REPORTABL E

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2457 OF 2006

Bholanath Mukherjee & Ors.            .. Appellants

VERSUS

R.K. mission V. Centenary  College & Ors.                 ..Respondents

J U D G M E N T

SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.

1. This  appeal  is  directed  against  the  final  judgment  and  order  of  the  Calcutta  High  Court dated                 21st September, 2004  in M.A.T. No. 476 of 2004 arising out of Writ  Petition No. 29805(W) of 1997 vide which the  order of the learned Single Judge of the High  Court was set aside.  

2. We  may  notice  the  essential  facts,  which  would have a bearing on the determination of  the issues raised in this appeal. Admittedly,  there has been a controversy with regard to  the  special  status  enjoyed  by  the  Ramakrishna  Mission  Vivekananda  

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Centenary  College  at  Rahara  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘respondent  No.1’)  for  a  long  period  of  time.   The  College  was  initially  established in the year 1961 with a grant of  Rs.2 lakhs given by the Government of West  Bengal  in  the  Education  Department.  The  additional  cost  for  establishing  the  College  had  been  borne  by  the  State  Government.  Subsequently  on  25th April,  2002,  the  Government  of  West  Bengal,  in  order  to  advance collegiate education and with a view  to reduce the overcrowding in good colleges in  Calcutta decided to set up a three year degree  college at Rahara.  Such college was to be set  up on the recommendations of the University  Grants  Commission  (for  short  ‘UGC’).   The  college  was  duly  established  and  granted  affiliation to Calcutta University on 13th May,  1963.   It  is  a  fully  aided  college;  being  sponsored  and  financed  by  the  State  Government.   

3. The  controversy  herein  relates  to  the  appointment of  the Principal  of  the College.  The  post  of  Principal  is  included  in  the  definition of Teacher, as contained in Section  2 Clause 9 of the aforesaid Act.  The aforesaid  Clause defines the term Teacher to include a  Professor,  Assistant  Professor,  Lecturer,  Tutor,  Demonstrator,  Physical  Instructor  or  any other person holding a teaching post of a  college recognised by the University to which  such  college  is  affiliated  and  appointed  as  such  by  such  college  and  includes  its  Principal and                 Vice-Principal.  Section 3 of the Act provides “appointment to  the post of a Teacher shall be made by the  Governing Body on the recommendations of  the  University  and  College  Service  Commission  to  be  constituted  by  the  State  Government in the manner prescribed”.  The  

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appointment  on  the  post  of  Teachers  of  a  college  is  governed  by  the  College  Service  Commission  established  under  the  West  Bengal  College  Service  Commission  Act,  1978.   Section  3 of  the  aforesaid Act  is  as  under:-

“(1) The State  Government  shall,  with effect  from  such  date  as  may  by  notification,  appoint,  constitute Commission by the name  of the West Bengal College Service Commission  consisting of five members of whom one shall  be the Chairman.   (2) Of the members one shall be person who,  not  being  an  educationist,  occupies  or  has  occupied  in  the  opinion  of  the  State  Government, a position of eminence in public  life or in Judicial or administrative service and  the other shall have teaching experience either  as a Professor of a University or as a Principal  for a period of not less than ten years or as a  teacher, other than Principal of a College, for a  period of not less than fifteen years.”

Section 7(1) and Proviso (ii) are as under:-

“Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  any  other law for the time being in force or in any  contract,  custom or usage to the contrary, it  shall be the duty of the Commission to select  persons  for  appointment  to  the  post  of  Teachers of a College: Provided that- (i).. (ii) For selection of a person for appointment  to the post of Principal, the Commission shall  be  aided  by  the  vice-Chancellor  of  the  University to which such college is affiliated or  his nominee and a nominee of the Chancellor  of such University.”

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4. Section 15 provides that “nothing contained  in  the  Act  shall  apply  in  relation  to  any  college not receiving any aid from the State  Government  or  any  college  established  and  administered  by  a  minority,  whether  based  on  religion  or  language.”  The  State  Government issued Memo No. 752–Edn (CS)  to  revise  the  existing  pattern  for  the  composition  of  the  governing  bodies  of  the  Government sponsored colleges excepting in  cases  where  the  college  has  a  special  constitution on the basis of  Trust Deeds or  where  the  colleges  are  run  by  Missionary  Societies on the basis of agreement with the  respective  missions.  The  academic  qualification  prescribed  for  appointment  on  the  post  of  Principal  by  the  Government  of  West  Bengal  vide  a  G.O.  No.  149-Edn(CP)  dated       22nd February, 1994.

5. It  appears  that  earlier  the  controversy  with  regard  to  the  appointment  on  the  post  of  Principal was subject matter of the decision  rendered  by  this  Court  in  the  case  of  Bramchari Sidheswar Shai & Ors. Vs. State  of W.B. & Ors.  1  .   In deciding the controversy  raised in the aforesaid case, this Court has  extensively traced the history with regard to  the setting up of  three  year degree colleges  under  the  auspicious  of  Ramakrishna  Mission Boy’s Home at Rahara.  Therefore, it  is  not  necessary  for  us  to  recapitulate  the  entire  sequence  of  events  in  the  present  proceedings.  

6. Suffice it to say that the aforesaid controversy  had arisen in the context of a challenge made  in  Writ  Petition  being  C.O.No.  12837(W)  of  

1 (1995) 4 SCC 646

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1980  to  the  appointment  of  Swami  Shivamayananda, who was till then Head of  Ramakrishna Mission,  Vidya Mandir,  Bellur  Math,  as  the  Principal  of  Ramakrishna  Mission College.  The petitioners had claimed  that  Shivamayananda  did  not  have  the  requisite qualifications for being appointed as  the  Principal  and  that  he  had  not  been  appointed  by  a  duly  constituted  Governing  Body.  The prayers in the writ petition were  for  the  issue  of (i)  a  writ  in  the  nature  of  mandamus commanding the  Government of  West  Bengal  to  reconstitute  the  Governing  Body  of  the  Ramakrishna  Mission  College  according to standard pattern for Governing  Bodies  of  sponsored  colleges  as  per  Government  Memo No.  752-Edn  (CS)/C.  S.  30-3/77  dated  18th April,  1978;  (ii)  a  writ  declaring  that  the  Ramakrishna  Mission  College  is  governed  by  West  Bengal  Act  of  1975 and West Bengal Act of 1978; (iii) a writ  in  the  nature  of  quo  warranto  restraining  Swami  Shivamayananda  as  Principal  of  Ramakrishna  Mission  College  and  other  incidental writs.

