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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.5924 OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.27674 OF 2011)

BALESHWAR DAYAL JAISWAL                       …APPELLANT

VERSUS

BANK OF INDIA & ORS.                           ...RESPONDENTS

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.5925 OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.36316 OF 2011)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.5926 OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.38436 OF 2012)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.5927 OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.5789 OF 2013)

J U D G M E N T

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.

1. Leave granted.

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2. The   question  in  this  batch  of  appeals  is  whether  the

Appellate Tribunal under the Securitisation and Reconstruction

of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act,

2002 (“the SARFAESI Act”) has the power to condone delay in

filing an appeal under Section 18(1) of the said Act.

3. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties,

including  S/Shri Amol Chitale and Akshat Shrivastava, counsel

for the appellants-borrowers and Shri Rana Mukherjee, senior

counsel  and  S/Shri  Anil  Kumar  Sangal  and  Pranab  Kumar

Mullick, counsel appearing for the Banks.

4. The appellants submit that the Appellate Tribunal has the

power  to  condone delay  in  filing  the appeal  beyond by the

prescribed  period  of  limitation  because  of  the  following

reasons:

(i) Section  18(2)  of  the  SARFAESI  Act

provides that the Appellate Tribunal shall

follow the provisions of the Recovery of

Debts  Due  to  Banks  and  Financial

Institutions Act, 1993 (“the RDB Act”) in

disposing of the appeal unless otherwise

provided under the SARFAESI Act or the

rules made thereunder.  The proviso to

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Section 20(3) of the RDB Act empowers

the  Appellate  Tribunal  to  entertain  an

appeal  after  expiry  of  period  of

limitation, if sufficient cause for not filing

the appeal within the period of limitation

was shown.  Thus, the proviso to Section

20(3) of the RDB Act is incorporated in

Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act;  

(ii) Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963

makes  the  said  Act’s  Sections  4  to  24

applicable  to  a  special  or  local  law

prescribing  a  different  period  of

limitation for a suit, appeal or application

unless  expressly  excluded.  There  being

no  provision  in  the  SARFAESI  Act

excluding the applicability of Sections 4

to 24 of the Limitation Act, delay can be

condoned  under  Section  5  of  the

Limitation Act, and time can be excluded

under  Section  14  of  the  Limitation  Act

wherever applicable; and

(iii) Section  24  of  the  RDB  Act  makes  the

Limitation  Act  applicable  to  an

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application made to a Tribunal.  Section

36 of the SARFAESI Act makes period of

limitation  prescribed  under  the

Limitation  Act  applicable  to  measures

taken under Section 13(4).  Thus, there

is be no exclusion of the Limitation Act.  

5. On the other hand, the Banks would contend that:

(i) Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act cannot

be  read  as  extending  provisions  of

proviso to Section 20(3) of the RDB Act

to an appeal filed under Section 18(1) of

the SARFAESI Act;

(ii)  Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is not

attracted  to  proceedings  before  a

Tribunal  as  the  period  of  limitation

prescribed  under  the  Limitation  Act  is

applicable only to proceedings before a

Court and not before a Tribunal; and

(iii) Provisions  of  Limitation  Act  can  stand

excluded  not  only  by  an  express

provision  of  a  local  or  special  law  but

also  by  necessary  implication  from the

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scheme of such local or special law.  The

scheme of the SARFAESI Act  by making

the Limitation Act expressly applicable to

measures under section 13(4) of the Act

impliedly  excludes  the  said  Act  from

appeals or other proceedings.

6. Learned  counsel  for  the  parties  have  brought  to  our

notice that the issue in question has been examined by the

High Courts of Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Bombay and

Madras.   While  Madhya  Pradesh  High  Court  in  M/s.  Seth

Banshidhar Media Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd. vs. State Bank of

India1  held that delay in filing an appeal cannot be condoned

by  the  Tribunal,  the  Andhra  Pradesh  High  Court  in  Sajida

Begum vs. State Bank of India2, the Bombay High Court in

UCO Bank, Mumbai vs. M/s. Kanji Manji Kothari and Co.,

Mumbai3  and the Madras High Court in  Punnu Swami vs.

The Debts Recovery Tribunal4  have taken contrary view.

