1    

REPORTABLE    

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6875 OF 2008  

BHAGWAT SHARAN (DEAD THR.LRS.)                …APPELLANT(S)    

Versus  

PURUSHOTTAM & ORS.                                  …RESPONDENT(S)      

WITH    

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6876-6877 OF 2008  

J U D G M E N T  

Deepak Gupta, J.  

1. One Mangat Ram was a resident of Village Narnaul in  

Rajasthan.  He had four sons viz., Madhav Prashad, Lal Chand,  

Ram Chand and Umrao Lal.  Ram Chand was adopted by one Shri  

Gauri Mal of Gwalior.  Lal Chand had four sons viz., Sri Ram, Hari  

Ram, Govind and Laxmi Narayan.  Madhav Prashad had no issues.   

Therefore, he adopted Hari Ram, the son of Lal Chand.  Ram  

Chand also had no issues and he adopted Shriram, son of Lal  

Chand.  It is the admitted case of the parties that both Ram Chand

2    

and Lal Chand severed connections with the family and had no  

connection with the property of the family. This left two branches  

in the family of Mangat Ram, one being Madhav Prashad and his  

descendants through his son Hari Ram, the other branch  

consisted of Umrao Lal and his three sons viz., Brij Mohan,  

Rameshwar and Radha Krishan.  The plaintiff Bhagwat Sharan,  

who filed the suit is the son of Radha Krishan and grandson of  

Umrao Lal.  

2. The above facts are not disputed.  The parties are also ad idem  

that Madhav Prashad shifted from his native village and came to  

Ashok Nagar, about 70 years prior to the filing of the suit.  The suit  

was filed in 1988.  Thus, Madhav Prashad must have shifted in or  

around 1918.  It is also not disputed that Madhav Prashad started  

working as munshi of the then zamindar of the area and was  

thereafter known as munshi Madhav Prashad.  The dispute  

basically starts hereinafter.  The plaintiff claims that his  

grandfather Umrao Lal also came to Ashok Nagar at about the  

same time and started doing grain business.  Thereafter, Madhav  

Prashad left the work of munshi and both the brothers started grain  

business in the name of “Munshi Madhav Prashad”, by setting up  

a shop.  The case of the plaintiff is that both Madhav Prashad and

3    

Umrao Lal lived together and carried on the business jointly and  

purchased various properties described in para 9 of the plaint.  Six  

properties comprise of six different houses.  The properties at para  

9(2) comprised of various agricultural lands in different villages.   

The case of the plaintiff is that all these houses have been  

constructed jointly by Madhav Prashad and Umrao Lal, and  

Madhav Prashad being the elder brother was the karta and was  

running the joint family in this capacity.  It was further alleged in  

the plaint that Madhav Prashad being the karta managed to get  

some of the joint family property recorded in his own name.  It was  

also alleged that after the death of Madhav Prashad and Umrao  

Lal, Hari Ram, adopted son of Madhav Prashad (who had died by  

the time the suit was filed in 1988) was the karta of the joint Hindu  

family and in this capacity some of the properties of the Joint  

Hindu Family were recorded in his name.   

3. It is not disputed that Madhav Prashad died some time in the  

year 1935, Umrao Singh died some time in 1941-42 and Hari Ram  

died in the year 1978.    

4. In respect of agricultural lands it was pleaded that all these  

agricultural lands were under the joint cultivation of the family  

and the full accounts of the cultivation was kept by late Madhav

4    

Prashad and Umrao Lal, and after their death by Hari Ram.  After  

the death of Hari Ram, his widow Rajjo Devi (Def.no.6), used to  

look after cultivation on behalf of the family.  It was further alleged  

in the plaint that Hari Ram had transferred some of the  

agricultural lands in the name of his brother-in-law, son, son-in-

law and other relatives as benami transactions, which was obvious  

from the fact that the General Power of Attorney was executed by  

the beneficiaries of these transactions in favour of Hari Ram.   

