REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL  NO. 831 OF 2006

Bachni Devi & Anr.        …Appellants

Versus   State of Haryana Through Secretary, Home Department               …Respondent

JUDGEMENT  

R.M. LODHA, J.  

The mother (A-1)  and son (A-2)  are in appeal  as  

both of them have been convicted by the Additional Sessions  

Judge (I), Kurukshetra for the offence punishable under Section  

304B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced to suffer  

rigorous  imprisonment  of  seven  years.  The  High  Court  of

Punjab and Haryana affirmed their conviction and sentence and  

did not interfere with the judgment of the trial court.

2. Kanta died within 3 months of  her marriage.   On  

August 11, 1990, she was found dead by hanging from a ceiling  

fan in the appellants’ house.  Kanta hailed from a poor family.  

Her  father,  Pale  Ram  (PW-8)  is  a  Rikshawpuller.   A-2  and  

Kanta got married on May 12, 1990.  About 20 days prior to  

Kanta’s death, A-1 had  gone to the house of PW-8 and told  

him that her son A-2 wanted to start milk vending business and  

for that a motorcycle is needed for carrying the milk to the city.  

She demanded a motorcycle for A-2 to be purchased by PW-8.  

PW-8 did not accede to her demand and told A-1 that  he was  

not in a position to purchase motorcycle as demanded by her.  

A-1 warned PW-8  that if he  failed to provide a motorcycle to A-

2, then Kanta would not be allowed to stay in the matrimonial  

home. PW-8 called Amar Singh (PW-10) and Mam Chand (DW-

1) to his house and told them about the demand made by A-1.  

A-1 reiterated the demand and warning  in their presence and  

left the house of PW-8.  

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3. This was the beginning of  Kanta’s end.  A-1 and A-

2  started harassing and ill-treating  her.  Some five days prior  

to Rakshabandhan, A-2 brought Kanta to the house of PW-8.  

A-2 left Kanta there and returned to his house the same day.  

Kanta  told  PW-8  about  harassment   and  ill-treatment  being  

meted out to her by A-1 and A-2.  Three days thereafter,  A-2  

went to the house of PW-8 and told him that he had come to  

take Kanta with him as there was engagement ceremony of his  

brother. A-2 assured PW-8 that he would bring Kanta  on the  

day  of  Rakshabandhan.  Kanta,  however,   was  reluctant  in  

going with A-2 as she knew that  there was no engagement  

ceremony at her in-laws place.  She had apprehension that if  

she went to her matrimonial home, her life would not be spared.  

PW-8  persuaded his daughter to go along with  A-2 as she has  

to spend her entire life with him.  

4. On the insistence of her father, Kanta went to her  

matrimonial  home  along  with  A-2.  On  the  day  of  

Rakshabandhan, PW-8 and the members of the family waited  

for Kanta for whole day but she did not come.  After about eight  

days  i.e.  on August  12,  1990,  PW-8 was informed by some  

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villager that Kanta was dead.  PW-8 then went to the house of  

A-1 and A-2 along with few  persons and saw the dead body of  

Kanta lying in a room. It appeared to PW-8 that Kanta’s death  

had occurred some 2/3 days earlier.    

5. Kanta’s  death  having  taken  place  in  unnatural  

circumstances,  PW-8  reported  the  matter  to  the  police  

immediately and a First Information Report (FIR) was registered  

on that  very day (August  12,  1990)  at  Police Station Ladwa  

under  Section  304B  IPC.  Karnail  Chand  (PW-11)   started  

investigation, visited the spot and also sent the dead body of  

Kanta  for  post-mortem.    Dr.  P.K.  Goel  (PW-1)  conducted  

postmortem on the dead body of  Kanta.  Upon completion of  

investigation and after committal,   A-1 and A-2 were sent up for  

trial under Section 304-B IPC.

6. Besides  PW-1,  PW-8,  PW-10  and  PW-11,  the  

prosecution  examined  seven  other  witnesses  including  the  

deceased’s  mother  Premo  (PW-9).  In  defence,  the  accused  

examined DW-1 and Amarjit Kaur (DW-2).

