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Reporta ble

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL     APPEAL     No.     1723     OF     2008   

Smt. Badami (Deceased) By her L.R.        ….. Appellant

Versus

Bhali … Respondent  

J     U     D     G     M     E     N     T      

Dipak      Misra,     J  .   

The singular question that arises for consideration in this  

appeal by way of special leave under Article 136 of the  

Constitution of India is whether the judgment and decree dated  

27.11.1973 passed by the learned sub-Judge, Kaithal in Civil  

Suit No. 1422 of 1973 is to be declared as a nullity being vitiated  

by fraud and manifest illegality being writ large and thereby the  

claim of right, title and interest and possession based on the said

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judgment and decree by the respondent-plaintiff in the  

subsequent suits, namely, Civil Suit No. 401 of 1984 and Civil  

Suit No. 784 of 1984 which have been decreed and got  

affirmance by a composite order passed by the Additional District  

Judge, Kurukshetra in Civil Appeal No. 19/13 of 1987 and Civil  

Appeal No. 18/13 of 1986 and further gained concurrence by the  

learned single Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at  

Chandigarh in R.S.A. Nos. 2001 of 1988 and 2002 of 1988, is  

bound to collapse and founder.

2. To appreciate the controversy, it is incumbent to travel to  

the year 1973 as to how the original suit was instituted,  

proceeded and eventually decreed.  For the said purpose it is  

necessary to note that one Dai Ram was the common ancestor.  

He had two sons, namely, Dinda and Rachna.  Dinda had one  

son, namely, Roora and Rachna had one son, namely, Ram  

Chand.  Badami was the widow of Roora and Bhali is the son of  

Ram Chand.  Risali is the daughter of Roora and Badami.  Bhali,  

respondent herein, instituted Civil Suit No. 1422 of 1973 on  

24.11.1973 alleging that Badami was the owner of 1894/9549  

share of the ancestral land and had received it at a prior  

arrangement.  When she was in possession, there was a family

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settlement on 1.6.1972 and in that family settlement the  

defendant gave her whole share to the plaintiff-Bhali and the  

possession of the same was also handed over in pursuance of  

that settlement.  As pleaded, the defendant-Badami agreed that  

he would get the revenue entries of the suit land corrected in  

favour of the plaintiff but the name of the defendant continued as  

owner in the revenue records and despite the request of the  

plaintiff therein not to interfere with the possession there was  

interference.  Hence, he had been compelled to file a suit for  

declaration and for permanent injunction.

3. On the date of presentation of the plaint, the defendant in  

the suit, Badami, filed the written statement admitting the  

assertions in the plaint to be correct and, in fact, prayed for  

decree of the suit.  The learned sub-Judge, Kaithal on  

27.11.1973 decreed the suit.   

4. As the facts would reveal, in spite of the said consent decree  

the record of entries stood in the name of Badami and she  

remained in possession and enjoyed the same.  The respondent-  

Bhali, thereafter, initially instituted Civil Suit No. 401 of 1984  

seeking permanent injunction against her restraining from

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alienating the land in any manner.  The learned trial Judge relied  

on the earlier judgment and decree dated 27.11.1973, did not  

accept the stand put forth by the defendant that the said decree  

was obtained by fraud and passed a decree for permanent  

injunction restraining the defendant from alienating the suit land  

to anyone in any manner.   

5. In the second suit for possession, the learned trial Judge  

framed two vital issues, namely, whether the plaintiff was owner  

of the suit land and whether the impugned decree dated  

27.11.1973 is null, void and not binding on the rights of the  

defendants and, thereafter, came to hold that factual matrix  

would show that the decree was passed three days after and  

Badami had appeared in the court, and hence, the decree was  

validly passed.  On appeals being preferred, the learned  

Additional District Judge affirmed the said findings further  

elaborating the reasoning that Badami had appeared in court,  

made a statement and given the thumb mark and further she  

had not been able to discharge the onus that the decree was  

obtained by fraud.  The appellate court gave credence to the  

family settlement and also took note of the fact that the parties  

were related and hence, there was no reason to discard the

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family settlement; and that it was a common phenomenon that a  

member of a family is given property out of love and affection.  

The learned appellate Judge opined that though after the decree  

dated 27.11.1973 the possession was with the appellant and the  

revenue entry had not been corrected, that was possibly due to  

an implied understanding between the parties that the  

arrangement under the decree would be worked out only after  

the death of the appellant, i.e., Badami.  Being of this view, the  

learned appellate Judge dismissed both the appeals.   

