18 December 2014
Supreme Court
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BANARSI DASS Vs STATE OF HARYANA

Bench: KURIAN JOSEPH,ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE
Case number: Crl.A. No.-000534-000535 / 2012
Diary number: 25786 / 2011
Advocates: RISHI MALHOTRA Vs MONIKA GUSAIN


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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 534-535 OF 2012

Banarsi Dass and others … Appellant (s)   

Versus

State of Haryana … Respondent (s)

J U D G M E N T  

KURIAN, J.:   

1. The  appellants  faced  trial  under  Section  498A  read  with  

Section 304B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (45  

of  1860)  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘IPC’).  The  trial  court  

acquitted them under Section 304B of IPC but convicted them  

under  Section  498A  of  IPC.  The  State  took  up  the  matter  in  

appeal before the High Court against the non-conviction under  

Section  304B of  IPC.  The  High  Court  allowed  the  appeal  and  

convicted  them  under  Section  304B  of  IPC  also.  During  the  

pendency  of  the  appeal,  appellant  no.1-father-in-law  of  the  

deceased  and  appellant  no.2-mother-in-law  of  the  deceased  

expired.  Therefore,  the  appeals  survive  only  in  respect  of  

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appellant no.  2-husband of the deceased,  appellant no.3-elder  

brother of the deceased and appellant no.4-younger brother of  

the deceased.

2. The  deceased  Chander  Kalan  was  the  sister  of  PW-12-

Mahabir  and  PW-13-Satpal  and  the  wife  of  accused-Ramesh  

Kumar. The marriage was on 14.04.1995. The allegation is that  

on account of non-payment of the dowry as demanded by the  

husband  and  in-laws,  she  was  being  ill-treated.  One  such  

incident was on 01.01.1997 and she lost a couple of teeth. There  

was  a  Panchayat  and  the  matter  was  compromised  and  

therefore, the case then registered under Section 498A read with  

Section  323  of  IPC  was  not  pursued.  It  is  alleged  that  even  

thereafter  the  attitude  of  the  in-laws  did  not  change.  On  

18.06.1998, it is alleged that she was beaten and pushed out of  

the  house  and  at  around  02.00  p.m.,  the  accused  sprinkled  

kerosene on her and set her on fire. She was admitted in the  

hospital  by 05.00 p.m. and examined by PW-1-Dr.  S.D.  Goyal,  

who found that Chander Kalan suffered burn injuries which were  

approximately  45%.  On his  request,  PW-16-ASI  Jagdeep Singh  

recorded  Exhibit-PM-dying  declaration.  Thereafter,  she  was  

admitted in the hospital of PW-9-Dr. Soni on 19.06.1998 and, on  

17.07.1998, she was further shifted to the hospital of PW-5-Dr.  

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SubhashVerma,  where  she  died  on  04.08.1998.  PW-2-Dr.  V.K.  

Kawatra conducted the postmortem along with Dr. Arun Gupta.  

3. The  trial  court  chose  not  to  believe  Exhibit-PM-dying  

declaration,  but  relied  on  the  evidence  of  PW-5-Dr.  Subhash  

Verma and                         PW-6-Lalman, Tehsildar and ruled out  

the possibility of burning by the accused. However, having found  

that there is evidence to establish cruelty, all the accused were  

convicted  under  Section  498A of  IPC.  The  High  Court,  in  the  

appeal  by  the  State,  entered  the  following  conclusion  at  

paragraphs-8 to 10:

