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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2546 OF 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.6105 of  2018)

(D.No.35250 of 2017)

Bhupendra Kumar Chimanbhai Kachiya Patel              ….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Divisional Controller GSRTC Nadiad                    ….Respondent(s)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL Nos.2594-2598 OF 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos. 28519-28522 of 2017)

Prakashbhai Ishwarlal Dave            ….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Divisional Controller GSRTC Junagarh                    ….Respondent(s)

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WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2556-2592 OF 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos.6115-6151 of 2018)

(D. No.30838 of 2017)

Ghanshyam Pratapsinh Parmar         ….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Divisional Controller GSRTC Rajkot                            ….Respondent(s)

AND

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2547-2555 OF 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 6106-6114 of 2018)

(D. No.30615 of 2017)

Pradhyumansinh Lakhuba Jadeja         ….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Divisional Controller  GSRTC               ….Respondent(s)

                 J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1. Leave granted.

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2. These  appeals  are  filed  against  the  final

judgments and orders passed by the High Court of

Gujarat at Ahmedabad dated 28.06.2016 in L.P.A.

No.550/2016,  dated  22.08.2017  in  L.P.A.

Nos.1344-1347/2017,  dated  04.07.2017  in  L.P.A.

Nos.1185/2014,  1199,  1252,  1254-1259,  1261,

1264-1278,  1281-1282,  1284,  1286,  1288,

1291-1296, 1298/2014, dated 21.06.2016 in L.P.A.

Nos.497-500/2016 and dated 04.07.2017 in L.P.A.

Nos.1200,  1287,  1289,  1297  and  1299/2014

whereby  the  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court

dismissed the appeals filed by the appellants herein

and upheld the orders passed by the Single Judge

of the High Court.  

3. In order  to  appreciate  the  issues involved in

these appeals, it is necessary to set out the facts in

detail. The facts and the legal issues arising in all

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these appeals are similar in nature except the date

of their initial  appointment and absorption, which

vary  from  case  to  case  in  the  service  of  the

respondent.

4. For  the  sake  of  convenience,  the  facts

mentioned in Reference I.T. No.44/2011 (Annexure-

12) of the paper book of SLP Nos. 28519-28522 of

2017 are mentioned hereinbelow.   

5. Prafulbhai  Hirabhai  Solanki,  one  of  the

appellants herein, whose name appears at page 18

of  the  SLP  paper  book  joined  the  services  of  the

respondent-Gujarat  State  Road  Transport

Corporation  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the

Corporation) on 04.06.1999 as "Badali Kamdar" at

Mangrol  Depot  of  Junagadh  Section.  He  was

employed as a daily wager.

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6. On 21.12.1989, the Corporation and the Union

of the workers entered into a settlement to resolve

several issues in relation to the service conditions of

the employees working in the Corporation.

7. Clause 20 of the Settlement, which is relevant

for  the  disposal  of  these  appeals,  deals  with  the

placement and absorption of the “Badali Kamdar” in

the permanent cadre of conductor and grant of time

scale to such workers. It provides a procedure as to

how, when and in what manner, the services of a

“Badali Kamdar” shall be regularized and absorbed

in a particular time scale.   

8. In terms of clause 20 of the settlement dated

21.12.1989, the Corporation considered the case of

the  appellant  when  the  vacancy  occurred  in  the

permanent  cadre  on  the  post  of  Conductor  and

accordingly  he  was  absorbed  as  permanent

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employee  in  the  services  of  the  Corporation  on

27.08.2008 as  Conductor.  He  was given the  time

scale  with  effect  from  27.08.2008  with

consequential benefits.  

9. Like  the  appellant,  there  were  hundreds  of

“Badali Kamdars" who were working in the set up of

Corporation at all relevant time. The cases of these

“Badali Kamdars” were also considered with a view

to find out as to whether they fulfill the conditions

set out in clause 20 for making them permanent in

the  set  up  of  the  Corporation  as  and  when

permanent  vacancy  arose  in  the  cadre  of  the

Conductor.  Those  who  were  found  eligible  and

fulfilled the conditions were absorbed in the services

as permanent employees on the post of conductor

and were accordingly  given the  time scale  on the

expiry of completion of 180 days in the cadre. They

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were accordingly made permanent in terms of the

procedure prescribed in clause 20 of the Settlement.

10. This  led to  dispute between these employees

and the Corporation. The dispute was essentially as

to  from which date  this  benefit,  namely,  to  make

them  permanent  and  the  benefit  of  time  scale

should be granted to such “Badali Kamdars”.  

11. According to the employee (appellant), he was

entitled to claim this benefit on his completing 180

days of the service from the date of his initial joining

of the service as "Badali Kamdar", i.e., 04.06.1999

and  not  from  the  date  of  absorption  whereas

according to the Corporation, the appellant and all

employees alike the appellant were rightly granted

the benefit on the expiry of 180 days from the date

when they were absorbed in the permanent cadre,

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i.e., as in the case of the appellant from 27.08.2008

as provided in clause 20 of the Settlement.