6. Being aggrieved, Badami, the original defendant, preferred  

two Regular Second Appeals, namely, R.S.A. Nos. 2001 of 1988  

and 2002 of 1988.  During the pendency of the appeals, she  

expired and Risali, her daughter, was substituted by order dated  

21.2.1992 in both the appeals.  The learned single Judge who  

dealt with the appeals by the impugned judgment dated 1st  

September, 2006 referred to the issues framed by the learned  

trial Judge, the analysis made by the courts below and came to  

hold that original defendant No. 1 had failed to discharge the  

onus that the initial decree dated 27.11.1973 was obtained by  

fraud inasmuch as she had given a statement in court and put  

the thumb impression and that the conclusion drawn by the

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courts below were justified being based on facts and did not  

warrant any interference as no substantial question of law was  

involved.

7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused  

the records.

8. To appreciate the controversy, it is appropriate to refer to  

para 3 of the plaint presented on 24.11.1973.  It reads as  

follows:-

“3. That the parties entered into a family  settlement on 1/6/72 and in that family  settlement the defendant gave her whole share  to the plaintiff and the possession of the same  was also handed over to the plaintiff in  pursuance of that family settlement, the  defendant also agreed that he would get the  revenue entries of the suit land corrected in  favour of the plaintiff, but the name of the  defendant is still continuing as owner in the  revenue records.”

9. From the perusal of the averments made in the plaint, it is  

obvious that emphasis was laid on the family settlement and  

handing over of possession.  It is interesting to note that the first  

appellate court had opined that the possession remained with  

Badami and the revenue entries were not corrected and  

continued possibly due to implied understanding but the plaintiff

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was compelled to file the second suit when there was  

interference.  It has come out on the testimony of evidence of  

Badami that she was absolutely illiterate.  The only ground on  

which the courts have proceeded that there was a consent decree  

and allegation of fraud had not been established.   

10. In this context, we may usefully refer to the decision in  

Santosh v. Jagat Ram and another1 wherein this Court was  

dealing with a situation almost similar to the present nature.  In  

the said case the day the plaint was presented, on the same day  

written statement was also filed, evidence of the plaintiff and the  

defendant was recorded and the judgment was also made ready  

along with a decree on the same day.  In that context, this Court  

observed as follows: -

“This, by itself, was sufficient to raise serious  doubts in the mind of the courts.  Instead, the  appellate court went on to believe the evidence  of Dharam Singh (DW 1), record keeper, who  produced the files of the summons.  One  wonders as to when was the suit filed and  when did the Court issue a summons and how  is it that on the same day, the written  statement was also ready, duly drafted by the  other side lawyer S.K. Joshi (DW 3).”

The Bench further proceeded to observe as follows: -

1 (2010) 3 SCC 251

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“We are anguished to see the attitude of the  Court, who passed the decree on the basis of a  plaint and a written statement, which were  filed on the same day.  We are also surprised  at the observations made by the appellate  court that such circumstance could not, by  itself, prove the fraudulent nature of the  decree.

A fraud puts an end to everything.  It is a  settled position in law that such a decree is  nothing, but a nullity.”

11. From the aforesaid decision it becomes quite clear that this  

Court expressed a sense of surprise the way the suit in that case  

proceeded with and also expressed its anguish how the court  

passed a decree on the foundation of a plaint and a written  

statement that were filed on the same day.   

12. It is seemly to note that the Code of Civil Procedure provides  

how the court trying the suit is required to deal with the matter.  

Order IV Rule 1 provides for suit to be commenced by plaint.  

Order V Rule 1(1) provides when the suit has been duly  

instituted, a summon may be issued to defendant to appear and  

answer the claim on a day to be therein specified.  As per the  

proviso to Order V Rule 1 no summon need be issued if the  

defendant appears and admits the claim of the plaintiff.  Order X  

deals with the examination of parties by the court.  Rule 1 of

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Order X provides for ascertainment whether allegations in  

pleadings are admitted or denied.  It stipulates that “at the first  

hearing” of the suit the court shall ascertain from each party or  

his pleader whether he admits or denies such allegations of fact  

as are made in the plaint or written statement (if any) of the  

opposite party and as are not expressly or by necessary  

implication admitted or denied by the party against whom they  

are made.  The court is required to record such admissions and  

denials.  Use of the term ‘first hearing of the suit’ in Rule 1 has  

its own signification.  Order XV Rule 1 lays a postulate that  

where “at the first hearing” of the suit it appears that the parties  

are not at issue on any question of law or of fact, the court may  

at once pronounce the judgment.  Recently, this Court in  

Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi2, while dealing  

with the concept of first hearing, speaking through one of us (Dr.  

