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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL     APPEAL     NO.      7005         OF      2012   (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 20394 of 2005)

Avinash Sadashiv Bhosale (D) Thr. LRs.     ...Appellant  

VERSUS

Union of India & Ors.  

...Respondents

J     U     D     G     M     E     N     T   

SURINDER     SINGH     NIJJAR,     J.   

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal by special leave is directed against the  

judgment and order dated 30th March, 2005 passed in  

the Writ Petition No. 8606 of 2004 by the High Court  

of Bombay, by which the writ petition against the  

order of dismissal of the petitioner from service dated  

19th July, 2003 and the order passed by the Appellate  

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Authority on 27th July, 2004 affirming the said order of  

the dismissal was dismissed in limine.

3. Before adverting to the facts leading to the filing of the  

present appeal, we must notice that the petitioner Mr.  

Avinash Sadashiv Bhosale died during the pendency of  

this appeal.  His legal heirs have been brought on  

record, in his place. However, for the sake of  

convenience, he shall be referred to as Mr. Bhosale or  

as the appellant whichever is appropriate.   

4. It appears that Mr. Bhosale joined the services of  

respondent No.2 Bank as a Probationary Officer on  

31st July, 1975.  He was confirmed as an Officer in  

Junior Management Grade Scale–I on 31st July, 1977.  

In course of time, he was promoted to Middle  

Management Scale-II (August, 1984).  Thereafter, he  

was further promoted as Officer in Middle  

Management  Scale–III in August, 1994.  In course of  

time, he was posted as the Branch Manager at Washi  

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Turbhe branch  on 31st January, 1998 and was  

officiating in the Senior Management Scale-IV.  

5. Whilst he was working at Washi Turbhe branch, it was  

discovered that the branch had indulged in fraudulent  

transactions to the tune of Rs. 12 crores.    On 8th  

July, 1998, the appellant was relieved from the branch  

of the aforesaid bank, presumably due to his alleged  

involvement in the said transactions.     On 16th July,  

1998, he apparently reported the fraud to the Crime  

Branch, CBD, Belapur, Navi Mumbai. The A.G.M. in  

charge of the Region IV, State Bank of India, Zonal  

Office, Mumbai was also informed. In the complaint  

made to the police, he had requested that the culprits  

who are involved in the fraud be identified. He had  

also asked the police to initiate suitable action against  

the culprits in accordance with law.

6. It is claimed by Mr. Bhosale that instead of taking  

action on the complaint submitted by him, the A.G.M.  

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on 22nd July, 1998 wrote to the police indicating that  

the appellant had no locus standi to file the complaint.  

It was stated that Mr. Bhosale “is not an authorised  

person to lodge a complaint on behalf of the Bank,  

since he himself is involved in the alleged offence in  

the above matter.”  As noticed earlier, the appellant  

was relieved from the Branch on 8th July, 1998. He  

had protested that he had an excellent and  

unblemished service record in the Bank for the past  

23 years. He maintained that he was entirely innocent  

and did not commit any breach of the service  

regulations of the bank. He pointed out that he  

proceeded on leave on account of sickness  

on 26th March 1998 and also that he was mostly either  

on leave or on some outdoor assignment duties during  

the period immediately preceding the detection of the  

said fraudulent transactions. Further, it has been  

claimed that certain officials in the Bank in  

connivance with each other committed fraud by  

purchasing cheques without his knowledge.

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7. The appellant was suspended from service  on 23rd  

July, 1998 alongwith one Mr. Yadneshwar Choudhary.  

However, the latter was soon reinstated in service as  

he was not made a co-accused in the criminal  

proceedings initiated against Mr. Bhosale and three  

other co-accused.  

8. It appears that after completion of investigation by the  

police, the appellant was prosecuted for having  

committed the offences punishable under  Sections  

120(B), 420, 467, 468, 471 and 201 of Indian Penal  

Code alongwith three others who were the account  

holders. By judgment dated 4th December, 2001,  Mr.  

Bhosale and the other co-accused were acquitted of all  

the charges.  

