Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1644-1645 of 2019 [Arising out of SLP(C)No(s).13627-13628 of 2012]

BAYAJI SAMBHU MALI @ BORATE(D) THROUGH LRS.             APPELLANT(S)

                               VERSUS

NAZIR MOHAMMED BALAL ZARI  THROUGH GPA HOLDER & ORS.         RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

K.M. JOSEPH  , J.

1. Leave granted.

2. By  the  impugned  judgment  and  order,  the  High

Court has dismissed the writ petition filed by the

appellant  under  Article  227  of  the  Constitution

against the order dated 09.01.1997 of the Maharashtra

Revenue Tribunal and the review petition filed against

the same.

3.    These appeals arise under the Bombay Tenancy and

Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to

as ‘the Act’).  The appellant is the tenant and the

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respondent is the landlord.  On what is described as

Tillers day i.e. 01.04.1957, the landlord was a minor.

The controversy, which we are called upon to resolve,

is whether the appellant is a deemed purchaser within

the meaning of Section 29 read with Section 32 of the

Act or whether this is a case under Section 32F of the

Act under                which the tenant is obliged

to give a notice under Section 32F(1A).

4. To  appreciate  the  question  which  arises  before

us, it is  necessary we should first set out the facts

according to the appellant which are related to the

impugned order.     

5. It is the case of the appellant that the first

respondent – landlord claimed that he had attained

majority  on  10.09.1966  and  filed  an  application

bearing  Tenancy  Case  No.  1  of  1967  before  the

Mamalatdar for his personal cultivation under Section

31(3) of the Act.  The appellant claimed that he had

received a notice issued by Tenancy Awwal Karkun and

was directed to appear on 05.06.1967.  His statement

was  recorded.   By  order  dated  27.07.1967,  the

application filed by the landlord seeking possession

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was dismissed.

6. It is the further case of the appellant that the

first  respondent  –  landlord  filed  Tenancy  Appeal

(bearing  No.  148  of  1967)  before  the  Appellate

Authority.  The said appeal came to be dismissed on

09.03.1968.  The respondent – landlord carried the

matter  further  before  the  Tribunal  by  way  of  a

Revision  Application.   The  Maharashtra  Revenue

Tribunal  vide  order  dated  22.04.1970  dismissed  the

Revision Application.  It is thereafter the tenant-

initiated proceedings under Section 32G of the Act in

the year 1977.  The Original Authority, however, took

the  view  that  the  tenant  did  not  comply  with  the

provision  of  Section  32F  of  the  Act  which  was

challenged  before  the  Sub-Divisional  Officer  who

confirmed the order vide order dated 30.09.1978.   

7. The  Tribunal,  on  a  Revision  filed  by  the

appellant, set aside the order and remanded the matter

for a fresh inquiry under Section 32G of the Act.

8. By  order  dated  20.07.1990,  the  Additional

Tehsildar, after noticing certain discrepancies in the

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extract of Appeal Register relating to the proceeding

commenced by the landlord found that the appellant had

failed to prove that the landlord had exercised his

right to recover possession under Section 31 of the

Act and therefore the provision of Section 32F of the

Act applies.  Since the same had not been complied

with,  therefore  the  purchase  in  favour  of  the

appellant was found to be ineffective.   

9. The  Appellate  Authority,  by  order  dated

24.04.1992, however, found otherwise and allowed the

appeal  filed  by  the  appellant.   The  landlord

challenged the order of the Appellate Authority.  By

order dated 09.01.1997, the Tribunal set aside the

order of the Appellate Authority and confirmed the

order passed by the Additional Tahsildar and found

that  the  appellant  had  not  complied  with  the

provisions of Section 32F(1A).  It is against the said

order of the Tribunal, the appellant filed the writ

petition.  The High Court dismissed the writ petition

and though the appellant filed a review petition, the

same was also rejected.   

10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

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11. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that

this is a case where the matter should be treated as

governed by the provisions under Section 29 read with

Section 31 of the Act.  In a case governed by these

provisions, learned counsel pointed out that there is

no requirement of issuing notice within the meaning of

Section 32F.  He relied on  Tukaram Maruti Chavan v.

Maruti Narayan Chavan (D) by Lrs. and Ors. (2008) 9

SCC  358  and  Sudam  Ganpat  Kutwal  v.  Shevantabai

Tukaram Gulumkar (2006) 7 SCC 200.

12. It  is  clear  that  the  landlord  had  filed  an

application under Section 29 of the Act and the said

application was rejected and the rejection was upheld

right upto the Tribunal in Revision.

13. These documents have been brushed aside as also

the  legal  effect  of  the  orders  passed.   He  would

further contend that though he had produced certified

copies along with review petition in the High Court

even then the same were not considered.  He would

maintain  that  in  a  case  where  there  is  a  deemed

purchase, there is no requirement to issue a notice

under Section 32F(1A).

