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                                                                                     REPORTABLE      

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT     PETITION     (CIVIL)     NO.     666     OF     2002   

Bar Council of India           ……  Petitioner

   Vs.

Union of India          ……  Respondent

JUDGMENT

R.M.     LODHA,     J  .  

Bar Council of India by means of this writ petition under Article  

32 of the Constitution of India has raised challenge to the vires of Sections  

22-A, 22-B, 22-C, 22-D and 22-E of the Legal Services Authorities Act,  

1987 (for short, ‘1987 Act’) as inserted by the Legal Services Authorities  

(Amendment) Act, 2002 (for short, ‘2002 Amendment Act’).

2. By 2002 Amendment Act, in Section 22 of the 1987 Act, the  

words “Lok Adalat”  were  substituted by “Lok Adalat or Permanent Lok  

Adalat”  and a new Chapter VI-A entitled “Pre-litigation Conciliation and  

Settlement”  comprising of Sections 22-A to 22-E came to be inserted.  In  

Section 23 of the 1987 Act, the words “members of the Lok Adalats” were  

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substituted by the words “members of the Lok Adalats or the persons  

constituting Permanent Lok Adalats”.

3. The challenge is principally on the ground that Sections 22-A,  

22-B, 22-C, 22-D and 22-E are arbitrary per se; violative of Article 14 of the  

Constitution of India and are contrary to the rule of law as they deny  fair,  

unbiased and even-handed justice to all.

4. We have heard Mr. Manoj Goel, learned counsel for the  

petitioner and Mr. T. S. Doabia, learned senior counsel for the Union of  

India.  After oral arguments were over, Mr. Manoj Goel, learned counsel for  

the petitioner has also filed written submissions.  Elaborating the vice of  

arbitrariness in the impugned provisions, in the written submissions, it is  

submitted that Section 22-C(1) read with Section 22-C(2) provides that a  

dispute before Permanent Lok Adalat can be raised by moving an  

application to it unilaterally by any party to the dispute (before the dispute  

is brought before any court for settlement). The public utility service  

provider, thus, can play mischief by pre-empting an aggrieved consumer  

from   going   to   the   consumer  fora   or   availing  other  judicial  process

for redressal of his grievance and enforcement of his rights. Permanent  

Lok Adalats have been empowered to decide dispute on merits upon  

failure between the parties to arrive at a settlement under Section 22-C(8).  

While deciding the case on merits, the Permanent Lok Adalat is not  

required to follow the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code or the  

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Evidence Act.  Section 22-C(8) prevents  the courts and the consumer fora  

to examine the deficiencies in services such as transport, postal and  

telegraph, supply of power, light or water, public conservancy or sanitation,  

service in hospital, etc. and  renders the  provisions under challenge  

arbitrary and irrational.  

5. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that  award of  

the Permanent Lok Adalat on merits is made final and binding and cannot  

be called in question in any forum or court of law under Section 22-E(1)  

and (4). No right to appeal has been provided for against the award in any  

court of law. Since all the public utility services basically relate to the  

fundamental right to life provided under Article 21 of the Constitution, any  

adverse decision on merits by Permanent Lok Adalat would immediately  

impinge upon fundamental right of an aggrieved citizen and, therefore,  

even absence of one right of appeal makes these provisions  

unconstitutional as it is against the fundamental principles of fair procedure.  

To say that an aggrieved person can approach the High Court under  

Articles 226/227 of the Constitution against awards given by the Permanent  

Lok Adalats on merits and, therefore, absence of right of appeal does not  

matter, is completely misplaced. The writ jurisdiction under Articles  

226/227 is extremely limited and is no substitute of the appellate  

jurisdiction.

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6. An argument was raised that though  Permanent Lok Adalat  

supplants the civil court, consumer court or motor accident claims tribunal  

yet its mechanism and delivery of justice are not as effective as the above  

fora  as  the Permanent Lok Adalat is not required to follow the procedure  

contemplated in the Code of Civil Procedure and the Evidence Act.  

Moreover an award given on merits by Permanent Lok Adalat has to be by  

majority and since  Permanent Lok Adalat consists of one judicial member  

and two administrative members, there is preponderance of administrative  

members which is against fundamental principles of justice enshrined in  

the Constitution.