However, this fact was not revealed to the branch of the family who  

were descendants of Umrao Lal. Basically, the allegation was that  

all the properties mentioned in para 9 of the plaint were properties  

of the Hindu Undivided Family (for short HUF) and, therefore, the  

plaintiff sought partition of the same by metes and bounds as per  

his share.    

5. For the sake of convenience it would be appropriate to extract  

para 18 of the plaint which reads as follows:-  

“(18) That the business of the plaintiff and defendant Nos.  

1 to 18 was almost joint till the year 1954.  Thereafter, on  

account of the loss in the business and the business coming to  

a closure position almost all the people started carrying on their  

separate business and the immovable properties of the joint  

family remained undivided so far.  Late Hari Ram sold the house  

properties mentioned in para No.9(1) (c) (d) (e) (f) of the plaint  

during his life time, which are liable to be reduced from there  

share”

5    

This suit was contested by some of the defendants who were either  

in the line of descendants of Hari Ram or his beneficiaries.   

Transfer documents were executed in their favour.  It would be  

pertinent to mention that none of the other heirs from the lineage  

of Umrao Lal filed a written statement.  In the written statement  

filed by the contesting respondents the main objection taken was  

that the properties mentioned in para 9 of the plaint were not  

properties of the HUF and it was denied that there ever was any  

such HUF.  

6. The defendants denied the fact that the business being run  

under the name of “Munshi Madhav Prashad” was a joint family  

business.  It was denied that Umrao Lal was a member of this  

business or the said shop was a joint shop.  With regard to all the  

properties mentioned in para 9 of the plaint, it was stated that all  

the houses had been purchased/constructed by Madhav Prashad  

alone and that the agricultural lands were purchased by Hari Ram  

from his own income.  

7. In the written statement the defendants also placed reliance  

on the Will of late Hari Ram and made reference to a suit filed by  

the plaintiff and defendant nos.1-3 in which they had stated that a  

portion of the house had been bequeathed to them by Hari Ram by

6    

his Will.  It was therefore urged that the plaintiff having elected to  

accept the bequest under the Will cannot now turn around and say  

that the description of the properties given by Hari Ram in the Will  

showing them to be his personal properties was not correct.  It was  

also alleged that as admitted in the plaint itself 3 out of 6 houses  

were sold by Hari Ram in his lifetime.  

8. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties various issues  

were framed but according to us only the following issues are  

relevant which are extracted below :-  

1. Whether the properties mentioned in para No.9 of the plaint  are the properties of the joint family both the sides or whether  the same are the self acquired properties as per the averments  made by the defendants?    2. Whether the plaintiff in Civil Suit No.94-A/86 filed in the  Court of Civil Judge Class-II, Ashok Nagar, has mentioned the  Will dated 6.2.1987 executed by Hari Ram as the basis of the  suit?    3. If yes, Whether the plaintiff is stopped from alleging the said  Will as null and void?    4. Whether the Will dated 6.2.1987 executed by Hari Ram in  connection with the disputed property is Null and void?    

The trial court decided all these issues in favour of the plaintiff and  

decreed the suit holding that all the properties were joint family  

properties and that plaintiff had 2.38% share in the same.  The  

contesting defendants filed an appeal in the High Court of Madhya  

Pradesh, and the decree of partition by the trial court was set aside.

7    

The plaintiff approached the High Court for review. The High Court  

dismissed the application for condonation of delay, the application  

for review and the application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code  

of Civil Procedure, 1908.  Hence this appeal before us.  

9. We have heard Shri Sushil Kumar Jain, learned senior  

counsel for the appellant, Shri Harin P. Raval, learned senior  

counsel for those respondents who support the appellant and Shri  

Guru Krishna Kumar, Shri Vikas Singh, and Shri Anupam Lal Das,  

learned senior counsel, for the contesting respondents.  