12. This  issue  was  accordingly  referred  to  the

Industrial  Tribunal,  Rajkot  at  the  instance  of  the

appellant under Section 10 of the Industrial Dispute

Act  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the  Act”).  Several

such  references  were  made  to  the  Industrial

Tribunal  at  the  instance  of  similarly  situated

employees.  

13. By award dated 08.08.2013 (Annexure-P-12),

the  Industrial  Tribunal  answered the  reference  in

favour  of  the  employees  and  accordingly  granted

them benefit, which the employees had claimed. In

other words, the Industrial Tribunal held that the

appellant  (employee)  is  entitled  to  claim  the

permanent  absorption  in  his  service  in  the  time

scale as Conductor with effect from the completion

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of his 180 days of service period from the date of his

initial joining, i.e., 04.06.1999. The Corporation was

accordingly asked to pay all consequential benefits

from  such  date.  In  substance,  the  Industrial

Tribunal  rejected  the  stand  taken  by  the

Corporation.

14. The  Corporation felt  aggrieved  and filed  writ

petition in the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmadabad.

The Single Judge of the High Court, by order dated

18.09.2014, allowed the writ petition and set aside

the  award  of  the  Industrial  Tribunal.  The  Single

Judge accepted the stand taken by the Corporation

and accordingly upheld their action in granting the

benefit to the employee (appellant) from 27.08.2008

as provided in clause 20 of the Settlement.

15. The appellants (employees) felt aggrieved and

filed intra court appeals before the Division Bench.

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By impugned judgments  and  orders,  the  Division

Bench dismissed the appeals filed by the employees

and upheld the orders of  the Single Judge, which

has given rise to filing of these appeals by way of

special leave by the employees in this Court.

16. Heard  Mr.  Colin  Gonsalves,  learned  senior

counsel for the appellants and Mr. Tushar Mehta,

learned  Additional  Solicitor  General  for  the

respondent.

17. Mr.  Colin  Gonsalves  learned  senior  counsel

appearing  for  the  appellants(employees)  while

assailing  the  legality  and  correctness  of  the

impugned orders contended that the reasoning and

the conclusion arrived at by the Industrial Tribunal

was just, proper and legal and hence it should not

have been interfered with by the High Court (Single

Judge and Division Bench).

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18. Learned counsel urged that the findings of the

Industrial  Tribunal  were  based  on  proper

appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties and

hence  such  findings  could  not  be  faulted  with.

Learned  counsel  took us  through the  evidence  to

show that  the  findings recorded by the Industrial

Tribunal  deserve  to  be  upheld  as  against  the

findings of Single Judge and Division Bench.  

19. Learned  counsel  placed  reliance  on  some

judicial orders passed in previous litigation between

the Corporation and its employees which, according

to him, decided the issue in question in favour of

the employees.  

20. Learned  senior  counsel  for  the  appellants

submitted that in the light of these judicial orders,

the similar order should be passed in these appeals

also.             

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21. In reply, Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Additional

Solicitor  General,  appearing  for  the  respondent

supported the impugned judgment and contended

that  the  concurrent  findings  of  the  High  Court

(Single  Judge  and  Division  Bench)  deserve  to  be

upheld.  

22. Placing reliance on clause 20 of the settlement,

learned ASG contended that the action taken by the

Corporation is in conformity with the requirements

of Clause 20 and hence deserves to be upheld.  

23. Having  heard  the  learned  counsel  for  the

parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we

find no merit in the appeals.

24. As  rightly  argued  by  the  learned  ASG,  the

issue in question has to be decided in the light of

clause 20 of the Settlement.

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25. One cannot dispute the legal proposition that

the settlement once arrived at between the employer

and the employees as provided in Section 18 of the

Act,  it  is  binding  on  the  employer  and  the

employees.  

26. It  is  not  in  dispute  that  on 21.12.1989,  the

Corporation  and the  Union  of  the  workers  of  the

Corporation  has  entered  into  the  settlement  in

respect of various issues in relation to their service

conditions.  One such issue was in relation to the

absorption  of  Badali  Kamdars  in  the  permanent

cadre  of  the  Corporation.  Clause  20  provides  the

manner in which it is to be given effect to by the

parties.  

27. Clause 20  of the Settlement dated 21.12.1989

reads as under:

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“In reference to the representation made to delete the provision of the section 29 of the settlement dated 23/11/1984 and implement the provision of section 43 of the settlement dated 22/10/1964 it is determined that after preparing  the  Division  wise  list  of  the selected  employees  they  will  be  given temporary/daily  wager  appointment  against the  permanent  posts  in  the  division/unit, and if such appointed temporary/daily wager has  worked  continuously  for  180  days including   the  weekly  holiday/paid  holiday and authorize leave then they will be taken on  time  scale.  This  provision  will  not  be applicable to the employees on work charge working in the Civil Engineering Department and  such  appointed  temporary/daily  wager has  worked  continuously  for  180  days including  the  weekly  holiday/paid  holiday and authorized leave then they will be taken in time scale and they will be entitled to all benefits  available  to  time  scale  employees. The absence due to authorized leave for the above purpose will  not  be considered break and these days will not be considered for 180 days service.    