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14. Per  contra,  learned  counsel  for  the  respondent

would support the order of the High Court.  He would

contend that it is mandatory to give a notice under

Section 32F(1A).  Without giving such a notice, it is

not open  to contend that he must be deemed to have

purchased the right.  He would also point out that the

case of the respondent is that the application was not

accepted since the certified copies were produced only

after the dismissal of the writ petition that too in

the review.  Therefore, no store can be laid by the

said  documents.   He  also  contends  that  it  was

appellant’s case that there was substantial compliance

of Section 32F(1A) in the High Court.

15. Time  is  now  apposite  to  make  a  survey  of

statutory scheme of the Act.  The Act was enacted in

the  year  1948.   We  must  advert  to  the  following

provisions  which  we  think  are  relevant  for  the

purposes of this case.

16. Section  29  deals  with  Procedure  of  taking

possession which, inter alia, reads as follows:

29.  (1)  A  tenant  or  an  agricultural labourer  or  artisan  entitled  to possession of any land or dwelling house under any of the provisions of this Act

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may apply in writing for such possession to the Mamlatdar. The application shall be  made  in  such  form  as  may  be prescribed [and within a period of two years from the date on which the right to  obtain  possession  of  the  land  or dwelling house is deemed to have accrued to the tenant, agricultural labourer or artisan, as the case may be].

(2) [Save as otherwise provided in sub- section (3A), no landlord] shall obtain possession of any land or dwelling house held by a tenant except under an order of  the  Mamlatdar.  For  obtaining  such order he shall make an application in the prescribed form [and within a period of two years from the date on which the right to obtain possession of the land or dwelling house, as the case may be, is deemed to have accrued to him].

(3) On receipt of application under sub- section (1) or (2) the Mamlatdar shall, after  holding  an  inquiry,  pass  such order  thereon  as  he  deems  fit  : [Provided  that  where  an  application under  sub-section  (2)  is  made  by  a landlord  in  pursuance  of  the  right conferred on him under section 31, the Mamlatdar  shall  first  decide,  as preliminary  issues,  whether  the conditions specified in clauses (c) and (d) of section 31A and sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 31B are satisfied. If the Mamlatdar finds that any of the said conditions  is  not  satisfied,  he  shall reject the application forthwith].

17. Section  31  deals  with  Landlord’s  right  to

terminate tenancy for personal cultivation and non

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agricultural purpose which reads as follows:

31.  (1)  Notwithstanding  anything contained  in  sections  14  and  30  but subject  to  sections  31A  to  31D  (both inclusive), a 3 [landlord (not being a landlord within the meaning of Chapter III-AA)  may],  after  giving  notice  and making an application for possession as provided  in  sub-section  (2),  terminate the  tenancy  of  any  land  (except  a permanent  tenancy),  if  the  landlord bona-fide requires the land for any of the  following  purposes  :––  (a)  for cultivating personally, or (b) for any non-agricultural purpose.

(2)  The  notice  required  to  be  given under  sub-section  (1)  shall  be  in writing,  shall  state  the  purpose  for which the landlord requires the land and shall  be  served  on  the  tenant  on  or before the 31st day of December 1956. A copy of such notice shall, at the same time,  be  sent  to  the  Mamlatdar.  An application for possession under section 29 shall be made to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March 1957.

(3)  Where a landlord is a minor, or a widow, or a person subject to mental or physical disability then such notice may be  given  [and  an  application  for possession  under  section  29  may  be made,]––

(i) by the minor within one year from the date on which he attains majority;

(ii)  by  the  successor-in-title  of  a widow within one year from the date on which her interest in the land ceases to exist;

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(iii) within one year from the date on which  mental  or  physical  disability ceases to exist;

[Provided that where a person of such category is a member of a joint family, the provisions of this sub-section shall not apply if at least one member of the joint family is outside the categories mentioned  in  the  sub-section  unless before the 31st day of March 1958 the share of such person in the joint family has been separated by metes and bounds and  the  Mamlatdar  on  inquiry,  is satisfied that the share of such person in the land is separated having regard to the area, assessment, classification and  value  of  the  land,  in  the  same proportion as the share of that person in the entire joint family property, and not in a large proportion].

18.   31A. The right of a landlord to terminate a

tenancy for cultivating the land personally under

section  31  shall  be  subject  to  the  following

conditions:–

------

(c) The income by the cultivation of the land  of  which  he  is  entitled  to  take possession  is  the  principal  source  of income for his maintenance.

(d) The land leased stands in the record of  rights  or  in  any  public  record  or similar revenue record on the 1st day of January 1952 and thereafter during the

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period  between  the  said  date  and  the appointed  day  in  the  name  of  the landlord  himself,  or  of  any  of  his ancestors 2 [but not of any person from whom  title  is  derived,  whether  by assignment or Court sale or otherwise], or  if  the  landlord  is  a  member  of  a joint family, in the name of a member of such family].