B.S. Chauhan, J) has opined thus: -

“12. The suit was filed on 26-4-2003 and  notice was issued returnable just after three  days i.e. on 29-4-2003 and on that date the  written statement was filed and the appellant  appeared in person and the statement was  recorded.  Order 10 Rule 1 CPC provides for  recording the statement of the parties to the  suit at the “first hearing of the suit”  which  

2 (2012) 4 SCC 307

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comes after the framing of the issues and then  the suit is posted for trial i.e. for production of  evidence.  Such an interpretation emerges  from the conjoint reading of the provisions of  Order 10 Rule 1, Order 14 Rule 1(5) and Order  15 Rule 1 CPC.  The cumulative effect of the  aboverffered provisions of CPC comes to that  the “first hearing of the suit”  can never be  earlier than the date fixed for the preliminary  examination of the parties and the settlement  of issues.  On the date of appearance of the  defendant, the court does not take up the case  for hearing or apply its mind to the facts of the  case, and it is only after filing of the written  statement and framing of issues, the hearing  of the case commences.  The hearing  presupposes the existence of an occasion  which enables the parties to be heard by the  court in respect of the cause.  Hearing,  therefore, should be first in point of time after  the issues have been framed.

13. The date of “first hearing of a suit” under  CPC is ordinarily understood to be the date on  which the court proposes to apply its mind to  the contentions raised by the parties in their  respective pleadings and also to the  documents filed by them for the purpose of  framing the issues which are to be decided in  the suit.  Thus, the question of having the  “first hearing of the suit”  prior to determining  the points in controversy between the parties  i.e. framing of issues does not arise.  The  words “first day of hearing”  do not mean the  day for the return of the summons or the  returnable date, but the day on which the  court applies its mind to the case which  ordinarily would be at the time when either the  issues are determined or evidence is taken.  (Vide Ved Prakash Wadhwa v. Vishwa Mohan3,  

3 (1981) 3 SCC 667 : AIR 1982 SC 816

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Sham Lal v. Atme Nand Jain Sabha4, Siraj  Ahmad Siddiqui v. Prem Nath Kapoor5 and  Mangat Singh Trilochan Singh v. Satpal6.”

After so stating, it has been further observed as follows: -

“From the above fact situation, it is  evident that the suit was filed on 26-4-2003  and in response to the notice issued in that  case, the appellant-defendant appeared on  29.4.2003 in person and filed his written  statement.  It was on the same day that his  statement had been recorded by the court.  We  failed to understand as to what statutory  provision enabled the civil court to record the  statement of the appellant-defendant on the  date of filing the written statement.  The suit  itself has been disposed of on the basis of his  statement within three weeks of the institution  of the suit.”

13.   Keeping in view the aforesaid pronouncement of law relating  

to the procedure and the lapses committed by the trial court in  

the case at hand, the stand of the original defendant, the  

predecessor-in-interest of the present appeal gets fructified.  

From the evidence brought on record, it is perceptible that  

Badami was a rustic and an illiterate woman; that she had one  

daughter who was married and there was no animus between  

them to exclude her from the whole property; and that the  

4 (1987) 1 SCC 222 : AIR 1987 SC 197 5 (1993) 4 SCC 406 : AIR 1993 SC 2525 6 (2003) 8 SCC 357 : AIR 2003 SC 4300

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concept of family arrangement is too farfetched to give any kind  

of credence. That apart, the filing of written statement, the  

recording of statement and taking the thumb impression in a  

hurried manner further nurtures the stance that the defendant  

was totally unaware as to what had happened.  The averments in  

the plaint show that the plaintiff was put in possession but as  

she was going to alienate the property because of record of rights  

reflected name of Badami, the suit was filed for permanent  

injunction restraining her from alienating in any manner and the  

defendant conceded to the same.  The averments in the plaint  

show that the defendant had refused the request of the plaintiff  

on 11.11.1973 not to interfere with the possession yet she  

accompanied him to suffer a consent decree.  It is worth noting  

that there is evidence on record that she was brought to the  

court premises to execute the lease deed for a period of two years  

and she had faith in Bhali.  It is a matter of grave anguish that in  

the first suit the court had not applied its mind to the real nature  

of the family arrangement.   The learned counsel for the  

appellant has submitted that there was no need for a family  

settlement because Badami had got a part of the property in an  

earlier family arrangement.  She had a daughter and a son-in-

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law and she had no cavil with plaintiff.  She had also to support  

herself.  He fairly submitted that the family arrangement need  

not be construed narrowly and it need not be registered but it  

must prima facie appear to be genuine which is not so in the  

case at hand.   