As  per  permission  of  S.T.T.  1981,  if  the recruitment of the staff has been done as a temporary  or  badli  kamdar  then  after completion of  their  180 days of  service  on the permitted vacancies they would be taken on time scale serially.  

Such workers will be granted all benefits as per  the  Rules  along  with  the  notional increment with effect from 1.8.87 and there

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will  not be any recoveries made from them nor there will be any arrears paid.  

The  workmen  taken  into  service  are  not required during the monsoon, therefore they can be retrenched as per the requirement and after  the  monsoon  if  their  services  are required then again as per seniority they will be  taken  in  time  scale.  If  there  is  any permanent post vacant then the appointment of  the administrative staff  will  be made on time scale.”   

28. It is not in dispute that the Corporation has

followed the procedure provided in clause 20 while

granting the employees their permanent cadre and

the  time  scale  of  conductor.  In  other  words,  all

eligible “Badali Kamdars” were absorbed in the set

up and accordingly granted benefit in terms of the

procedure prescribed in clause 20 of the Settlement.

29. It is also clear from the undisputed facts that

firstly,  the  appellant  (employee  concerned)  was

appointed  as  "Badali  Kamdar"  in  the  set  up  of

Corporation on 04.06.1999; Secondly, clear vacancy

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arose in the permanent cadre of Conductor in and

around 27.08.2008; Thirdly, as per the seniority list

of  the  “Badali  Kamdars”,  the  appellant  was

accordingly absorbed in the permanent cadre at the

time  scale  with  effect  from  27.08.2008  on

completion of 180 days of his service in the cadre

and, as a consequence thereof,  was given all the

benefits  of  the  said  post  from the  said  date;  and

lastly,  since then the appellant and all  employees

alike him  are  continuing on their respective post.

30. In our considered opinion, in the light of what

we  have  held  above,  there  is  no  basis  for  the

appellants (employees) to claim the aforesaid benefit

from the date of their initial appointment as “Badali

Kamdar”.  Indeed,  there  is  neither  any  factual

foundation nor any legal foundation to claim such

benefit.

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31. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  was  also

not  able  to  show  any  document,  such  as  any

term/condition in the appointment letter or in the

settlement  or  any  Rule/Regulation  framed by  the

Corporation  recognizing  such  right  in  appellants’

favour to enable  them to claim such benefit  from

the date of their initial appointment.  

32. Clause 20 of the Settlement is the only clause

which  recognizes  the  appellant’s  right  for

consideration of his case on individual basis and to

grant  him  the  benefit  subject  to  his  fulfilling

conditions  specified  therein  which,  in  appellant’s

case, were found satisfied and accordingly, he was

granted the benefit along with each such employees.

33. It is pertinent to mention that the appellants

neither  challenged  the  settlement  nor  its

applicability.  In  other  words,  the  legality  or/and

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binding nature of settlement dated 21.12.1989 was

never questioned in these proceedings. In this view

of  the  matter,  the  settlement  is  binding  on  both

parties in terms of Section 18 of the Act.

34. The  concept  of  “Badli  Kamdar”  is  statutorily

recognized under the Act.  Explanation to Section

25C defines the term “Badli Kamdar”. The appellant

never  questioned  his  status  as   “Badli  Kamdar”.

Indeed, it  is due to the status of  “Badli  Kamdar”,

which  he  enjoyed  for  few  years  in  the  service  of

Corporation,  he  got  the  benefit  of  absorption  in

permanent cadre.  

35. So far  as  the  reliance  placed by the  learned

counsel for the appellants on some previous judicial

orders are concerned,  in our view, they are of  no

help  to  the  appellants  inasmuch  as  those  orders

turned  on  the  facts  involved  in  the  case  and

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secondly,  we find that  in those  cases,  parties did

not even lead any evidence (see Para-3 of the order

dated  27.01.2000  passed  in  SCA  No.  393/2000

page 45 of  Paper Book),  and lastly,  one case was

based on clause 49 of 1956 settlement and clause

19 of 1985 settlement.  

36. In substance, in our view, those orders did not

directly deal with the issues, which are the subject

matter of these appeals and, even if, they deal with

the  issue  in  question,  as  urged  by  the  learned

counsel, then also, in our view, those cases turned

on their own facts.  

37. In this view of the matter, those orders were

rightly not relied on by the High Court and we find

no  good  ground  to  take  different  view  and

accordingly reject this submission.

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38. Mr. Colin Gondsalves, learned senior counsel

for  the appellants then referred extensively to the

evidence  led  by  the  parties  to  support  his

submission.  

39. We  are  afraid  we  cannot  appreciate  the

evidence in the appeals filed under Article  136 of

the  Constitution.  It  is  more  so  when  the  Single

Judge and Division Bench did not  agree with the

factual findings of the Tribunal and rightly reversed

those findings.  It is binding on this Court.

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40. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we find

no  merit  in  the  appeals  which  thus  fail  and  are

accordingly dismissed.

………...................................J. [R.K. AGRAWAL]

                                    …...……..................................J.

        [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE] New Delhi; March 07, 2018