7. It was strenuously submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the  

jurisdiction conferred upon Permanent Lok Adalat can not oust the  

jurisdiction of the fora created under specialized statutes dealing with the  

services referred to in Section 22-A(b). In this regard, the provisions  

contained in three specialized statutes, namely, the Consumer Protection  

Act, 1986, The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 and the  

Insurance Act, 1938 were referred.  By relying upon a decision of this Court  

in The Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of  

Bombay and Others1, in the written arguments it has been submitted that  

the consumer fora as well as specialized courts/tribunals under the  

Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 and the Insurance Act,  

1938 have exclusive jurisdiction as far as enforcement of rights under these  

1  (1976)  (1) SCC 496

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statutes are concerned and their jurisdiction can not be taken away by  

Permanent Lok Adalat. Particularly, with reference to the provisions  

contained in the Consumer Protection Act, it is submitted that  

compensatory remedies available under this law are in addition to and not  

in derogation of any other law and since Permanent Lok Adalats  have no  

jurisdiction to grant compensatory relief, the jurisdiction of the consumer  

fora  remains intact.  Reliance has been placed on the decisions of this  

Court in Fair Air Engineers Pvt. Ltd. and another v. N.K. Modi2,  Skypak  

Couriers Ltd. v. Tata Chemicals Ltd.3, Trans Mediterranean Airways v.  

Universal Exports and another4 and National Seeds Corporation Limited v.  

M. Madhusudhan Reddy and another5. National Seeds Corporation  

Limited5 was also pressed into service in support of the submission that  

consumer protection laws were enacted pursuant to the solemn  

international obligations of our country and, therefore, the Permanent Lok  

Adalats cannot oust the jurisdiction of the consumer courts. It is also  

submitted that the jurisdiction of the consumer courts is protected unless it  

is expressly barred even in cases where some disputes can be adjudicated  

in different fora. Two decisions of this Court in this regard, namely,  

Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society v. M.  

2  (1996) 6 SCC 385 3  (2000) 5 SCC 294 4  (2011) 10 SCC 316 5  (2012) 2 SCC 506

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Lalitha (Dead) through LRs. and Others6  and  Kishore Lal v. Chairman,  

Employees’ State Insurance Corpn.7  have been relied upon.

8. Mr. T.S. Doabia, learned senior counsel for the Union of India,  

on the other hand, submitted that the issues raised in the writ petition have  

already been decided by this Court in S.N. Pandey v. Union of India (Writ  

Petition (Civil) No. 543/2002; decided on 28.10.2002) and the writ petition  

deserves to be dismissed on this ground alone. He  submitted that the  

impugned provisions are  in conformity with the objectives of Article 39A  

and intended to provide an affordable, speedy and efficient mechanism to  

secure justice.

9. As regards decision of this Court in S.N. Pandey (supra),   the  

counsel for the petitioner in rejoinder would submit that the dismissal of the  

earlier writ petition was in limine and would not be a binding precedent. The  

decisions of this Court in B. Prabhakar Rao and others v. State of Andhra  

Pradesh and others8, Union of India and others v. Jaipal Singh9 were relied  

upon.  Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that in the earlier  

writ petition, there was no law declared under Article 141 of the  

Constitution since points  now raised in the present writ petition were  

neither argued nor discussed. In this regard,  the learned counsel referred  

to the two  decisions of this Court in B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory of  

6  (2004) 1 SCC 305 7  (2007) 4 SCC 579 8  1985 (Supp) SCC 432 9  (2004) 1 SCC 121

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Pondicherry10, Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur11 and State  

of Punjab v. Baldev Singh12 .  

10. Article 39-A came to be inserted in the Constitution by  

Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976 with effect from 3.1.1977. It  

enjoins upon  the State to  secure that the operation of the legal system  

promotes justice on the basis of equal opportunity and in particular to  

provide free legal aid by suitable legislation or schemes or in any other way  

and to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any  

citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. Equal justice to all and  

free legal aid  are hallmark of Article 39-A. Pursuant to these objectives,  

the 1987 Act was enacted by the Parliament to constitute legal services  

authorities to provide free and competent legal services to the weaker  

sections of the society to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are  

not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities, and to  

organize Lok Adalats to secure that the operation of the legal system  

promotes justice on a basis of equal opportunity. The statement of objects  

and reasons that led to enactment of 1987 Act reads as follows :

“Article 39-A of the Constitution provides that the State shall  secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice on  the basis of equal opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide  free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any other  way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not  denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities.

10  AIR 1967 SC 1480 11  (1989) 1 SCC 101 12  (1999) 6 SCC 172

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2. With the object of providing free legal aid, Government had,  by Resolution dated the 26th September, 1980 appointed the  “Committee for Implementing Legal Aid Schemes” (CILAS) under  the Chairmanship of Mr. Justice P.N. Bhagwati (as he then was)  to monitor and implement legal aid programmes on a uniform  basis in all the States and Union territories. CILAS evolved a  model scheme for legal Aid programme applicable throughout  the country by which several legal aid and advice boards have  been set up in the States and Union territories. CILAS is funded  wholly by grants from the Central Government. The Government  is accordingly concerned with the programme of legal aid as it is  the implementation of a constitutional mandate. But on a review  of the working of the CILAS certain deficiencies have come to  the fore. It is, therefore, felt that it will be desirable to constitute  statutory legal service authorities at the National, State and  District levels so as to provide for the effective monitoring of  legal aid programmes. The Bill provides for the composition of  such authorities and for the funding of these authorities by  means of grants from the Central Government and the State  Governments.  Power has been also given to the National  Committee and the State Committees  to supervise the effective  implementation of legal aid schemes.