7. At  this  stage  it  will  be  appropriate  to  reproduce  the

provisions of Sections 18 and 36 of the SARFAESI Act, Section

20  and  Section  24  of  the  RDB  Act  and  Section  29  of  the

Limitation Act :

1 AIR 2011 MP 205 2 AIR 2013 AP 24 3 2008 (4) MhLj424 4 2009 (3) BJ 401

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“Sections 18 and 36 of the SARFAESI Act :

18. Appeal to Appellate Tribunal (1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made

by  the  Debts  Recovery  Tribunal  under section 17, may prefer an appeal alongwith such  fee,  as  may  be  prescribed  to  an Appellate  Tribunal  within  thirty  days  from the  date  of  receipt  of  the  order  of  Debts Recovery Tribunal:  PROVIDED  that  different  fees  may  be prescribed  for  filing  an  appeal  by  the borrower or  by  the person other than the borrower:  PROVIDED FURTHER that no appeal shall be entertained  unless  the  borrower  has deposited  with  the  Appellate  Tribunal  fifty per cent. of  the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less:  PROVIDED ALSO that the Appellate Tribunal may,  for  the  reasons  to  be  recorded  in writing, reduce the amount to not less than twenty-five per cent. of debt referred to in the second proviso.

(2)  Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall,  as far as may be, dispose  of  the  appeal  in  accordance  with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and rules made thereunder.

36. Limitation No  secured  creditor  shall  be entitled to take all or any of the measures under sub-section (4) of section 13, unless his  claim  in  respect  of  financial  asset  is made  within  the  period  of  limitation prescribed  under  the  Limitation  Act,  1963 (36 of 1963).

Sections 20 and 24 of the RDB Act :

Section 20 Appeal to the Appellate Tribunal (1)  Save  as  provided  in  subsection  (2),  any

person  aggrieved  by  an  order  made,  or deemed to have been made, by a Tribunal

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under this Act, may prefer an appeal to an Appellate Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter.  

(2) No appeal shall lie to the Appellate Tribunal from an order made by a Tribunal with the consent of the parties.

(3) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within a period of forty-five days from the date on which a copy of the order made, or  deemed  to  have  been  made,  by  the Tribunal is received by him and it shall be in such form and be accompanied by such fee as may be prescribed:  

Provided  that  the  Appellate  Tribunal  may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of forty-five days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period.  

(4) On receipt of an appeal under sub-section (1), the Appellate Tribunal may, after giving the parties to the appeal, an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks  fit,  confirming,  modifying or  setting aside the order appealed against.

(5) The Appellate Tribunal shall send a copy of every order made by it to the parties to the appeal and to the concerned Tribunal.  

(6) The  appeal  filed  before  the  Appellate Tribunal under sub-section (1) shall be dealt with by it as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made by it to dispose of the  appeal  finally  within  six  months  from the date of receipt of the appeal.

Section 24 Limitation—The provisions of the  Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), shall, as  far as may be, apply to an application made to a Tribunal.

Section 29 of the Limitation Act  

29. Savings-   (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect section 25 of the Indian

Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872).  

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(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal  or application a period of  limitation different from  the  period  prescribed  by  the  Schedule,  the provisions  of  section  3 shall  apply as  if  such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose  of  determining  any  period  of  limitation prescribed for any suit,  appeal or application by any special  or  local  law,  the  provisions  contained  in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and  to  the  extent  to  which,  they  are  not  expressly excluded by such special or local law.  

(3) Save  as  otherwise  provided  in  any  law for  the  time being in  force with  respect  to  marriage  and divorce, nothing  in  this  Act  shall  apply  to  any  suit  or  other proceeding under any such law.  

(4) Sections 25 and 26 and the definition of "easement" in section  2  shall  not  apply  to  cases  arising  in  the territories to which the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), may for the time being extend.”

8. The  first  point  for  consideration  is  the  applicability  of

proviso to Section 20(3) of the RDB Act to the disposal of an

appeal by the Appellate Tribunal  under Section 18(2) of  the

SARFAESI Act.  A bare perusal of the said Section 18(2) makes

it clear that the Appellate Tribunal under the SARFAESI Act has

to dispose of an appeal in accordance with the provisions of

the RDB Act.  In this respect, the provisions of the RDB Act

stand  incorporated  in  the  SARFAESI  Act  for  disposal  of  an

appeal.  Once it is so, we are unable to discern any reason as

to why the SARFAESI  Appellate Tribunal  cannot entertain an

appeal beyond the prescribed period even on being satisfied

that there is sufficient cause for not filing such appeal within

that period.  Even if power of condonation of delay by virtue of

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Section  29(2)  of  the  Limitation  Act  were  held  not  to  be

applicable,  the  proviso  to  Section  20(3)  of  the  RDB  Act  is

applicable by virtue of Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act.  This

interpretation is clearly borne out from the provisions of the

two statutes and also advances the cause of justice. Unless the

scheme  of  the  statute  expressly  excludes  the  power  of

condonation,  there  is  no  reason  to  deny  such  power  to  a

Appellate  Tribunal  when  the  statutory  scheme  so  warrants.

