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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7919 OF 2011

BASANTI DEVI (DEAD) BY LRS & ORS … APPELLANTS  

VERSUS

RATI RAM & ORS … RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

S.ABDUL NAZEER, J.

1. This appeal  by the appellants-defendants is directed against  the judgment

and decree in RSA No. 1571of 1985 dated 31.08.2007 passed by the High Court of

Punjab and Haryana, whereby the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court

has been set aside and the judgment and decree of the trial Court has been restored.

2. The plaintiffs filed the civil suit No. 34 of 1977 for possession of 1/6 th share

of agricultural land measuring 348 kanals 14 marlas along with rights in well etc.

situated in village Berli Khurd, Tehsil Rewari.  It was alleged in the plaint that one

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Har Narain was the ancestor of the plaintiffs.  He had three brothers, namely, Jag

Ram,  Jas  Ram and Mukh Ram.   All  the three  brothers  died  issueless  and Har

Narian became the owner of the suit property.  Har Narian had four sons, namely,

Udmi, Bhoru, Shadi and Murli.  Murli died during the life time of Har Narain.

Murli had two sons, namely, Chhaju and Chiranji, who were minors at the time of

the death of Murli.  One Sheo Lal son of Anta, and Makhan son of Chunna got

their names entered in the revenue record showing themselves to be sons and the

heirs of  Har Narian.  Sheo Lal and Makhan applied for partition which was stayed

by the Assistant Collector First Grade, Gurgaon as in the meanwhile their title was

challenged.  The Assistant Collector First Grade, Gurgaon allowed the parties to

get the question of title decided in the Civil Court.  Therefore, the plaintiffs filed

the suit for declaration to the effect that Sheo Lal and Makhan were not the sons of

Har Narian and were not the co-sharers in the suit land.

3. This suit was dismissed by the Trial Court on 23.12.1929.  The appeal filed

by the plaintiffs challenging the said decree was allowed by the District Judge,

Gurgaon  and the decree of the Trial Court was set aside vide judgment and decree

dated 21.07.1930.  Sheo Lal and Makhan challenged the said decree by filing a

second appeal  which was allowed by the High Court  in part  and the case was

remanded to the District Judge for fresh disposal.  On remand, the parties entered

into a compromise and a compromise decree came to be passed.

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4. It was further contended by the plaintiffs that in terms of this compromise,

Sheo Lal was given a limited right to use the land in question without any right to

alienate or mortgage the property.  It was agreed that on the death of Sheo Lal, in

absence of any male lineal, his surviving wife would also have the limited right in

the land which comprised of 1/6th share of the total estate of Har Narain.  Under the

compromise, it was stipulated that after the death of the widow, in the absence of

any male lineal, the land will revert to the plaintiffs i.e. the heirs of Har Narain,

who will be entitled to take possession and Makhan will have no right over the

land.  Sheo Lal died somewhere in the year 1961-1962.  On his death, mutation

was entered in favour of Smt. Chhimli, who was the wife of Sheo Lal and the

daughters of Sheo Lal.  On the death of Chhimli in the year 1976, plaintiffs filed

the suit for possession of the 1/6th share which was earlier held by Sheo Lal and

upon his death by Smt. Chhimli.

5. The defendants filed the written statement opposing the suit by contending,

inter  alia,  that  after  the  death  of  Sheo  Lal,  his  widow Smt.  Chhimli  acquired

absolute ownership right by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act,

1956  (for  short  ‘the  Act’).   The  Trial  Court  vide  judgment  and  decree  dated

12.06.1979 held that Sheo Lal came into possession of the suit property by virtue

of the compromise decree.  It was further held that Smt. Chhimli is not entitled to

the benefit of Section 14(1) of the Act as Sheo Lal had limited right under the

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decree of the court and in this way Section 14(1) will not apply and her estate is

not enlarged into full ownership.  It was held that the limited right granted to Smt.

Chhimli cannot be inherited by her heirs and the same will revert to the plaintiffs in

terms of the compromise decree dated 23.12.1932.  It was also held that by virtue

of Section 14(2) of the Act Chhimli’s right of limited estate cannot be converted

into an absolute ownership right.

6. The First Appellate Court reversed this judgment and decree by holding that

Sheo Lal and Makhan had pre-existing right and the compromise decree cannot

restrict their rights.  It was also held that the limited estate of Sheo Lal is enlarged

into an absolute ownership right by operation of the law and thus, the plaintiffs

could not enforce the compromise decree against Smt. Chhimli and her heirs were

entitled to inherit the suit property.

7. As noticed above, the High Court has set aside the judgment and decree of

the First  Appellate Court and has restored the judgment and decree of the trial

court.   

8. Appearing for the appellants, Sh. M.N. Rao, learned senior counsel, submits

that Section 14(1) of the Act enlarges the scope of the estate into absolute estate if

the widow is in the possession of the land.  Sheo Lal died in 1961 and his wife

Chhimli died in 1976 and during that period she was in possession of the land.