3. For some time now, Lok Adalats are being constituted at  various places in the country for the disposal, in a summary way  and through the process of arbitration and settlement between  the parties, of a large number of cases expeditiously and with  lesser costs. The institution of Lok Adalats is at present  functioning as a voluntary and conciliatory agency without any  statutory backing for its decisions. It has proved to be very  popular in providing for a speedier system of administration of  justice. In view of its growing popularity, there has been a  demand for providing a statutory backing to this institution and  the awards given by Lok Adalats. It is felt that such a statutory  support would not only reduce the burden of arrears of work in  regular Courts, but would also take justice to the door-steps of  the poor and the needy and make justice quicker and less  expensive.”   

11. For about a decade and half, the operation of the 1987 Act  

was closely watched.  It was felt that the system of Lok Adalats provided in  

the 1987 Act sometimes results in delaying  the dispensation of justice  

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where the parties do not arrive at any compromise or settlement in Lok  

Adalat and the case is  returned to the court of law or the parties are  

advised to pursue appropriate remedy for redressal of their grievance.  

Accordingly, amendment in the 1987 Act was felt by the Parliament to be  

necessary. The statement of objects and reasons of the 2002 Amendment  

Act, inter alia, reads as under:

“The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 was enacted to  constitute legal services authorities for providing and competent  legal services to the weaker sections of the society to ensure  that opportunities for securing justice were not denied to any  citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities and to  organize Lok Adalats to ensure that the operation of the legal  system promoted justice on a basis of equal opportunity.  The  system of Lok Adalat, which is an innovative mechanism for  alternate dispute  resolution, has proved effective for resolving  disputes in a spirit of conciliation outside the Court.   

2.   However, the major drawback in the existing scheme of  organisation of the Lok Adalats under Chapter VI of the said Act  is that the system of Lok Adalats is mainly based on compromise  or settlement between the parties. If the parties do not arrive at  any compromise or settlement, the case is either returned to the  Court of law or the parties are advised to seek remedy in a Court  of law. This causes unnecessary delay in the dispensation of  justice. If Lok Adalats are given power to decide the cases on  merits in case parties fails to arrive at any compromise or  settlement, this problem can be tackled to a great extent.  Further, the cases which arise in relation to public utility services  such as Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited, Delhi Vidyut  Board, etc., need to be settled urgently so that  people get  justice without delay even at pre-litigation stage and thus most of  the petty cases which ought not to go in the regular Courts would  be settled at the pre-litigation stage itself which would result in  reducing the workload of the regular Courts to a great extent. It  is, therefore, proposed to amend the Legal Service Authorities  Act, 1987 to set up Permanent Lok Adalats for providing  compulsory pre-litigative mechanism for conciliation and  settlement of cases relating to public utility services.

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3. The salient features of proposed legislation are as follows :-

(i) to provide for the establishment of Permanent Lok  Adalats which shall consists (sic) of a Chairman who is or has  been a District Judge or Additional District Judge or has held  judicial officer (sic)  higher in rank than that of the District Judge  and two other persons having adequate experience in public  utility services;

(ii) the Permanent Lok Adalat shall exercise jurisdiction  in respect of one or more public utility services such as transport  services of passengers of goods by air, road and water, postal,  telegraph or telephone services, supply of power, light or water  to the public by any establishment, public conservancy or  sanitation, services in hospitals or dispensaries, and insurance  services;

(iii) the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Permanent Lok  Adalat shall be up to Rupees Ten Lakhs. However, the Central  Government may increase the said pecuniary jurisdiction from  time to time. It shall have no jurisdiction in respect of any matter  relating to an offence not compoundable under any law;

(iv) it also provides that before the dispute is brought  before any Court, any party to the dispute may make an  application to the Permanent Lok Adalat for settlement of the  dispute;

(v) where it appears to the Permanent Lok Adalat that  there exist elements of a settlement, which may be acceptable to  the parties, it shall formulate the terms of a possible settlement  and submit them to the parties for their observations and in case  the parties reach an agreement, the Permanent Lok Adalat shall  pass an award in terms thereof. In case parties to the dispute fail  to reach an agreement, the Permanent Lok Adalat shall decide  the dispute on merits; and  

(vi) every award made by the Permanent Lok Adalat shall  be final and binding on all the parties thereto and shall be by a  majority of the persons constituting the Permanent Lok Adalat.”