19. Section  32  deals  with  Tenants  deemed  to  have

purchased land on tillers’ day.  It reads as follows:

32. [(1)] On the first day of April 1957 (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the tillers’  day”)  every  tenant  shall, [subject to the other provisions of this section and the provisions of] the next succeeding  section,  be  deemed  to  have purchased from his landlord, free of all encumbrances  subsisting  thereon  on  the said  day,  the  land  held  by  him  as tenant, if–

(a) such tenant is a permanent tenant thereof and cultivates land personally;

(b)  such  tenant  is  not  a  permanent tenant  but  cultivates  the  land  leased personally; and

(i) the landlord has not given notice of termination of his tenancy under section 31; or

(ii) notice has been given under section 31, but the landlord has not applied to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of  March  1957  under  section  29  for obtaining possession of the land; [or]

[(iii) the landlord has not terminated

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his  tenancy  on  any  of  the  grounds specified  in  section  14,  or  has  so terminated  the  tenancy  but  has  not applied to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March 1957 under section 29 for obtaining possession of the lands ] :

Provided that if an application made by the  landlord  under  section  29  for obtaining  possession  of  the  land  has been rejected by the Mamlatdar or by the Collector in appeal or in revision by the [Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal] under the provisions of this Act, the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land  on  the  date  on  which  the  final order of rejection is passed. The date on which the final order of rejection is passed  is  hereinafter  referred  to  as “the  postponed  date”  :   [Provided further that the tenant of a landlord who is entitled to the benefit of the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 31 shall be deemed to have purchased the land on the 1st day of April 1958, if no separation  of  his  share  has  been effected  before  the  date  mentioned  in that proviso].

20. Section 32A provides that Tenants are deemed to

have purchased upto ceiling area.

32A. A tenant shall be deemed to have purchased land under section 32,- (1) in the case of a tenant who does not hold any  land  as  owner  but  holds  land  as tenant in excess of the ceiling area, upto the ceiling area;

(2) in the case of a tenant who holds land as owner below the ceiling area,

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such part of the land only as will raise his holding to the extent of the ceiling area.

21. Section 32B provides for the circumstances in

which the tenants are not deemed to have purchased

lands.  It provides that if the tenant holds land

partly as owner and partly as tenant but the area of

the  land  held  as  owner  is  equal  to  or  exceeds

ceiling  area,  he  shall  not  be  deemed  to  have

purchased the land held by him as a tenant under

Section 32.

22. Section  32C  permits  the  tenants  entitled  to

choose  lands  to  be  purchased.   Section  32D

contemplates when tenants are deemed to have purchased

fragments.  The balance of any land, if any, after the

purchase  by  the  tenant  under  Section  32  shall  be

disposed of in the manner laid down in Section 15 as

if it were land surrendered by the tenant.  This is

the mandate of Section 32E.

23. Section  32F  deals  with  Right  of  tenant  to

purchase where landlord is minor etc. which reads as

follows:

32F.  (1)  Notwithstanding  anything

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contained in the preceding sections,– (a) where the landlord is a minor, or a widow, or a person subject to any mental or  physical  disability,   the  tenant shall have the right to purchase such land under section 32 within one year from  the  expiry  of  the  period  during which  such  landlord  is  entitled  to terminate the tenancy under section 31 [and for enabling the tenant to exercise the  right  of  purchase,  the  landlord shall send an intimation to the tenant of  the  fact  that  he  has  attained majority,  before  the  expiry  of  the period  during  which  such  landlord  is entitled to terminate the tenancy under section 31] : [Provided that where a person of such category is a member of a joint family, the provisions of this sub-section shall not apply if at least one member of the joint family is outside the categories mentioned  in  this  sub-section  unless before the 31st day of March 1958 the share of such person in the joint family has been separated by metes and bounds and  the  Mamlatdar  on  inquiry  is satisfied that the share of such person in the land is separated, having regard to the area, assessment, classification and  value  of  the  land,  in  the  same proportion as the share of that person in the entire joint family property and not in a larger proportion].

(b) where the tenant is a minor, or a widow, or a person subject to any mental or  physical  disability  or  a  serving member of the armed forces, then subject to  the  provisions  of  clause  (a),  the right to purchase land under section 32 may be exercised– (i) by the minor within one year from the date on which he attains majority;

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(ii)  by  the  successor-in-title  of  the widow within one year from the date on which her interest in the land ceases to exist;

(iii) within one year from the date on which the mental or physical disability of the tenant ceases to exist;

(iv) within one year from the date on which the tenant ceases to be a serving member of the armed forces :

[Provided that where a person of such category is a member of a joint family, the provisions of this sub-section shall not apply if at least one member of the joint family is outside the categories mentioned  in  this  sub-section  unless before the 31st day of March 1958 the share of such person in the joint family has been separated by metes and bounds and  the  Mamlatdar  on  inquiry  is satisfied that the share of such person in the land is separated, having regard to the area, assessment, classification and  value  of  the  land,  in  the  same proportion as the share of that person in the entire joint family property, and not in a larger proportion].

[(1A)  A  tenant  desirous  of  exercising the right conferred on him under sub- section (1) shall give an intimation in that  behalf  to  the  landlord  and  the Tribunal in the prescribed manner within the  period  specified  in  that  sub- section] :

[Provided that, if a tenant holding land from a landlord (who was a minor and has attained  majority  before  the commencement  of  the  Tenancy  and

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Agricultural Lands Laws (Amendment) Act, 1969)  has  not  given  intimation  as required by this sub-section but being in  possession  of  the  land  on  such commencement  is  desirous  of  exercising the right conferred upon him under sub- section (1), he may give such intimation within a period of two years from the commencement of that Act].