14. In this regard we may refer with profit to certain authorities  

of this Court.  In Krishna Beharilal (dead) by his legal  

representatives v. Gulabchand and others7  a compromise  

decree had come into existence, on the basis of a compromise  

deed which specifically stated that the properties given to one  

Pattobai were to be enjoyed by her as “Malik Mustakil”.  This  

Court referred to certain decisions in the field and opined that  

the circumstances under which the compromise was entered into  

as well as the language used in the deed did not in any manner  

go to indicate that the estate given to Pattobai was anything  

other than an absolute estate.  The High Court had treated the  

compromise decree to be illegal on the basis that a Hindu widow  

could not have enlarged her own rights by entering into a  

compromise in a suit.  This Court observed that this was not a  

compromise entered into with third parties.  It was a compromise  

7 AIR 1971 SC 1041

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entered into with the presumptive reversioners and in that case  

the issue would be totally different.  Further, the question arose  

whether there could have been any family settlement.  In that  

context, this Court held as follows:-   

“8……It may be noted that Lakshmichand and  Ganeshilal who along with Pattobai were the  principal parties to the compromise were the  grand-children of Parvati who was the aunt of  Bulakichand.  The parties to the earlier suit  were near relations.  The dispute between the  parties was in respect of a certain property  which was originally owned by their common  ancestor namely Chhedilal.  To consider a  settlement as a family arrangement, it is not  necessary that the parties to the compromise  should all belong to one family.  As observed  by this Court in Ram Charan Das v. Girija  Nandini Devi8, the word “family”  in the  context of the family arrangement is not to be  understood in a narrow sense of being a group  of persons who are recognised in law as having  a right of succession or having a claim to a  share in the property in dispute.  If the dispute  which is settled is one between near relations  then the settlement of such a dispute can be  considered as a family arrangement- see  Ramcharan Das’s case, 1965-3 SCR 841=(AIR  1966 SC 323) (supra).   

9. The Courts lean strongly in favour of the  family arrangements to bring about harmony  in a family and do justice to its various  members and avoid in anticipation future  disputes which might ruin them all.”

8 (1965) 3 SCR 841 =  AIR 1966 SC 323

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15. In Kale and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation  

and others9, it has been held that the object of the arrangement  

is to protect family from filing long drawn litigation or perpetual  

strifes which mar the unity and solidarity of the family and  

create hatred and bad blood between the various members of the  

family.   Their Lordships opined that the family is to be  

understood in the wider sense so as to include within its fold not  

only close relations or legal heirs but even those persons who  

may have some sort of antecedent title, a semblance of claim or  

even if they have a spes successionis so that future disputes are  

sealed forever and litigation are avoided. What could be the  

binding effect and essentials for a family settlement were  

expressed thus:-   

“10. In other words to put the binding effect  and the essentials of a family settlement in a  concretised form, the matter may be reduced  into the form of the following propositions:  

(1) The family settlement must be a bona fide  one so as to resolve family disputes and rival  claims by a fair and equitable division or  allotment of properties between the various  members of the family;

(2) The said settlement must be voluntary and  should not be induced by fraud, coercion or  undue influence;  

9 AIR 1976 SC 807

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(3) The family arrangements may be even oral  in which case no registration is necessary;

(4) It is well settled that registration would be  necessary only if the terms of the family  arrangement are reduced into writing.  Here  also, a distinction should be made between a  document containing the terms and recitals of  a family arrangement made under the  document and a mere memorandum prepared  after the family arrangement had already been  made either for the purpose of the record or for  information of the court for making necessary  mutation.  In such a case the memorandum  itself does not create or extinguish any rights  in immovable properties and therefore does not  fall within the mischief of Section 17(2) (sic)  (Sec. 17 (1) (b)?) of the Registration Act and is,  therefore, not compulsorily registrable;  

(5) The members who may be parties to the  family arrangement must have some  antecedent title, claim or interest even a  possible claim in the property which is  acknowledged by the parties to the settlement.  Even if one of the parties to the settlement has  no title but under the arrangement the other  party relinquishes all its claims or titles in  favour of such a person and acknowledges him  to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title  must be assumed and the family arrangement  will be upheld and the Courts will find no  difficulty in giving assent to the same;

(6) Even if bona fide disputes, present or  possible, which may not involve legal claims  are settled by a bona fide family arrangement  which is fair and equitable the family  arrangement is final and binding on the  parties to the settlement.”

