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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.  204-205  OF 2004

Bhimandas Ambwani (D) Thr. Lrs.                   …Appellants

Versus

Delhi Power Company Limited & Ors.               …Respondents

with

C.A. No. 203/2004

O R D E R  

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.  204-205  OF 2004

1. These  appeals  have  been  preferred  against  the  impugned  

judgment  and  order  dated  22.3.2002,  passed  by  Delhi  High  

Court  in  LPA No.46 of  1983 and judgment  and order  dated  

21.5.2002 passed in Review Application C.M. No.893 of 2002  

therein by way of which the appeal  filed by the respondents

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against  the  judgment  and  order  of  the  learned  Single  Judge  

dated 26.11.1982 had been allowed.

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are that :-

A. The appellants had been conferred title over the land in Khasra  

No.307 admeasuring  3  bighas  and  3  biswas  situate  in  the  revenue  

estate of village Kilokri, Delhi and the Conveyance Deed for the same  

was registered on behalf  of  the President of India in favour of  the  

appellant on 6.6.1962.   

A Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,  

1894 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) was issued on 5.3.1963 in  

respect of the land admeasuring 139 bighas and 2 biswas including the  

aforesaid land of the appellants.  A declaration under Section 6 of the  

Act was made in respect of the said land on 22.8.1963.  The Land  

Acquisition Collector made the award under the Act on 29.11.1963.  

However, no award was made in respect  of the land measuring 23  

bighas and 7 biswas including the suit land as it had been shown to be  

the land of Central Government. However, the possession of the land  

in respect of which the award was made and the land transferred to the  

appellants was also taken and the Union of India handed it over to  

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Delhi Electric Supply Units (for short ‘DESU’) for the construction of  

staff  quarters  on  5.7.1966.   The  appellants  claimed  to  have  been  

deprived of the land without paying any compensation whatsoever,  

thus,  there was a regular correspondence by the appellants   and in  

view  thereof  Section  4  Notification  under  the  Act  was  issued  on  

7.10.1968 in respect of the land admeasuring 31 bighas and 15 biswas  

including the land in dispute.  The said Notification under Section 4  

was not  acted upon, but  a supplementary award No. 1651-A dated  

16.2.1974,  was  made  in  respect  of  the  land  in  dispute,  making  

reference to Section 4 Notification dated 5.3.1963.

B. Aggrieved, Predecessor in interest of the appellants filed Writ  

Petition No.307 of 1972 before Delhi High Court and the said writ  

petition was disposed of vide judgment and order dated 26.11.1982  

making  it  clear  that  acquisition  proceedings  emanating  from  

Notification dated 5.3.1963 came to an end rather stood superseded by  

second  Notification  dated  7.10.1968  and  therefore,  supplementary  

award No.1651-A dated 16.2.1974 was illegal and without jurisdiction  

and thus, the award was quashed.  The respondents were directed to  

handover the vacant  possession of the suit property to the appellants  

by 31.12.1983.  However, liberty was given to the State to issue a  

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fresh Notification under Section 4 of the Act within a period of one  

year and till then the possession could be retained by the respondents.  

C. It  was  in  view  thereof,  a  Notification  dated  26.3.1983  was  

issued under Section 4 of the Act in respect of the suit land and in the  

meanwhile, the respondents preferred LPA No.46 of 1983 against the  

said judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 26.11.1982.

D. Declaration under  Section 6 of  the Act  dated 30.5.1983 was  

issued in respect of the suit land and the respondents did not complete  

the acquisition proceedings rather abandoned the same.

E. The Division Bench allowed the said LPA vide judgment and  

order dated 22.3.2002.  Review Petition against the said LPA filed by  

the appellant was dismissed on 21.5.2002.   

Hence, these appeals.

3. Shri  Arvind Kumar and Ms.  Henna George,  learned counsel  

appearing  for  the  appellants  have  submitted  that  there  had been  3  

successive Notifications under Section 4 of the Act.  Therefore, the  

second  Notification  superseded  the  first  and  the  third  Notification  

superseded the second notification.  In response to the first Section 4  

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Notification there was no award as the Land Acquisition Collector  

considered that the suit land belonged to the Central Government. The  

supplementary award was made subsequent to the second Section 4  

Notification making reference to the first Section 4 Notification dated  

5.3.1963 which had already elapsed.  The learned Single Judge has  

rightly decided the issue and in pursuance of the same once the third  

Section  4  Notification  was  issued  on  26.3.1983  and  no  further  

proceedings were taken, it also stood elapsed.  Therefore, in law, there  

had been no proceedings regarding acquisition of the land in dispute.  