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12. With the above objectives, 2002 Amendment Act was enacted  

by the Parliament and thereby Chapter VI-A (Sections 22-A to 22-E)  was  

brought in with few other consequential amendments elsewhere.

13. The title of Chapter VI-A is “Pre-litigation Conciliation and  

Settlement”. Section 22-A(a) defines “Permanent Lok Adalat”  to mean a  

Permanent Lok Adalat established under sub-section (1) of Section 22-B.  

“Public utility service”  is defined in Section 22-A(b). It means (i) transport  

service for the carriage of passengers or goods by air, road or water; or (ii)  

postal, telegraph or telephone service; or (iii) supply of power, light or  

water to the public by any establishment; or (iv) system of public  

conservancy or sanitation; or (v) service in hospital or dispensary; or (vi)  

insurance service. If the Central Government or the State Government  

declares in the public interest, any service to be a public utility service for  

the purposes of Chapter VI-A, such service on declaration is also included  

in the definition of ‘public utility service’ under Section 22-A(b).

14. The establishment of Permanent Lok Adalat is done under  

Section 22-B. The Central Authority and every State Authority, as the case  

may be, have been mandated to establish Permanent Lok Adalats at such  

places and for exercising such jurisdiction in respect of one or more public  

utility services and for such areas as may be notified. The composition of  

Permanent Lok Adalat is provided in Section 22-B (2). Accordingly, every  

Permanent Lok Adalat shall consist of (a) a person who is or has been a  

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District Judge or Additional District Judge or has held judicial office higher  

in rank than that of a District Judge and (b) two other persons having  

adequate experience in public utility service to be nominated by the Central  

Government or by the State Government, as the case may be on the  

recommendation of the Central Authority or by the State Authority (as the  

case may be). The judicial officer, namely, the District Judge or Additional  

District Judge or the Judicial Officer higher in rank than that of a District  

Judge shall be the Chairman of the Permanent Lok Adalat.

15. Section 22-C provides for the procedure for raising dispute  

before the Permanent Lok Adalat. Sub-section (1) provides that any party  

to a dispute may make an application to the Permanent Lok Adalat for the  

settlement of dispute before the dispute is brought before any court.  

However, Permanent Lok Adalat has no jurisdiction to deal with any matter  

relating to an offence not compoundable under any law. The second  

proviso puts a cap on the pecuniary jurisdiction inasmuch as it provides  

that the Permanent Lok Adalat shall not have jurisdiction in a matter where  

the value of the property in dispute exceeds ten lakh rupees. The Central  

Government, however, may increase the limit of ten lakh rupees in  

consultation with the Central Authority by notification.  

16. Sub-section (2) of Section 22-C puts an embargo on the  

parties to a dispute after an application has been made by any one of them  

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under sub-section (1) in invoking jurisdiction of any court in the same  

dispute.

16.1. Sub-section (3) of Section 22-C provides for the procedure to  

be followed by the Permanent Lok Adalat once an application is made  

before it by any party to a dispute under sub-section (1). This procedure  

includes filing of a written statement by each party to the application stating  

therein the facts and nature of the dispute and highlighting the points or  

issues in such dispute and the documents and other evidence in support of  

their respective written statement and exchange of copy of such written  

statement together with copy of documents/other evidence. The Permanent  

Lok Adalat may require any party to the application to file additional  

statement before it at any stage of the conciliation proceedings. Any  

document or statement received by Permanent Lok Adalat from any party  

to the application is given to the other party. On completion of the above  

procedure, the Permanent Lok Adalat proceeds with conciliation  

proceedings between the parties to the application under sub-section (4) of  

Section 22-C. During conduct of the conciliation proceedings under sub-

section (4) of Section 22-C, the Permanent Lok Adalat is obliged to  assist  

the parties in their attempt to reach an amicable settlement of the dispute  

in an independent and impartial manner. Every party to the application has  

a duty to cooperate in good faith with the Permanent Lok Adalat in  

conciliation of the dispute relating to the application and to comply with the  

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direction of the Permanent Lok Adalat to produce evidence and other  

related documents before it.

16.2. On satisfaction that there is likelihood of settlement in the  

proceedings, the Permanent Lok Adalat may formulate the terms of  

possible settlement of the dispute and give to the parties for their  

observations and where the parties reach at an agreement on the  

settlement of the dispute, they shall sign the settlement/agreement and  

Permanent Lok Adalat then passes an award in terms thereof and furnishes  

a copy of the same to each of the parties concerned.