9. Simultaneously to the criminal proceedings, the  

respondent bank had initiated departmental  

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proceedings against Mr. Bhosale.  He was served a  

charge sheet  dated 14th January, 2000 containing  

articles of charge and statement of imputation of  

misconduct in terms of Rule 68(2)(iii) of the State Bank  

of India Officers Service Rules, 1992 (hereinafter  

referred to as the “1992 Rules”).  In the aforesaid  

charge sheet certain specific and serious allegations  

have been made against Mr. Bhosale.  The statement  

of imputation alleges that after his transfer at Washi  

Turbhe Branch on 31st January, 1998 from Rabala  

Trans Thane Creek Branch, he permitted M/s  

Kalgindar Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. to open a  

current account at Washi Turbhe Branch without  

completing the required formalities. Further, the  

account was allegedly opened with a view to  

accommodate the said construction company at a later  

date by executing the fictitious Demand Draft (D.D.)  

purchase transactions. The statement of imputation  

thereafter tabulates the departure from established  

norms which are to be observed by the Bank for DD  

purchase. It is alleged that Mr. Bhosale  

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indiscriminately and without any justification  

authorised D.D. purchase of 11 cheques aggregating to  

Rs.5,51,51,070/- drawn in favour of    M/s Kalgindar  

Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. and presented by it  

for credit of proceeds thereof to its Current Account.  

All the cheques so discounted except one for Rs.5 lacs  

were beyond the discretionary powers vested in Mr.  

Bhosale. While allowing D.D. purchases, no D.D.  

purchase limit was fixed for the said construction  

company, nor was the genuineness of the transactions  

or credentials of the parties ascertained by Mr.  

Bhosale. All the D.D. purchase transactions in  

question were also not reported to the Controllers. The  

high value cheques were allowed to be handed over to  

the representative of the said construction Company,  

instead of dispatching them to the Bank’s branch  

located at the centre by Regd. A.D. Post.  This  

deliberate action of Mr. Bhosale facilitated the said  

construction company to perpetrate a fraud on the  

Bank as the said cheques did not reach the drawee  

Banks.

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10.Charge No.2 narrates a similar incident where  Mr.  

Bhosale allowed M/s. Kumar Constructions Company,  

a proprietory firm, to open a current account on 15th  

June, 1998 without making enquiries of antecedents  

of the proprietor and completing the other required  

formalities with a malafide intention to accommodate  

the aforesaid company at a later date by allowing  

fictitious D.D. purchase of cheques.  Thereafter, the  

actual details of the D.D. purchase are tabulated.

11.  The third Charge in the list of allegation relates to  

M/s. Kalani Builders and Developers Pvt. Ltd., dealing  

in construction business.  The aforesaid company  

submitted a proposal prepared by a Chartered  

Accountant for being extended credit facilities.  Based  

on the aforesaid proposal, Mr. Bhosale sanctioned  

cash credit limit of Rs.20 lacs (fund based) and Rs.20  

lacs (non-fund based). All this was done by him  

without making independent enquiries, carrying out  

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pre-sanction survey, arranging visits by the field officer  

or by himself, properly scrutinizing and appraising the  

proposal, compiling an opinion report on the  

borrowers and the guarantors and obtaining  

recommendations of the field officer.  Mr. Bhosale,  

within a period of one month from the date of sanction  

of cash credit limit on 1st June, 1998 permitted D.D.  

purchase of a high value cheque for Rs.31,00,980/-,  

which was beyond his discretionary powers.  He had  

not ascertained the genuineness of the large value  

D.D. purchase transaction nor made enquiries about  

the credentials of the drawer of the cheque. He also  

allowed cash withdrawals of Rs.30 lacs. Further, he  

directed the Dispatch Clerk to hand over the said  

purchased cheque to the representative of the said  

company for dispatching it to the drawee Bank instead  

of dispatching it by Regd. A.D. Post.  Charge No. 3(iii)  

alleges that on 9th May, 1998, Mr. Bhosale issued a  

Letter of Credit for Rs.19,87,000/- on behalf of  M/s.  

Kalani Builders Pvt. Ltd., without proper  

scrutiny/assessment of the required particulars. Even  

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the counter guarantee was not obtained, nor was it  

ensured that obligations of the said company would be  

met on due date.  Due to his reckless financing and  

allowing D.D. purchase to M/s. Kalani Builders and  

Developers Pvt. Ltd., the Bank suffered a huge  

financial loss to the extent of Rs.70 lacs.  He wanted to  

conceal the facts of his irregular financing and,  

therefore, he did not obtain prior sanction of the  

Controllers or reported for post facto confirmation of  

the Controllers.