Chhimli’s right was not a grant for the first time.  Her pre-existing right as wife of

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Sheo Lal to claim the property was not in dispute.  This position is clear from the

terms of compromise.  In other words, the pre-existing right of Sheo Lal’s widow

was recognized even in the compromise. The learned counsel has taken us to the

terms of compromise and submits that Sheo Lal had subsisting interest in the land.

Therefore, his widow has the right in the property of her husband.  It was argued

that even before the compromise, Sheo Lal was the owner and possessor of the

land.  Therefore, the High Court is not right in holding that the case falls under

Section 14(2) of the Act.  In support of his submissions learned senior counsel has

placed reliance on the decision of this Court in  V.Tulasamma & Ors.  v.  Sesha

Reddy (dead) by Lrs. reported in 1977 (3) SCC 99.   

9. On the  other  hand,  Sh.  P.N.  Sharma,  learned advocate  appearing for  the

respondents, submits that Chhimli, widow of Sheo Lal, had no pre-existing right in

the suit property and that she had acquired the right under the compromise decree.

Therefore, the case is covered under Section 14(2) of the Act.

10. Having regard to the contentions urged,  the question for  consideration is

whether Smt. Chhimli, the widow of Sheo Lal had any pre-existing right in the suit

property  or  she  acquired  the  right  under  the  compromise  decree  alone.

Consequently, whether the case would be covered under Section 14(1) or 14(2) of

the Act?

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11. It  is  an  admitted  position  that  on  23.12.1932  a  compromise  decree  was

passed in a suit filed by predecessors of the defendants against the predecessors of

the plaintiffs.  In terms of the compromise decree, the sons of Har Narain who

were predecessors-in-interest  of  the plaintiffs  agreed to  give limited possessory

rights  to  the predecessor  of  the defendant,  namely,  Sheo Lal.   In  terms of  the

compromise, the consent decree was passed holding that “during the lifetime of

Sheo Lal, he will not be entitled to sell or mortgage his property in any case”,

thereby meaning that Sheo Lal merely got restrictive possessory rights in terms of

the  decree  dated  23.12.1932  passed  by  the  District  &  Sessions  Judge,  Hissar.

Further,  it  categorically  provided  that  the  suit  property  was  to  revert  to  the

predecessors of the plaintiffs in case the widow predeceased Sheo Lal and in case

Sheo Lal  predeceases  the  widow,  the  widow shall  be  entitled to  use  the same

during her life time.  Thereafter, the suit property will revert to the predecessors of

the plaintiff.   It is thus clear that Sheo Lal was given a limited right in respect of

the suit property.  Sheo Lal died in the year 1961.  Chimmli, wife of Sheo Lal died

in 1976.  

12. The suit  was filed primarily on the ground that  neither  Sheo Lal nor his

widow had any pre-existing right in the suit land since their rights flow from the

compromise decree.   After the death of Smt. Chimmli, the plaintiffs were entitled

to the possession of the land.  It is clear that Sheo Lal was granted limited right not

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in  recognition  of  his  pre-existing  right.    Section  14(1)  of  the  Act  does  not

recognize the pre-existing right of a male Hindu.  The suit property never became

the self acquired property of Sheo Lal.  Even his widow Chimmli did not hold the

land in lieu of maintenance which can be enlarged into full ownership by virtue of

Section 14(1) of the Act.   The estate was conferred on Chimmli by virtue of the

decree which created a new right.  There were no pre-existing rights of either Sheo

Lal or his widow Chimmli.   The property in her hands came as a result of she

being a successor of Sheo Lal.   Smt. Chimmli would not have acquired a better

right than Sheo Lal in the suit property.  The rights of Sheo Lal as well as Smt.

Chimmli flow from the consent decree.

13. In  Tulasamma  (supra),  this  Court  has held that  Hindu women’s right  to

maintenance is the personal obligation so far as the husband is concerned and it is

the duty to maintain her even if he has no property.  The right to maintenance is a

pre-existing right.   If  the husband has property then the right  of  the widow to

maintenance becomes an equitable charge on his property and any person who

succeeds to the property carries with it the legal obligation to maintain the widow.

It was further held that the claim for the right to maintenance possessed by a Hindu

family is legally a substitute of a share which she would have got in the property of

her husband.

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14.  In the instant case, there is nothing on record to show that the property in

the hands of Chimmli came in lieu of maintenance or on account of arrears of

maintenance.  The property in her hands came as a result of she being a successor

of  Sheo Lal.  Sheo Lal did not possess any property.  He had only life interest in

the property which did not enlarge into a full right because Section 14(1) does not

recognize the pre-existing right of a Hindu male.   Smt. Chimmli could not have

acquired a better right than her husband had in the property in dispute.  Right of

Sheo Lal, as also Smt. Chimmli, flows from the decree.  Therefore, her right would

not  mature  into  full-fledged  ownership  by  virtue  of  Section  14(1).   She  has

acquired the right by virtue of the compromise decree for the first time.  Therefore,

Section 14(2) would apply to the instant case.

15. Resultantly, the appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed.  There will be

no order as to costs.        

……………………………J.      (N.V. RAMANA)

……………………………J.      (S. ABDUL NAZEER)

New Delhi; May 08, 2018.