“8. Ex.PM  the  dying  declaration  of  Chander  Kalan  recorded by PW16 ASI Jagdeep Singh and PW6 Lalman  Tehsildar is found to be an important document which  ultimately  determines  the  crime  committed  by  the  accused.  PW1 Dr.  S.D.  Goyal  who examined Chander  Kalan on 18.6.1998 at about 5.00 pm has deposed that  Chander Kalan was in a fit state of mind. PW6 Lalman  Tehsildar  and  PW16  ASI  Jagdeep  Singh  also  would  depose that the dying declaration of Chander Kalan was  recorded  by  PW16  ASI  Jagdeep  Singh  only  after  the  opinion  was  expressed  by  the  doctor  that  Chander  Kalan was in a fit state of mind. It is relevant to note at  this state that the occurrence took place as early as on  18.6.1998  at  about  2:00  pm.  Unfortunately  Chander  Kalan passed away only on 4.8.1998 in the hospital of  Dr.  Subhash  Verma  who  was  examined  as  PW5.  Chander Kalan had survived for about one and a half  month with 40 to 45% burn injuries on her person. The  above  materials  would  go  to  establish  that  Chander  Kalan  was  infact  in  a  fit  state  of  mind  to  give  declaration as to the cause of her death. 9. PW16 ASI Jagdeep Singh should have in all fairness  approached  the  Judicial  Magistrate  for  recording  the  dying  declaration.  Anyway  the  position  of  the  law  is  very  clear  that  the  dying  declaration  may  not  be  in  

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writing. The dying declaration of a dying person can be  given to any person for that matter, as otherwise the  person who is in the death bed would pass away before  the  respectable  person  comes  to  the  hospital  for  recording  the  dying  declaration.  In  this  case  the  deceased survived for about one and a half month. She  sustained only 40 to 45% burn injuries. She was also in  a  fit  state  of  mind  at  the  time when  PW16  inquired  about her health from the doctor who gave treatment  to  her.  As  already  pointed  out  by  me  PW16  had  associated  PW6  Lalman  Tehsildar  for  recording  the  dying declaration of Chander Kalan. Just because PW16  failed to associate the learned Judicial Magistrate, the  Court cannot throw away the dying declaration given by  Chander Kalan, if the dying declaration is found to be  truthful and is found to have been given without any  influence from outside. 10. Of  course,  PW6  Lalman  Tehsildar  would  depose  that PW13 Satpal was very much present and he was  found chatting with Chander Kalan at  the time when  they  descended  on  the  ward  to  record  the  dying  declaration  of  Chander  Kalan.  The  relatives  of  the  injured person fighting for life would naturally inquire  about  the health  of  the injured person.  The relatives  cannot be kept away from their natural inquiry about  the health of the injured just because dying declaration  was to be recorded from the dying person. PW13 Satpal  was very much present when the dying declaration was  recorded.  In  fact  PW13  Satpal  had  subscribed  his  signature to dying declaration Ex.PM as a witness to the  same document. The presence of the relative does not  ipso  facto cast  a  doubt  on the veracity  of  the dying  declaration.”  

 

4. On  the  basis  of  the  above  discussion,  the  High  Court  

entered the following finding at paragraph-12,  which reads as  

follows:

“12. I find that the dying declaration given by Chander  Kalan to PW16 ASI Jagdeep Singh in the presence of  PW6 Lalman Tehsildar is found to be truthful and the  same has been given without any external  influence.  

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The dying declaration gave a  graphic  account  of  the  earlier occurrence wherein she received an attack from  these  accused  and  the  persistent  demand  of  dowry  made by the accused which culminated in the present  occurrence wherein she was put to death by sprinkling  kerosene upon her and setting fire by the accused. I do  not entertain any doubt as to the veracity of the dying  declaration given by Chander Kalan. The trial court has  rejected the dying declaration not  only on the flimsy  ground but also on pure surmise.”

5. Heard learned Counsel appearing for both the parties.

6. According to learned Counsel appearing for the appellants,  

there is absolutely no justification in convicting the appellants  

under Section 304B of IPC and Section 498A of IPC. However,  

learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  respondent-State  contends  

that  in  view  of  the  overwhelming  evidence  which  has  been  

minutely discussed by the High Court, the conviction under both  

Section 304B of IPC and Section 498A of IPC are to be sustained.