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16. We may note that the principles stated in Maturi Pullaiah  

and another v. Maturi Narasimham and others10 were  

reiterated in S. Shanmugam Pillai & others v. K.  

Shanmugam Pillai & others.11 in the following terms:-  

“In Maturi Pullaiah v. Maturi Narasimham, AIR  1966 SC 1836 this Court held that although  conflict of legal claims in praesenti or in futuro  is generally a condition for the validity of  family arrangements, it is not necessarily so.  Even bona fide disputes present or possible,  which may not involve legal claims would be  sufficient.  Members of a joint Hindu family  may, to maintain peace or to bring about  harmony in the family, enter into such a family  arrangement.  If such an agreement is entered  into bona fide and the terms thereto are fair in  the circumstances of a particular case, the  Courts would more readily give assent to such  an agreement than to avoid it.”

17.  If the present factual matrix tested on the anvil of the  

aforesaid decisions, the family arrangement does not remotely  

appear to be a bona fide.  Bhali had not semblance of right in the  

property.  All rights had already been settled and she was the  

exclusive owner in possession.  It is difficult to visualise such a  

family settlement.  More so, it is absolutely irrational that  

Badami would give everything to Bhali in lieu of nothing and  

10  AIR 1966 SC 1836 11 AIR 1972 SC 2069

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suffer a consent decree.  That apart, there was no reason to  

exclude the daughter and the son-in-law.  Had there been any  

likely possibility of any future legal cavil between the daughter  

and Bhali the same is understandable.  It is well nigh impossible  

to perceive any dispute over any property or the possibility of it  

in future.  On the contrary in this so called family settlement the  

whole property of Badami is given to Bhali.  We are unable to  

accept it to be a bona fide settlement.   

18. From the aforesaid analysis it is clear as crystal that the  

judgment and decree passed in civil suit No. 1422 of 1973 on  

27.11.1973 are fundamentally fraudulent.  It is a case which  

depicts a picture that the delineation by the learned Judge was  

totally ephemeral.  The judgement is vitiated by fraud.   

19. Presently, we shall refer as to how this Court has dealt with  

concept of fraud.  In S. B. Noronah v. Prem Kumari Khanna12  

while dealing with the concept of estoppel and fraud a two-Judge  

Bench has stated that it is an old maxim that estoppels are  

odious, although considerable inroad into this maxim has been  

made by modern law.  Even so, “a judgment obtained by fraud or  

collusion, even, it seems a judgment of the House of Lords, may  

12  AIR 1980 SC 193

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be treated as a nullity”.  (See Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 16  

Fourth Edition para 1553).  The point is that the sanction  

granted under Section 21, if it has been procured by fraud or  

collusion, cannot withstand invalidity because, otherwise, high  

public policy will be given as hostage to successful collusion.

20. In S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs.  v.  

Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. and others13 this court commenced  

the verdict with the following words:-   

““Fraud-avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical  or temporal”  observed Chief Justice Edward  Coke of England about three centuries ago.  It  is the settled proposition of law that a  judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud  on the court is a nullity and non est in the  eyes of law.  Such a judgment/decree - by the  first court or by the highest court - has to be  treated as a nullity by every court, whether  superior or inferior.  It can be challenged in  any court even in collateral proceedings.”  

21. In the said case it was clearly stated that the courts of law  

are meant for imparting justice between the parties and one who  

comes to the court, must come with clean hands.  A person  

whose case is based on falsehood has no right to approach the  

Court.  A litigant who approaches the court, is bound to produce  

13 AIR 1994 SC 853

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all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the  

litigation.  If a vital document is withheld in order to gain  

advantage on the other side he would be guilty of playing fraud  

on court as well as on the opposite party.

