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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 684 OF 2018

BENGAL CHEMISTS & DRUGGISTS ASSN.      …APPELLANT

VERSUS

          KALYAN CHOWDHURY                                  …RESPONDENT

                      J U D G M E N T

R.F. Nariman, J.    

1) The  present  appeal  is  against  an  order  of  the  National

Company Law Appellate Tribunal  dated 31.07.2017 by which

the Appellate Tribunal,  after setting out Section 421(3) of the

Companies Act,  2013,  (for  short  'the Act')  has dismissed the

appeal as not maintainable, inasmuch as the appeal has been

filed 9 days after the period of limitation of 45 days has expired

and a further period of another 45 days has also expired.

2) Mr. Jayant Mehta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of

the appellant,  has argued the matter  persuasively before us.

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He points out that Section 421(3) of the Act does not contain

the  language of  Section  34(3)  proviso  of  the  Arbitration  Act,

1996 which contains the words “but not thereafter” which Union

of  India vs.  Popular  Construction  Co. (2001)  8  SCC  470

considered.   He  further  points  out  that,  in  any  case,  under

Section 433 of the Act, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963

shall, as far as may be, apply to Appeals before the Appellate

Tribunal and that therefore, Section 5 would be applicable to

condone  the  delay  beyond  the  period  of  90  days.   He  has

buttressed his submission by referring to various decisions of

this Court.

3) Before  coming  to  the  judgments  of  this  Court,  it  is

important to first set out Section 421(3) and Section 433 of the

Act.  These provisions read as follows:

“421. Appeal from orders of Tribunal.-     **** **** ****

(3) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be

filed within a period of forty-five days from the

date  on  which  a  copy  of  the  order  of  the

Tribunal  is  made  available  to  the  person

aggrieved  and  shall  be  in  such  form,  and

accompanied  by  such  fees,  as  may  be

prescribed:

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Provided  that  the  Appellate  Tribunal  may

entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said

period of forty-five days from the date aforesaid,

but  within  a  further  period  not  exceeding

forty-five days, if it is satisfied that the appellant

was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the

appeal within that period.

433.   Limitation.-  The  provisions  of  the Limitation  Act,  1963  shall,  as  far  as  may be,

apply  to  proceedings  or  appeals  before  the

Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal, as the case

may be.”

4) A cursory reading of Section 421(3) makes it clear that the

proviso  provides  a  period  of  limitation  different  from  that

provided in the Limitation Act, and also provides a further period

not exceeding 45 days only if it is satisfied that the appellant

was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within

that period.  Section 433 obviously cannot come to the aid of

the appellant because the provisions of the Limitation Act only

apply “as far as may be”.  In a case like the present,  where

there is a special provision contained in Section 421(3) proviso,

Section 5 of the Limitation Act obviously cannot apply.

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5) Another very important aspect of the case is that 45 days

is the period of limitation, and a further period not exceeding 45

days is provided only if sufficient cause is made out for filing the

appeal within the extended period.  According to us, this is a

peremptory  provision,  which  will  otherwise  be  rendered

completely  ineffective,  if  we  were  to  accept  the argument  of

learned counsel for the appellant.  If we were to accept such

argument, it  would mean that notwithstanding that the further

period of 45 days had elapsed, the Appellate Tribunal may, if

the  facts  so  warrant,  condone  the  delay.  This  would  be  to

render otiose the second time limit of 45 days, which, as has

been pointed out by us above, is peremptory in nature.

6) We are fortified in this conclusion by the judgment of this

Court in Chhattisgarh SEB v. Central Electricity Regulatory

Commission,  2010 (5) SCC 23. The language of Section 125

of  the  Electricity  Act,  2003,  which  is  similar  to  the  language

contained in Section 421 (3) of the Companies Act, 2013, came

up for  consideration in the aforesaid decision. The issue that

arose before this Court was whether Section 5 of the Limitation

Act can be invoked for allowing the aggrieved person to file an

appeal beyond 60 days plus the further grace period of 60 days.

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This Court held that Section 5 cannot apply to Section 125 of

the Electricity Act in the following terms:

“25. Section  125  lays  down  that  any  person

aggrieved by any decision or order of the Tribunal

can file an appeal to this Court within 60 days from

the date of communication of the decision or order

of the Tribunal. Proviso to Section 125 empowers

this  Court  to  entertain  an  appeal  filed  within  a

further period of 60 days if it is satisfied that there

was sufficient cause for not filing appeal within the

initial period of 60 days. This shows that the period

of  limitation  prescribed  for  filing  appeals  under

Sections 111(2)  and 125 is  substantially different

from the period prescribed under the Limitation Act

for  filing  suits,  etc.  The  use  of  the  expression

“within a further period not exceeding 60 days” in

the proviso to Section 125 makes it clear that the

outer limit for filing an appeal is 120 days. There is

no provision in the Act under which this Court can

entertain  an  appeal  filed  against  the  decision  or

order of the Tribunal after more than 120 days.”