7. In the nature of the view we propose to take in this case,  

particularly since the conviction by the High Court is only on the  

basis  of  Exhibit-PM-dying  declaration,  we  do  not  think  it  

necessary to go elaborately into the evidence. It will be sufficient  

to  refer  to  the  evidence  of  PW-16-ASI  Jagdeep  Singh,  who  

recorded the dying declaration and the medical evidence. It is  

seen that the request for recording the statement was first made  

before the First Divisional Magistrate, Hisar, who in turn directed  

the  Executive  Magistrate,  Hisar  to  record  the  same.  The  

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Executive Magistrate, viz., Tehsildar, Hisar took along with him  

PW-16-ASI Jagdeep Singh. PW-16 states thus in his evidence:

“…  On  reaching  the  ward  Chander  Kalan  made  statement  to  Tehsildar  in  my  presence  and  on  the  asking of  Tehsildar  I  recorded that  statement  on the  dictation of Tehsildar. The statement made by Chander  Kalan to the Tehsildar in my presence and dictated to  me by Tehsildar Sh. Lal man is Ex.PM.  Chander Bhan  and  Satpal  brother  of  Chander  Kalan  were  standing  inside the gate of the ward.  They were called and in  their presence the statement was read over by me to  Chander  Kalan  and after  admitting  her  statement  as  correct  Chander  Kalan  thumb  marked  the  statement  Ex.PM.  Chander  Bhan  and  Satpal  also  put  their  signatures under the statement which was attested by  the Tehsildar. This statement was forwarded by me to  the  police  station  with  my  endst.  Ex.PM/1  got  registration of case.”

(Emphasis supplied)   

8. PW-1 is Dr. S.D. Goyal who examined the deceased when  

she was first brought to the Community Health Centre, Uklana  

Mandi. He stated as follows:

“The entire face was having burns. The skin had  collected at the edges. The front and back of neck was  burnt. The entire front of chest was having burns. Both  sides of chest extending a bit to back burnt. Front of  abdomen and sides were having burns above umbilicus.  There was a small  burn patch in  lower part  of  back.  Both  the  arms  were  having  burns  in  front  and  back  except some part of right fore-arm on back. The hands  in front and back were having burns. B.P. was 110/70,  pulse  90  per  minute,  patient  was  conscious.  The  duration of injury being within 6 hours. The percentage  of burns was 45% approximately.”

(Emphasis supplied)     

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9. In  cross-examination,  it  is  stated  by  him  that  she  was  

brought to the clinic by her husband-Ramesh Kumar along with  

3/4 more persons whom the doctor could not identify. It has also  

clearly come out in the evidence that “except burn injuries, no  

other injury caused by any other weapon blunt or incised was  

found on the person of Chander Kalan”. And still further, it was  

noted that there was no sign of any burn mark below umbilicus  

and on the back of  the deceased except  one small  patch on  

lower  part  of  the  back.  The long hair  was  not  affected at  all  

which  indicates  that  the  fire  was  extinguished  soon  after  it  

caught the clothes of Chander Kalan. According to him, a patient  

with 45% burns can survive if  good and proper medical aid is  

given to him or her.

10. On  the  request  of  PW-1,  the  patient  was  shifted  to  the  

General Hospital at Hisar for further treatment. PW-9 is Dr. S.K.  

Soni  of  Soni  Nursing  Home,  Hisar  where  the  deceased  was  

treated  from  19.06.1998  to  17.07.1998.  Being  a  very  crucial  

piece of evidence, we shall extract the same as such:

“When Chander Kalan was discharged from my hospital  she was not having any symptom of septicemia due to  infection of burn. Slight infection was there in the burn  injuries. This infection could have been cured by skin  grafting  but  the  relation  of  the  patient  were  not  prepared for skin grafting operation and for keeping the  patient in my hospital. If kerosene had fallen of any part  of the body are on the cloth that part of the body and  

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even  it  surrounding  and  the  cloth  if  set  ablaze  shall  catch  fire  immediately.  The  burns  on  the  body  of  Chander  Kalan were  in  the front  portion of  the body  from face to  umbilicus.  I  had advised Chander  Kalan  and her  attendant that Chander Kalan should remain  admitted  in  my  clinic  for  some  more  days  for  her  complete cure but her relation did not agree and she  was discharged. There was no bed sore on the body of  Chander Kalan till she remained admitted in my clinic.  There were chances of survival of the patient where the  burns were 40% if continuous medical care has been  given to the patient.”  

