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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2146 OF 2009

BHIM SINGH & ANR.                        … APPELLANTS :Versus:

STATE OF UTTARAKHAND           …RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J.:

1. This  appeal,  by  special  leave,  has  been  filed  against  the  

judgment and order dated 23.03.2009 passed by the High  

Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Criminal Appeal No.1706  

of 2001 whereby the High Court while acquitting the two co-

accused (appellant Nos.2 & 3 herein), upheld the conviction  

and sentence of appellant Nos.1 & 2 herein, as awarded by  

learned  Special  Judge  (CBI)/Additional  Sessions  Judge,  

Nainital,  and  dismissed  their  appeal.  The  learned  Special  

Judge  (CBI)/Additional  Sessions  Judge,  Nainital,  by  its

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judgment  and order  dated 25.04.2000 passed in  Sessions  

Trial  No.36 of  1998 convicted appellant  Nos.1 & 2 herein  

under  Section  304-B  of  IPC  and  sentenced  them  to  

imprisonment  for  life,  and  further  convicted  all  the  

appellants under Section 498-A IPC and sentenced them to  

rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs.500/- to  

each of them.  All the appellants were also convicted under  

Sections  3  &  4  of  the  Dowry  Prohibition  Act,  1961  and  

sentenced  each  of  them  to  three  months’  simple  

imprisonment and fine.     

2. The facts leading to this appeal are that one  Bhim Singh S/o  

of  Govind  Singh,  resident  of  Village  Naliana  in  District  

Nainital  got married to Prema Devi (deceased) on 4.5.1997.  

Appellants Nos.2 & 3, namely Aan Singh and Nain Singh are  

brothers of  Bhim Singh and Appellant No.4, namely Janki  

Devi is the wife of  Aan Singh (appellant No.2 herein).  Prema  

Devi  died  unnatural  death  in  her  in-laws’  house  on  

26.9.1997. Soon after the death of Prema Devi, Pushpa Joshi,  

Village Pradhan of Jeolikot made a complaint telephonically

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to  Sub-Divisional  Magistrate  about  the  unnatural  death  of  

Prema Devi. Upon receiving this information, the Magistrate  

along with Sub-Inspector Shiv Singh Gusain (PW-7) reached  

the village and took the dead body in their possession and  

an  inquest  report  was  prepared  on  the  same day.   Post-

mortem examination of the deceased was conducted on the  

same day at about 4.55 p.m. by Dr. D.K. Joshi (PW-5) and  

one Dr. H.C. Bhatt who prepared the Autopsy Report. Post-

mortem report reveals that there were 90% burn injuries on  

the body of the deceased. Since the cause of death was not  

ascertained  by  the  medical  officers,  therefore,  vicera  was  

preserved for chemical examination.     

3. First Information Report was lodged on 27.9.1997 at around  

1830 Hrs.,  at  Police Station Jyolikot,  Police Station Tallital,  

District Nainital  by one Sri. Birbal Singh Sambhal, inter alia,  

stating that the marriage of his sister Smt. Prema Devi was  

solemnized  with  Bhim  Singh  son  of  Govind  Singh,  in  the  

month of May, 1997 in Village Jyolikot,  Nainital.  The elder  

brother of Bhim Singh, namely Aan Singh played the role of

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mediator  in  finalizing  the  marriage.   Several  items  were  

given in the aforesaid marriage. FIR states that Prema Devi,  

complainant’s  sister,  told  him that  when she went  to  the  

house  of  her  in-laws  after  marriage,  her  husband  Bhim  

Singh, Aan Singh, Nain Singh,  all sons of Govind Singh and  

Smt. Janki Devi wife of Aan Singh, used to taunt and torture  

her by saying that she had brought nothing in dowry. When  

she narrated these events  to  her  parents  they persuaded  

Prema and told her to adjust with her family and live with  

them  cordially.  Father  of  the  complainant  however  

convinced Prema that he would himself talk to her in-laws  

and settle things. They went to the house of the in-laws of  

Prema and tried their best to persuade them, but instead of  

settling matters, they exhorted to taunting.  Consequently,  

Prema  was  advised  to  adjust  herself  to  the  situation.  