17. Upto the above pre-litigation conciliation and settlement  

procedure, there is no problem or issue.  The petitioner is seriously  

aggrieved by the provision contained in Section 22-C(8) which provides  

that where the parties fail to reach at an agreement under sub-section (7),  

the Permanent Lok Adalat shall, if the dispute does not relate to any  

offence, decide the dispute. This provision followed by Section 22-D which,  

inter-alia,   provides that while deciding a dispute on merit the Permanent  

Lok Adalat shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and  

the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and  Section 22-E which accords finality to  

the award of Permanent Lok Adalat under sub-section (1) and the provision  

made in sub-section (4) that every award made by the Permanent Lok  

Adalat shall be final and hence shall not be called in question in any  

original suit, application or execution proceedings form mainly bone of  

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contention.   Are these provisions violative of Article 14 of the Constitution  

of India and contrary to rule of law, fairness and even- handed justice? are  

the questions to be considered.

18. Chapter VI-A inserted by the 2002 Amendment Act in 1987  

Act, as its title suggests, provides for pre-litigation conciliation and  

settlement procedure. The disputes relating to public utility service like  

transport service for carriage of passengers or goods by air, road or water  

or postal, telegraph or telephone service or supply of power, light or water  

or public conservancy system or sanitation or service in hospital or  

dispensary or insurance service, etc., in the very scheme of things deserve  

to be settled expeditiously.  Prolonged dispute in respect of the above  

matters between the service provider and an aggrieved party may result in  

irretrievable damage to either party to the dispute.  Today, with increasing  

number of cases, the judicial courts  are not able to cope with the heavy  

burden of inflow of cases and the matters coming before them. The  

disputes in relation to public utility service need urgent attention with focus  

on their  resolution at threshold by conciliation and settlement and if for any  

reason such effort fails, then to have such disputes adjudicated through an  

appropriate mechanism as early as may be possible. With large population  

in the country and many public utility services being provided by various  

service providers, the disputes in relation to these services are not  

infrequent between the service providers and common man. Slow motion  

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procedures in the judicial courts are not conducive for adjudication of  

disputes relating to public utility service.  

19. The statement of objects and reasons itself spells out the  

salient features of Chapter VI-A. By bringing in this law, the litigation  

concerning public utility service is sought to be nipped in the bud by first  

affording the parties to such  dispute an opportunity to settle  their dispute  

through the endeavours of the Permanent Lok Adalat and if such effort fails  

then to have the dispute between the parties adjudicated through the  

decision of the Permanent Lok Adalat. The mechanism provided in Chapter  

VI-A enables a party to a dispute relating to public utility service to  

approach the Permanent Lok Adalat for the settlement of dispute before the  

dispute is brought before any court.

20. Parliament can definitely set up effective alternative  

institutional mechanisms or make arrangements which may be more  

efficacious than the ordinary mechanism of adjudication of disputes through  

the judicial courts.  Such institutional mechanisms or arrangements by no  

stretch of imagination can be said to be contrary to constitutional scheme  

or against the rule of law. The establishment of Permanent Lok Adalats and  

conferring them jurisdiction upto a specific pecuniary limit in respect of one  

or more public utility services as defined in Section 22-A(b) before the  

dispute is brought before any court by any party to the dispute is not  

anathema to the rule of law.  Instead of ordinary civil courts, if other  

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institutional mechanisms are set up or arrangements are made by the  

Parliament with an adjudicatory power, in our view, such institutional  

mechanisms or arrangements cannot be faulted on the ground of  

arbitrariness or irrationality.  

21. The Permanent Lok Adalats under the 1987 Act (as amended  

by 2002 Amendment Act) are in addition to and not in derogation of Fora  

provided under various statutes.  This position is accepted by the Central  

Government in their counter affidavit.    

22. It is necessary to bear in mind that the disputes relating to  

public utility services have been entrusted to Permanent Lok Adalats only if  

the process of conciliation and settlement fails. The emphasis is on  

settlement  in respect of disputes concerning public utility services through  

the medium of Permanent Lok Adalat.  It is for this reason that sub-section  

(1) of Section 22-C states in no unambiguous terms that any party to a  

dispute may before the dispute is brought before any court make an  

application to the Permanent Lok Adalat for settlement of dispute. Thus,  

settlement of dispute between the parties in matters of public utility  

services is the main theme.  However, where despite the endeavours and  

efforts of the Permanent Lok Adalat  the settlement between the parties is  

not through and the parties are required to have their dispute determined  

and adjudicated, to avoid delay in adjudication of  disputes relating to  

public utility services, the Parliament has intervened and conferred power  

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of adjudication upon the Permanent Lok Adalat.   Can the power conferred  

on Permanent Lok Adalats to adjudicate the disputes between  the parties  

concerning public utility service upto a specific pecuniary limit,  if they  do  

not relate to any offence, as provided under Section 22-C(8), be said to be  

unconstitutional and irrational? We think not. It is settled law that an  

authority empowered to adjudicate the disputes between the parties and  

act as a tribunal may not necessarily have all the trappings of the court.  