(Emphasis supplied)

 

11. PW-2 is Dr. V.K.Kawatra, Medical Officer, General Hospital,  

Hisar, who conducted postmortem. The descriptions of the burns,  

as noted by him, reads as follows:

“There  was  a  dressed  wound  on  the  anterior  surface of the both upper limbs, anterior surface of the  chest and part of the abdomen above the umbilicus, the  anterior surface of the neck and lower part of the face,  both shoulders and a little part on the posterior surface  of the chest and neck. The dressing was opened. The  granulation tissue was present on the front of the chest,  arms  and  neck.  There  was  pus-discharge  seen  at  various places. There were bed sores on the back and  at  the  sacral  region.  Pus  was  also  seen  it.  The  approximate percentage of burn was 45%.”

 

12. According to Dr. V.K. Kawatra, “the cause of death in the  

instant case was septicemia due to infected burns”. The burns  

were                        ante-mortem in nature and sufficient to  

cause death in the ordinary course of nature.  

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13. In cross-examination,  PW-1-Dr.  V.K.  Kawatra has deposed  

as follows:-

“It is correct to suggest that if proper care should have  been taken then the bedsore should not have occurred.  There  was  a  great  possibility  that  infection  of  burn  causing septicemia could have been avoided if proper  care and treatment had been given to Chander Kalan. I  agree in good institution, if there is a proper treatment  45% burns on the parts of the body as found in this  case could not have been fatal.”

(Emphasis supplied)

 

14. From the  evidence  which  we  have  extensively  extracted  

above,  the  emerging  factual  position  is  that  the  dying  

declaration  does  not  come under  Section  32(1)  of  the  Indian  

Evidence  Act,  1872  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the  Evidence  

Act”) and, hence, it is not relevant for the following reasons:

a. The  alleged  incident  of  pouring  of  kerosene  on  the  

deceased was on 18.06.1998 at around 02.00 p.m. and the  

statement is said to have been recorded on the same day.  

b. PW-16-ASI  Jagdeep  Singh,  who  is  also  the  investigating  

officer,  had  not  recorded  the  statement  given  by  the  

deceased. What he recorded was the statement made by  

the  deceased  to  the  Tehsildar  and  what  the  Tehsildar  

dictated to him. It has come in evidence that the Tehsildar  

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did  not  have  any  problem  or  difficulty  in  recording  the  

statement himself. It is also not a case of any translation.  

c. The statement does not pertain to the cause of death or  

circumstances of the transaction which resulted in death.  

The death in this case on 04.08.1998, after seven weeks of  

the incident, is not caused by the burns but on account of a  

serious  infection,  septicemia  caused  due  to  improper  

management of the wounds.

d. It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  patient  was  initially  at  the  

Community Health Centre.  Thereafter,  she was shifted to  

General Hospital, from 19.06.1998 to 17.07.1998, she was  

in Dr. Soni’s Hospital and, thereafter, from 17.07.1998 till  

her  death  on  04.08.1998 at  the  Hospital  of  Dr.  Subhash  

Verma. The available medical evidence clearly shows that  

the death is not due to the burns. It is due to septicemia  

and  the  infection  could  have  been  avoided  by  proper  

medical care.    

15. Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act deals with cases in which  

statement  of  the  cause  of  death,  by  a  person  who  is  dead,  

becomes a relevant fact. To quote:

“32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by  person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is  

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relevant.-Statements,  written  or  verbal,  of  relevant  facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be  found,  or  who  has  become  incapable  of  giving  evidence,  or  whose  attendance  cannot  be  procured  without an amount of delay or expense which,  under  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  appears  to  the  Court  unreasonable,  are  themselves  relevant  facts  in  the  following cases:- (1) when it relates to cause of death.—When the  

statement is made by a person as to the cause of  his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the  transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in  which the cause of that person's death comes into  question.