Thereafter  when  she  came  to  her  parents’  house  on  the  

occasion  of  Rakhi,  she  told  them   that  Bhim  Singh,  Aan  

Singh, Nain Singh and Janki Devi are repeatedly taunting and  

torturing her.  She further told that the elder  brother,  Aan  

Singh threatened to insult her before the entire village and

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pressurised her for getting clothes and other items from her  

parents’  house.  On  27.9.1997  the  complainant  received  

information that  his  sister  had died due to burning.  Upon  

receiving  this  information,  they  immediately  went  to  the  

house of Prema’s in-laws and they found her dead. She was  

completely burnt. They were told that she had set herself on  

fire.  

4. Investigation  was  done  by  Bimla  Gunjyal,  Deputy  

Superintendent of Police (PW-6) and after the investigation  

was  complete,  charge-sheet  against  all  the  four  accused  

persons was filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate  and  

the case was committed to the Sessions Court for trial.  

5. The  Trial  Court  on  finding  that  the  prosecution  has  

succeeded in proving the guilt of the appellants, convicted  

them for offences under Section 498-A of IPC and sentenced  

them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years each  

with  a  fine  of  Rs.500/-,  and  in  the  event  of  default  in  

payment of fine, further simple imprisonment for fifteen days  

each.  Accused Bhim Singh and Aan Singh (appellants Nos.1

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& 2 herein)  were also held guilty of offence 304-B of IPC and  

both  of  them  were  sentenced  to  undergo  rigorous  

imprisonment for life. Appellants were also convicted for the  

offences under Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,  

1961  and  sentenced  to  undergo  three  months’   rigorous  

imprisonment along with fine of Rs.500/-.   In the event of  

default  in  payment  of  fine,  they  were  to  undergo  further  

simple  imprisonment  for  fifteen  days.  However,  all  these  

sentences were directed to run concurrently.   

6. An appeal was preferred by the appellants under Section 374  

of  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973  (“Cr.P.C.”  for  short)  

against the judgment and order dated 25.04.2000 passed by  

the Special Judge (C.B.I)/ Additional Sessions Judge, Nainital  

in Sessions Trial No.36 of 1998. After hearing the counsel for  

the parties and perusing the Trial Court’s record, the High  

Court  relied,  firstly on  the  finding  by  the  team  of  two  

doctors  who  after  post-mortem examination  prepared  the  

autopsy  report.  The said  report  disclosed that  there  were  

90% burns and all  these burns were skin deep. As to the

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cause of death, the two officers Dr. D.K. Joshi and Dr. H.C.  

Bhatt  opined  that  the  cause  of  death  could  not  be  

ascertained, hence the viscera was preserved. The viscera  

report  on  the  Trial  Court  record  disclosed  that  pieces  of  

stomach,  intestine,  liver,  kidney  and  spleen  contained  

Organo  Chloro  Insecticide  and Ethile  Alcohol  poisons.  The  

Autopsy  report  and  chemical  examiner’s  report  with  

statement of Dr. D.K. Joshi clearly established the fact that  

the deceased died an unnatural death.  Secondly the High  

Court also relied on the statements of Virbal Singh, brother  

of  the  deceased  (PW-  1),   Maan  Singh,  father  of  the  

deceased  (PW-2)  and  Trilok  Singh,  uncle  of  the  deceased  

(PW-3)  that  the  deceased  got  married  to  Bhim  Singh  on  

07.05.1997  and  died  an  unnatural  death  on  26.9.1997,  

within 5 months of marriage. It also noted that the accused  

had  themselves  admitted  in  their  replies  recorded  under  

Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that the marriage took place on the  

said date and Prema Devi died an unnatural death. The only  

question in dispute as framed by the High Court was whether  

the  deceased  was  subjected  to  cruelty  by  the  accused

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appellants before her  death or  not.  The High Court  found  

that  firstly  the  prosecution  had  sufficiently  shown  as  

required  under  Section  304-B  IPC  that  the  deceased  was  

subject to cruelty and harassment by Bhim Singh and Aan  

Singh by relying on the statements made on oath by PW-1  

Virbal Singh, PW-2 Maan Singh and PW-3 Trilok Singh where  

they specifically stated that in the ceremony of Durgun, Aan  

Singh complained that expenditure incurred by him in the  

marriage  had  not  been  recovered.  Their  statements  were  

corroborated  by  statement  of  Trilok  Singh.   Relying  on  

Section  113-B of  the  Indian  Evidence  Act  1872  read with  

prosecution  evidence,  the  High  Court  opined  that  the  

prosecution  had  successfully  proved  charge  of  offence  

punishable under Section 498-A and 304-B of I.P.C. and one  

punishable under Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act,  

1961 against Bhim Singh and Aan Singh.  Secondly on the  

point of proving proximity between the taunts and death of  

the deceased, the High Court decided that five months was  

proximate enough and that presumption under Section 113B  

was proved beyond doubt to prove charge.  Thirdly, the fact

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of living separately by showing ration cards was immaterial.  