The respondent-authorities cannot be permitted to encroach upon the  

land of the appellants without resorting to the procedure prescribed by  

law.   The  Division  Bench  erred  in  reversing  the  judgment  of  the  

learned Single Judge under the misconception that there was a valid  

award in respect of the land in dispute as it could be made referable to  

Notification  under  Section  4  dated  7.10.1968  and  therefore,  the  

appeals deserve to be allowed.

4. Per contra, Ms. Avnish Ahlawat, learned counsel appearing for  

the  respondent  no.1  and  Shri  Vishnu  Saharya,  learned  counsel  

appearing for  DDA have opposed  the  appeal  contending that  their  

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land had been acquired by the Union of India and handed over to the  

respondent  no.1  after  taking  the  amount  of  compensation  from it.  

Therefore, the said respondent cannot be penalised at such a belated  

stage for the reason that DESU has deposited a sum of Rs.10,16,400/-  

towards the price of land on 24.5.1966.  The judgment of the High  

Court does not require to be interfered with and thus, the appeals are  

liable to be dismissed.

5. We  have  considered  the  rival  submissions  made  by  learned  

counsel for the parties and perused the record.

6. There cannot be any dispute to the settled legal proposition that  

successive Notifications under Section 4 or successive Declarations  

under Section 6 of the Act can be made, however, the effect of the  

same would be that earlier notification/declaration stands obliterated/  

superseded and in such a fact-situation, it would not be permissible for  

either of the parties to make any reference to the said notifications/  

declarations which stood superseded.

7. In  Bhutnath  Chatterjee  v.  State  of  West  Bengal  & Ors.,  

(1969)  3  SCC  675,  this  Court  held  that  where  second  Section  4  

Notification has been issued, the market value is to be determined in  

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terms of the later notification for the reason that there was an intention  

to supersede the previous notification and if the Government did not  

choose to explain the reasons which persuaded it to issue the second  

notification, the court is justified in inferring that it was intended to  

supersede the earlier notification by the later notification.   

8. In  Land Acquisition Officer-cum-RDO, Chevella Division,  

Ranga Reddy District  v.  A.  Ramachandra Reddy & Ors.,  AIR  

2011 SC 662, while dealing with the same issue, this Court held:      

“…..  the  Government  after  considering the  facts  and  circumstances,  with  a  view to  avoid  further  challenge,  issued  a  fresh  notification  dated  9.9.1993  (gazetted  on  19.11.1993)  followed  by  final  declaration  dated,  16.2.1994.  The  State  Government  did not  subsequently  cancel/rescind/  withdraw  the  notifications  dated  9.9.1993  and  16.2.1994.  The  State  Government  had  clearly  abandoned  the  earlier  notifications dated  3.1.1990 and 10.l.1990 by issuing the subsequent  notifications dated  9.91993  and  16.2.1994.  The  appellant cannot therefore contend that the second  preliminary notification is  redundant or  that  first  preliminary  notification  continues  to  hold  good…..” (Emphasis added)

(See also : Raghunath & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR  

1988 SC 1615; Hindustan Oil Mills Ltd. & Anr. vs. Special Deputy  

Collector  (Land  Acquisition),  AIR  1990  SC  731;  and  Raipur  

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Development Authority v. Anupan Sahkari Griha Nirman Samiti  

& Ors., (2000) 4 SCC 357).  

9. In view of the above, Section 4 Notification dated 26.3.1983  

and  Declaration  under  Section  6  dated  13.5.1983  superseded  all  

earlier notification/declaration.  However, no proceedings were taken  

in  pursuance  of  the  said  notification/declaration  issued  in  the  year  

1983 and after commencement of the Amendment Act 1987, the said  

notification/declaration made in  the year  1983 stood elapsed as  no  

award  had  been  made  within  the  period  stipulated  under  the  Act.  

