction  this  Court  does  not  intend  to  re-open the  issues  which  could have been raised in the original proceeding nor  shall  it  embark  upon  other  questions  including  the  plea of equities which could fall for consideration only  in  the  original  proceedings.  The  Court  is  not  concerned with as to whether the original order was  right or wrong. The court must not take a different  view  or  traverse  beyond  the  same.  It  cannot  ordinarily  give  an  additional  direction  or  delete  a  direction issued. In short, it will not do anything which  would amount to exercise of its review jurisdiction”.

24. We cannot lose sight of the fact that there is a judgment,  

inter parties, which has become final. Even when the Civil Appeal  

was being heard, certain other parties claiming their interest in  

these very lands had moved intervention applications which were  

dismissed. At that time also it was mentioned that there are 195  

applicants. However, notwithstanding the same, this Court issued  

firm directions to the State Government to recommend the case  

of the petitioners for mining lease in both the areas. In view of  

such  categorical  and  unambiguous  directions  given  in  the  

judgment  which  has  attained  finality,  merely  because  another  22

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judgment has been delivered by this Court in Sandur Manganese  

case, cannot be a ground to undo the directions contained in the  

judgment dated 14.3.2012. In so far as law laid down in Sandur  

Manganese  (Supra)  is  concerned,  that  may  be  applied  and  

followed by the State Government in respect of other applications  

which  are  still  pending.  However,  that  cannot  be  pressed  into  

service qua the petitioner whose rights have been crystallised by  

the judgment rendered in its favour. It cannot be re-opened, that  

too at the stage of implementation of the said judgment.

25. We would like to place on record the arguments of learned  

Senior  Counsel  for  the  petitioner  that  the  total  area  under  

notification is 731.67 sq. kms. and out of this 406 sq. km. is yet to  

be allotted. The area which comes to the share of the petitioner  

under MOU is 13.91 sq. km. which is barely 3 percent of 406 sq.  

km and, therefore recommendation by the State Government in  

favour of the petitioner cannot be stalled or put to naught only on  

the  basis  of  inchoate  applications,  fate  whereof  is  yet  to  be  

decided. It is also pointed out that in so far as the petitioners in  

other writ petitions are concerned area claimed by them is not  

overlapping with the petitioner's area. However, it may not even  

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be necessary to go into these contentions in detail. Once we hold  

that  the  respondents  are  bound  to  implement  the  direction  

contained in  judgment dated 14.3.2012,  in  so far  as the State  

Government is concerned, it is obliged to comply therewith and  

such matters, alongwith other relevant considerations, can be left  

to the wisdom of the Central Government while taking a decision  

on the recommendation of the State Government.  

26. In so far as intervention applications by Tatas and LNT are  

concerned these are dismissed as non maintainable, in view of  

law laid down in by this Court in Supreme Court Bar Association v.  

Union of India & Anr.; (1998) 4 SCC 409;

“42. The contempt of court is a special jurisdiction to  be exercised sparingly and with caution whenever an  act adversely affects the administration of justice or  which tends to impede its course or tends to shake  public  confidence  in  the  judicial  institutions.  This  jurisdiction  may  also  be  exercised  when  the  act  complained of adversely affects the majesty of law or  dignity  of  the  courts.  The  purpose  of  contempt  jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the  courts  of  law.  It  is  an  unusual  type  of  jurisdiction  combining “the jury, the judge and the hangman” and  it is so because the court is not adjudicating upon any  claim  between  litigating  parties.  This  jurisdiction  is  not exercised to protect the dignity of an individual  judge but to protect the administration of justice from  being  maligned.  In  the  general  interest  of  the  

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community it is imperative that the authority of courts  should  not  be  imperilled  and  there  should  be  no  unjustifiable  interference  in  the  administration  of  justice.  It  is  a  matter  between  the  court  and  the  contemner  and  third  parties  cannot  intervene.  It  is  exercised  in  a  summary  manner  in  aid  of  the  administration of justice, the majesty of law and the  dignity of the courts. No such act can be permitted  which  may  have  the  tendency  to  shake  the  public  confidence  in  the  fairness  and  impartiality  of  the  administration of justice”.

27. As  a  consequence,  we  hold  that  the  Respondents/  

Contemners are in contempt of orders dated 14.3.2012 passed by  

this Court in not complying with the directions in respect of Keora  

area.  However,  we are giving one final  opportunity to them to  

purge the contempt by transmitting requisite recommendations to  

the Central Government. It would be for the Central Government  

to consider the said recommendations on its own merits and in  

accordance with law. In case the recommendation is sent within  

one month  from the  date  of  copy  of  receipt  of  this  order,  we  

propose  not  to  take  any  further  action  and  the  respondents/  

contemners shall stand discharged from this Contempt Petition.  

However,  in case the respondents do not purge in the manner  

mentioned above, it would be open to the petitioners to point out  

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the same to this Court by moving appropriate application and in  

that event the Contemners shall be proceeded against.  

28. With this, I.A. No. 14 in C.A. NO. 2790 of 2012 and I.A. No. 2  

in I.A. NO. 14 in C.A. NO. 2790 of 2012 also stand disposed of.

Writ Petitions

29. In so far as three writ petitions are concerned we need not  

go  into  the  detailed  arguments  advanced  by  Counsel  for  the  

petitioners in those petitions. As already noted above, for their  

own  reasons  all  the  three  petitioners  pray  that  the  same  

directions  as  given  in  favour  of  BPSL  in  judgment  dated  

14.3.2012, be passed in their cases as well. This they claim on the  

basis of parity with BPSL. However, we are constrained to hold  

that, on the basis of such an argument, they cannot approach this  

court directly under Article 32 of the Constitution by filing writ  

petitions. It has already been authoritatively determined that no  

fundamental right of the petitioners is violated. No fundamental  

right is violated by non-granting of mining lease. (See (2012) 11  

SCC 1 and (1973) 1 SCC 584).  

30. That apart, there are few other aspects, aptly pointed out  

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by Mr. L. Nageswara Rao, learned ASG, which come in the way of  

maintainability of the instant petitions. He, inter alia, submitted  

that atleast in respect of applications which are still pending and  

yet to be decided, judgment in Sandur Manganese (Supra) shall  

have to be applied as it does not remain virgin area, which was  

the position when the case of BPSL was decided. He had made  

various other submissions on merit as well. Without going into all  

these  issues,  we  dismiss  these  petitions  giving  liberty  to  the  

petitioners to approach the High Court in the first instance and/ or  

any other forum which is available, as per law. We make it clear  

that in so far as these petitions are concerned we have not dealt  

with  the  issues  on  merits.  Wherever  the  petitions  are  filed,  it  

would be open to the said forum to deal with the question as to  

whether  the  petitioners  would  be  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  

judgment dated 14.3.2012 passed in the case of BPSL or not. All  

other  issues  are  also  kept  open  to  be     agitated  in  those  

proceedings. Writ petitions are dismissed with liberty as aforesaid.  

…................................J. [Surinder Singh Nijjar]

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…................................J. [A.K. SIKRI]

New Delhi April 22, 2014

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