Principle of legislation by incorporation is well known and has

been applied inter alia in Ram Kirpal Bhagat vs. The State

of  Bihar5,  Bolani  Ores  Ltd.  vs.   State  of  Orissa6,

Mahindra  and  Mahindra  Ltd.  vs.  Union  of  India7 and

Onkarlal Nandlal vs. State of Rajasthan8  relied upon on

behalf of the appellants.  We have thus no hesitation in holding

that  the Appellate  Tribunal  under  the SARFAESI  Act  has the

power to condone the delay in filing an appeal before it  by

virtue of  Section 18(2) SARFAESI Act  and proviso to Section

20(3) of the RDB Act.

9. The  fact  that  RDB  Act  and  the  SARFAESI  Act  are

complimentary  to  each  other,  as  held  by  this  Court  in

Transcore vs. Union of India9,  also supports this view.   

5 (1969) 3 SCC 471 6 (1974) 2 SCC 777 7 (1979) 2 SCC 529 8 (1985) 4 SCC 404 9 (2008) 1 SCC 125

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10. We may now deal with the conflicting views of the High

Courts on the subject.   The Madhya Pradesh High Court has

held that the power of condonation of delay stood excluded by

principle of interpretation that if a later statute has provided

for shorter  period of  limitation without express provision for

condonation, it could be implied that there was no power of

condonation.   Reliance  has  been  placed  on  principles  of

statutory  interpretation  by  Justice  G.P.  Singh,  12th Edition,

2010, page 310.  It was further observed that the Limitation

Act was made applicable to a Tribunal under Section 24 of the

RDB Act, but there was no similar provision with respect to the

Appellate Tribunal.  To justify such an inference, reliance has

also  been  placed  on  Gopal  Sardar  case  and  Fairgrowth

Investments  Ltd.  vs.  The  Custodian10.   It  was  further

observed  that  the  object  of  SARFAESI  Act  was  to  ensure

speedy recovery of the dues and quicker resolution of disputes

arising out of action taken for recovery of such dues.  We find

the approach to be erroneous and incorrect understanding of

the principle of interpretation which has been relied upon.  The

principle discussed in the celebrated Treatise in question is as

follows:

“When an amending Act alters the language of the principal statue, the alteration must be taken to have been made deliberately.”

10 (2004) 11 SCC 472

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11. It  is  difficult  to  appreciate  how  the  above  principle

justifies the view of the High Court.  The change intended in

SARFAESI Act has to be seen from the statute and not from

beyond it.  No doubt the period of limitation for filing appeal

under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act is 30 days as against 45

days  under  Section  20  of  the  RDB  Act.  To  this  extent,

legislative  intent  may  be  deliberate.    The  absence  of  an

express  provision  for  condonation,  when  Section  18(2)

expressly adopts and incorporates the provisions of the RDB

Act which contains provision for condonation of delay in filing

of  an  appeal,  cannot  be  read  as  excluding  the  power  of

condonation.   As  already  observed,  the  proviso  to  Section

20(3) which provides for condonation of delay (45 days under

RDB  Act)  stands  extended  to  disposal  of  appeal  under  the

SARFAESI  Act  (to  the  extent  that  condonation  is  of  delay

beyond 30 days).  There is no reason to exclude the proviso to

Section 20(3) in dealing with an appeal under the SARFAESI

Act.  Taking such a view will be nullifying Section 18(2) of the

SARFAESI Act.  We are thus, unable to uphold the view taken

by the Madhya Pradesh High Court.

12. We  approve  the  view  taken  by  the  Madras,   Andhra

Pradesh and Bombay High Courts,  but  for  different  reasons.