7. During the pendency of this writ petition, the  University of Calcutta issued three notices to  the Ramakrishna Mission to reconstitute the  Governing  Bodies  of  the  Ramakrishna  Mission  Residential  College,  Narendrapur,  Ramakrishna  Mission  Shiksha  Mandir,  Howrah  and  Ramakrishna  Mission  Vidya  Mandir, Howrah.  The legality of these notices  was challenged by the Ramakrishna Mission  by filing an Interlocutory Application in the  writ petition.  The writ petition was resisted  by the Ramakrishna Mission on the ground  that being a minority based on religion, the  institutions  established  by  it  would  be  

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protected  under  Article  30(1)  of  the  Constitution.  Therefore, the West Bengal Act  of 1975 and West Bengal Act of 1978 would  not be applicable.  The Ramakrishna Mission  had  also  claimed its  right  to  establish  and  maintain  institutions  for  religious  and  charitable purposes and to manage its  own  religious affairs; to own and acquire movable  and immoveable property; and to administer  such  property  in  accordance  with  the  law.  The  aforesaid  rights  were  claimed  under  Article 26 of the Constitution of India.  The  writ  petition  was  dismissed  by  the  learned  Single  Judge.   It  was held that  institutions  established  by  Ramakrishna  Mission  were  protected  under  Article  30(1)  of  the  Constitution of India.  It was also held that  the West Bengal Act of 1975 and West Bengal  Act  of  1978  would  not  be  applicable.   It  quashed  the  three  notices  issued  by  the  Calcutta University.  It, however, rejected the  claim of Ramakrishna Mission under Article  26(a)  of  the  Constitution  of  India.   The  aforesaid  judgment  was  carried  in  appeal  before  the  Division  Bench  by  the  writ  petitioners  as  well  as  the  State  of  West  Bengal and Calcutta University.  The Division  Bench heard all the appeals together, and by  a  common  judgment  dismissed  all  the  appeals.   The  Division  Bench  upheld  the  conclusion of the learned Single Judge that  Ramakrishna Mission being a minority based  on religion was protected under Article 30(1)  of the Constitution of India.  It further held  that the Ramakrishna Mission had the right  to  establish  educational  institutions  as  religious denomination under Article 26(a) of  the Constitution of India.  It further held that  both the West Bengal Act        of 1975 and  West  Bengal  Act  of  1978  would  not  be  applicable  as  these  enactments  did  not  

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contain any express provision indicating their  application  to  educational  institutions  established  and  maintained  by  the  Ramakrishna  Mission.   It  further  observed  that  to  hold  otherwise  would  lead  to  infringement  of  the  rights  enjoyed  by  the  Ramakrishna Mission under Article 26(a) and  26(b)  of  the  Constitution.   However,  it  left  open the question of legality or otherwise of  the direction contained in the notices issued  by  the  Calcutta  University  to  the  Ramakrishna  Mission  for  reconstitution  of  Governing  Bodies  of  the  Ramakrishna  Mission  Residential  College,  Narendrapur,  Ramakrishna  Mission  Shiksha  Mandir,  Howrah  and  Ramakrishna  Mission  Vidya  Mandir, Howrah.

8. The aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench  was challenged before this Court in a number  of  appeals,  which  has  been  noticed  above.  These appeals were decided by this Court by  a common judgment dated      2nd July, 1995  in  the  case  of  Bramchari  Sidheswar  Shai  (supra).   

9. This  Court  formulated  six  points  arising  for  

consideration  in  the  appeals,  which  were  as  

follows:-

“1.  Can the  citizens  of  India  residing  in  the  State  of  West  Bengal  who  are  professing,  practising  or  propagating  the  religious  doctrines and teachings of  Ramakrishna and  have become his followers, claim to belong to a  minority based on Ramakrishna religion which  was distinct and different from Hindu religion  

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and as such entitled to the fundamental right  under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India,  of establishing and administering educational  institutions  of  their  choice  through  Ramakrishna Mission or its branches in that  State ?

2. Do persons belonging to or owing allegiance  to Ramakrishna Mission belong to a religious  denomination or any section thereof as would  entitle  them to claim the  fundamental  rights  conferred on either of them under Article 26 of  the Constitution of India ?

3. If persons belonging to or owing allegiance  to  Ramakrishna  Mission  is  a  religious  denomination or a section thereof,  have they  the  fundamental  right  of  establishing  and  maintaining  institutions  for  a  charitable  purpose under Article 26(a) of the Constitution  of India?

4.  If  Ramakrishna  Mission  as  a  religious  denomination or a section thereof establishes  and  maintains  educational  institutions,  can  such  institutions  be  regarded  as  institutions  established  and  maintained  for  charitable  purpose within the meaning of Article 26(a) of  the Constitution of India ?

5. Is Ramakrishna Mission College at Rahara  established  and  maintained  by  Ramakrishna  Mission and if  so, will  the constitution of its  governing  body  by  the  Government  of  West  Bengal  amount  to  infringement  of  Ramakrishna  Mission’s  fundamental  right  to  establish  and  maintain  an  educational  institution  under  Article  26(a)  of  the  Constitution of India?

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6.  Can  the  court  direct  the  West  Bengal  Government  because  of  W.B.  Act  1975  and  W.B. Act 1978, to constitute governing body on  a  “standard  pattern”  of  sponsored  college  envisaged under its Memo dated 18-4-1978 in  respect of Ramakrishna Mission College when  that memo itself says that colleges established  and maintained  by Missions  on the  basis  of  agreements  cannot  be  treated  as  sponsored  colleges  for  the  purpose  of  constituting  governing  bodies  for  them  on  a  “standard  pattern” ?”