On being urged by the accused that the charge framed by  

Trial Court is defective and alternative charge could not have  

been framed in the manner it  is  done by Trial  Court,  the  

Court found that there was no error in stating the offence  

nor  in  particulars  stated in  the charge,  nor  any failure  of  

justice as is shown by the appellants.  Relying on Sections  

221 and Section 464 of Cr.P.C. the High Court opined that  

there was no error in the charge nor there was any failure of  

justice. On going through the entire evidence on record the  

High Court found that though the names of Nain Singh and  

Janki Devi are mentioned with Bhim Singh and Aan Singh, no  

specific  role  in  harassing  the  deceased  is  stated  against  

them  and  as  such  the  possibility  of  implication  of  their  

names, on suspicion, cannot be ruled out. Even in respect of  

charge  of  offence  punishable  under  Section  498-A  and  

Sections 3 and 4 of  Dowry Prohibition Act,  1961,   charge  

against  Nain  Singh  and  Janki  Devi  had  not  been  proved  

beyond reasonable doubt.  But as far as conviction recorded  

by the Trial Court in respect of Bhim Singh and Aan Singh is

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concerned, the Trial Court had committed no error in law in  

convicting and sentencing them under Section 498-A I.P.C.,  

304-B  I.P.C.,  and  one  under  Sections  3  and  4  of  Dowry  

prohibition Act, 1961 as the charge against them was proved  

on the record beyond all reasonable doubt.  

7. The High Court  in  the  present  matter  convicted appellant  

Nos.1 & 2,  on the basis  of  circumstantial  evidence in  the  

impugned  judgment.  It  has  been  established  in  leading  

judicial precedents that where the prosecution case is based  

on circumstantial evidence, only the circumstantial evidence  

of  the  highest  order  can  satisfy  the  test  of  proof   in  a  

criminal prosecution. To base a conviction on circumstantial  

evidence  put  forth by the prosecution should establish a  

complete  and  unbroken  chain  of  events  so  that  only  one  

inference could be drawn out from the same and if  more  

than one inference could be drawn, then the accused should  

be entitled to the benefit of doubt.  

8. The learned counsel appearing for the State of Uttarakhand  

contended that PW-1 Birbal Singh had categorically stated

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on oath  that  marriage of  his  sister  Smt.  Prema Devi  was  

solemnized on 7.5.1997 with Bhim Singh.  Elder brother of  

Bhim Singh, Aan Singh, played role of mediator in finalizing  

the  marriage.  Loan  was  taken  for  marriage.  However  no  

demand for dowry was made. But his sister had complained  

twice that his family was taunting her and demanding dowry.  

This statement given by PW-1 is fully corroborated by the  

father  of  the  deceased  also.  Prosecution  counsel  also  

examined PW-3 Trilok Singh the uncle, who said that Bhim  

Singh and Aan Singh talked about  dowry  before  him and  

thereupon he expressed his displeasure. The learned counsel  

also argued that she died after 4 months and some days of  

her marriage in an unnatural way. Further, it is argued that  

since there was no mode of transport in the village at night,  

they could not go to the house of Prema Devi’s in-laws on  

26.9.1997 and next day when they reached by walking on  

foot for about 15 km, they came to know that the dead body  

had been sent to Nainital for post-mortem. Apart from the  

above witnesses,  Smt.  Pushpa Joshi,  the Gram Pradhan of  

the Village was produced as PW-4. She stated that the elder-

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brother Aan Singh came to her and told her that Prema Devi  

had set  herself  on fire  and thereafter  she along with  her  

neighbor,  went  to  their  house  and  saw  Prema  Devi  lying  

there  badly  burnt.   PW-4  informed  Darogaji  Gusai  Singh  

about the incident. The learned counsel further stated that  

PW-5 Dr. D.K. Joshi examined the dead body on 26.9.1997  

and in external examination found 90% burn injuries on the  

body. The deceased had died 6-8 hours prior to examination.  