Thus, there can be no sanctity to any of the acquisition proceedings  

initiated  by  the  respondents  so  far  as  the  suit  land  is  concerned,  

though the appellants stood dispossessed from his land in pursuance  

of the Notification under Section 4 dated 5.3.1963.  Thus, we have no  

hesitation  in  making  a  declaration  that  the  appellants  had  been  

dispossessed  without  resorting  to  any  valid  law  providing  for  

acquisition of land.  The Court is shocked as the appellants had been  

dispossessed from the land during the period when right to property  

was a fundamental right under Articles 31A and 19 of the Constitution  

of India and subsequently became a constitutional and human right  

under Article 300A.   

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10. This Court dealt with a similar case in Tukaram Kana Joshi &  

Ors.  thr.  Power  of  Attorney  Holder  v.  Maharashtra  Industrial  

Development Corporation & Ors., (2013) 1 SCC 353, and held :  

“……There is a distinction,  a  true and  concrete  distinction,  between  the  principle  of  "eminent  domain" and "police power" of  the  State.  Under  certain  circumstances,  the  police  power  of  the  State may be used temporarily, to take possession  of property but the present case clearly shows that  neither of the said powers have been exercised. A  question then arises with respect to the authority or  power  under  which  the  State  entered  upon  the  land. It is evident that the act of the State amounts  to encroachment, in exercise of "absolute power"  which in common parlance is also called abuse of  power or use of  muscle power. To further clarify  this position, it must be noted that the authorities  have  treated  the  land  owner  as  a  'subject'  of  medieval  India,  but  not  as  a  'citizen'  under  our  constitution.

xx xx xx

Depriving the appellants of their immovable  properties,  was a clear violation of Article 21 of  the  Constitution.  In  a  welfare  State,  statutory  authorities  are  bound,  not  only  to  pay  adequate  compensation, but there is also a legal obligation  upon them to rehabilitate such persons. The non- fulfillment of  their  obligations would tantamount  to  forcing  the  said  uprooted  persons  to  become  vagabonds or to indulge in anti-national activities  as  such  sentiments  would  be  born  in  them  on  account of such ill-treatment. Therefore, it is not  permissible   for  any  welfare  State  to  uproot  a  person  and  deprive  him  of  his  

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fundamental/constitutional/human rights, under the  garb of industrial development.   

The appellants have been deprived of their  legitimate dues for about half a century. In such a  fact-situation, we fail to understand for which class  of  citizens,  the  Constitution  provides  guarantees  and rights  in  this  regard   and what  is  the  exact  percentage of the citizens of this country, to whom  Constitutional/statutory  benefits  are  accorded,  in  accordance with the law”.   

11. The instant case is squarely covered by the aforesaid judgment  

in  Tukaram’s case  (supra)  and  thus,  entitled  for  restoration  of  

possession of the land in dispute.  However, considering the fact that  

the possession of the land was taken over about half a century ago and  

stood  completely  developed  as  Ms.  Ahlawat,  learned  counsel  has  

submitted  that  a  full-fledged  residential  colony  of  employees  of  

DESU has been constructed thereon, therefore, it would be difficult  

for respondent no.1 to restore the possession.

12. In  such  a  fact-situation,  the  only  option  left  out  to  the  

respondents is to make the award treating Section 4 notification as, on  

this date, i.e. 12.2.2013 and we direct the Land Acquisition Collector  

to make the award after hearing the parties within a period of four  

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months  from today.   For  that  purpose,  the  parties  are  directed  to  

appear  before  Land  Acquisition  Collector,  C/o  The  Deputy  

Commissioner,  South M.B.  Road,  Saket,  New Delhi  on 26.2.2013.  

The appellants are at liberty to file a reference under Section 18 of the  

Act  and  to  pursue  the  remedies  available  to  him  under  the  Act.  

Needless to say that the appellants shall  be entitled to all  statutory  

benefits.

13. With these directions, the appeals are allowed. The judgments  

impugned herein are set aside.  

C.A. No. 203/2004

14. In view of  the order  passed in  C.A.  Nos.  204-205/2004,  the  

appeal is dismissed.

..………………………….J.  (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

 .…………………………..J. (V. GOPALA GOWDA)

New Delhi;

February 12, 2013

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