10. Upon  consideration  of  the  entire  matter,  the  

conclusions recorded were as under :-

                Point 1

(i) For  the  foregoing reasons,  we hold that  the citizens of India residing in the State  of  West  Bengal,  who  are  professing,  practising  or  propagating  the  religious  doctrines and teachings of Ramakrishna  and  have  become  his  followers,  cannot  claim to  belong to  a  minority  based on  Ramakrishna religion which was distinct  and different from Hindu religion and as  such are not entitled to the fundamental  right  under  Article  30(1)  of  the  Constitution of India, of establishing and  administering educational institutions of  their  choice  through  Ramakrishna  Mission or its branches in that State and  answer  Point  1  accordingly,  in  the  negative.

Point 2

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(ii) For  the  said  reasons,  we  hold  that  persons  belonging  to  or  owing  their  allegiance  to  Ramakrishna  Mission  or  Ramakrishna Math belong to a religious  denomination within Hindu religion or a  section thereof as would entitle them to  claim  the  fundamental  rights  conferred  on either of them under Article 26 of the  Constitution of India and answer Point 2,  accordingly, in the affirmative. Point 3

(iii) Since  we  have  held  while  dealing  with  Point 2 which arose for our consideration  that  the  persons  belonging  to  or  owing  allegiance  to  Ramakrishna  Mission  or  Ramakrishna  Math  as  followers  of  Ramakrishna,  form  a  religious  denomination  in  Hindu  religion,  as  a  necessary  concomitant  thereof,  we  have  to  hold  that  they  have  a  fundamental  right  of  establishing  and  maintaining  institutions  for  a  charitable  purpose  under Article 26(a) of the Constitution of  India, subject, of course, to public order,  morality  and  health  envisaged  in  that  very  article.   Point  3  is,  accordingly  answered, in the affirmative.

(iv) On  Point  Nos. 4  &  5,  it  was  observed  as  

follows:-

“We think that the learned Judges of the  High Court  should not have decided on  the general question whether educational  institutions  established  and  maintained  by religious denomination including those  established  and  maintained  by  Ramakrishna  Mission  for  general  

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education  get  the  protection  of  Article  26(a)  of  the  Constitution  when  that  question in a general form, was not really  at issue before them. Therefore, the views  expressed  on  the  question  shall,  according to us,  ought  to be treated as  non est and the question is left open to  be  decided  in  proper  case,  where  such  question really arises and all the parties  who  might  be  concerned  with  it  are  afforded  adequate  opportunity  to  have  their say in the matter.”

(v) On Point No. 6, it was observed as follows:-

“67.  As  stated  above,  the  State  Government  has  excepted  the  Ramakrishna Mission College at Rahra in  the  matter  of  constituting  a  Governing  Body  on  a  standard  pattern  for  the  obvious reason that constituting such a  governing  body  for  a  college  like  Ramakrishna Mission College which was  all  through allowed to have a governing  body  constituted  by  Ramakrishna  Mission, which had built  the College on  its land conceding to the request made in  that behalf by the State Government itself  on  the  initiation  of  the  Central  Government, may not be just. Thus when  Ramakrishna Mission  College  had come  to be built, established and managed by  the  Ramakrishna  Mission,  it  is  difficult  for us to think that the learned Judges of  the  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  were  not  right  in  holding  that  the  Government  should  not  be  directed  by  issue  of  a  mandamus,  to  constitute  a  governing  body  for  the  Ramakrishna  Mission  College  on  a  standard  pattern  taking recourse to the W.B. Act of 1975  

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and the W.B. Act of 1978, although for its  own reasons.  Therefore,  in  the  peculiar  facts  and  circumstances  in  which  Ramakrishna  Mission  College  at  Rahra  was  established  on  Ramakrishna  Mission’s  land  and  allowed  to  be  administered  by  the  Ramakrishna  Mission through its own governing body,  we feel that interests of justice may suffer  by  directing  the  State  Government  to  constitute  its  own governing  body  on  a  standard pattern of the usual sponsored  colleges,  as  prayed  for  by  the  writ  petitioners.  However,  the  view  we  have  expressed in the matter shall not come in  the  way  of  the  State  Government  to  change their earlier arrangement with the  Ramakrishna  Mission  in  the  matter  of  governance  of  the  Ramakrishna Mission  College,  if  on  objective  considerations  such  change  becomes  necessary  in  the  larger interests of students, teachers and  other employees of that College and is so  permitted by law.

68. In the said view we have taken in the  matter of constituting a Governing Body  by  the  Government  of  West  Bengal  in  respect  of  the  Ramakrishna  Mission  College at Rahra, there is no need to go  into  the  question  that  there  has  been  infringement  by  the  Government  of  Ramakrishna  Mission’s  fundamental  rights  to  establish  and  maintain  educational  institutions  under  Article  26(a)  of  the  Constitution  of  India  inasmuch as  such  a  question  does  not  arise, in view of the answer already given  by us on Point 3 above. So also, question  of directing the West Bengal Government  because of the W.B. Act of 1975 and the  

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W.B. Act of 1978, to constitute governing  body on “standard pattern” of sponsored  college envisaged under  its  Memo dated  18-4-1978  in  respect  of  Ramakrishna  Mission College, cannot arise.

69.  Points  4  to  6  are  accordingly  answered.”

11. After the decision in the aforesaid case, again Writ  

Petition  No.29805(W)  of  1997  was  filed  in  the  

Calcutta  High  Court  challenging  initially  the  

appointment  of  Swami  Shivamayananda  

(Respondent No.16 herein) and Swami Divyananda  

(respondent  No.17  herein)  as  Principal  and  

Honorary Vice-Principal respectively. It was alleged  

that appointment of both the respondents had been  

made without following the provisions of the West  

Bengal Act of 1975 and West Bengal Act of 1978.  