(2) The provisions of sections 32 to 32E (both inclusive) and sections 32G to 32R (both inclusive) shall, so far as may be applicable, apply to such purchase.

24. Section 32G reads as follows:-

32G. (1) As soon as may be after the tillers’ day the Tribunal shall publish or cause to be published a public notice in the prescribed form in each village within its jurisdiction calling upon –

(a) all tenants who under section 32 are deemed to have purchased the lands,

(b) all landlords of such lands, and

(c)  all  other  persons  interested therein, to appear before it on the date specified  in  the  notice.  The  Tribunal shall  issue  a  notice  individually  to each such tenant, landlord and also, as far  as  practicable,  other  persons calling  upon  each  of  them  to  appear before it on the date specified in the public notice.

(2)  The  Tribunal  shall  record  in  the prescribed manner the statement of the tenant whether he is or is not willing to  purchase  the  land  held  by  him  as tenant.

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(3) Where any tenant fails to appear or makes a statement that he is not willing to purchase the land, the Tribunal shall by an order in writing declare that such tenant is not willing to purchase the land  and  that  the  purchase  is ineffective :

Provided that if such order is passed in default of the appearance of any party, the  Tribunal  shall  communicate  such order to the parties and any party on whose default the order was passed may within 60 days from the date on which the order was communicated to him apply for the review of the same.

(4) If a tenant is willing to purchase, the  Tribunal  shall,  after  giving  an opportunity to the tenant and landlord and all other persons interested in such land to be heard and after holding an inquiry, determine the purchase price of such  land  in  accordance  with  the provisions of section 32H and of sub- section (3) of section 63A :

[Provided that where the purchase price in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of section 32H is mutually agreed upon by the  landlord  and  the  tenant,  the Tribunal after satisfying itself in such manner  as  may  be  prescribed  that  the tenant’s  consent  to  the  agreement  is voluntary may make an order determining the purchase price and providing for its payment  in  accordance  with  such agreement].

(5)  In  the  case  of  a  tenant  who  is deemed to have purchased the land on the postponed  date  the  Tribunal  shall,  as soon  as  may  be,  after  such  date

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determine the price of the land.

(6) If any land which, by or under the provisions of any of the Land Tenures Abolition Acts referred to in Schedule III  to  this  Act,  is  regranted  to  the holder thereof on condition that it was not  transferable,  such  condition  shall not be deemed to affect the right of any person  holding  such  land  on  lease created  before  the  regrant  and  such person shall as a tenant be deemed to have  purchased  the  land  under  this section, as if the condition that it was not transferable was not the condition of regrant.

25. Section 32H provides for the purchase price and

its maxima.

26. Now that we have the case as setup by learned

counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the

respondents and also the statutory scheme, we must

delve a little deeper into the facts and also apply

the same in the backdrop of the scheme of the Act.

The High Court has proceeded on the basis that the

appellant has not given notice under Section 32F(1A).

According to the High Court, it is mandatory.  Learned

counsel  for  the  respondent  also  relies  on  that

reasoning.   On  the  other  hand,  the  case  of  the

appellant is that in accord with his case, there is no

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requirement to give a notice under Section 32F(1A).

The landlord would point out that the Court may notice

that it is the case of the appellant that Section

32F(1A) has been substantially complied with by the

appellant.   

27. Section 29(2) contemplates that no landlord shall

obtain possession of any land or dwelling house held

by a tenant except under an order of the Mamlatdar.

He is obliged to make an application within two years

from the date on which the right to obtain possession

of the land or dwelling house, as the case may be is

deemed  to  have  accrued  on  him.   Subsection  (3)

provides that the Mamlatdar is to pass an order after

conducting such inquiry.  In the proviso, it may be

noticed that where an application under subsection (2)

is  made  by  a  landlord  in  pursuance  of  the  right

conferred upon the landlord under Section 31, in such

case, the Mamlatdar is to first decide preliminary

issues which include whether the conditions in clauses

(c) and (d) of Section 31A are satisfied.  He must

also be convinced that the conditions mentioned under

subsections (2) and (3) of Section 31B are fulfilled.

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He  is  dutybound  to  reject  the  application,  if  the

conditions therein are not fulfilled.  With the rest

of the provisions contained in Section 29, we may not

be detained.  Therefore, now coming to Section 31,

Section  31  falls  under  Chapter  III  titled  Special

Rights and Privileges of Tenants and Provisions for

Distribution of Land for Personal Cultivation.

28. Chapter III is divided in two parts.  Section 31

falls under Part (I) which provides - Termination of

Tenancy for Personal Cultivation and Non Agricultural

Use.  It will be noticed that Section 32 and other

provisions which follow the same fall under Part (II)

which deals with Purchase of Land by Tenants.

29. Reverting  back  to  Section  31,  it  contemplates

that subject to Sections 31A to 31D both inclusive and

notwithstanding whatever may be contained in Sections

14 and 30, a landlord after giving notice and making

an  application  for  possession  as  provided  in

subsection (2) can terminate the tenancy of any land

barring permanent tenancy, should he require the land

for cultivating personally or for any non agricultural

purpose.