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7. The trial  court  vide  its   judgment  dated March 6,  

1991 held that the prosecution has been able to establish that  

the death of Kanta was within seven years of her marriage and  

otherwise than under normal  circumstances;   that  before her  

death she was subjected to cruelty and harassment by A-1 and  

A-2 in connection with the demand of motorcycle and that  A-1  

and A-2 were guilty of causing dowry death. A-1 and A-2 were  

convicted under Section 304-B IPC accordingly and  sentenced  

to suffer seven years’ rigorous imprisonment as noticed above.  

The  High  Court  in  the  appeal  preferred  by  the  appellants  

concurred with trial court and dismissed their appeal.

8. Mr. V. Madhukar, learned counsel for the appellants  

submitted that  it  was highly improbable that  a demand for  a  

motorcycle would be made from PW-8 knowing well that it could  

not be fulfilled by him as he was a Rikshawpuller earning Rs.  

20/-  per  day.  He  argued  that  the  evidence  let  in  by  the  

prosecution  was  not  trustworthy  at  all  and  the  demand  for  

dowry   is  not  established.  He  would  submit   that  the  only  

independent  witness  of  demand  was  DW-1  but  he  was  not  

examined by the prosecution. However, DW-1  was examined  

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in  defence  and he has denied  that any  demand was made by  

A-1 in his presence.  

9. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  argued   that  

there was  no evidence of demand of motorcycle by A-2.  He  

further argued that in any case the demand of motorcycle for  

the purposes of the business does not qualify as a ‘demand for  

dowry’  and, therefore, no offence under Section 304-B IPC can  

be said to have been made out against the appellants. In this  

regard, he relied upon a decision of this Court in  Appasaheb &  

Anr. v. State of Maharashtra1.

10. On  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Kamal  Mohan  Gupta,  

learned  counsel  for  the  State  of  Haryana,  supported  the  

judgment of the High Court.  

11. Section 304B was inserted in IPC  with effect from  

November 19, 1986 by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act,  

1986 (for short, ‘(Amendment) Act, 1986’). Thereby substantive  

offence  relating  to  ‘dowry  death’  was  introduced  in  the  IPC.  

Section 304-B IPC reads as follows :

“304B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a  woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or  occurs  otherwise  than  under  normal  

1 (2007) 9 SCC 721

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13. Pertinently, for the purposes of Section 304B IPC,  

‘dowry’ has the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry  

Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short, ‘1961 Act’).

14. Section  2  of  the  1961  Act  defines  ‘Dowry’  as  

follows:

“2.  Definition of  `dowry’.- “Dowry”  means any  property or valuable security given or agreed to  be given either directly or indirectly—

(a) By  one  party  to  a  marriage  to  the  other party to the marriage; or

(b) By  the  parent  of  either  party  to  a  marriage  or  by  any  other  person  to  either  party  to  the  marriage  or  to  any  other person,

at  or  before  or  any  time  after  the  marriage  in  connection with the marriage of the said parties,  but does not include dower or mahr in the case of  persons  to  whom  the  Muslim  Personal  Law  (Shariat) applies.

Explanation I—…………(Omitted). Explanation  II—The  expression  “valuable  security” has the same meaning as in section 30  of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”

15. 1961  Act  was  enacted  to  prohibit  the  giving  or  

taking  of  ‘dowry’  and  for  the  protection  of  married  woman  

against  cruelty  and violence in  the matrimonial  home by the  

husband and  in-laws.   The mere  demand for  ‘dowry’  before  

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marriage, at the time of marriage or any time after the marriage  

is an offence.  1961 Act has been amended by the Parliament  

on more than one occasion and by the (Amendment) Act, 1986,  

Parliament  brought  in  stringent  provisions  and  provided  for  

offence  relating  to  ‘dowry  death’.  The  amendments  became  

imperative  as  the  dowry  deaths  continued  to  increase  to  

disturbing proportions and the existing provisions in 1961 Act  

were found inadequate in dealing with the problems of dowry  

deaths. The definition of ‘dowry’ reproduced above would show  

that the term is defined comprehensively to include properties  

of all sorts as it takes within its fold ‘any property or valuable  

security’  given  or  agreed  to  be  given  in  connection  with  

marriage either directly or indirectly. In S. Gopal Reddy v. State  

of A.P.2 , this Court stated as follows :

