BHAVANAGAR MUN.CORP. Vs SALIMBHAI UMARBHAI MANSURI
Bench: K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN,PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE
Case number: C.A. No.-005498-005498 / 2013
Diary number: 40416 / 2011
Advocates: JATIN ZAVERI Vs
O. P. BHADANI
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPEALLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5498 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.5387 of 2012)
Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation Appellant
Versus
Salimbhai Umarbhai Mansuri Respondent
with
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5510 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.5390 of 2012)
J U D G M E N T
K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.
Leave granted.
1. We are concerned in this case with the question whether
termination of services of the respondent on the expiry of the
contract period would amount to retrenchment within the
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meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1948 (for
short “the ID Act”). We may refer to the facts in Civil Appeal
arising out of SLP(C) No.5390 of 2012 for disposal of both the
appeals, since the question of law involved in both the appeals is
the same.
2. The respondent in Civil Appeal @ SLP(C) No.5390 of 2012
was appointed on daily wages as a helper in the Water Works
Department in the appellant Corporation for two fixed periods
from 02.05.1988 to 30.06.1988 and 04.07.1988 to 15.07.1988,
under two separate office orders dated 19.05.1988 and
01.07.1988. The service of the respondent stood terminated on
15.07.1988 after serving a total period of 54 days. The
respondent raised an industrial dispute on 07.12.1989 and the
same was referred to Labour Court for adjudication which was
registered as Reference (LCB) No.606 of 1989.
3. The Labour Court on 18.10.2003 passed an award holding
that the Corporation had violated Section 25G and H of the ID Act
by not calling the respondent for work before appointing new
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workmen. The Labour Court then directed the Corporation to
reinstate the respondent with continuity in service. Aggrieved by
above-mentioned order the Corporation preferred Writ Petition
SCA No.3290 of 2004 before the Gujarat High Court. The High
Court vide its judgment dated 12.08.2010 set aside the award of
the Labour Court and remanded the matter to the Labour Court
for fresh consideration. The Labour Court on 15.11.2010 held that
the Corporation had violated the provisions of Sections 25G and H
of the ID Act and directed the Corporation to reinstate the
respondent with continuity in service with consequential benefits.
The Corporation then preferred Writ Petition SCA No.7918 of
2011, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide
judgment dated 29.06.2011 against which Corporation preferred
LPA No.1275 of 2011 which was also dismissed. Aggrieved by the
same the Corporation has preferred this appeal.
4. Shri Jatin Zaveri, learned counsel appearing for the
Corporation submitted that the Labour Court as well as the High
Court has failed to appreciate the various terms and conditions of
appointment and committed a grave error in holding that the
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Corporation had violated the provisions of Section 25G and H of
the ID Act. Learned counsel submitted that going by the terms
and conditions of the appointment order would clearly indicate
that the provisions of Section 2(oo) and (bb) would apply to the
facts of the case, consequently, the respondent cannot be said to
have been retrenched and hence the provisions of Section 25G
and H of the ID Act would not be attracted.
5. Mr. O.P. Bhadani, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent, on the other hand, pointed out that there has been a
clear violation of the provisions of Section 25G and H of the ID Act
by not reinstating the respondent in service. Learned counsel
submitted that the Labour Court has elaborately considered the
rival contentions of the parties and rendered a reasoned award
which has been affirmed by the learned Single Judge as well as
the Division Bench of the High Court and, therefore, calls for no
interference by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of
India.
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6. We are of the view that the Labour Court as well as the High
Court have completely misunderstood the scope of Section 2(oo),
(bb), as well as Section 25G and H of the ID Act. The contract of
employment and the terms and conditions contained therein are
crucial in the application of the above-mentioned provisions.
Facts would clearly indicate that the respondent had worked only
for 54 days in two fixed periods and on expiry of the second term
his service stood automatically terminated on the basis of the
contract of appointment. A reference to the contract would be
useful to understand the nature of appointment of the
respondent. Clause 1, 2 and 7 to 10 of the office order dated
19.05.1988 are relevant, which are extracted herein below for
ready reference:
“1. With reference to your application dated _____, a meeting was held with us/the Commissioner and subject to the following conditions arrived at with mutual consent you are being appointed as a Daily Wager Helper in the Water Works Department from 1.5.88 to 30.6.88 at a daily minimum wages of Rs.12/13 and dearness allowance, daily special allowance of Rs.10/20 aggregating to Rs.22/33 in accordance with the Approval No.Commi O/CPO/M.No.204 dated 16.5.88 and upon completion of last duty on 30.6.88, your service shall stand automatically terminated.