10. At the outset we may note that a lot of arguments were  

addressed and judgments were cited on the attributes of HUF and  

the manner in which it can be constituted.  In view of the facts  

narrated above, in our view, a large number of these arguments  

and citations need not be considered.  The law is well settled that  

the burden is on the person who alleges that the property is a joint  

property of an HUF to prove the same.  Reference in this behalf  

may be made to the judgments of this Court in Bhagwan Dayal   

vs.  Reoti Devi1.  Both the parties have placed reliance on the this  

judgment.  In this case this Court held that the general principle  

is that a Hindu family is presumed to be joint unless the contrary  

                                                           1 AIR 1962 SC 287

8    

is proved.  It was further held that where one of the coparceners  

separated himself from other members of the joint family there was  

no presumption that the rest of coparceners continued to  

constitute a joint family.  However, it was also held that at the  

same time there is no presumption that because one member of  

the family has separated, the rest of the family is no longer a joint  

family.  However, it is important to note that this Court in  

Bhagwati Prasad Sah and Ors. vs. Dulhin Rameshwari Kuer  

and Ors.2, it held as follows:-  

“…. Except in the case of reunion, the mere fact that  separated coparceners chose to live together or act jointly  for purposes of business or trade or in their dealings with  

properties, would not give them the status of coparceners  under the Mitakshara law.”  

The Privy Council in Appalaswami v.  

Suryanarayanamurti3 held as follows:  

"The Hindu law upon this aspect of the case is well settled.  

Proof of the existence of a joint family does not lead to the  

presumption that property held by any member of the  

family is joint, and the burden rests upon anyone asserting  

that any item of property was joint to establish the fact.  

But where it is established that the family possessed some  

joint property which from its nature and relative value may  

have formed the nucleus from which the property in  

question may have been acquired, the burden shifts to the  

party alleging self-acquisition to establish affirmatively  

                                                           2  (1951) 2 SCR 603  

3 I.L.R. 1948 Mad.440

9    

that the property was acquired without the aid of the joint  

family property”  

The aforesaid view was accepted by this Court in Shrinivas  

Krishnarao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango and Ors.4  In D.S.  

Lakshmaiah and Ors. v. L. Balasubramanyam and Ors.5 this  

Court held as follows:  

“The legal principle, therefore, is that there is no  

presumption of a property being joint family property only  

on account of existence of a joint Hindu family. The one  

who asserts has to prove that the property is a joint family  

property. If, however, the person so asserting proves that  

there was nucleus with which the joint family property  

could be acquired, there would be presumption of the  

property being joint and the onus would shift on the  

person who claims it to be self-acquired property to prove  

that he purchased the property with his own funds and  

not out of joint family nucleus that was available.”  

Similar view was taken in Mst Rukhmabai v. Lala  

Laxminarayan and Others.6 and Appasaheb Peerappa  

Chamdgade  v. Devendra Peerappa Chamdgade7.  The law is  

thus well settled that the burden lies upon the person who alleges  

the existence of the Hindu Undivided Family to prove the same.  

11. Normally, an HUF can only comprise of all the family  

members with the head of the family being karta.  Some property  

                                                           4 (1955) 1 SCR 1  5 (2003) 10 SCC 310  6 (1960) 2 SCR 253  7 (2007) 1 SCC 521

10    

has to be the nucleus for this joint family.  There is cleavage of  

opinion as to whether two brothers of a larger group can form a  

joint family. But assuming that such a joint family could have been  

formed by Madhav Prashad and Umrao Lal the burden lies heavily  

on the plaintiff to prove that the two of them joined together to form  

an HUF.  To prove this, they will have to not only show jointness  

of the property but also jointness of family and jointness of living  

together.  

12. From the facts stated above it is apparent that there is no  

pleading that Mangat Ram and Sons constituted a HUF.  There is  

no allegation that this family had some property as its nucleus.   

Since there is no allegation that Mangat Ram and his four sons  

constituted a HUF, the fact that Lal Chand left the family to live by  

himself, would not in any manner mean that there was a disruption  

of the joint family status.  A disruption would arise only if there  

was an allegation that earlier there was a HUF.  