What is essential is that it must be a creature of statute and should  

adjudicate the dispute between the parties before it after giving reasonable  

opportunity to them consistent with the principles of fair play and natural  

justice. It is not a constitutional right of any person to have the dispute  

adjudicated by means of a court only. Chapter VI-A has been enacted to  

provide for an institutional mechanism, through the establishment of  

Permanent Lok Adalats for settlement of disputes concerning public utility  

service before the matter is brought to the court and in the event of failure  

to reach any settlement,  empowering the Permanent Lok Adalat to  

adjudicate such dispute if it does not relate to any offence.   

23. The difference between “courts”  and “tribunals”  has come up  

for consideration before this Court on more than one occasion. Almost five  

decades back, this Court in M/s. Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam  

Sundar Jhunjhunwala and others13 stated that by “courts” the courts of civil  

judicature is meant and by “tribunals”  those bodies of men who are  

13 1962 (2) SCR 339

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appointed to decide controversies arising under certain special laws. All  

tribunals are not courts though all courts are tribunals. It was further  

observed that in the exercise of judicial power, a clear division was  

noticeable between courts and tribunals, particularly, certain special  

matters go before tribunals, and the residue goes before the ordinary  

Courts of Civil Judicature. Their procedures may differ, but the functions  

are not essentially different.  Both  courts and tribunals act “judicially”.  

24. In Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P. N. Sharma &  

Anr.14, the Constitution Bench of this Court observed that under our  

Constitution, the judicial functions and powers of the State have been  

primarily conferred on the ordinary courts; the Constitution recognises a  

hierarchy of courts and they are normally entrusted to adjudicate all  

disputes between citizens and citizens as well as between the citizens and  

the State. The powers which the courts exercise are judicial powers, the  

functions they discharge are judicial functions and the decisions they reach  

and pronounce are judicial decisions. The tribunals decide special matters  

entrusted to them for their decision. The procedure which the tribunals have  

to follow may not always be so strictly prescribed but the approach adopted  

by both the courts and tribunals is substantially the same; it is State’s  

inherent judicial function which they discharge.   

14  (1965) 2 SCR 366

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25. In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu & Ors.15, it has been stated by  

this Court that where the authority is called upon to decide a lis on the  

rights and obligations of the parties,  there is an exercise of judicial power.  

The  authority is called a tribunal if it does not have all the trappings of a  

court.

26. In a comparatively recent decision in Union of India v. R.  

Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association16 (Civil Appeal  No. 3067 of  

2004); decided on May 11, 2010, a Constitution Bench of this Court was  

concerned with the matters wherein the constitutional validity of Parts I-B  

and I-C of the Companies Act, 1956 inserted by Companies (Second  

Amendment) Act, 2002 providing for the Constitution of National Company  

Law Tribunal and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal was under  

challenge.  The Court while examining the difference between the courts  

and tribunals, inter alia, referred to earlier decisions of this Court, some of  

which have been noted above. The Court summarized the legal position as  

follows:

“(a) A legislature can enact a law transferring the jurisdiction  exercised by courts in regard to any specified subject (other than  those which are vested in courts by express provisions of the  Constitution) to any tribunal.               

(b) All courts are tribunals. Any tribunal to which any existing  jurisdiction of courts is transferred should also be a Judicial  Tribunal. This means that such Tribunal should have as members,  persons of a rank, capacity and status as nearly as possible equal  

15  1992 Supp (2) SCC 651 16 (2010) 11 SCC 1

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to the rank, status and capacity of the court which was till then  dealing with such matters and the members of the Tribunal should  have the independence and security of tenure associated with  Judicial Tribunals.

(c) Whenever there is need for ‘Tribunals’, there is no  presumption that there should be technical members in the  Tribunals. When any jurisdiction is shifted from courts to Tribunals,  on the ground of pendency and delay in courts, and the jurisdiction  so transferred does not involve any technical aspects requiring the  assistance of experts, the Tribunals should normally have only  judicial members. Only where the exercise of jurisdiction involves  inquiry and decisions into technical or special aspects, where  presence of technical members will be useful and necessary,  Tribunals should have technical members. Indiscriminate  appointment of technical members in all tribunals will dilute and  adversely affect the independence of the Judiciary.