Since  no  cause  of  death  was  visible  from  external  

examination,  therefore,  viscera  of  the  deceased  was  

preserved for internal examination. Post-mortem report was  

prepared by Dr. H.C. Bhatt  in which it was stated that he  

was of the opinion that the deceased was given some toxic  

substance before her death due to which she died and later  

on she was burnt.  Because no external reason of death was  

found,  the  viscera  was  sent  to  the  State  Laboratory  for  

chemical examination and it was found that toxic material  

was present in the viscera. The counsel for the State, thus,  

submitted that the accused tried to kill Smt. Prema Devi by  

giving poisonous substance after torturing her for dowry and

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when they became apprehensive whether she had died or  

not,  they set her on fire to confirm her death. Thereafter,  

they informed the Gram Pradhan of the Village that Prema  

Devi had died due to burning so that the deceased is not  

able to give her dying declaration.  

9. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the appellants  

submitted that  PW-1 Birbal  has admitted in his statement  

that no demand for dowry was made by accused before the  

marriage  and  if  at  all  they  wanted  dowry,  they  would  

demand it before marriage itself.  None of them were in a  

position to demand and give dowry. Birbal admitted in his  

statement that the marriage was settled voluntarily by Birbal  

and his father on their own accord.  He stated that “marriage  

of his sister was settled by his father and his marriage was  

solemnized with the consent of both me and my father. My  

sister came back to our house after some days of marriage.  

But  I  cannot  tell  after  how  many  days  she  came  back.  

Because I was in Haldwani that time.”  Further, it was urged  

that  PW-1  and  PW-2  have  admitted  that  no  reports  were

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lodged by  them prior  to  death  of  Prema,  with  respect  to  

torture on demand of dowry. The Counsel further said that,  

the conduct of the accused was of great importance, as the  

information of the death was given by Aan Singh himself to  

the Gram Pradhan of the Village. If they had killed her, they  

would not have informed her family members and instead  

would  have  cremated  her  immediately  after  her  death.  

Counsel  urged  that,  it  appears  that  the  deceased  herself  

committed suicide, by first consuming poisonous substance  

and  thereafter  she  thought  she  might  not  die  due  to  its  

consumption, therefore she burnt herself.  Learned Counsel  

further argued that Bhim Singh,  husband of the deceased  

has two brothers. Aan Singh, elder brother of Bhim Singh is a  

Chowkidar in P.W.D. and living separately with his wife. Bhim  

Singh  was  a  vehicle  driver  and  his  younger  brother  Nain  

Singh was running a shop. Thus, there was no correlation of  

Aan Singh, Nain Singh and Janki Devi with Bhim Singh. All  

three were doing their separate avocations. The voter lists  

and  ration  cards  of  all  the  three  brothers,  which  are  on  

record,  are separate.  Thus,  it  is  not  proved that  all  three

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brothers were involved in the offence.  On the other hand,  

they have helped the police in this case by informing them.  

10. Thus, the present appeal requires an evaluation and analysis  

of the circumstantial evidence on record and the statements  

made in the course of investigation and produced against  

the accused appellants.   

11. The first ground of defense taken by the appellants in this  

appeal is that there is no specific incident of abuse or torture  

for dowry and no prior report of dowry demand was filed by  

the family of the deceased.  It is also stated that there was  

no demand of dowry made by them before marriage as is  

evident from the statements of PW-1 Birbal Singh and PW-2  

Man Singh. However, as held by this Court in the  State of  

Himachal Pradesh v. Nikku Ram & Ors., (1995) 6 SCC 219,  

the demand for dowry can be made at any time, and not  

necessarily before marriage. The demand can be made on  

three occasions;  before marriage,  at the time of  marriage  

and  after  marriage.  The  relevant  extract  of  the  said  

judgment is reproduced hereunder:

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“Dowry,  dowry  and  dowry.  This  is  the  painful  repetition  which confronts,  and at  times  haunts,  many parents of  a girl  child  in  this  holy land of  ours where, in good old days the belief was: “Yatra  Naryastu Pujyante ramente tetra dewatah” (where  woman is worshipped, there is abode of God). We  have mentioned about dowry thrice, because this  demand  is  made  on  three  occasions:  (i)  before  marriage;  (ii)  at  the  time  of  marriage;  and  (iii)  after  the  marriage.  Greed  being  limitless,  the  demands  become  insatiable  in  many  cases,  followed by torture on the girl,  leading to either  suicide in some cases or murder in some.”