However, both the persons during the pendency of  

the writ petition before the High Court went on open  

ended leave from their respective posts. Thereafter  

on  14th May,  1999,  by  an  Office  Order  

No.RKMVCC/21/99, the college authorities elevated  

Swami  Sukadevananda  (respondent  No.  3  herein)  

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Vice-Principal  of  the  college  to  the  post  of  Acting  

Principal  with  immediate  effect,  again  without  

following  the  West  Bengal  Act  of  1975  and  West  

Bengal  Act  of  1978.  He  was  designated  as  the  

Principal  of  the  College on 20th March,  2001 vide  

Office  Order  No.3/RKMVCC/21/2001.  The  

appointment  of  Swami  Sukhadevananda,  as  

Principal of the College led to the amendment of the  

writ  petition  incorporating  a  challenge  to  his  

appointment.  

12. It is the case of the appellants, that the respondent  

No.  3  was  only  First  class  M.Sc.  in  Biochemistry  

from  Karnataka  University  and  had  worked  as  

Scientific  Officer  in  Bhabha  Atomic  Research  

Centre,  Bombay  for  about  four  years.   As  far  as  

teaching experience in the college is concerned, he  

had  only  six  years  of  such  experience.   Thus,  

according to the appellants, he did not possess the  

requisite qualifications for the post of Principal as  

laid  down  in  the  above  mentioned  Government  

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order dated 22nd February, 1994. The learned Single  

Judge by his judgment dated   29th September, 2003  

allowed  the  writ  petition  and  it  was  observed  as  

under;

“Therefore, I hold that as regard management,  administration  and  maintenance  of  this  Institution  the  State  government  at  present  has  denuded  itself  its  authority  or  right  to  interfere with.  But the provisions of the Acts  namely West Bengal College Teachers (Security  of  Service)  Act,  1975,  West  Bengal  College  Service  Commission  Act,  1978  and  the  Calcutta  University  First  Statute,  1979  will  have  application  unless  these  laws  by  themselves  exempt  these  organizations  from  being  applicable.   I  do  not  find  any  such  exception.”   

The  appointment  of  the  Principal  was  declared  not  to  

have been made under the provisions of the West Bengal  

Act of 1975, West Bengal Act of 1978 and the Calcutta  

University First Statute, 1979.   A direction was issued to  

the Governing Body of the College to take steps to fill the  

post  either  temporarily  or  permanently  in  accordance  

with laws in force.  Aggrieved, the Ramakrishna Mission  

College  went  in  appeal  before  the  Division  Bench.   In  

order to consider the entire matter, the Division Bench  

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analyzed  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  Bramchari  

Sidheswar  Shai’s  case (supra)  extensively.   It  noticed  

the conclusions recorded by this Court as extracted by us  

above.  The Division Bench concluded as under:-

“Thus,  from  the  questions  raised  by  the  Hon’ble Court and the answers given to each of  them by the Hon’ble Court as indicated above,  we  are  fully  convinced  that  although  the  Hon’ble  Court  declined  to  give  protection  of  Article 30(1) or protection under Section 26(a)  of  the  Constitution  to  the  Ramakrishna  Mission and the college established by it, the  Court  certainly  decided  in  a  most  assertive  manner that having regard to the background  of the establishment of the college and having  regard to the stand taken by the Government  of West Bengal since inception of the college in  the matter of its governance and management  with  special  reference  to  office  memo  dated  18th April,  1978, there is  no need to ask for  implementation of the provisions of the Act of  1975 or the Act of 1978.”

13. The Division Bench negated the contentions of the  

learned counsel for the writ petitioners/ appellants  

that in view of the provisions contained in the West  

Bengal Act of 1975, West Bengal Act of 1978 and  

the  Calcutta  University  First  Statute,  1979,  the  

college could not be allowed to have the Monk as  

Principal.  It is observed that the Government was  

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very much aware of the fact that in the matter of  

this college, the general procedure for selection of a  

Principal  through the  College  Service  Commission  

shall not be made applicable.  It is further observed  

that  natural  consequence  of  the  aforesaid  

conclusion was that there would be no application  

under the provisions of the Calcutta University First  

Statute,  1979,  aimed  at  filling  up  of  temporary  

vacancy  of  the  post  of  Principal  like  other  

Government sponsored colleges.  In the concluding  

paragraphs,  the  Division  Bench  observed  as  

follows:-

“After close examination of the judgment of the  Apex Court rendered in the case of Bramchari  Sidheswar  Shai’s  (supra),  we  are  seriously  contemplating  whether  the  present  writ  petition  at  all  was  maintainable  before  the  learned  Single  Judge  as  the  parties  of  the  present writ petition are almost identical of the  previous writ petition and almost same issues  as raised in the present petition were matter of  consideration  before  the  Apex  court  and  further  we are of  the view that following the  long established principle of judicial discipline  and  binding  precedent,  it  was  not  at  all  permissible  to  make  any  departure  from the  conclusion reached by the Apex court  which  has a binding effect upon the writ petitioners  who  were  parties  to  the  earlier  adjudication  

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and that apart, the present writ petition is also  barred under the principle of res judicata.  

Thus,  having  regard  to  the  submissions  of  contesting parties and on examination of the  materials placed before us, we are of firm view  that following the judgment of the Apex Court  rendered in the case of Bramchari Sidheswar  Shai’s (supra) and in view of the recent office  memo of the Government of West Bengal dated  30th April,  2004,  it  was  not  permissible  to  reopen the issue once again and to issue any  writ  dishonouring  the  mandate  of  the  Apex  Court when admittedly the State Government  has not deviated form its earlier stand relating  to the special  status accorded to the college.  We,  therefore,  find  sufficient  merit  in  the  present appeal and in the stay petition and we  are inclined to allow the both.

Accordingly,  both  the  appeal  and  the  stay  petition  are  allowed resulting in  dismissal  of  the  writ  petition  and  setting  aside  the  judgment  and  order  of  the  learned  Single  Judge  delivered  in  connection  with  Writ  Petition No. 29805(W) of 1997.  We, however,  make no order as to costs considering the fact  and circumstances of the case.”

14. This judgment is the subject matter of the present  

appeal.   We  have  heard  the  learned  counsel  for  

parties.  