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30. Subsection (2) provides that a notice is to be

given in writing.  It shall state the purpose for

which the landlord requires the land.  It is to be

served on or before 31st Day of December 1956.  A copy

of the said notice is to be sent to the Mamlatdar.  It

is thereafter clearly provided that an application for

possession  under  Section  29  is  to  be  made  to  the

Mamlatdar on or before 31st day of March 1957.

31. However,  subsection  (3)  of  Section  31

contemplates that where a landlord is a minor or a

widow  or  a  person  subject  to  mental  or  physical

disability, the notice may be given and an application

for possession under Section 29 may be made by the

minor  within  one  year  from  the  date  on  which  he

attains majority.  We are not concerned here with the

other categories.  Therefore, we can hold that if a

landlord  is  a  minor,  he  can  invoke  provisions  of

Section 29 and an application for possession under

Section 29 can be made within one year from the date

on which he attains majority.  Section 31A provides

for  the  conditions  of  termination  of  tenancy.   It

limits  the  right  of  the  landlord  to  terminate  a

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tenancy  for  cultivating  the  land  personally  under

Section  31  by  hedging  the  said  right  with  certain

conditions. The conditions also may not concern us.

It is now that we must pass on to Section 32.

32. Section 32 declares that on Tillers day which is

the First day of April 1957, every tenant shall be

deemed to have purchased from his landlord free of all

encumbrances subsisting thereon on the said day the

land held by him.  There are two limitations which can

be culled out from the said provisions.  A declaration

under  Section  32  is  made  subject  to  the  other

provisions of the said section.  It is further made

dependent  on  the  operation  of  the  next  succeeding

sections.  In other words, the provisions which follow

Section 32 will control the application of Section 32.

33. What is relevant to us is the first proviso of

Subsection (1) which is relied upon by the appellant.

This came to be added by the Bombay Act 38 of 1957.

If it is broken down, it provides as follows:

1. The  application  is  made  by  the landlord under Section 29 for obtaining possession of the land;

2.  it  has  been  rejected  by  the Mamalatdar or by the Collector in appeal

21

or  in  revision  by  the  Maharashtra Revenue  Tribunal.   [The  Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal has been brought in by way of Maharashtra Act 23 of 2007 with effect from 13.12.2007];

3.   if  the  aforesaid  elements  are satisfied the proviso declares that the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on the date on which the final order of rejection is passed;

4.  the date on which the final order of rejection is passed is to be referred to as 'the postponed date'.

34. Since  Section  32  has  been  made  subject  to  the

next succeeding sections, it will be noted that the

next succeeding sections in the form of Sections 32A,

32B,  32C  and  32D  provide  for  the  conditions  and

limitations  subject  to  which  the  deeming  provision

operates.  In other words, the deemed right which is

conferred on a tenant under Section 32 will be enjoyed

subject to the restrictions under Sections 32A to 32D.

35. Before  we  discuss  Section  32F,  we  deem  it

appropriate  to  refer  to  Section  32G.   Section  32G

deals with the power of the Tribunal to issue notice

and determine the price of the land to be paid by the

tenants.  Section 32G(5) declares that in the case of

a tenant who is deemed to have purchased the land on

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the postponed date the Tribunal shall determine the

price  of  the  land.   The  ‘Tribunal’  is  defined  in

Section 2(19) as the Agricultural Lands Tribunal under

Section 67.

36. Section 32G inter alia provides that the Tribunal

shall publish or cause to be published a public notice

calling  upon  the  persons  who  are  deemed  to  have

purchased the lands.  This is apart from calling upon

the landlords and other persons to appear on the date

specified in the notice.  The failure of the tenant to

appear or a tenant who makes a statement that he is

not willing to purchase the land will result in the

Tribunal  ordering  in  writing  declaring  that  such

tenant is not willing to purchase and the purchase is

ineffective.  If the tenant is willing to purchase,

the  Tribunal  after  giving  an  opportunity  to  the

landlord and the tenant determine the price.

37. Reverting back to Section 32F, it begins with a

non obstante clause.  The non obstante clause is qua

anything which is stated in the preceding sections.

38. It provides inter alia for a right of the tenant

to purchase where the landlord is a minor tenant.  In

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such  a  case,  he  would  have  the  right  to  purchase

within a period of one year under Section 32.  This

period of one year will begin to run from the expiry

of the period during which the landlord is entitled to

terminate the tenancy under Section 31.

39. Section 31 provides for a period of one year from

the date on which the minor attains majority when the

landlord  is  a  minor  for  him  to  give  notice  and

followed by an application under Section 29.

40. Section 32F further provides that the landlord is

obliged to send an intimation to the tenant of the

fact that he has attained majority before the expiry

of the period during which the landlord can terminate

the tenancy under Section 31.

41. We will illustrate working of the Section with a

concrete example.