The aforesaid judgment was reiterated and followed in ONGC

v. Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation Limited,  2017

(5) SCC 42 at Para 5.

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7) It now remains to deal with the decisions cited by learned

counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant.  The first is the

judgment  in  Guda  Vijayalakshmi vs.  Guda  Ramachandra

Sekhara Sastry, (1981) 2 SCC 646.  In that case, a Transfer

Petition was filed under Section 25, CPC, 1908 in this Court.  A

preliminary objection was taken stating that in view of Sections

21 and 21A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Section 25 would

not be applicable.  This was turned down by this Court stating

that Section 21 would not apply to substantive provisions of the

Code as apart from procedural provisions.  Equally, Section 21A

of the Hindu Marriage Act,  1955 only dealt  with transfers “in

certain  cases”.   This  being  so,  the  wide  and  plenary  power

conferred  on  this  Court  to  transfer  any suit,  appeal  or  other

proceedings from one High Court to another High Court or from

one Civil Court in one State to another Civil Court in any other

State was held not be entrenched upon by Sections 21 and 21A

of the Hindu Marriage Act.  We fail to see how this judgment, in

any manner, furthers the proposition sought to be canvassed on

behalf of the appellant,  which is that Section 5 of the Limitation

Act would continue to apply even after a second period of 45

days is peremptorily laid down.  This judgment, therefore, does

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not carry the matter any further.

8) Reliance  placed  on  Dr. Partap  Singh and Another vs.

Director of Enforcement, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act

and Others  , (1985) 3 SCC 72 is equally misplaced.   In this

case, Section 37 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973

was involved.  Section 37(2) provides that the provisions of the

Code relating  to  searches shall,  so  far  as  may be,  apply to

searches directed under Section 37(1).  This Court held that the

expression “so far as may be” has always been construed to

mean that those provisions may generally be followed to the

extent possible.  In the fact scenario of that case, it was held

that to give full meaning to the expression 'so far as may be',

sub-section (2) of Section 37 should be interpreted to mean that

broadly the procedure relating to search as enacted in Section

165 shall be followed.

9) This case again does not take the matter any further.  In

fact, the ratio of the judgment as far as this case is concerned is

that the expression “so far as may be” only means to the extent

possible.  If not possible, obviously the Limitation Act would not

apply.  We have already held that it is not possible for Section 5

of the Limitation Act to apply given the peremptory language of

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Section 421(3).

10) The  third  judgment  is  Mangu  Ram vs.  Municipal

Corporation of Delhi,  (1976) 1 SCC 392.  In this judgment,

Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 provided

for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal.  Section

417 (4) required that the application for special leave should be

made before the expiry period of 60 days from the date of the

order of acquittal.  Applying Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act,

this Court  held that  Section 5 of  the Limitation would not  be

impliedly  excluded  in  such  case  despite  the  mandatory  and

peremptory language contained in Section 417(4) of the Cr.P.C.

This Court held that all  periods of limitation are cast  in such

mandatory and peremptory language and, therefore, Section 5

could not be said to be impliedly excluded.

11) This case again is wholly distinguishable.  It applies only to

a  period  of  limitation  which  is  given  beyond  which  nothing

further is stated as to whether delay may be condoned beyond

such period.  In the present case, the Section 417(3) does not

merely contain the initial period of 45 days, in which case the

aforesaid judgment would have applied.   Section 417(3) goes

on to state that another period of 45 days, being a grace period

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given by the legislature which cannot be exceeded, alone would

apply, provided sufficient cause is made out within the aforesaid

grace period.  As has been held by us above, it is the second

period,  which  is  a  special  inbuilt  kind  of  Section  5  of  the

Limitation  Act  in  the  special  statute,  which  lays  down  that

beyond the second period of 45 days, there can be no further

condonation of delay. On this ground therefore, the aforesaid

judgment also stands distinguished.  

12) One  further  thing  remains  –  and  that  is  that  learned

counsel for the appellant pointed out the difference between the

expression used in the Arbitration Act as construed by Popular

Construction (supra) and its absence in the proviso in Section

421(3).  For the reasons given above, we are of the view that

this would also make no difference in view of the language of

the  proviso  to  Section  421(3)  which  contains  mandatory  or

peremptory negative language and speaks of a second period

not exceeding 45 days, which would have the same effect as

the expression “but not thereafter” used in Section 34(3) proviso

of the Arbitration Act, 1996.

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13) We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the judgment

under appeal.  The appeal is dismissed.  

                                                 .…………………………J.     (R.F. Nariman)

           ………………………..…..J.

            (Navin Sinha) New Delhi; February 02, 2018