15. Mr. Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel appearing  

for the appellants submitted that even if the College  

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established by the Ramakrishna Mission enjoys a  

special  status,  the  appointment  on  the  post  of  

Principal would still has to be made in conformity  

with  the  qualifications  prescribed  by  the  

Government of West Bengal in its Order dated 22nd  

February,  1994.   Respondent  No.3  does  not  even  

possess  the  qualifications  prescribed  by  the  

University  Grants  Commission.   Moreover,  

respondent No.3 has not cleared the eligibility test  

N.E.T./S.L.E.T.  for  Lecturer  as  required  by  the  

UGC.  His  initial  appointment  as Acting Principal  

and  thereafter  his  appointment  as  permanent  

Principal  was  null  and  void  having  been  made  

without  following  the  provisions  contained  in  the  

West  Bengal  Act of  1975 and West  Bengal  Act  of  

1978.   Learned  counsel  submits  that  the  

qualifications  prescribed  under  the  Government  

Order dated           22nd February, 1994 were in fact  

amended by the subsequent G.O.s being G.O. No.  

625-Edn (CS) dated 16th June, 1999 read with G.O.  

No.1047-Edn (CS) dated 20th August, 2002.  These  

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qualifications  were  duly  published  through  

advertisement  No.  2  of  2004.   For  the  post  of  

Principal,  the  qualifications  prescribed  are  as  

under:-

“I. For General Degree Colleges:

(A) Academic qualifications:

(a) Master  degree  in  Arts/Science/  Commerce/Music/Fine Arts with at least 55%  marks  or  its  equivalent  grade  and  good  academic record; Ph.D. Degree or evidence of  its equivalent published work of high standard  and  teaching/research  experience  in  an  affiliated  degree  college  or  University/Other  Institutions  of  Higher  Education  for  at  least  15 (fifteen) years preferably with administrative  experience. Or

(b) Serving as reader in any affiliated degree  College  or  University/research  Institute  with  total  teaching experience of  not less than 15  years. Or

(c) Serving  as  Selection  Grade  Lecturer  in  any affiliated degree college with at least 55%  marks at the Master’s level and good academic  record with teaching experience not less than  15  years  in  any  academic  Institution  with  authenticated  administrative  experience  of  at  least five years and further having published  work  equivalent  to  Ph.D.  degree,  the  equivalence  be  evaluated  by  the  University/Selection  Committee  consisting  of  the subject  experts  who in turn will  have to  mainly look in to the following aspects:-

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1. Number  of  research  paper  published,

2. Quality of research paper, 3. Relevance of the topic, 4. Journals  where  these  have  been  

published.”

16. It  is  submitted  that  respondent  No.3  does  not  

possess the Ph.D, degree.  He also did not possess  

fifteen years administrative experience at the time of  

his  appointment.   Learned  counsel  further  

submitted that respondent No.3 has been appointed  

on the said post merely because he is a monk at the  

Ramakrishna  Mission.   The  very  purpose  of  

prescribing minimum qualifications and method of  

selection for an important post like Principal of an  

educational institution has been defeated.  Learned  

counsel further submitted that the Division Bench  

has wrongly relied on the judgment of  Bramchari  

Sidheswar  Shai’s  case  (supra).   The  aforesaid  

judgment had no relevance to the issue which has  

been raised in the present proceedings.

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17.   On the other hand, Mr. L.N. Rao, learned senior  

counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.1, 2 and  

3 submits that the litigation in this case does not  

survive as the appellants have retired.  He further  

submits that the appellants have not sought a writ  

of quo warranto rather the relief sought is that one  

of  the  senior  teachers  should  be  appointed  as  

Principal.  The writ petition was based on individual  

grievances.   The  relief  claimed  is  also  for  the  

redressal of individual grievances. All the appellants  

had  made  a  claim  based  on  their  seniority  and  

qualifications.  Since all the appellants have retired  

in the mean time, the issue has become academic.  

This  Court  will,  therefore,  decline  to  examine  the  

matter on merits. He relies on the judgment of this  

Court  in the case of  M.L. Binjolkar Vs.  State of  

M.P.  2  .    On merits, the learned counsel submits that  

the  grievances  of  the  appellants  were  that  the  

respondent No.3 lacked fifteen years of experience.  

However,  by  now  respondent  No.3  possesses  the  

2 (2005) 6 SCC 224

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required fifteen years experience.  He also relies on  

certain observations made by this Court in the case  

of  Ram Sarup Vs.  State of Haryana & Ors  3  .    The  

entire  controversy has been rendered academic in  

the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. In  

the alternative, the learned senior counsel submits  

that the writ petition would have to be treated as  

public interest litigation.  It is, however, settled by  

this Court that public interest litigation would not  

be maintainable in service law cases. In support of  

this submission, he relies on the judgments of this  

Court in the cases of  Dr. Duryodhan Sahu & Ors.  

Vs. Jitendra  Kumar Mishra  &  Ors4 and Gurpal  

Singh  Vs. State  of  Punjab  &  Ors.  5  .  Therefore,  

again  no  relief  can  be  granted  to  the  writ  

petitioners/appellants.  

18. We have considered the submissions made by the  

learned  counsel  for  the  parties.   In  our  opinion,  

there is much substance in the submissions made  3 (1979) 1 SCC 168 4 (1998) 7 SCC 273 5 (2005) 5 SCC 136

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by Mr.  L.N.  Rao, Mr.  Dipankar P.  Gupta and Mr.  

Bhaskar P. Gupta,   learned senior counsel that at  

this stage, litigation in this case does not survive as  

the appellants have retired.  Even if the writ petition  

is allowed and the appointment of respondent No.3  

is  declared  null  and  void,  none  of  the  appellants  

could  be  appointed  on the  post  of  Principal.    A  

perusal of the averments made in the writ petition  

before  the  High  Court  would  show  that  the  

gravamen  of  the  grievances  of  the  writ  

petitioners/appellants was that they were all senior  

to Swami Sukhadevananda.  It was further pointed  

out  that  he  had  only  six  years  of  teaching  

experience,  while  G.O.  No.  149-Edn(CP)  dated  

22nd February, 1994 prescribes a minimum teaching  

experience  of  sixteen  years  with  administrative  

experience.   It  was  pointed  out  that  on  the  one  

hand,  respondent  No.3  did  not  possess  the  

necessary  experience  and  was  appointed  as  the  

Principal.   On the other hand, the applications of  

the  petitioner  Nos.  1,  9  and  12  for  the  post  of  

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Principal  made  through appropriate  channel  were  

not at all considered at any stage by the appropriate  

authority,  though  they  are  more  qualified  and  

senior to Swami Sukhadevananda.  It  was further  

pointed out that petitioners are suffering irreparable  

loss in the form of deprivation from being promoted  

as  a  Teacher-in-Charge  and  compelled  to  serve  

under  a  junior  in  service  and  possessing  lesser  

qualifications.  Again in Paragraph 41, it is stated  

that  Swami  Divyananda  is  junior  to  all  the  

petitioners.   It  was  further  pointed  out  that  Dr.  