13. It is also an admitted case of the parties that Madhav Prashad  

and Umrao Lal came separately to Ashok Nagar. Madhav Prashad  

initially worked as a munshi with a zamindar.  Thereafter, as per  

the defendants, Madhav Prashad started a business which was his  

own but later his brother Umrao Lal joined in the business.  It is,

11    

however, contended that this business was not a business of a  

HUF.    

14. On the other hand, the case of the plaintiff is that it was  

Umrao Lal who started the business and Madhav Prashad joined  

him later on but since Madhav Prashad was the elder brother, the  

business was started in the name of Madhav Prashad.  There is no  

evidence to support the claim either way.  The witnesses who have  

appeared were all born much later and they have not given any  

evidence with regard to the joint business.  The plaintiff Bhagwat  

Sharan was born in the year 1951.  The contesting defendants 4  

and 8 are younger to him by 5 and 11 years.  Therefore, the oral  

testimony of these witnesses is not of any use as rightly held by the  

trial court.    

15. The plaintiff places great reliance on the mortgage deed by  

which 5 houses were mortgaged in favour of Seth Budhmal on  

01.12.1944 and 26.11.1946.  It is not disputed that there were 6  

houses, some single storeyed and some double storeyed in Ashok  

Nagar which have been described in the plaint.  Out of these  

houses, one was used as dharamshala and the remaining 5 were  

mortgaged on 01.12.1944 vide mortgage deed (Exh.P.28).  This  

mortgage deed was executed by Hari Ram, S/o Madhav Prashad,

12    

and Brij Mohan, Rameshwar Das and Radha Krishan, S/o Umrao  

Lal and Pop Chand and Babu Lal @ Deep Chand, minor sons of  

Brij Mohan through their father and Nathu Lal minor S/o Hari  

Ram, through his father and they are shown as proprietors of firm  

M/s Madhav Prashad Agarwal.  In the mortgage deed after  

description of the 5 houses it is mentioned that these properties  

are “owned and possessed by us”.  Further it is mentioned that the  

properties are free from all encumbrances and there are no other  

sharers, and the mortgagees have full right to alienate the same.   

The 5 houses were accordingly mortgaged with Seth Budhmal.   

This was done with a view to pay off the loan of Krishna Ram Baldeo  

Bank, with which the properties were already mortgaged.  The  

amount which they obtained by mortgaging the property was  

transferred to the Bank and fresh mortgage was created in favour  

of Seth Budhmal.  In para 5 of the mortgage deed it was mentioned  

that the mortgaged property is free from all encumbrances and, “we  

are the absolute owners of the same and there is no co-parcener  

and co-sharer”.  This mortgage deed was signed by Hari Ram, Brij  

Mohan, Rameshwar Lal, Radha Krishan as mortgagors.  This  

would indicate that these properties were owned by them.   

13    

16. However, there is no material on record to show that the  

properties belonged to an HUF.  They may have been joint  

properties but merely on the basis of the recitals in the mortgage  

deed they cannot be said to be a joint family property. It appears  

that by another mortgage deed dated 26.11.1946, the value of the  

mortgaged properties was enhanced to Rs. 45,000/-, and in  

addition to the 5 houses, one oil mill at Pachhar was also  

mortgaged.  Seth Budhmal filed a suit (Exh.P.4) against Hari Ram,  

Brij Mohan, Rameshwar Lal, Radha Krishan, Nathu Lal etc., for  

realisation of the mortgage money under the said mortgage deed.   

In para 6 and 8 of the plaint it was averred as follows :-  

“6. That, the defendants at the time of execution of  

aforesaid documents constituted a Trading Joint Hindu  Family and of which all major members personally and  

minor members through their head of the branch were  represented in the execution of mortgage deeds.  

8.  That, minors mentioned in the documents have  now attained majority.  Therefore, they have been  

impleaded in person as defendants.  Their liability is  limited to the extent of property of Joint Hindu Family and  

personal dealing.  Defendant No.1 to 3 are personally and  in the capacity of head of their branch are made in as  defendants.”  