(d) The Legislature can re-organize the jurisdictions of Judicial  Tribunals. For example, it can provide that a specified category of  cases tried by a higher court can be tried by a lower court or vice  versa (A standard example is the variation of pecuniary limits of the  courts). Similarly while constituting Tribunals, the Legislature can  prescribe the qualifications/eligibility criteria. The same is however  subject to Judicial Review. If the court in exercise of judicial review  is of the view that such tribunalisation would adversely affect the  independence of the judiciary or the standards of the judiciary, the  court may interfere to preserve the independence and standards of  the judiciary. Such an exercise will be part of the checks and  balances measures to maintain the separation of powers and to  prevent any encroachment, intentional or unintentional, by either  the legislature or by the executive.”  

27. The competence of the Parliament to make a law creating  

tribunals to deal with disputes arising under or relating to a particular  

statute or statutes or particular disputes is, thus, beyond question.

28. Sine qua non of taking cognizance of a dispute concerning  

public utility service by the Permanent Lok Adalat is that neither party to a  

dispute has approached the civil court. There is no merit in the submission  

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of the petitioner that the service provider may pre-empt the consideration of  

a dispute by a court or a forum under special statute by approaching the  

Permanent Lok Adalat established under Chapter VI-A of the 1987 Act and,  

thus, depriving the user or consumer of such public utility service of an  

opportunity to have the dispute adjudicated by a civil court or a forum  

created under special statute. In the first place, the jurisdiction of fora  

created under the Special Statutes has not been taken away in any manner  

whatsoever by the impugned provisions.  As noted above, the Permanent  

Lok Adalats are in addition to and not in derogation of fora provided under  

Special Statutes.  Secondly, not a single instance has been cited where a  

provider of service of public utility in a dispute with its user has approached  

the Permanent Lok Adalat first.  The submission is unfounded and  

misplaced.  

29. The alternative institutional mechanism in Chapter VI-A with  

regard to the disputes concerning public utility service is intended to  

provide an affordable, speedy and efficient mechanism  to secure justice.  

By not making applicable  the Code of Civil Procedure and the statutory  

provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, there is no compromise on the  

quality of determination of dispute since the Permanent Lok Adalat has to  

be objective,  decide the dispute with fairness and follow the principles of  

natural justice.  Sense of justice and equity continue to guide the  

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Permanent Lok Adalat while conducting conciliation proceedings or when  

the conciliation proceedings fail, in deciding a dispute on merit.  

30. Insofar as composition of Permanent Lok Adalat is concerned,  

Section 22-B(2) provides that every Permanent Lok Adalat shall consist of  

a person who is or has been a District Judge or Additional District Judge or  

has held judicial office higher in rank than that of a District Judge and two  

other persons having adequate experience in public utility service to be  

nominated by the Central Government or the State Government, as the  

case may be, on the recommendation of the Central Authority or the State  

Authority, as the case may be. Of the three members, the judicial officer is  

the Chairman of the Permanent Lok Adalat. The Central Authority under  

Section 3 of the 1987 Act, inter alia, consists of the Chief Justice of India, a  

serving or retired Judge of the Supreme Court to be nominated by the  

President in consultation with the Chief Justice of India and the other  

members to be nominated by the Central Government in consultation with  

the Chief Justice of India. The Chief Justice of India is the Patron-in-Chief  

of the Central Authority while a serving or retired Judge of the Supreme  

Court is the Executive Chairman. Similarly, the State Authority under  

Section 6 consists of the Chief Justice of the High Court, a serving or  

retired Judge of the High Court to be nominated by the Governor in  

consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court and such number of  

other members to be nominated by the State Government in consultation  

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with the Chief Justice of the High Court. It would be, thus, seen that the two  

members other than the judicial officer of a Permanent Lok Adalat can be  

appointed by the Central Government or the State Government, as the  

case may be, on the recommendation of the Central Authority or the State  

Authority only.  The composition of Central Authority and the State  

Authority has been noted above.  In the above view, it is misconceived to  

say that the judiciary has  been kept out in the appointment of members of  

the Permanent Lok Adalats. The independence of Permanent Lok Adalats  

does not seem to have been compromised at all as even the non-judicial  

members of every Permanent Lok Adalat have to be appointed on the  

recommendation of a high powered Central or State Authority headed by  

none other than the Chief Justice of India or a serving or retired Judge of  

the Supreme Court where the nomination is made by the Central  

Government or by the Chief Justice of the State High Court or a serving or  

retired Judge of the High Court where the nomination is made by the State  

Government.

31. It is not unusual to have the tribunals comprising of judicial as  

well as non-judicial members. The whole idea of having non-judicial  

members in a tribunal like Permanent Lok Adalat is to make sure that the  

legal technicalities do not get paramountcy in conciliation or adjudicatory  

proceedings. The fact that a Permanent Lok Adalat established under  

Section 22-B comprises of one judicial officer and two other persons having  

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adequate experience in public utility service does not show any abhorrence  

to the rule of law nor such composition becomes violative of principles of  

fairness and justice or is contrary to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution  

of India.