“9. The  definition  of  the  term  ‘dowry’  under  Section 2 of the Act shows that any property or  valuable  security  given or  “agreed to  be  given”  either  directly  or  indirectly  by  one  party  to  the  marriage to the other party to the marriage “at or  before or after the marriage” as a “consideration  for  the  marriage of  the  said  parties”  would  become  ‘dowry’  punishable  under  the  Act.  Property or valuable security so as to constitute  ‘dowry’  within  the  meaning  of  the  Act  must  

2 (1996) 4 SCC 596

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therefore be given or demanded “as consideration  for the marriage”.   …………………………………………………………

11. The  definition  of  the  expression  ‘dowry’  contained  in  Section  2  of  the  Act  cannot  be  confined  merely  to  the  ‘demand’  of  money,  property or valuable security “made at or after the  performance of marriage” as is urged by Mr Rao.  The legislature has in its wisdom while providing  for the definition of ‘dowry’ emphasised that any  money, property or valuable security given,  as a  consideration  for  marriage,  “before,  at  or  after”  the marriage would be covered by the expression  ‘dowry’ and this definition as contained in Section  2 has to be read wherever the expression ‘dowry’  occurs  in  the  Act.  Meaning  of  the  expression  ‘dowry’  as  commonly  used  and  understood  is  different than the peculiar definition thereof under  the Act. Under Section 4 of the Act, mere demand  of ‘dowry’ is sufficient to bring home the offence  to  an  accused.  Thus,  any  ‘demand’  of  money,  property or valuable security made from the bride  or  her  parents  or  other  relatives  by  the  bridegroom or  his  parents  or  other  relatives  or  vice versa would fall within the mischief of ‘dowry’  under the Act where such demand is not properly  referable to any legally recognised claim and is  relatable  only  to  the  consideration  of  marriage.  Marriage in this context would include a proposed  marriage  also  more  particularly  where  the  non- fulfilment of the “demand of dowry” leads to the  ugly  consequence  of  the  marriage  not  taking  place at all. The expression ‘dowry’ under the Act  must be interpreted in the sense which the statute  wishes  to  attribute  to  it……………The definition  given  in  the  statute  is  the  determinative  factor.  The Act is a piece of social legislation which aims  to check the growing menace of the social evil of  dowry and it makes punishable not only the actual  receiving of dowry but also the very demand of  dowry  made  before  or  at  the  time or  after  the  

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marriage where such demand is referable to the  consideration of  marriage.  Dowry as a quid pro  quo for marriage is prohibited ………. .”.

16. While dealing with the term ‘dowry’ in Section 304B  

IPC,  this  Court  in  the case of  Kamesh Panjiyar  @ Kamlesh  

Panjiyar v. State of Bihar3 held as under :

“14. The word “dowry” in Section 304-B IPC has  to be understood as it is defined in Section 2 of  the Dowry Act.  Thus, there are three occasions  related  to  dowry.  One  is  before  the  marriage,  second is at the time of marriage and the third “at  any time” after the marriage. The third occasion  may appear to be unending period. But the crucial  words are “in connection with the marriage of the  said parties”. As was observed in the said case  “suicidal death” of a married woman within seven  years  of  her  marriage  is  covered  by  the  expression  “death  of  a  woman  is  caused ...  or  occurs  otherwise  than  under  normal  circumstances”  as  expressed  in  Section  304-B  IPC.”

17. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  heavily  relied  

upon the following observations made by this Court in the case  

of Appasaheb1:

“A  demand  for  money  on  account  of  some  financial  stringency  or  for  meeting  some  urgent  domestic  expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed  as a demand for  dowry  as the said word  is  normally  understood”.  