Such  statements  are  relevant  whether  the  person  who made them was or  was  not,  at  the  time when they were made, under expectation of  death,  and  whatever  may  be  the  nature  of  the  proceeding in which the cause of his death comes  into question.”

16. A bare analysis of the provision, for the purpose of the case  

at hand, would show that a statement by a person made before  

his  death  to  be  relevant,  the  following  ingredients  are  to  be  

satisfied:

i) The statement is made by a person who is conscious and  

believes or apprehends that death is imminent.  

ii) The statement must pertain to what the person believes to  

be the cause or circumstances of death.

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iii) What  is  recorded  must  be  the  statement  made  by  the  

person concerned,  since it  is  an exception to the rule of  

hearsay evidence.

iv) The  statement  must  be  confidence  bearing,  truthful  and  

credible  as  held  by  this  Court  in  Laxman v.  State  of  

Maharashtra1 and consistently followed including the very  

recent one in Mallella Shyamsunder v. State of Andhra  

Pradesh  (in  Criminal  Appeal  No.  1381  of  2011  

decided on 29.10.2014).

v) The  statement  should  not  be  one  made  on  tutoring  or  

prompting.

vi) The court may also scan the statement too see whether the  

same is prompted by any motive of vengeance.   

17. In the case before us, the incident occurred on 18.06.1998  

whereas  the  death  is  on  04.08.1998.  Exhibit-PM-dying  

declaration was recorded on 18.06.1998 itself.  At  the time of  

recording of the statement, the condition of the patient no doubt  

was very stable and she was in a very good state of mind as  

recorded by the doctor. The burn injury was only 40-45% of the  

body and, according to doctor 40-45% burns is not fatal and such  

a patient  can be saved if  given proper  treatment.  It  has also  1 (2002) 6 SCC 710

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come out in evidence that the death is not caused by the burns  

but because of septicemia, an infection on account of improper  

management of the wounds. It is fairly clear that the patient on  

18.06.1998 was  not  apprehending death,  not  merely  because  

she  lived  for  more  than  seven  weeks  after  the  incident  but  

because  of  the  nature  of  the  burn  injuries  which  we  have  

referred  to  above.  No  doubt,  as  laid  down  by  this  Court  in  

Najjam Faraghi @ Nijjam Faruqui v. State of West Bengal2,  

merely  because  a  person  died  long  after  making  the  dying  

declaration, the statement does not become irrelevant. It was a  

case where the incident was on 29.06.1985 and death was on  

31.07.1985  and  in  that  case,  there  was  a  certificate  by  the  

doctor who conducted the postmortem that death was due to  

ante-mortem  burns  and  the  burns  were  extending  over  the  

whole body. To quote:

“9. There  is  no  merit  in  the  contention  that  the  appellant’s  wife  died  long  after  making  the  dying  declarations  and therefore those statements  have no  value. The contention overlooks the express provision  in  Section  32  of  the  Evidence  Act.  The  second  paragraph of sub-section (1) reads as follows:

“Such statements are relevant whether the  person who made them was or was not,  at  the  time  when  they  were  made,  under  expectation of death, and whatever may be  the  nature  of  the  proceeding  in  which  the  cause of his death comes into question.”

2 (1998) 2 SCC 45 13

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No doubt it has been pointed out that when a person is  expecting his death to take place shortly he would not  be indulging in falsehood. But that does not mean that  such a statement loses its value if the person lives for a  longer  time  than  expected.  The  question  has  to  be  considered in each case on the facts and circumstances  established  therein.  If  there  is  nothing  on  record  to  show that the statement could not have been true or if  the other evidence on record corroborates the contents  of the statements,  the court can certainly accept the  same and act upon it. …”

(Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, however, Exhibit-PM-dying declaration  

does not either show the cause of death or the circumstances of  

the  transaction  which  resulted  in  the  death  of  the  declarant-

Chander Kalan. The burns were not fatal either.  