The  view  taken  by  Andhra  Pradesh  High  Court  in  Sajida

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Begum vs. State Bank of India11 is based on applicability of

Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.  In our view, Section 29(2)

of the Limitation Act has no absolute application, as the statute

in  question  impliedly  excludes  applicability  of  provisions  of

Limitation Act to the extent a different scheme is adopted. If no

provision of Limitation Act was expressly adopted, it may have

been possible to hold that by virtue of Section 29(2) power of

condonation of  delay was available.    It  is  well  settled that

exclusion of power of condonation of delay can be implied  as

laid  down  in  Union  of  India  vs.  Popular  Construction

Co.12,  Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board vs.  Central

Electricity  Regulatory  Commission13,  Commissioner  of

Customs  and  Central  Excise  vs.  Hongo  India  Private

Limited14 and  Gopal  Sardar  vs.  Karuna  Sardar15 relied

upon on behalf of the Banks.

13. We may now advert to the last question as to whether the

Appellate Tribunal under the SARFAESI Act was not a Court and

therefore,  Section  29(2)  of  the  Limitation  Act  was  not

attracted.

14. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sajida Begum case in

holding the Tribunal to be Court, has relied on Sections 22 and

11 AIR 2013 AP 24 12 (1995) 5 SCC 5 13 (2010) 5 SCC 23 14 (2009) 5 SCC 791 15 (2004) 4 SCC 252

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24 of the RDB Act.  Section 22 vests powers of Civil Court on

the  Tribunal  only  for  purposes  mentioned  therein,  such  as

summoning  witnesses,  discovery  and  production  of

documents,  receiving  evidence,  issuing  commission  for

examining witnesses etc. and deems Tribunals to be courts for

specified purposes, such as for Sections 193, 196 and 228 of

the  Indian  Penal  Code  and  Section  195  of  the  Criminal

Procedure Code.  These provisions may not be conclusive of

the question of the Tribunal being Court for Section 29(2) of

the Limitation Act without further examining the scheme of the

statutes in question.   In Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd.

vs.  Hong  Kong  and  Shanghai  Banking  Corpn.16,   this

Court examined the scheme of the two Acts in question and

held that the Tribunal  was a court  but not a civil  court  for

purposes of Section 24 of the CPC.  We are of the view that for

purposes of decision of these appeals, it is not necessary to

decide the question whether the Tribunal under the Banking

statutes in question was court for purposes of Section 29(2) of

the Limitation Act.  We have already held that the power of

condonation  of  delay  was  expressly  applicable  by  virtue  of

Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act read with proviso to Section

20(3)  of  the  RDB  Act  and  to  that  extent,  the  provisions  of

16 (2009) 8 SCC 646

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Limitation Act having been expressly incorporated under the

special  statutes  in  question,  Section  29(2)  stands  impliedly

excluded.  To this extent, we differ with the view taken by the

Andhra  Pradesh High Court  as  well  as  Madras  and Bombay

High Courts.  We are also in agreement with the principle that

even though Section 5 of the Limitation Act may  be impliedly

inapplicable, principle of Section 14 of the Limitation Act can

be held to be applicable even if Section 29(2) of the Limitation

Act  does  not  apply,  as  laid  down  by  this  Court  in

Consolidated  Engineering  Enterprises  vs.  Principal

Secretary,  Irrigation  Department17  and  M.P.  Steel

Corporation vs. Commissioner of Central Excise18 .

15. As  a  result  of  the  above  discussion,  the  question  is

answered in the affirmative by holding that delay in filing an

appeal  under  Section  18  (1)  of  the  SARFAESI  Act  can  be

condoned by the Appellate Tribunal under proviso to Section 20

(3) of the RDB Act read with Section 18 (2) of the SARFAESI

Act.   The contrary view taken by the Madhya Pradesh High

Court in Seth Banshidhar Media Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd. case

is overruled.

16. Accordingly,  the  appeal  filed  by  the  Bank  against  the

judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is dismissed and

17 (2008) 7 SCC 169 18 (2015) 5 SCALE 505

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the appeals filed by the borrowers are allowed.  The impugned

orders  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Madhya  Pradesh  (in

appeals arising out of SLP (C) No.27674 of 2011 and SLP (C)

No.36316 of 2011) are set aside and the matters are remanded

to the High Court  for  being dealt  with afresh in accordance

with law.  The appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.38436 of 2012

has  been  preferred  directly  from  the  order  of  the  Debt

Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Delhi passed by the said tribunal

relying upon the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court

in Seth Banshidhar Media Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd. case.  The

said  impugned  order  is  also  set  aside  and  the  matter  is

remanded to the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Delhi for

being dealt with afresh in accordance with law.

17. All the appeals are disposed of accordingly.  

…………..……..…………………………….J.  [ JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR]

…………..….………………………………..J.   [ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ]  

NEW DELHI AUGUST 05, 2015

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