Biman Kumar Mukherjee,  was the then petitioner  

No. 1 and the then senior most Teacher.  He had  

put  in  more  than  three  decades  of  lawful  and  

approved  service  to  the  Institution.   He  was,  

therefore, lawful claimant to the post of Teacher-in-

Charge of the college.  Therefore, it was a matter of  

great humiliation and injustice to all the petitioners  

to be forced to serve under  an illegally  appointed  

person, who is junior to them all. In Ground 3 of the  

writ petition, it is specially pleaded as follows:-  

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“For  that,  it  is  incumbent  upon  the  respondents  to  appoint  the  senior  most  teacher, as Teacher-in-Charge of the college in  terms  of  the  order  contained  in  the  letter  No.C/31/Cir  dated  1st January,  1995  and  Statute  101B  (as  amended)  and  for  such  failure of the respondents to act in accordance  with law the petitioners have been deprived of  their  rights  to  the  post  and  have  suffered  demotion and financial loss.”  

From the above, it becomes evident that the grievances of  

the writ petitioners were that they have been compelled  

to work under a person, who was junior to them.  The  

petitioners  having  retired  from  service,  no  relief  could  

possibly be granted to them, even if the appointment of  

respondent No.3 is  held to be illegal  or void.   In such  

circumstances, in our opinion, it would be an exercise in  

futility to examine the merits of the controversy raised in  

the appeal. By the retirement of all the appellants herein,  

the issues raised herein have been rendered academic.  

In  M.L.  Binjolkar’s  case  (supra),  this  Court  was  

considering  the  legality  of  the  orders  passed  by  the  

Madhya  Pradesh  State  Administrative  Tribunal,  

Jabalpur,  setting  aside  the  orders  of  compulsory  

retirement passed against a number of employees by the  

2

State  of  Madhya  Pradesh.   The  four  employees  were  

directed to be reinstated.  The writ petition filed by the  

State of Madhya Pradesh was dismissed.  The employees  

concerned were permitted to join back pursuant to the  

orders  of  reinstatement  passed  by  the  Administrative  

Tribunal.  All the four employees, who were so reinstated,  

retired during the pendency of proceedings.  The appeal  

filed by the State was dismissed by this Court with the  

following observations:-

“In  view of  the  undisputed  position  that  the  four  employees  who  were  directed  to  be  reinstated had, in fact, joined back service and  have  retired  on  reaching  the  age  of  superannuation,  therefore,  examination  in  their  cases as to the correctness of  the view  expressed  by  the  High  Court  would  be  an  exercise in futility. Though, implementation of  the Court’s order does not render challenge to  an order infructuous, yet the fact situation of  the  present  case  makes  the  issue  academic.  This  Court  did  not  grant  stay  on  the  High  Court’s  order.  The  employees  concerned,  as  noted above after  reinstatement have retired.  In  these  peculiar  circumstances,  we  do  not  think  it  necessary  to  examine  correctness  of  the  High  Court’s  order  on  merits.  Therefore,  the appeals filed by the State — Civil Appeals  Nos. 8695-97 of  2002 and 8663 of 2002 are  dismissed. We make it clear that we have not  expressed  any  opinion  on  the  correctness  of  the  High  Court’s  judgment  as  we  have  

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dismissed the appeals only on the ground that  the employees concerned have already retired  and it would not be in the interest of anybody  to go into the merits.”

Similarly, in the case of  Sumedico Corporation & Anr.  

Vs.  Regional   Provident  Fund  Commr.  6  ,  this  Court  

declined  to  go  into  the  vires  of  Section  7(a)  of  the  

Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions  

Act,  1952  as  during  the  pendency  of  the  appeal,  the  

Legislature itself  amended the provisions of the Act by  

inserting Section 7(d) providing for remedy of an appeal  

before  the  Appellate  Tribunal.   In  view  of  this  

development,  it  was  observed  that  the  question  of  

challenge to the vires of Section 7(a) on the ground that  

there  was  no  appeal  provided  under  the  Act  does  not  

survive and it has become academic.  In the case of State  

of Manipur & Ors. Vs.  Chandam Manihar Singh  7  , the  

respondent had been removed from the post of Chairman  

of  the  Manipur  State  Pollution  Control  Board  by  the  

Governor of Madhya Pradesh in exercise of the powers  

under Section 5(3) read with Section 6(1)(g) of the Act by  6 (1998) 8 SCC 381 7 (1999) 7 SCC 503

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the  order  dated  19th October,  1998.   The  respondent  

carried the matter in a writ petition before the High Court  

of  Assam,  Imphal  Branch.   The  learned  Single  Judge,  

who  heard  this  writ  petition  was  pleased  to  allow the  

same  on  30th April,  1999.   It  may  be  noted  that  the  

learned Single  Judge had directed that the respondent  

has continued to hold the office of the Chairman as his  

removal  was set  aside and his tenure will  end on 15th  

October,  1999 counting three  years  from 16th October,  

1996 when he  was  appointed  as  the  Chairman of  the  

Board pursuant to earlier order.  The State of Manipur  

unsuccessfully carried the matter in an appeal before the  

Division Bench.  When the  appeal  filed  by the  State  of  

Manipur  came  up  for  hearing  before  this  Court,  the  

learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  submitted  that  

pursuant to the orders of the High Court, the respondent  

has  continued  as  a  Chairman  of  the  Board  and  his  

tenure is almost coming to end and he does not intend to  

continue as Chairman beyond 15th October, 1999.  It was  

submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that  

the  issue  raised  by  the  State  of  Manipur  has  almost  

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become academic as no interim relief was granted by this  