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2. Since a definite date of termination of your service has been specified, the Municipal Corporation shall not be liable and you shall not be entitled to any notice, wages in lieu of notice, retrenchment compensation etc. 3. x x x x 4. x x x x 5. x x x x 6. x x x x 7. If you are transferred as provided in Clause 6 above and if you fail to perform you duty at the appointed time then it would tantamount to that you are not willing to work and this contract of service shall automatically come to an end and as such your services shall stand terminated. 8. As per the aforesaid para no.1 of the Office Order you are being appointed as a daily wager from 2.5.88 to 30.6.66 subject to the condition that you have to come for work as and when required by the Municipal Corporation, that is, if the Municipal Corporation does not require your service during the aforesaid period, then the Municipal Corporation is not bound to give you the work and you shall not be entitled to demand work for that day, of which you may take a special note. 9. Upon termination of your contract on the date specified above, you are not entitled to claim any right of seniority for the period for which you work nor are you entitled to be reinstated or make such a claim on account of the new appointment of daily wagers. 10. the Corporation shall be entitled to relieve you before the prescribed period if it no longer requires your services.”
7. The above order was signed by the respondent and,
therefore, bound by the terms and conditions of the office order.
The question is, termination of the service of the respondent on
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the expiry of the periods mentioned above would amount to
retrenchment? Facts in this case clearly show, so found by the
Labour Court itself that the respondent had not worked
continuously for 240 days in an year to claim the benefit of
Section 25F, G and H of the ID Act. Therefore, the only question
to be considered is whether termination of service of the
respondent on the basis of the contract of appointment would
amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 25H of the
ID Act so as to claim reinstatement.
8. A reference to Section 2(oo) and (bb) of the Act would be
apposite.
“2 Definitions:-
(oo) “retrenchment” means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include-
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on
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its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein."
9. Section 2(bb) says that if the termination of the service of
workman is as a result of non-renewal of the contract between
the employer and the workman on its expiry of such contract
being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained
therein, the same would not constitute retrenchment.
10. Facts would clearly indicate that the respondent’s service
was terminated on the expiry of the fixed periods mentioned in
the office orders and that he had worked only for 54 days. The
mere fact that the appointment orders used the expression “daily
wages” does not make the appointment “Casual” because it is
the substance that matters, not the form. The contract of
appointment consciously entered into by the employer and the
employee would, over and above the specific terms of the written
agreement, indicates that the employment is short-lived and the
same is liable to termination, on the fixed period mentioned in the
contract of appointment.
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11. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted
that the respondent is entitled to the benefit of Section 25G & H,
the same are extracted herein below:
“25G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman.
25H. Re- employment of retrenched workmen.- Where any workmen are retrenched, and the employer proposes to take into his employ any persons, he shall, in such manner as may be prescribed, give an opportunity 2[ to the retrenched workmen who are citizens of India to offer themselves for re- employment and such retrenched workman] who offer themselves for re- employment shall have preference over other persons.”
12. Section 25H will apply only if the respondent establishes that
there had been retrenchment. Facts will clearly indicate that
there was no retrenchment under Section 2(oo) read with Section
2(bb) of the ID Act. Consequently, Section 25H would not apply to
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the facts of the case. Similar is the factual and legal situation in
the civil appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.5387 of 2012 as well.
13. We are sorry to note that the Labour Court, learned Single
Judge and the Division Bench have not properly appreciated the
factual and legal position in this case. When rights of parties are
being adjudicated, needless to say, serious thoughts have to be
bestowed by the Labour Court as well as the High Court. For the
above-mentioned reasons we allow both the appeals, set aside
the award passed by the Labour Court and confirmed by the High
Court. However, there will be no order as to costs.
….…….…….……………J. (K.S. Radhakrishnan)
………..………………….J. (Pinaki Chandra Ghose)
New Delhi, July 16, 2013