12.  Charge No.4 alleges that Mr. Bhosale  

indiscriminately sanctioned loan aggregating to  

Rs.56.43 lacs to 19 borrowers under “Big Buy Scheme  

for purchase of vehicles during 30th April, 1998 to 1st  

June, 1998.”  In these transactions, quantum of loans  

was to be related to the income of the borrowers.  

However, this basic factor was totally neglected.  

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13. Charge No. 5 points to the expenditure of  Rs. 4.35  

lacs incurred by Mr. Bhosale during the period from  

March, 1998 to June, 1998 for carrying out repairs to  

Bank’s Property and providing furniture at the Branch.  

This was done without inviting any competitive  

quotations and without seeking approval from the  

Controlling Authority.   

14. Charge No.6 relates to 86 bills of stationery items  

amounting to Rs.1.16 lacs.  Here again, the  

expenditure was incurred without seeking sanction  

from the Controlling Authority.  On the basis of the  

aforesaid allegations, it was held that Mr. Bhosale  

failed to discharge his duty with utmost integrity,  

honesty, devotion and diligence to ensure and protect  

the interest of the Bank and acted in a manner in  

violation of         Rule 50(4) of the 1992 Rules.   

15.Thereafter, the enquiry proceedings were initiated  

against Mr. Bhosale. Mr. P.P. Thomas, Officer, Senior  

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Management Grade Scale-V was appointed as the  

Inquiry Officer on 30th June, 2000. The preliminary  

hearings of the inquiry were scheduled to be held on  

7th September, 2001 and 25th September, 2001, none  

of which were attended by Mr. Bhosale, despite being  

reminded in advance by the Inquiry Officer.  

Consequently, the preliminary hearing proceedings  

were held ex-parte.  The regular hearing of the inquiry  

was scheduled for            17th January, 2002.  Again,  

Mr. Bhosale expressed his inability to attend the same  

on account of sickness.  The hearing of the inquiry  

was, therefore, postponed to  18th March, 2002,  

whereupon the regular hearing was conducted by the  

Inquiry Officer, in the presence of the presenting  

officer Mr. D.R. Bapat and Mr. Bhosale. The entire  

evidence, including the statement of Mr. Suresh  

Mahadeva Mahale was recorded in the presence of  

Mr. Bhosale.  Mr. Mahale was working as a dispatcher  

at Washi Turbhe Branch during the period when the  

irregularities were committed thereat. Further, both  

Mr. Bhosale and the presenting officer were directed to  

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submit their respective written briefs. Consequently,  

the presenting officer submitted a brief on 8th April,  

2002, whereas Mr. Bhosale submitted his brief on 6th  

June, 2002.  

16.Finally, the Inquiry Officer submitted his report on 19th  

August, 2002, whereby it was held that all the charges  

have been proved against Mr. Bhosale.  A copy of the  

Inquiry Officer’s report was made available to  Mr.  

Bhosale for his submissions.  It appears from the  

record that Mr. Bhosale had submitted a detailed  

defence to the findings of the Inquiry Officer.  

Ultimately, the Disciplinary Authority in its Order  

dated 19th July 2003 rejected all the pleas raised in  

defence by the appellant. Upon careful examination of  

the entire material on record, the disciplinary  

authority passed the following effective order:-

“The C.O. has also contended that the I.A. has  not taken into consideration the acquittal of  the C.O. in the criminal case as a sufficient  and judicial proof of there being no  misconduct on his part.  He has further stated  

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that the I.A. has not considered the fact  finding reports compiled by the Bank officials  S/S. Vasant Karve and Mukand Joshi, which  have not implicated the C.O. for the lapses  mentioned in the charge sheet served on him.

The Court has acquitted the C.O. of offences  punishable under Indian Penal Code, whereas  the departmental action is for his misconduct  in terms of Rules 66 of the SBIOSR.

The above submissions have no relevance to  the allegations inasmuch as the allegations  levelled against the C.O. have been inquired by  the I.A. in the departmental enquiry as per the  procedures adopted / in-vogue in  departmental enquiry.  Reasonable  opportunity was given to the C.O. to put up his  defence before the I.A.   After evaluating the  evidence brought before the inquiry, the I.A.  has held the allegations as proved.