32. It is true that the award made by the Permanent Lok Adalat  

under 1987 Act has to be by majority of the persons constituting the  

Permanent Lok Adalat.  In a given case, it may be that the two non-judicial  

members disagree with the judicial member but that does not mean that  

such majority decision lacks in  fairness or sense of justice.

33. There is no inherent right of appeal. Appeal is always a  

creature of statute and if no appeal is provided to an aggrieved party in a  

particular statute, that by itself may not render that statute unconstitutional.  

Section 22-E(1)  makes every award of the Permanent Lok Adalat under  

1987 Act either on merit or in terms of a settlement  final and binding on all  

the parties thereto and on persons claiming under them. No appeal is  

provided from the award passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat but that, in  

our opinion, does not render the impugned provisions unconstitutional. In  

the first place, having regard to the nature of dispute upto a specific  

pecuniary limit relating to public utility service and resolution of such  

dispute by the procedure provided in Section 22-C(1) to 22-C(8), it is  

important that such dispute is brought to an end at the earliest and is not  

prolonged unnecessarily.  Secondly, and more importantly,  if  at all a  

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party to the dispute has a grievance against the award of Permanent Lok  

Adalat he can always approach the High Court under its supervisory and  

extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of  

India. There is no merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the  

petitioner that in that situation the burden of litigation would be brought  

back on the High Courts after the award is passed by the Permanent Lok  

Adalat on merits.

34. The challenge to the validity of the impugned provisions came  

up before this Court in S.N. Pandey (supra).  A  three-Judge Bench of this  

Court was not persuaded by the challenge and held as under:

“We have gone through the provisions of the said Chapter which  contemplated the setting up of permanent Lok Adalats, for deciding  disputes in which public utility services is one of the matters  involved. It is quite obvious that the effort of the legislature is to  decrease the work load in the Courts by resorting to alternative  disputes resolution. Lok Adalat is a mode of dispute resolution  which has been in vogue since over two decades. Hundreds of  thousands of cases have been settled through this mechanism and  is undisputedly a fast means of dispensation of justice. The  litigation is brought to a quick end with no further appeals or  anguish to the litigants. The constitution of the permanent Lok  Adalats mechanism contemplate the judicial officer or a retired  judicial officer being there alongwith other persons having  adequate experience in the public utility services.

We do not find any constitutional infirmity in the said legislation.  The act ensures that justice will be available to the litigant speedily  and impartially. We do emphasis that the persons who are  appointed on the Permanent Lok Adalats should be person of  integrity and adequate experience. Appropriate rules, inter alia in  this regard, no doubt will have to be framed, if not already in place. We upheld the validity of the said Act and hope the Permanent Lok  Adalats will be set up at an early date. The Lok Adalats are  enacted to Primarily bring about settlement amongst the parties.  The parties are normally required to be present in person and  

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since the impugned provisions are in the interest of the litigating  public, the Lok Adalats shall perform their duties and will function;  even if members of the Bar choose not to appear.”

35. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the disposal  

of the  writ petition filed by S.N. Pandey was  in limine and the order  

passed therein cannot be construed as a binding precedent. It was also  

submitted that the said decision does not declare any law under Article 141  

of the Constitution since points now raised in the present matter, were  

neither argued nor discussed.

36. We are not persuaded by the submission of the learned  

counsel for the petitioner. Although the disposal of writ petition in S.N.  

Pandey was in limine and the order is brief but the court has disposed of  

the same on merits. In B. Prabhakar Rao8 , O. Chinnappa Reddy ,J.  did  

observe in para 22 that the dismissal in limine of a writ petition cannot  

possibly bar the subsequent writ petitions but at the same time he also  

observed that such a dismissal in limine may inhibit the discretion of the  

Court. V. Khalid, J. in his supplementing judgment in para 27(6) exposited  

the position that normally this Court would be disinclined to entertain or to  

hear petitions raising identical points again where on an earlier occasion,  

the matter was heard and dismissed. Not that this Court had no jurisdiction  

to entertain such matters, but would normally exercise its discretion against  

it. We are in complete agreement with the above view of V. Khalid, J.  It is  

against public policy and well defined principles of judicial discretion to  

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entertain or hear petitions relating to same subject matter where the matter  

was heard   and dismissed on an earlier occasion.  

37. Independent of the view of this Court in S.N. Pandey,  for the  

reasons that we have indicated above, we find no merit in the challenge to  

the impugned provisions of Chapter VI-A brought in the 1987 Act by  2002  

Amendment Act.  

38. We, accordingly, dismiss the writ petition with no order as to  

costs.

                     …………………….. J.                                    (R.M. Lodha)

                     ………………………J.                         (Anil R. Dave)   

NEW DELHI. AUGUST 3, 2012.   

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