Court  against  the  order  of  the  High  Court.   Nor  any  

interim relief  had been granted pending appeal against  

the  order  of  the  learned  Single  Judge  by  the  Division  

Bench of the High Court.  In these circumstances, this  

Court observed as follows:-

“Having given our anxious consideration to the  rival  contentions,  we  find  that  as  the  High  Court’s direction in favour of the respondent’s  tenure which is to expire on 15-10-1999 has  almost worked itself out and less than a month  remains  for  him  to  act  as  Chairman  of  the  Board,  the  first  grievance  raised  by  learned  Senior  Counsel  for  the  appellants  in  connection with the removal of the respondent  by  order  dated  19-10-1998  has  become  of  academic  interest.  We,  therefore,  did  not  permit  learned  Senior  Counsel  for  the  appellants  to  canvass  this  point  any  further  before us. That takes us to the consideration of  the second point.”

In our opinion, the aforesaid observations of this Court  

would  be  clearly  applicable  in  the  facts  and  

circumstances of this case.     

19.  There is another reason why no relief, at present  

could perhaps be granted to the appellants.  Throughout  

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the proceedings before the High Court as well as before  

this Court, no interim relief was granted by restraining  

respondent  No.3  from  performing  the  functions  of  a  

Principal.  He has continued to function on the aforesaid  

basis since his appointment on 14th May, 1999 as Acting  

Principal and then on from 23rd March, 2001 onward as  

Principal.  Even according to the appellants, at the time  

of his appointment, respondent No.3 had possessed the  

experience of only six years.  Therefore, by now, he would  

have more than fifteen years of required experience for  

the  post  of  Principal.   Therefore,  the  ground  that  the  

respondent No.3 was not qualified as he did not possess  

the  necessary  experience  would  also  no  longer  be  

available to the appellants.  

20. In similar circumstances, this Court, in the case of  

Ram Sarup (supra), observed as follows:-

“The question then arises as to what was the  effect of breach of clause (1) of Rule 4 of the  Rules. Did it have the effect of rendering the  appointment wholly void so as to be completely  ineffective or merely irregular, so that it could  be  regularised  as  and  when  the  appellant  acquired the  necessary  qualifications  to  hold  

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the  post  of  Labour-cum-Conciliation  Officer.  We are of the view that the appointment of the  appellant  was  irregular  since  he  did  not  possess  one  of  the  three  requisite  qualifications but as soon as he acquired the  necessary qualification of five years’ experience  of the working of Labour Laws in any one of  the three capacities mentioned in clause (1) of  Rule  4  or  in  any  higher  capacity,  his  appointment must be regarded as having been  regularised. The appellant worked as Labour- cum-Conciliation Officer from January 1, 1968  and  that  being  a  post  higher  than  that  of  Labour Inspector, or Deputy Chief Inspector of  Shops  or  Wage  Inspector,  the  experience  gained by him in the working of Labour Laws  in the post of Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer  must  be  regarded  as  sufficient  to  constitute  fulfilment  of  the  requirement  of  five  years’  experience provided in clause (1) of Rule 4. The  appointment  of  the  appellant  to  the  post  of  Labour-cum-Conciliation  Officer,  therefore,  became  regular  from  the  date  when  he  completed five years after taking into account  the period of about ten months during which  he worked as Chief Inspector of Shops. Once  his appointment became regular on the expiry  of this period of five years on his fulfilling the  requirements for appointment as Labour-cum- Conciliation Officer  and becoming eligible  for  that  purpose,  he  could  not  thereafter  be  reverted to the post of Statistical Officer. The  order  of  reversion  passed  against  the  appellant, was, therefore, clearly illegal and it  must be set aside.”     

A  perusal  of  the above  would show that  the  appellant  

therein did not possess the necessary experience of five  

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years of the working of labour laws.  It was held that his  

appointment was irregular since he did not possess the  

necessary experience.  However, during the pendency of  

the  proceedings,  he  had  acquired  the  necessary  

experience  and,  therefore,  the  appointment  must  be  

regarded as having been regularised.  The aforesaid ratio  

would  be  squarely  applicable  to  the  appointment  of  

respondent No.3.   

21. Mr. Prashant Bhushan, however, submitted that the  

appeal would not be rendered infructuous by the mere  

retirement of the appellants.  Learned counsel submitted  

that all the appellants have been engaged in the field of  

education  throughout  their  lives.   Therefore,  deeply  

interested in ensuring that  the  standards of  education  

are  maintained.   They  are  deeply  concerned  that  of  

appointment for the post of Principal  shall  be made in  

accordance with the statutory provisions.  Therefore, the  

appellants would have the locus standi to continue the  

proceedings.   

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22. We are unable to accept the aforesaid submission  

made by the learned counsel.  As noticed in the earlier  

part  of  the  judgment,  the  entire  pleadings  in  the  writ  

petition are founded on the personal grievance of the writ  

petitioners/appellants.  The  writ  petitioners  have  not  

come before this Court as educationists. Merely because  

they  are  senior  most  teachers  in  the  same institution,  

would not necessarily give rise to the presumption, that  

they had filed the writ petition in public interest. In our  

opinion, a pure and simple service dispute is sought to  

be camouflaged as a public interest litigation. This Court  

on  numerous  occasions  negated  such  efforts  in  

disguising  the  personal  grievances  as  public  interest  

litigation. It is, however, not necessary to recapitulate the  

oft  quoted  caution,  save  and  except  the  observations  

made by this Court in the case of Gurpal Singh (supra).  

In paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 it is observed as follows :

     “10.  Public  interest  litigation  is  a  weapon  which  has  to  be  used  with  great  care  and  circumspection  and  the  judiciary  has  to  be  extremely  careful  to  see  that  behind  the  beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private  malice,  vested  interest  and/or  publicity-

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seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an  effective  weapon  in  the  armoury  of  law  for  delivering  social  justice  to  the  citizens.  The  attractive  brand  name  of  public  interest  litigation should not be allowed to be used for  suspicious products of mischief.  It  should be  aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or  public  injury  and  not  publicity-oriented  or  founded  on  personal  vendetta.  As  indicated  above, court must be careful to see that a body  of  persons  or  member  of  the  public,  who  approaches the court is acting bona fide and  not  for  personal  gain  or  private  motive  or  political  motivation  or  other  oblique  consideration.  The  court  must  not  allow  its  process  to  be  abused  for  oblique  considerations  by  masked  phantoms  who  monitor at times from behind. Some persons  with vested interest indulge in the pastime of  meddling with judicial process either by force  of habit or from improper motives and try to  bargain for  a  good deal  as well  as  to enrich  themselves.  Often  they  are  actuated  by  a  desire  to  win  notoriety  or  cheap  popularity.  The petitions of such busybodies deserve to be  thrown out by rejection at the threshold, and  in appropriate cases with exemplary costs.

11. The Council for Public Interest Law set up  by the Ford Foundation in USA defined “public  interest  litigation”  in  its  Report  of  Public  Interest Law, USA, 1976 as follows: “Public  interest  law  is  the  name  that  has  recently  been  given  to  efforts  which  provide  legal  representation  to  previously  unrepresented  groups  and  interests.  Such  efforts  have  been  undertaken  in  the  recognition that ordinary marketplace for legal  services  fails  to  provide  such  services  to  significant segments of the population and to  significant  interests.  Such  groups  and  

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interests include the proper environmentalists,  consumers,  racial  and  ethnic  minorities  and  others.” [See  B. Singh (Dr.) v.  Union of India7,  SCC p. 373, para 13.]

12. When a particular person is the object and  target of a petition styled as PIL, the court has  to be careful to see whether the attack in the  guise  of  public  interest  is  really  intended  to  unleash a private vendetta, personal grouse or  some other mala fide object.  Since in service  matters  public  interest  litigation  cannot  be  filed  there  is  no  scope  for  taking  action  for  contempt,  particularly,  when  the  petition  is  itself not maintainable. In any event, by order  dated  15-4-2002  this  Court  had  stayed  operation of the High Court’s order.”

The aforesaid observations have been reiterated by this  

Court  in  the  case  of  P.Seshadri Vs.  S.Mangati  Gopal  

Reddy & Ors  8  , in the following words:-

“The High Court has committed a serious error  in  permitting  respondent  No.1 to pursue the  writ petition as a public interest litigation. The  parameters  within  which  Public  Interest  Litigation can be entertained by this Court and  the  High  Court,  have  been  laid  down  and  reiterated by this Court in a series of cases. By  now it ought to be plain and obvious that this  Court  does not  approve  of  an approach that  would  encourage  petitions  filed  for  achieving  oblique  motives  on  the  basis  of  wild  and  reckless allegations made by individuals,  i.e.,  busybodies; having little or no interest in the  proceedings.  The  credentials,  the  motive  and  the  objective  of  the  petitioner  have  to  be  apparently  and  patently  aboveboard.  

8  2011 (4) SCALE 41

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Otherwise the petition is liable to be dismissed  at the threshold.”   

23. We  are,  therefore,  unable  to  

accept the aforesaid submission as it is tantamount to  

treating the writ  petition as a public interest litigation.  

As  noticed  above,  the  entire  grievance  of  the  writ  

petitioners/appellants  was  personal.   They  were  all  

aggrieved  and  humiliated  for  being  compelled  to  serve  

under a Principal junior to them in service.  Therefore, it  

could not be treated as a public interest litigation. This  

Court  has  repeatedly  disapproved  the  tendency  of  

disgruntled employees disguising pure and simple service  

dispute  as  public  interest  litigation.  The  observations  

made by this Court in the case of        Dr. B. Singh vs.  

Union of India & Ors.  9   would be of some relevance and  

we may notice the same. In paragraph 16, it is observed  

as follows :  

“As noted supra, a time has come to weed out  the  petitions,  which  though  titled  as  public  interest  litigations  are  in  essence  something  else.  It  is  shocking  to  note  that  courts  are  flooded with a large number of so-called public  

9 (2004) 4 SCC 363

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interest litigations, whereas only a minuscule  percentage can legitimately be called as public  interest litigations. Though the parameters of  public  interest  litigation  have  been indicated  by this Court in a large number of cases, yet  unmindful  of  the  real  intentions  and  objectives,  courts  at  times  are  entertaining  such  petitions  and  wasting  valuable  judicial  time which, as noted above, could be otherwise  utilized for disposal of genuine cases. Though  in  Duryodhan  Sahu  (Dr) v.  Jitendra  Kumar  Mishra8 this Court held that in service matters  PILs should not be entertained,  the inflow of  the  so-called  PILs  involving  service  matters  continues  unabated  in  the  courts  and  strangely are entertained.  The least the High  Courts could do is to throw them out on the  basis of the said decision.”

24. We  are  also  unable  to  accept  the  submission  of  

Mr.  Prashant  Bhushan  that  the  writ  petition  can  be  

treated as a writ  in the  nature  of  a quo warranto.   It  

appears that the appellants had not claimed a writ of quo  

warranto either before the learned Single Judge or before  

the  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court.   Even  in  this  

Court, it appears to us that Mr. Prashant Bhushan has  

made  the  submission  as  a  weapon  of  last  resort.   As  

noticed earlier, during the pendency of the proceedings,  

respondent No. 3 has acquired the experience of sixteen  

years.  The requirement under Rules was of fifteen years  

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experience, it would, therefore, not be appropriate to go  

into the question as to whether a writ of quo warranto  

would lie in the present case or not.  In our opinion, it  

would be an exercise in futility.  The issue has become  

purely academic.   

25. Before we part with this judgment, we make it clear  

that  we  have  not  expressed  any  opinion  on  the  

correctness  of  the  High  Court’s  judgment  as  we  have  

dismissed  the  appeal  only  on  the  ground  that  the  

concerned  appellants  have  already  retired  from service  

and it would not be in the interest of anybody to go into  

the merits.  

26.In view of the above, the appeal is dismissed.  

……………………………..J.                                                [B.Sudershan Reddy]

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……………………………..J.   [Surinder Singh Nijjar]

New Delhi April 18, 2011.

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