18. In  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  present  case,  

Exhibit-PM-declaration  does  not  meet  the  requirements  of  a  

dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. It has  

to be noted that the very foundation of the reliability of the dying  

declaration  is  the  principle  of  Nemo  moriturus  praesumitur  

mentire which literally means that no one at the point of death is  

presumed to lie since one is normally afraid to meet his maker  

with a lie on his mouth at the time of death.

19. The other major issue is on applicability of Section 304B of  

IPC. In order to attract Section 304B of IPC, one of the essential  

ingredients is that death of the married woman should be caused  14

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by burns or bodily injury or that she should have died otherwise  

than  under  normal  circumstances.  In  the  instant  case,  it  has  

clearly come out in evidence that the death is not caused by the  

burns:  it  is  caused  by  septicemia  on  account  of  improper  

management of wounds. The parts of the body affected by the  

burns  would  clearly  show  that  the  burns  are  not  caused  on  

account of somebody pouring kerosene on her body and setting  

her on fire. As can be seen from the medical evidence and the  

postmortem report,  the injuries  are on front  side of  the body  

from face up to the umbilicus. Her long hair was not burnt at all.  

The approach of the trial  court seems to be quite proper and  

reasonable, and which, in our view, could not have been better  

explained. To quote from paragraph-17:

“According  to  the  version  of  the  accused  persons  Rajesh accused had come from school  and he asked  Chander Kalan to prepare meal for him. Chander Kalan  who wanted to live separately started grumbling. When  Rajesh insisted upon Chander Kalan to prepare meal for  him she started  lighting  the  stove  and kerosene got  sprinkled on her blouse from the stove and it caught  fire.  Rajesh  and  his  mother  Urmila  immediately  extinguished the fire with the help of a bed sheet and  quilt  cover.  Absence of  burn injuries  below umbilicus  and on the long hair and back of Chander Kalan and  recovery  of  partially  burnt  bed  sheet,  partially  burnt  quilt  cover  with  pieces  of  blouse  of  Chander  Kalan  sticking to these lends support to the defence version  that clothes of Chander Kalan caught fire when she was  lighting  the  stove  and  the  fire  was  immediately  extinguished  by  her  mother-in-law  Urmila  and  her  husband’s brother Rajesh accused. If a stove containing  

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kerosene is filled with air by pumping and a pin is used  for  opening  the  choked  nozzle  of  its  burner,  the  kerosene will gush out of the nozzle with a force and if  at that moment a burning stick of match box is used for  lighting the stove kerosene will burst into flames which  may sometimes rise upto more than a feet. Since the  kerosene in such circumstances is partially burnt it may  get  sprinkled  over  the  face  and  front  portion  of  the  upper garments of the person who is lighting the stove  and  the  garments  may  catch  fire  by  coming  into  contact with the rising flames. So, the defence version  that clothes of Chander Kalan caught fire when she was  lighting the stove appears to be very natural. There is  one more aspect  of  the defence story which lends it  credibility. The relation between Chander Kalan and the  accused persons were highly strained. All the accused  persons  subjected  her  to  cruelty  in  connection  with  their demand for dowry. Even her teeth were broken by  them  on  1st January,  1997.  The  accused  also  misappropriated  the  cash  and  the  articles  of  dowry  given to Chander Kalan must have been insisting upon  the accused persons to allow her to live separate from  them. Because of her strained relations Chander Kalan  also must not have liked to cook meal for her husband’s  brother Rajesh when he came from the school at 2.00  p.m.  When  she  was  forced  to  cook  meal  for  Rajesh,  Chander Kalan unwillingly went to the stove in a tense  mood and because of tension she must have pumped  the air in the stove vigorously and neglected to keep  her face and body at a safe distance from the nozzle of  the  burner  of  the  stove.  It  was  these  circumstances  which resulted in sprinkling of kerosene on the face and  clothes  of  Chander  Kalan  and  her  suffering  burn  injuries.”  