If a landlord is a minor and he attains

majority as on 01.01.1966 then under Section 31,

he will get a period of one year for terminating

the  tenancy.   The  period  will  run  out  on

31.12.1966.  The landlord is obliged to intimate

his tenant about the fact that he has attained

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majority before 31.12.1966.  Thereupon, the tenant

if he wishes to purchase, he would have the right

to give a notice within a period of one year from

31.12.1966.  Thus, he would have the period till

30.12.1967.  As to how the intimation is to be

given  under  subsection  (1)  of  Section  32F  is

provided  in  Section  32F(1A).   Section  32F(1A)

provides  he  must  give  an  intimation  about  his

exercising the right under subsection (1) both to

the  landlord  and  the  Tribunal  in  the  manner

prescribed  within  the  period  mentioned  in

subsection (1) which we have explained by way of

an illustration.  The proviso which was added by

the Act 49 of 1969 contemplates an extended period

of giving the intimation by a tenant who is in

possession with which we may not be concerned.

42. We are inclined to proceed in this case on the

basis  that  the  appellant  had  not  given  intimation

within the meaning of Section 32F(1A) of the Act.  On

the other hand, the specific case which is pressed

before  us  is  that  what  is  crucial  is  he  must  be

treated as a deemed tenant having regard to the fact

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that the respondent – landlord unsuccessfully filed an

application within the meaning of Section 29 read with

Section 32.

43. At  this  juncture,  we  must  focus  on  the  facts

given  by  the  landlord  more  closely.   As  we  have

noticed,  the  case  of  the  appellant  is  that  the

respondent filed an application under Section 29 and

the  same  came  to  be  rejected  by  order  dated

27.07.1967.  The landlord, according to the appellant,

preferred an appeal which was rejected on 09.03.1968.

44. In  the  order  dated  09.03.1968,  the  Appellate

Authority found glaring loopholes in the evidence of

the first respondent.  On the one hand, there was an

entry regarding the date of birth which was in the

school register and on the other hand there was an

entry in the birth register.  One date of birth was

shown as 10.09.1947 whereas the other date of birth

was shown as 04.06.1948.  The school certificate shows

that the date of birth is 04.06.1948 where as the date

given in the birth register is 10.09.1947.

45. The application was filed by the first respondent

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- landlord on 20.05.1967.  If the date of birth is

taken as 04.06.1948, which was apparently pressed upon

by  the  first  respondent,  the  application  dated

20.05.1967 would have been within time.  Whereas if

the  date  of  birth  is  taken  as  10.09.1947,  the

application filed by the respondent was clearly time

barred.  The Authority did not accept the version of

the landlord.

46. From the orders which are produced before us in

the  revision  application  filed  by  the  first

respondent,  the  Maharashtra  Tribunal  has  confirmed

this finding.  The revision application was dismissed.

47. It  is  thereafter  that  the  appellant  filed  an

application purporting under Section 32G.  As we have

noticed the matter travelled upto the Tribunal which

remanded  it  to  the  Original  Authority,  it  is

thereafter that a new round of litigation commenced

and which culminated in the impugned order of the High

Court.   In  this  round,  the  order  of  the  Original

Authority went against the appellant and it is found

that the landlord became a major on 04.06.1966.

48. He found that the provisions of Section 32F are

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applicable.  The Original Authority further reasoned

that it was necessary for the appellant to exercise a

right of purchase by giving intimation under Rule 20

of the Rules, 1956 within two years from the date of

attaining majority i.e. by 04.06.1968.  This mandatory

provision was not complied with by the tenant and he

lost  his  right.   Regarding  the  proceedings  at  the

hands of the first respondent – landlord, it is stated

as regards extract of appeal register, there is some

discrepancy in the extract.  It has mentioned that the

date of lower court order is 27.07.1967 and the date

of  receipt  is  19.06.1967  (apparently  the  date  of

receipt is the date of receipt of the appeal, in other

words, the discrepancy is that the date of the appeal

is  earlier  than  the  date  of  the  order  which  is

impugned in the appeal).  It is further stated that

there  is  no  evidence  by  the  first  respondent  to

establish that the landlord terminated the tenancy and

filed an application for possession of the suit land

under Section 29 read with Section 31 after attaining

majority.   Therefore,  it  was  for  the  tenant  to

exercise his right of purchase under Section 32F(1A)

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which he failed to exercise and thus resulted in the

loss of his right.  The Assistant Collector in the

appeal filed by the appellant allowed his appeal.  The

Tribunal reversed the order of the Appellate Authority

and restored the order of the Original Authority.  The

Tribunal has proceeded on the basis of the discrepancy

in the appeal and the order is substantially on the

lines of what the Original Authority has proceeded to

hold.  It is further pointed out that where the party

is  to  produce  the  primary  evidence  it  would  be  a

certified copy and nothing else. The  landlord  has

denied the filing of the case for possession and the

tenant  /  appellant  has  failed  to  comply  with  the

provisions of Section 32F.  He has lost the right to

purchase the suit land.

49. The High Court has adverted to the provisions and

found there was a serious doubt expressed about the

initiation of proceedings filed by the landlord and

the  learned  Single  Judge  could  not  see  how  the

Tehsildar  and  the  Agricultural  Land  Tribunal  have

committed an error apparent on the face of the record

or perversity in regard to the finding about giving

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intimation.   It  was  further  found  that  in  the

proceedings under Section 32G, it was permissible to

the landlord to raise an issue of non compliance under

Section 32F(1A) by the tenant.