On a careful examination and consideration,  the submissions of the C.O. are found to be  not convincing and hence not acceptable.  I,  therefore, considering the case in its entirety in  my capacity as the Disciplinary and  Appointing Authority, hold all the allegations  and the charge as a whole as “Proved”  on  sufficient and acceptable evidence.  The proven  allegations are very serious in nature which  have exposed the Bank to substantial financial  loss.  The proven misconduct evidently speaks  of lack of honesty and integrity on the part of  the Charged Officer.  Considering all the facts  and circumstances of the case, I am of the  view that retaining the officer in the Bank’s  

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Service is fraught with grave risks.  I,  therefore, consider that imposition of penalty  of “Dismissal”  under rule 67(j) of the State  Bank of India Officers Service Rules on Shri A.  S. Bhosale, Officer, MMGS III (under  suspension), would meet the ends of justice,  treating the period of suspension undergone  by the official, as such.  I order accordingly.

The C.O. may, if he so desires, prefer an  appeal against this order to the Appellate  Authority within 45 days from the date of  receipt thereof in terms of Rule 69(1) and (2)  ibid.”

17.Against the aforesaid order of dismissal, Mr. Bhosale  

preferred a statutory appeal on 19th August, 2003  

under the 1992 Rules. Upon consideration of the  

submissions made by Mr. Bhosale in the appeal by  

Order dated 27th February, 2004, the Appellate  

Authority  (Chief General Manager) dismissed the  

same.  The relevant observations made by the  

Appellate Authority are as under:-

“I have examined the entire records of the case  and on the basis thereof observe as under,  seriatim:

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i) The contentions of the appellant are  without basis. The entire inquiry process  has been correctly followed and fair  opportunity has been provided to the  appellant to defend himself.

ii) The Inquiry Authority in his report has  unequivocally stated that the preliminary  hearing, which was to be held on 17th  August, 2001 was postponed to the 7th  September, 2001, due to the charged  official’s absence. Later the hearing  scheduled for 7th September, 2001 was  also postponed to 25th September, 2001,  for the same reasons. The appellant’s  submission that the Inquiring Authority  was biased therefore has no basis.   

iii) The appellant’s contention seems to be an  after thought since in the Regular hearing  on the 18th March, 2002, the appellant  did not raise objections on this count.  Moreover, during the hearing, the  appellant confirmed having received these  documents (presenting Officer’s exhibits).

iv) It is apparent from the inquiry  proceedings that the defence was  provided a fair opportunity to defend  itself. The appellant’s attempt to cry foul  at this juncture is therefore not valid.  

v) This argument of the appellant does not  have any basis. The charge sheet had  clearly outlined these details.

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vi) The process followed in a departmental  inquiry is distinctly different from that  followed in a proceedings before the  court. The appellant’s contention is  therefore not acceptable.  

vii) The appellant cannot disclaim  responsibility on this count. As the head  of the Branch, he should have ensured  that the Bank’s instruction relating to  dispatch of instruments (DD Purchased)  should have been meticulously followed.  Moreover, PW-1 (the dispatch clerk) has  confirmed in the proceedings held  on 18th March, 2002 that the covers  containing the instruments were  delivered at the behest of the appellant.

viii) The Inquiring Authority’s conclusion that  the initials on the Demand Liability  Register were those of the appellant is  supported by reasoned logic. The  Inquiring Authority has lucidly portrayed  as to how he reached such a conclusion.

ix) a) Allegation     1     (i)     &     (ii)     :   

The appellant cannot disown the fact that  cheques were purchased for large  amounts. He further cannot disassociate  himself by stating that other officers  permitted the withdrawals in the account.  Moreover, the officials who permitted  these withdrawals had done so, on the  basis of the credit balance available in  the account(s).

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b) Allegation     1(iii)     :     

In addition to stating that the cheques  were delivered to the beneficiary at the  instructions of Shri Balkawade, the  witness had affirmed that these were also  delivered at the behest of the appellant.  His contention that the prosecution did  not introduce key witness is irrelevant.   

c) Allegation     1(iv)     :             

The submission of the appellant has no  basis.  

d) Allegation     2(i)     and     (ii)     :   

It has been proved in the inquiry that DD  Purchases were authorised by the  appellant. His attempt to pass the  responsibility to officials who passed the  withdrawals in the account is not  appreciated. Further, it is a fact that tee  account was not properly introduced.    

e) Allegation2(iii),     (iv)     and     (v)     :    

The appellant is merely trying to raise  vague issues. As already stated earlier,  the Inquiry Authority has very aptly  concluded that the initials in the Demand  Liability Register were that of the  appellant.  