 

20. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the  

trial court as far as the possible version of the burn injuries. The  

nature of the burn injuries, the extent of the same and the parts  

of the body affected from face to umbilicus, and the same only  

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on  the  front  of  the  body,  would  clearly  show  that  it  was  an  

accident caused while clearing the choked nozzle of the stove.

21. The High Court even otherwise is not justified in reversing  

the acquittal under Section 304B of IPC on a mere possibility of  

another  view,  if  at  all  possible,  on  the  evidence.  Unless  the  

judgment of acquittal is passed on no evidence or is perverse or  

the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or is not a  

plausible view or there is non-consideration of any evidence or  

there is a palpable misreading of evidence, the High Court is not  

justified in interfering with the order of acquittal as held by this  

Court in Basappa v. State of Karnataka3.

22. Thus,  Exhibit-PM-statement in the instant case cannot be  

relied  upon  at  all  to  convict  the  accused.  The  ingredients  of  

Section 304B of IPC are also not made out.

23. The High Court has also found that the appellants are liable  

to be convicted under Section 498 of IPC holding also that the  

conviction by the trial court in that regard is to be maintained.  

On  going  through  the  judgment  of  the  trial  court,  it  is  fairly  

evident  that  the  conviction  under  Section  498A  of  IPC  is  on  

account of the incident on 01.01.1997. That was compromised  

among the parties and all proceedings were dropped. Thereafter,  

3 (2014) 5 SCC 154 17

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there is no clear evidence as to any cruelty. However, as found  

by the trial court, there is evidence                       available  

regarding harassment of the deceased by the accused/appellant  

nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5. But in the case of accused/appellant no. 4-

Rajesh,  who was studying in  the  school  at  the  relevant  time,  

there  is  no  evidence  as  to  any  harassment.  Therefore,  while  

maintaining conviction under Section 498A of IPC in respect of  

appellant nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5, appellant no. 4-Rajesh is liable to be  

acquitted under Section 498A of IPC as well.

24. Now, regarding the sentence, it is brought to our notice that  

appellant nos. 2 and 3 have served imprisonment for around two  

years. Since the appellants are acquitted under Section 304B of  

IPC and the conviction is  only under Section 498A of IPC and  

since accused/appellant nos. 1 and 5 are no more, and having  

regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the  

view that the sentence of accused/appellant nos. 2 and 3 is to be  

limited to the period already undergone.  

25. In the result, the conviction under Section 304B of IPC in  

respect of all the appellants is set aside. The conviction under  

Section 498A of IPC in respect of appellant no. 4-Rajesh is set  

aside. The conviction under Section 498A of IPC is maintained in  

respect  of  accused/appellant  nos.  1,  2,  3  and  5.  

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Accused/appellant nos. 1 and 5 are no more and the appeal as  

against them is abated. The sentence of accused/appellant nos.  

2 and 3 is limited to the period already undergone.  

26. It  is  seen  that  the  deceased  had  been  undergoing  

treatment from 18.06.1998 till her death on 04.08.1998, initially  

in two government hospitals and thereafter, for a long period, in  

two private  hospitals.  Therefore,  we are  of  the  view that  the  

accused/appellants should be made liable to pay compensation  

to the parents of the deceased. Accused/appellant nos. 2 and 3  

are directed to pay total compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- to the  

parents  of  the  deceased-Chander  Kalan  within  a  month  from  

today. In the event of default, the District Magistrate, Hisar shall  

take  appropriate  coercive  action  to  recover  the  amount  from  

accused/appellant nos. 2 and 3 and pay the same to the parents  

of the deceased, within another six months.

27.   The appeals are allowed as above.   

..………….………………………J.                                   (KURIAN JOSEPH)

………......………………………J.       (ABHAY MANOHAR  

SAPRE)

New Delhi; 19

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December 18, 2014.                         

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