17. A written statement was filed on 09.10.1955 (Ex.P-5) on  

behalf of the aforesaid Hari Ram, Brij Mohan, Rameshwar Lal,  

Radha Krishan and Nathu Lal, and reply to paras 6 and 8 of the  

mortgage deed, read as follows:-

14    

“6. That as regards paragraph 6 of the plaint there is  no objection.  

8. That, as regards paragraph 8 of the plaint the  

reply is that the defendant No.6 is still minor.  He has not  attained majority.  It is not admitted that defendant No.1  

to 3 are Head (KARTA) being wrong, nor they are the Head,  nor the mortgage transaction was made in such a capacity  and the plaintiff has no right to sue in such a manner.”  

On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings in the earlier suit it is  

submitted that Hari Ram had admitted that there was  a joint  

family business when this written statement was filed and,  

therefore, there is proof that the business was a joint family  

business and there is no material to show that this joint family  

status was ever disrupted.  

18. It is submitted on behalf of the contesting respondent that  

since the family members of Hari Ram were residing in the  

mortgaged house, by way of abundant precaution they may have  

been made to sign the mortgage deed.  In our view, that may not  

be true because the mortgage deed clearly reflects that all the  

family members including the minors were shown to be owners of  

the properties by mortgaging the same.  Therefore, this property  

which was mortgaged in the year 1944 and then re-mortgaged in  

1946 would prima facie appear to be joint property though at this

15    

stage we are not deciding whether the property is a joint property  

or the property of HUF.  

19. An admission made by a party is only a piece of evidence and  

not conclusive proof of what is stated therein.  It is in this light  

that we have to examine the admission made by Hari Ram and his  

brothers while filing the written statement to the suit filed by Seth  

Budhmal.  In paragraph 6 the averment was that the defendants  

constituted trading Joint Hindu Family.  It is obvious that the  

admission was with regard to a trading family and not HUF.  In  

view of the law cited above, it is clear that not only jointness of the  

family has to be proved but burden lies upon the person alleging  

existence of a joint family to prove that the property belongs to the  

joint Hindu family unless there is material on record to show that  

the property is the nucleus of the joint Hindu family or that it was  

purchased through funds coming out of this nucleus.  In our  

opinion, this has not been proved in the present case.  Merely  

because the business is joint would not raise the presumption that  

there is a Joint Hindu Family.  As far as paragraph 8 is concerned  

in our view there is no clear-cut admission.  The allegation made  

was that the minors were represented by defendant nos. 1-3, who  

were head of their respective branches.  In reply to this it was

16    

stated that defendant nos.1-3 were neither the head or the karta,  

nor the mortgage transaction was made in that capacity.  This  

admission cannot be said to be an unequivocal admission of there  

being a joint family.   

20. In  Nagubai Ammal and Ors. vs. B. Shama Rao and Ors.8  

which is the locus classicus on the subject it was held as follows:-  

“An admission is not conclusive as to the truth of the  matters stated therein. It is only a piece of evidence, the  

weight to be attached to which must depend on the  circumstances under which it is made. It can be shown to  be erroneous or untrue, so long as the person to whom it  

was made has not acted upon it to his detriment, when it  might become conclusive by way of estoppel.”9  

It would be pertinent to mention that in Himani Alloys Ltd.  vs.   

Tata Steel Ltd.,10 it was also held that the admission should be  

categorical, should be conscious and deliberate act of the party  

making it.  As far as the present case is concerned we do not find  

any clear-cut admission with regard to the existence of an HUF.   

At best, from the recitals in the mortgage deed and averments in  

the written statement, all that can be said is that at the relevant  

period of time the property was treated to be a joint property.  