50. It was reiterated that intimation to the landlord

and the Tribunal under Section 32F(1A) is a mandatory

pre-requisite.

51. The  argument  of  the  appellant  that  the

proceedings  after  the  remand  must  be  treated  as  a

continuation of an earlier round of litigation and

there is a substantial compliance with Section 32F(1A)

was not accepted.

Interplay between Section 29 read with first proviso to Section 32(1) and Section 32F

52. A perusal of the First Proviso to Section 32(1)

read  with  Section  29  would  show  that  when  an

application is filed by the landlord for possession

and that application is rejected then the tenant is

deemed to have purchased the land.  With reference to

the date on which the order rejecting the landlord's

application under section 29 read with Section 32 is

passed.  This is a case of deemed purchase.  Section

32F,  on  the  other  hand,  entitles  the  tenant  to

30

purchase.  This is applicable in a situation where the

landlord is a minor and on attaining majority though

he has a period of one year from the date on which he

attains majority to terminate the tenancy and he does

not  do so.   Then  the time  starts ticking  for the

tenant from the expiry of the period of one year from

which the minor landlord becomes major.

53. If there is no deemed tenancy within the meaning

of Section 32 proviso read with Section 29 then the

only  alternative  available  for  the  tenant  is  to

purchase the right by invoking provision of Section

32F.  Both cannot exist together viz. if a person has

a deemed status, there is no need for him to apply for

purchase  under  Section  32F.   Section  29  read  with

Sections 32 and 32F deal with two mutually exclusive

situations.  In a case covered by Section 29 read with

Section 32(1) the tenant acquires the deemed status

and in a case where a matter is covered by Section

32F, there is no deemed status for the tenant but he

has to invoke provision of section 32F and issue a

notice both to the landlord and to the Tribunal within

the meaning of Section 32F(1A) and the matter has to

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be decided by the Authority.

54. In the facts of this case, if it is established

that  provisions  contained  in  Section  32  read  with

Section 29 are applicable in so far as if we accept

the case of the appellant that the respondent landlord

had invoked Section 29 read with Section 32,  being a

case of a minor who became entitled to apply within a

period of one year from the date of attaining majority

and the application culminated in the rejection of his

case then the appellant would acquire deemed status.

If he acquires deemed status, then there could be no

need to invoke Section 32F.  Rather there is no need

for him to again acquire a status which is conferred

upon him by law by a deeming provision.  Nothing more

is required to be done by the tenant in such a case.

55. Coming to the merits of the matter, the appellant

has  produced  material,  the  orders  passed  by  the

Appellate  Authority  and  also  by  the  Tribunal  in

Revision. It does show by invoking Sections 29 and 32,

the first respondent had applied by projecting the

case that he was born in 1948.  The application filed

by  him  stood  rejected  on  the  basis  that  the

32

application was barred as birth register showed that

he was born in 1947.  Though the appellant has not

produced certified copies earlier, the appellant has

produced the same in the High Court after the judgment

was  delivered  in  the  writ  petition  along  with  the

review petition.

56. A reference to case law does not advance the case

of the respondents.  In  Amrit Bhikaji Kale and Ors.

v. Kashinath Janardhan Trade and Anr. (1983) 3 SCC 437

which related to the proceedings under the Same Act,

this Court held as follows:

“On  the  tillers’  day  the  landlord’s interest in the land gets extinguished and simultaneously by a statutory sale without  anything  more  by  the  parties, the extinguished title of the landlord is  kindled  or  created  in  the  tenant. That  very  moment  landlord-tenant relationship as understood in common law of Transfer of Property Act comes to an end.  The link and chain is broken.  The absent  non-cultivating  landlord  ceases to have that ownership element of the land  and  the  cultivating  tenant,  the tiller  of  the  soil  becomes  the  owner thereof.

Section 32F has an overriding effect over Section 32 as it opens with a non obstante clause.  The combined effect of Sections 32F and 32 is that where the landlord  is  under  no  disability  as envisaged by Section 32F the tenant of

33

such landlord by operation of law would become the deemed purchaser by where the landlord is of a class or category as set  out  in  Section  32F,  the  date  of compulsory  sale  would  be  postponed  as therein  provided.   Since  ‘T’,  the landlord was under no disability and was alive on April 1, 1957 his tenant ‘J’ became  the  deemed  purchaser  on  the tillers’  day.   Therefore,  the relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant between  ‘T’  and  ‘J’  came  to  be extinguished  and  no  right  could  be claimed either by ‘T’ or anyone claiming through him such as ‘A’ or the present purchasers on the footing that they are the owners of the land on or after April 1, 1957.”

57. In Anna Bhau Magdum, Since Deceased by LRs v.

Babasaheb Anandrao Desai (1995) 5 SCC 243,  the Court,

no doubt, held that requirement under Section 32F(1A)

was mandatory.  There cannot be any automatic purchase

under Section 32 read with Section 32G in such a case.

However, it is relevant to note para 15.   