f) Allegation     3     :   

By merely stating that the documents  were in the custody of the Field Officer,  

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the appellant cannot disclaim  responsibility. It was also open to the  appellant to produce the field Officer as a  defence witness.

g) Allegation     4:   

The allegation have been proved based on  the documentary evidence produced by  the Presenting Officer in the course of the  inquiry proceeding. The appellant has  during the regular hearing held on 18th  March, 2002 confirmed having verified  the documents. His contention that no  document was produced in the inquiry is  therefore incorrect.  

h) Allegation     5     :   

The allegation has been proved based on  documentary evidence. Splitting of Bills  has been proved from the fact that 111  bills were paid in respect of 7 items of  expenditure.  

i) Allegation     6     :   

The allegation was proved based on  documentary evidence. From the evidence  brought out in the inquiry it is apparent  that the appellant split bills pertaining to  stationery items, in order to ensure that  the amount of the split bills falls within  his discretionary powers.

x) Although there has been some delay in  the issuance of the charge sheet, the  

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appellant’s claim that it had amounted to  denial of opportunity to establish his  innocence is not maintainable.  

xi) The Honourable Court had acquitted the  appellant on the subject matter of  criminal conspiracy. The appellant  cannot draw a parallel between the  findings of the departmental proceedings  and the Court’s verdict.  

Having so considered the various points  brought out in the appeal, I am of the view  that the appellant has not been able to put  forth any convincing point of merit. The  appellant has committed serious and grave  irregularities. There is therefore no scope for  modification of the penalty imposed on him. I  therefore reject the appeal and order  accordingly.”      

18.Mr. Bhosale challenged the orders passed by the  

Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate  

Authority by filing Writ Petition No. 8606 of 2004 in  

the High Court of Judicature at Bombay by Order  

dated 30th March, 2005.  The writ petition was  

dismissed by a Division Bench of the Bombay High  

Court in limine.  The aforesaid Order of the High Court  

is challenged by   Mr. Bhosale in this appeal.  

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19. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at  

length.

20.Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain, learned counsel appearing for  

the appellant submits that the disciplinary  

proceedings conducted against Mr. Bhosale are  

vitiated as he was acquitted by the Criminal Court.  All  

the offences for which Mr. Bhosale was tried, and then  

acquitted by the criminal court, were founded on the  

facts which form the basis of the departmental  

enquiry. It has been emphasized that the departmental  

proceedings ought to have been stayed during the  

pendency of the criminal trial. Once the appellant had  

been acquitted by the trial court in its judgment dated  

4th December, 2001, the appellant ought to have been  

reinstated forthwith.  

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21. Mr. Jain submits that continuation of departmental  

proceedings after the appellant was acquitted in the  

criminal trial is in violation of the principle underlying  

Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India.  He argues  

that the statement of imputations of misconduct  

clearly show that the foundational facts on which the  

criminal charges were based are also the facts forming  

the basis of the charges levelled against the appellant.  

The learned counsel made a detailed and elaborate  

reference to the findings recorded by the learned  

Magistrate, in support of the submissions that there  

was clearly no evidence against the appellant on the  

basis of which the charges could be said to have been  

proved.  

22. He pointed out that the learned trial court after  

considering the entire evidence on record has held and  

observed as under :-

“18…………If at all any foul play was played at  the time of purchasing the cheques, persons  like witness no.12 Yadneshwar Choudhary  

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and others were responsible for it who were  passing the cheques and putting their  signatures.  Instead of prosecuting such  persons, prosecution has made them  witnesses. In this way, when these persons are  themselves at fault in the episode, naturally  they will try to save their own skin when  entered in the witness box therefore their  evidence carries least evidentiary value.

23……..Sufficient evidence has come on record  that during the period of transactions effected  in between accused Nos.1, 3 and 4 with the  aggrieved bank, all these bank officers were  working in the bank and were taking active  participation. If really any guilt is committed  why all these persons are left at liberty by the  prosecution and how they can be believed in  the court. It has come on record that P.W.  No.12 Yadneshwar Choudhary is suspended  from his service only because of this case.  Neither the Bank Officers nor the police is  coming forward to make such a person  accused in the case.

28………..Mr. Bhave is very specific in stating  that if the despatch clerk fails to follow this  practice, he is personally liable for the breach.  Admittedly, the accused No.2 never issued any  direction in writing to the despatch clerk to  give the cheques by hand delivery.      