                                                           8 (1956) 1 SCR 451  9 This view has been consistently followed by this Court in a large number of cases including  Bharat Singh  and  Anr.  vs.  Bhagirathi 1966 SCR (1) 606; Uttam Singh Dugal  and Co.  vs.  Union of India and Ors. (2000) 7 SCC 120;  Himani Alloys Ltd.  vs.  Tata Steel Ltd. (2011) 15 SCC 273.  10  (2011) 15 SCC 273

17    

21. On the other hand, there are many other documents relied  

upon by the defendants.  Out of the 6 houses, 5 were mortgaged  

and one is admittedly a dharamshala.  Out of these 5 houses, 3  

were sold by Hari Ram during his life time and during the life time  

of the predecessors of the plaintiff, nobody objected to the sales of  

the properties and in the sale deeds Hari Ram is described as the  

sole owner of the property. One such sale deed is Exh.D-4 wherein  

it is mentioned that the double storey house is the property of the  

trading firm Madhav Prashad Agarwal and that Hari Ram is the  

owner of the firm and in order to repay the loan, sold the house  

to two persons.  This sale deed was witnessed by Seth Budhmal.  

Though it is not stated so in the sale deed it appears that the  

amount of consideration must have been paid to Seth Budhmal.   

This document was executed on 12.09.1967, and this read with  

the other two sale deeds clearly indicate that Hari Ram claimed  

that he was the sole proprietor of the business of the trading firm  

Madhav Prashad Agarwal.    

22. These sale deeds and the recitals were never challenged by  

the plaintiff or his predecessors.  This would indicate that the  

jointness of the property if any had ceased because of some family  

arrangement or partition which may have happened much earlier.  

18    

We have to read the sale deeds in conjunction with the averments  

made in the plaint quoted hereinabove wherein the plaintiff has  

stated that the business came to a closure and then almost all the  

people started carrying on their separate business. Though it is  

averred that the immovable properties remained the properties of  

the joint family the fact that separate branches started doing  

separate business is indicative of the fact that some separation, if  

not, a formal partition had taken place between the parties.  

23. The other important document is the Will of Hari Ram       

(Exh. P-3).  In this Will, Hari Ram gives details of the remaining 3  

houses and mentions that these were owned by his father Madhav  

Prashad and that he (Hari Ram) has been doing business in the  

name of his father Munshi Madhav Prashad Agarwal.  Out of the  

6 houses, 3 had already been sold by Hari Ram and he has  

bequeathed the remaining 3 houses to various persons.  It would  

be relevant to refer to the portion of the Will where Hari Ram states  

that he had 3 cousins Brij Mohan, Rameshwar Lal and Radha  

Krishan.  Out of these, Radha Krishan died and was survived by  

his widow and 3 sons and they were living in the 2nd and 3rd floor  

in building No.2.  Hari Ram bequeathed certain portions of the  

immovable property to the widow and children of Radha Krishan.  

19    

It would be pertinent to mention that the plaintiff Bhagwat Sharan  

is the son of Radha Krishan.  He also bequeathed certain  

properties in favour of his cousins Brij Mohan and Rameshwar Lal.    

24. It is also not disputed that the plaintiff and defendant nos.   

1-3 herein filed suit for eviction of an occupant in which he claimed  

that the property had been bequeathed to him by Hari Ram.   

According to the defendants the plaintiff having accepted the Will  

of Hariram and having taken benefit of the same, cannot turn  

around and urge that the Will is not valid and that the entire  

property is a joint family property. The plaintiff and defendant nos.  

1-3 by accepting the bequest under the Will elected to accept the  

will.  It is trite law that a party cannot be permitted to approbate  

and reprobate at the same time. This principle is based on the  

principle of doctrine of election.  In respect of Wills, this doctrine  

has been held to mean that a person who takes benefit of a portion  

of the Will cannot challenge the remaining portion of the Will. In  

The Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment  

Corporation and Anr.  vs .  Diamond and Gem Development  

Corporation Ltd. and Anr11, this Court made an observation that  

a party cannot be permitted to "blow hot and cold", "fast and loose"  

                                                           11 AIR 2013 SC 1241

20    

or "approbate and reprobate". Where one party knowingly accepts  

the benefits of a contract or conveyance or an order, it is estopped  

to deny the validity or binding effect on him of such contract or  

conveyance or order.   