3 (2005) 2 SCC 388

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The above observations of this Court must be understood in the  

context of the case.  That was a case  wherein the prosecution  

evidence did not show ‘any demand for dowry’ as defined in  

Section 2 of the 1961 Act.  The allegation to the effect that the  

deceased was  asked to  bring  money for  domestic  expenses  

and for  purchasing manure in the facts of  the case was not  

found  sufficient  to  be  covered  by  the  ‘demand  for   dowry’.  

Appasaheb1 cannot  be  read  to  be  laying  down  an  absolute  

proposition  that  a  demand  for  money  or  some  property  or  

valuable  security  on  account  of  some  business  or  financial  

requirement could not be termed as ‘demand for dowry’. It was  

in the facts of the case that  it  was held so.  If  a demand for  

property or valuable security, directly or indirectly, has a nexus  

with  marriage,  in  our  opinion,  such demand would constitute  

‘demand  for  dowry’;  the  cause  or  reason  for  such  demand  

being immaterial.      

18. In the backdrop of the above legal  position,  if  we  

look at the facts of the case, it is clearly established that Kanta  

died otherwise than under normal circumstances. There is no  

dispute of fact that death of Kanta occurred within seven years  

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of her marriage. That Kanta was subjected to  harassment and  

ill-treatment by A-1 and A-2 after PW-8 refused to accede to  

their demand for purchase of motorcycle is established by the  

evidence of PW-8 and PW-9.  Then there is evidence of PW-10  

that PW-8 had called him and DW-1 to his house where A-1  

had made demand of motorcycle. PW-10 stated that he sought  

to reason to  A-1 about inability of PW-8 to give motorcycle at  

which  A-1  got  angry  and  warned  that  Kanta  would  not  be  

allowed to  stay  in  her  matrimonial  home.  It  is  true  that  the  

appellants produced DW-1 in defence and he did state in his  

examination-in-chief that he did not meet A-1 at the house of  

PW-8 but in cross-examination when he was confronted with  

his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. (portion A to A)  where  

it was recorded that he and PW-10 had gone to the house of  

PW-8 and both of them (PW-10 and DW-1) counselled A-1 to  

desist  from  demanding  motorcycle  but  she  stuck  to  her  

demand, DW-1 had no explanation to offer.  The evidence of  

DW-1  is,  therefore,  liable  to  be  discarded.  In  light  of  the  

evidence let in by the prosecution, the trial court cannot be said  

to have erred in holding that it  was established that unlawful  

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demand of motorcycle was made by A-1 and A-2 from PW-8  

and Kanta was harassed on  account of his failure to provide  

the  motorcycle  and  that  led  Kanta  to  commit  suicide  by  

hanging.   Pertinently, the demand of motorcycle by A-1 from  

PW-8 was for A-2 and when PW-8 showed his inability to meet  

that demand, A-2 started harassing and ill-treating Kanta.  In  

this  view of  the  matter,  it  cannot  be said  that  there  was  no  

demand by A-2.

19. The  High  Court  has  also  examined  the  matter  

thoroughly and reached the finding that A-1 and A-2 had raised  

a demand for purchase of motorcycle from PW-8; this demand  

was  made  within  two  months  of  the  marriage  and  was  a  

demand towards ‘dowry’  and when this demand was not met,  

Kanta was maltreated and harassed continuously which led her  

to  take extreme step of  finishing her life.  We agree with  the  

above  view  of  the  High  Court.   There  is  no  merit  in  the  

contention of the counsel for the appellants that the demand of  

motorcycle does not qualify as a ‘demand for  dowry’.  All the  

essential  ingredients  to  bring  home  the  guilt  under  Section  

304B  IPC  are  established  against  the  appellants   by  the  

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prosecution  evidence.   As  a  matter  of  law,  the  presumption  

under Section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872 is fully attracted  

in  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  present  case.  The  

appellants have failed to rebut the presumption under Section  

113B.

20. For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in the  

appeal  and it  is  dismissed accordingly.  Two months’  time is  

given to A-1 to surrender for undergoing the sentence awarded  

to her.

……………….. J.     (Aftab Alam)

….……………. J.                                                           (R.M. Lodha) NEW DELHI, FEBRUARY  8, 2011.

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