22. In Smt. Shrist Dhawan v. M/s. Shaw Brothers14 it has  

been opined that fraud and collusion vitiate even the most  

solemn proceedings in any civilised system of jurisprudence.  It  

has been defined as an act of trickery or deceit.  The aforesaid  

principle has been reiterated in Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal15,  

Ram Preeti Yadav v. U. P. Board of High School and  

Intermediate Education and other16 and Ram Chandra  

Singh v. Savitri Devi and others17.   

23. In State of Andhra Pradesh and another v. T.  

Suryachandra Rao18  after referring to the earlier decision this  

court observed as follows:-

“In Lazaurs Estate Ltd. v. Beasley19 Lord  Denning observed at pages 712 & 713, “No  judgment of a Court, no order of a Minister  can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained  by fraud.  Fraud unravels everything.”  In the  

14 AIR 1992 SC 1555 15 AIR 2002 SC 33 16 (2003) 8 SC 311  17  (2003) 8 SCC 319 18 AIR 2005 SC 3110 19  (1956) 1 QB 702

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same judgment Lord Parker LJ observed that  fraud vitiates all transactions known to the law  of however high a degree of solemnity.   ”

24. Yet in another decision Hamza Haji v. State of Kerala &  

Anr.20 it has been held that no court will allow itself to be used  

as an instrument of fraud and no court, by way of rule of  

evidence and procedure, can allow its eyes to be closed to the  

fact it is being used as an instrument of fraud.  The basic  

principle is that a party who secures the judgment by taking  

recourse to fraud should not be enabled to enjoy the fruits  

thereof.   

25. It would not be an exaggeration but on the contrary an  

understatement if it is said that all facets of fraud get attracted to  

the case at hand.  A rustic and illiterate woman is taken to court  

by a relation on the plea of creation of a lease deed and magically  

in a hurried manner the plaint is presented, written statement is  

drafted and filed, statement is recorded and a decree is passed  

within three days.  On a perusal of the decree it is manifest that  

there is no reference of any kind of family arrangement and there  

is total non-application of mind.  It only mentions there is  

consent in the written statement and hence, suit has to be  

20 AIR 2006 Sc 3028

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decreed.  Be it noted, it was a suit for permanent injunction.  

There was an allegation that the respondent was interfering with  

the possession of the plaintiff.  What could have transpired that  

the defendant would go with the plaintiff and accede to all the  

reliefs.  It not only gives rise to a doubt but on a first look one  

can feel that there is some kind of foul play.  However, the  

learned trial Judge who decreed the first suit on 27.11.1973 did  

not look at these aspects.  When the second suit was filed in  

1984 for title and the third suit was filed for possession  

thereafter, the courts below had routinely followed the principles  

relating to consent decree and did not dwell deep to find out how  

the fraud was manifestly writ large.  It was too obvious to ignore.  

The courts below have gone by the concept that there was no  

adequate material to establish that there was fraud, though it  

was telltale.  That apart, the foundation was the family  

arrangement.  We have already held that it was not bona fide,  

but, unfortunately the courts below as well as the High Court  

have held that it is a common phenomenon that the people in  

certain areas give their property to their close relations.  We have  

already indicated that by giving the entire property and putting  

him in possession she would have been absolutely landless and

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would have been in penury.  It is unimaginable that a person  

would divest herself of one’s own property in entirety in lieu of  

nothing.  No iota of evidence has been brought on record that  

Bhali, the respondent herein, had given anything to Badami in  

the arrangement.  It is easily perceivable that the rustic woman  

was also not old.  Though the decree was passed in 1973 wherein  

it was alleged that the defendant was already in possession, she  

lived up to 1992 and expired after 19 years.  It is a matter of  

record that the possession was not taken over and inference has  

been drawn that possibly there was an implied agreement that  

the decree would be given effect to after her death.  All these  

reasonings are absolutely non-plausible and common sense does  

not even remotely give consent to them.  It is fraudulent all the  

way.  The whole thing was buttressed on the edifice of fraud and  

it needs no special emphasis to state that what is pyramided on  

fraud is bound to decay.  In this regard we may profitably quote a  

statement by a great thinker:  

“Fraud generally lights a candle for justice to  get a look at it; and rogue’s pen indites the  warrant for his own arrest.”

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26. Ex consequenti, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and  

decree of the High Court in the Second Appeal as well as the  

judgments and decrees of the courts below are hereby set aside  

and as a natural corollary the judgment and decree dated  

27.11.1973 is also set aside.  There shall be no order as to costs.

............................................J.  [DR. B.S. Chauhan]

............................................J.  [Dipak Misra]

New Delhi; May 22, 2012.