12. The accused have taken the defense that the PWs. have also  

stated in  their  statements that  no demand for  dowry was  

made before marriage and that the marriage was concluded  

by  the  consent  of  the  two  parties.   They  also  took  the  

defense that no prior police complaint of dowry demand was  

made by the family of the deceased. However, in light of the  

decision of this Court in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Nikku  

Ram  &  Ors. (supra)  and  the  social  evil  of  dowry  that  is  

prevalent in the Indian society, this defense does not hold  

water.  The demand for dowry can be made at any time and  

not  necessarily  before marriage.  The appellants have also  

taken the plea that no specific incidents of abuse or torture

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were there. But in the present case, PW-3 Trilok Singh has  

categorically stated in his statement that the accused Aan  

Singh  had  come  in  the  ceremony  of  durgud,  which  is  

celebrated  after  marriage  in  which  he  had  stated  in  the  

presence of all the persons that he had not recovered the  

money he had spent in the marriage and became angry. The  

PWs. have also stated that, the deceased, Smt. Prema Devi  

had also complained to her family members twice, regarding  

taunts and demand for dowry by the four accused persons.  

These incidents  occurred  “soon  before  her  death”  as  she  

died  within  5  months  of  her  marriage.  This  raises  a  

presumption, under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, as to  

dowry  death  punishable  under  Section  304-B  of  I.P.C.  A  

conjoint  reading of  Section 113B of  the Evidence Act  and  

Section 304-B of I.P.C. shows that there must be material to  

show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to  

cruelty or harassment. The prosecution has to rule out the  

possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it  

within  the  purview  of  “death  occurring  otherwise  than  in  

normal circumstances”. The prosecution is obliged to show

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that  soon  before  the  occurrence  there  was  cruelty  or  

harassment for or in connection with the demand for dowry.  

In other words, only when the prosecution proves that soon  

before  her  death,  the  lady  was  subjected  to  cruelty  or  

harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry  

as  laid  down by this  Court  in  Kaliyaperumal  and Anr.  Vs.   

State of Tamil Nadu (2004) 9 SCC 157. The prosecution has  

proved by producing cogent evidence that soon before her  

death the lady was subjected to cruelty or  harassment in  

connection with the demand for dowry.  Thus, it  becomes  

obligatory  for  the  Court  to  raise  a  presumption  that  the  

death is a dowry death.  

13. It is the case of the defense that the deceased would have  

tried to commit suicide by consuming poison and when she  

was apprehensive whether she would die or not, she set fire  

to  herself.  Assuming,  without  conceding,  that  Smt.  Prema  

had  committed  suicide,  then  under  Section  113A  of  the  

Indian  evidence  Act,  onus  is  shifted  on  the  accused  to  

dislodge the presumption of having committed abetment of

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suicide  by  a  married  woman.  Unlike  as  in  Section  304-B  

where  the  court  “shall  presume”  dowry  death,  when  the  

prosecution has established the ingredients,  under Section  

113A  of  the  Evidence  Act,  discretion  has  been  conferred  

upon the Court wherein it has been provided that the Court  

may presume abetment of suicide. Therefore the onus lies  

on the  accused to  rebut  the presumption,  and in  case of  

Section 113-B of the Evidence Act relatable to Section 304B  

of IPC, the onus to prove shifts exclusively and heavily on  

the accused as held in Bansilal v. State of Haryana (2011) 11  

SCC  359.   Thus,  where  the  death  of  the  wife  was  

concurrently  found to  be unnatural,  viz.,  by  strangulation,  

and there was demand for  dowry and also cruelty on the  

part of the husband the presumption under Section 113B has  

been rightly drawn, as held in Hemchand v. State of Haryana  

AIR 1995 SC 120, 121.   Even then the presumption against  

the accused persons as in Section 113A of the Evidence Act  

is  rightly  presumed  as  if  we  assume that  she  committed  

suicide, as the circumstantial evidence shows that she might  

be  compelled  to  take  the  extreme  steps  as  the  alleged

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suicide was committed within 7 years of marriage, as  held in  

Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh 1990 Cri. LJ 562,571 (SC).  