30………Witness No.7 Suresh Mahadik who is  despatch clerk himself is responsible and  faulty in discharging his duty.

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Witness No.10 Vinayak Kadam, witness No.11  Arun Balakawade, witness No.12 Yadneshwar  Choudhary are all employees of the same bank  where the incident has taken place. Not only  this, but they actively participated in the  transaction in question. Therefore to save their  own skin, they may blame the Branch  Manager. As such their evidence cannot be  believed.”     

23. Relying on the aforesaid observations, Mr. Jain  

submitted that the entire departmental proceedings  

are vitiated as the appellant has been made scapegoat  

for   the misconduct committed by other employees of  

the bank who were acting in connivance with each  

other. According to Mr. Jain, the fraud could not have  

been committed unless there was connivance at every  

level from the Clerk to the Deputy Manager. It is for  

this reason that Yadneshwar Chaudhary was  

reinstated in service and then used as a witness  

against the appellant. Mr. Jain emphasised that  

inspite of efforts made by the respondent-Bank the  

learned Judicial Magistrate had clearly held that there  

is no evidence of criminal conspiracy against the  

appellant. Hence, he was acquitted of the offences  

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punishable under Section 120-B IPC with the following  

observations :-  

“In the result, I come to a firm conclusion that  the accused are entitled to get clean chit in the  matter”.

24. Mr. Jain also pointed out to certain other  

observations made by the learned Magistrate to  

demonstrate that the enquiry proceedings are vitiated  

by legal mala-fides as the same were initiated and  

conducted against the appellant with the oblique  

purpose of shielding the real culprits. He points out to  

the observations made by the trial court to  

demonstrate that there was no breach of the service  

regulations. It is pointed out by the learned trial court  

that the bank had failed to place on record any rule  

which would show that the appellant was empowered  

to purchase a cheque only to the extent of Rs.6 lacs.  

The trial court further pointed out that the bank had  

also not placed on record any document or resolution  

to prove that there was a limit of Rs.6 lacs for  

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purchase of cheques by the appellant. The trial court  

further observed that:-

“If there was really any such rule then how all  the bank officers actively participated in the  process of purchasing cheques against or  contrary to such so-called rule. Even the bank  officers who have stepped in the witness Box  did not feel shy to state that they are not fully  conversant with banking rules.”  

25. The learned trial court also adverted to the evidence  

of Witness No.16 as follows :-  

“20. Witness No.16 Vinay Bhave who is Senior  Officer of the bank working as a Regional  Manager. He also in his examination-in-chief  itself stated that he used to receive weekly  reports of all the branches on every Friday  including the branch in question, and he used  to scrutinize the reports. If this gentleman was  scrutinizing the reports on every Friday, how  and why he kept mum when the cheques of  more than Rupees 6,00,000/- were purchased  in the concerned bank. This witness has tried  to shift responsibility upon another bank  officer named Shri Karve.”

26. The learned trial court further pointed out that the  

Bank rules were not known even to the other Senior  

Officers. Mr. Jain has made a reference to the  

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observations made by the learned trial court whilst  

considering the evidence of PW-11, Arun Balkawade,  

who was a Senior Officer of the bank. In fact, he was  

next in the designation to the Chief Manager of Washi  

Turbhe branch at the material time.  Even this witness  

admitted that he does not know fully all the rules and  

regulations regarding D.D. purchase of cheques.  

Learned trial court also concluded that since the other  

bank employee had actively participated in the  

fraudulent transactions, their statements could not be  

relied upon. Summing up the entire evidence, learned  

trial court had come to a firm conclusion that the  

accused are entitled to get “clean chit”  in the matter.  

Relying on the aforesaid observations, Mr. Jain  

submitted that the acquittal of the appellant is proof of  

the total inability of the bank to produce any evidence  

in the trial. The appellant was acquitted as there was  

no evidence of culpability against him.  