“15. The submission of Shri Wad is that if express statement made by the tenant could  not  stand  in  the  way  of  his availing the right conferred by the Act, there is no reason why merely because of inaction on his part a tenant should be deprived of the right.  The observations aforementioned  made  in  Amrit  Bhikaji Kale have to be read in the context of the  facts  of  that  case  where  it  was found  that  the  landlord  who  was  major and was under no disability, was alive

34

on  1-4-1957  and  the  provisions  of Section 32F were not attracted and there was deemed purchase of the land by the tenant  by  virtue  of  Section  32.   The subsequent statement made by the tenant in proceedings before the Aval Karkoon were, therefore, held to be of no avail. The  position  in  the  instant  case  is, however,  different.   The  respondent  – landlord was a minor on 1-4-1957 and the case  was  governed  by  Section  32F  and there  has  been  non  compliance  of  sub- section (1A) of Section 32-F.”

58. It is also relevant to note that it was not a

case where the question related to ‘postponed date’

within the meaning of the first proviso to Section

32(1), but the principle relating to deemed status

under Section 32(1) will apply in respect to deemed

status under the proviso.

59. In Sudam Ganpat Kutwal v. Shevantabai Tukaram

Gulumkar (2006)  7  SCC  200,  the  landlord  filed  an

application under Section 31 read with Section 29 of

the Act.  The claim was accepted and possession of

half of the land was directed to be delivered for a

bona fide cultivation.  The other half was to remain

with the tenant.  Thereafter, the landlady filed an

application seeking possession of the remaining half

of the land alleging certain defaults by the tenant.

35

Later,  the  successor-in-interest  of  the

landlady filed an application under Section 32(P)

read  with  Section  32F  for  declaration  that  the

deemed statutory purchase by the tenant was void

as  there  was  no  required  notice  under  Section

32F(1A) of the Act.  This Court referred to the

provisions and culled out its conclusions in para

23, which read, inter alia, as follows:

“23. The  position  as  disclosed  by  a combined  and  harmonious  reading  of Sections  31,  32,  32F  and  32G  may  be stated thus :

a) Where the landlord has not served on the tenant, a notice of termination (as stated in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 32), the tenant is deemed to have purchased the land on the tillers day (1.4.1957);

b) Where the tenant is deemed to have purchased the land on the Tillers Day (1.4.1957),  the  Lands  Tribunal  is required to issue notice and determine the price of land to be paid by tenant. Where there is a deemed purchase, but the right to purchase is postponed, the Land Tribunal shall determine the price of land, as soon as may be after the postponed date;

--------

f)  Where  a  landlord,  who  is  a  widow,

36

exercises her right of termination and secures  possession  of  part  of  the tenanted  land  for  personal  cultivation under  section  31(1)  of  the  Act,  then there is no question of her successor- in-title giving a notice of termination within one year from the date on which the  widow’s  interest  ceases  to  exist. When  section  31  (3)  ceases  to  apply, section  32F  also  will  not  apply  and there is no need for the tenant to give any intimation under section 32F(1A).”

60. In  Tukaram Maruti Chavan v. Maruti Narayan

Chavan (Dead) by LRs and Others (2008) 9 SCC 358, the

question  was  whether  the  appellant  could  exercise

right    to purchase in the absence of intimation

under  Section  32F(1A)  to  the  landlord  and  to  the

Tribunal.

61. The original landlady who was a widow died in

1964 leaving behind him two sons.  The original tenant

initiated  proceedings  under  Section  32G  which  was

ordered in his favour.

62. The Court was of the view that notice under

Section 32F(1A) is mandatory.  However, the Court also

inter alia held as follows:

“The  required  notice  is  not  mandatory only in a case when a widow landlady has already  exercised  her  right  under Section  31(1)  i.e.  when  during  her

37

lifetime,  a  notice  is  served  to  the tenant  that  the  landlady  requires  the land  bona  fide.   Once  a  notice  under Section 31(1) is served by such a widow landlady, the further benefit of Section 31(3) is not available.”

63. No  doubt,  learned  counsel  for  the  respondent

submitted that in the event the Court is inclined to

take a view that the certified copies are to be looked

into, the matter may be remitted back.

64. We are of the view that there is a wealth of

documents showing that the respondent litigated the

matter at three levels i.e. the application filed by

the landlord dated 20.05.1967, the order passed in

appeal and still further the order in revision before

the Tribunal.  Relying on some discrepancy as noted as

regards the date of filing of the appeal and the date

of the impugned order, the Authorities and the High

Court should not have found against the appellant.

65. There is no doubt in the case that the appellant

admittedly was a tenant of the first respondent.  We

hold it is a case where there was no need for the

appellant to send any intimation within the meaning of

38

Section 32F(1A).  He had acquired a deemed status with

the  rejection  of  the  application  filed  by  the

landlord.   The  appellant  was  not  obliged  to  do

anything further.  In view of the matter, we allow the

appeals and set aside the impugned decisions passed by

the High Court and restore the order passed by the

Collector. There will be no order as to costs.

…....................J. [ASHOK BHUSHAN]

…....................J. [K.M. JOSEPH]

NEW DELHI; FEBRUARY 12, 2019.

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