The circumstantial evidence leads to the guilt of the accused  

persons, as the prosecution has proved that the accused had  

the opportunity to administer the poison and the doctors in  

the  medical  examination  have  also  reported  that  the  

deceased was a healthy woman who, along with her family,  

was trying to reconcile matters with the accused persons.  

The fact that the death occurred in the house of the accused  

persons, leads to their guilt. They have not discharged the  

onus of  disproving the presumptions under Sections  113A  

and 113B.  Thus,  the question of  suicide is  ruled out.  The  

Court in this case is obliged to take the presumption raised  

under Section 113B of the Evidence Act.  

14. The  accused  persons  have  taken  the  defense  that  they  

themselves had informed the Gram Panchayat after she had  

died upon which the Gram Pradhan along with other persons  

went to the accused persons house, where they found the  

dead body of Smt. Prema. A prudent man, trying to save a

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person from dying would have taken the deceased person to  

the nearest hospital, and would not have waited for her to  

die. The argument put forward by the learned counsel for the  

accused that the deceased first consumed poison and then  

on being apprehensive of her death, she set herself on fire,  

is further proved wrong, as any reasonable man would try to  

save his wife if such a situation arise. When facts are clear, it  

is immaterial whether motive was proved. Absence of motive  

does  not  break  the  link  in  the  chain  of  circumstances  

connecting the accused with the crime as held by this Court  

in Mulakh Raj v. Staish Kumar, (1992) 3 SCC 43 = AIR 1992  

SC 1175. Further, proof of motive or ill-will is unnecessary to  

sustain conviction where there is clear evidence.  

15. In the present case, the guilt or innocence of the accused  

has to be adduced from the circumstantial evidence. The law  

regarding  circumstantial  evidence  is  more  or  less  well  

settled. This Court in a plethora of judgments has held that  

when  the  conviction  is  based  on  circumstantial  evidence  

solely,  then there should not be any snap in the chain of

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circumstances. If there is a snap in the chain, the accused is  

entitled  to  benefit  of  doubt.  Gurpreet  Singh  v.  State  of   

Haryana (2002)  8  SCC  18  is  one  of  such  cases.  On  the  

question of any reasonable hypothesis, this Court has held  

that  if  some  of  the  circumstances  in  the  chain  can  be  

explained  by  any  other  reasonable  hypothesis,  then  the  

accused is entitled to benefit of doubt. But in assessing the  

evidence, imaginary possibilities have no place. The Court  

considers ordinary human probabilities.

16. On  circumstantial  evidence,  this  Court  has  laid  down  the  

following principles in Sharad Birdhichand Sardar v. State of   

Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116:  

(1) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is  

to be drawn must or should be and not merely “may be”  

fully established.

(2) The facts so established should be consistent only with  

the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say they  

should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except  

that the accused is guilty.

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(3) The circumstances should be of conclusive nature and  

tendency.

(4) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except  

the one to be proved and,  

(5) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not  

to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent  

with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all  

human  probability  the  act  must  have  been  done  by  the  

accused.  

Whenever there is a break in the chain of circumstances, the  

accused  is  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  doubt;  State  of  

Maharashtra v. Annappa Bandu Kavatage (1979) 4 SCC 715.

17. Following the  decision  in  Sharad  Birdhichand (supra), this  

Court in the case of  Liyakat v. State of Uttaranchal, (2008)  

16 SCC 148, and in the case of Kusuma Ankama Rao v. State  

of Andhra Pradesh, (2008) 13 SCC 256, upheld the conviction  

as  awarded  by  the  Trial  Court  and  affirmed  by  the  High  

Court.    

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18. Thus, in light of the above, there is no missing link in the  

circumstantial  evidence  put  forth  by  the  prosecution,  and  

hence the accused are not entitled to benefit of doubt. The  

guilt  of  the  accused persons i.e.  the  appellant  Nos.1  & 2  

herein,  under  Section  304-B  IPC  has  been  successfully  

established. We, therefore, find no infirmity in the impugned  

judgment  passed  by  the  High  Court.  This  appeal  is  

accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

............................................J   (M.Y. Eqbal)

............................................J   (Pinaki Chandra Ghose)

New Delhi; February 11, 2015.