25. The doctrine of election is a facet of law of estoppel.  A party  

cannot blow hot and blow cold at the same time.  Any party which  

takes advantage of any instrument must accept all that is  

mentioned in the said document. It would be apposite to refer to  

the treatise 'Equity-A course of lectures' by F.W. Maitland,  

Cambridge University, 1947, wherein the learned author  

succinctly described principle of election in the following terms:-  

“The doctrine of Election may be thus stated: That he who  

accepts a benefit under a deed or will or other instrument  

must adopt the whole contents of that instrument, must  

conform to all its provisions and renounce all rights that  

are inconsistent with it....’’  

This view has been accepted to be the correct view in Karam  

Kapahi  and Ors.  vs.  Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust and  

Ors.12.  The plaintiff having elected to accept the Will of Hari Ram,  

by filing a suit for eviction of the tenant by claiming that the  

property had been bequeathed to him by Hari Ram, cannot now  

                                                           12 (2010) 4 SCC 753

21    

turn around and say that the averments made by Hari Ram that  

the property was his personal property, is incorrect.  

26. As far as the agricultural lands are concerned the trial court  

decreed the suit in respect of the agricultural lands on the basis  

that Madhav Prashad and his brother Umrao Lal and their  

successors constituted an HUF.  The said lands having been  

bought out of the funds of the HUF would be treated to be the  

property of the HUF, even though they may have been entered in  

the name of any other person.  In view of the above discussion,  

and the fact that we have held that the plaintiff has failed to prove  

that there is an HUF, we are not inclined to agree with the finding  

of the trial court.    

27. We now deal with each of the agricultural property  

separately.  The properties described in paragraph 9(2)(a) of the  

plaint were earlier recorded in the name of Hari Ram and later in  

the names of his sons Purushottam and Vinod.  The property at  

paragraph 9(2)(b) was also recorded in the name of Hari Ram and  

he had given cultivation rights to Sri Ram who is stated to have  

become the owner thereof.  Similarly, the land described in  

paragraph 9(2)(c) also was shown in the name of Hari Ram and  

this was given to Kahiya Lal on tenancy.  The land described in

22    

paragraph 9(2)(d) was also recorded in the name of Hari Ram and  

was transferred to Shiv Charan, and now stands in the name of  

his legal heirs.  The land described in paragraph 9(2)(e) which  

stood in the name of Hari Ram was also transferred by him in the  

name of his wife Rajjo Devi in 1969.  

28. As far as the lands described in 9(2)(f) and 9(2)(g) are  

concerned these lands were taken on lease by Nathu Lal, S/o Hari  

Ram from the zamindar of Ashok Nagar.  According to the plaintiffs  

these lands were also lands of the joint family but that version  

cannot be believed in view of the patta granted in favour of Nathu  

Lal.  It may be true that consideration for grant of patta may have  

been paid but there is no material on record to show that this  

payment was made out of the funds of HUF.  It may be pertinent  

to mention here that the plaintiffs have alleged that in 1951 Nathu  

Lal was a minor and the amount was paid by Hari Ram.  However,  

no proof has been led in this regard.  In fact, from the material on  

record it appears that Nathu Lal was about 21 years old at that  

time.  He was definitely more than 18 years old and thus not a  

minor.  These lands were never shown to be owned by Madhav  

Prashad or Umrao Lal.  It is also pertinent to mention that various  

parts of the land were transferred to various other persons and

23    

these transfers were never challenged by the plaintiff at the  

relevant time.  It would also be pertinent to mention that both the  

courts below have come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs have  

failed to prove that they were getting any proceeds from the income  

of the agricultural land.  This also indicates that the said land was  

not joint.   

29. In view of the above discussion we find no merit in the  

appeals filed by the appellant(s) and the same are dismissed with  

no order as to costs.  Pending application(s) if any, shall  

accordingly stand disposed of.  

…………………………………J.  (L. Nageswara Rao)  

…………………………………J.  (Deepak Gupta)  

 New Delhi  April 3, 2020