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27. Relying on a number of judgments of this Court,  

Mr. Jain has submitted that the submissions made by  

the appellant before the Disciplinary Authority have  

been totally ignored without any basis.  According to  

Mr. Jain, the Departmental Enquiry conducted against  

the appellant was an eye wash.  In the Departmental  

Enquiry, the bank examined only one witness PW-7,  

Suresh Mahadik, who has been disbelieved by the  

criminal court. Such a witness who has been proved to  

be not truthful could not have been relied upon, in the  

departmental enquiry.  He points out that the criminal  

court recorded a categorical finding that there is no  

evidence to connect any particular officer with the  

non-completion of the proper documentation.  In the  

face of such a finding, the Inquiry Officer, without any  

basis recorded the finding that the charge was proved  

against the appellant. Similarly, the evidence of  

Suresh Mahadik having been ignored by the learned  

trial court, no reliance could have been placed on the  

same by the Inquiry officer.  Mr. Jain further pointed  

out that in the departmental enquiry, the bank had  

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failed to produce any document or evidence by leading  

oral evidence. All the documents were merely placed  

on record by an employee of the bank. Mr. Jain further  

pointed out that the bias of the inquiry officer as well  

as the bank is obvious from the fact that all the  

employees involved in the completion of the  

transactions were neither prosecuted nor proceeded  

against departmentally. On the other hand, these  

individuals have been examined as prosecution  

witnesses. Having been acquitted, there was no  

justification for the bank to hold a departmental  

enquiry on the same facts and on the basis of same  

evidence.       

28. Mr. Jain then submitted that the order passed by  

the appellate authority is vitiated as it has been  

passed with a closed mind. None of the submissions  

made by the appellant in the written submissions have  

been considered by the appellate authority. Further  

more, the submissions which have been considered  

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have not been considered on the basis of the relevant  

material which was placed before the appellate  

authority.  

29. In support of these submissions, Mr. Jain relied on  

some judgments of this Court which are as follows:-

Roop     Singh     Negi   Vs. Punjab     National     Bank     &    

Ors.  1  ,     Calcutta     Dock     Labour     Board     &     Ors.   Vs.  

Jaffar     Imam  2  ,     Subhash     Chand   Vs. State     of    

Rajasthan  3  ,     Omar     Salay     Mohd     Sait   Vs.  

Commissioner     of     Income     Tax,     Madras  4  ,      Union     of    

India Vs. H.C.     Goel  5  ,     Narinder     Mohan     Arya   Vs.  

United     India     Insurance     Co.     Ltd.     &     Ors.  6  ,      G.M.    

Tank Vs. State     of     Gujarat     &     Ors.  7  ,     Union     of     India    

&     Ors.   Vs. Naman     Singh     Shekhawat  8  ,     Capt.     M.    

Paul     Anthony   Vs. Bharat     Gold     Mines     Ltd.     &     Anr.  9  ,    

1 (2009) 2 SCC 570 2 1965 3 SCR 453 3 (2002) 1 SCC 702 4 AIR 1959 SC 1238 5 AIR 1964 SC 364 6 (2006) 4 SCC 713 7 (2006) 5 SCC 446 8 (2008) 4 SCC 1 9 (1999) 3 SCC 679

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Sawai     Singh   Vs. State     of     Rajasthan  10  ,     and     Pritam    

Singh     &     Anr.   Vs. State     of     Punjab  11  .   

30.Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel appearing  

for respondent Nos. 2 to 5 has submitted that  

acquittal in a criminal case is not a bar for holding  

departmental proceedings against the bank official.  

Learned counsel pointed out that the proceedings  

before the criminal trial are different in nature to the  

proceedings in a Departmental Enquiry.  Whereas  

prosecution had to prove the guilt of the accused in  

the criminal trial beyond reasonable doubt, in the  

departmental enquiry, the standard of proof is only  

preponderance of probabilities. Mr. Dwivedi further  

submitted that the appellant cannot take any  

advantage of non-production of the relevant evidence  

by the prosecution in the trial. The lapse committed by  

the prosecuting agency cannot be attributed to the  

bank. Further more, in the prosecution, the emphasis  

was on the involvement of individuals in a criminal  10 (1986) 3 SCC 454 11 AIR 1956 SC 415

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conspiracy to defraud the bank. In the departmental  

proceedings, charges levelled against the appellant are  

that he has failed to maintain absolute devotion to  

duty. The charges were that he had disregarded the  

provisions of the bank regulations. Therefore, two  

proceedings cannot be placed in the same category.  

Mr. Dwivedi pointed out that, at the relevant time, the  

hierarchy in the Branch put the Branch Manager at  

the top.  Below him were the Field Officer, Accountant,  

Cashier, Dispatch Clerk and a Peon. As a Branch  

Manager, the appellant was the controller of all the  

affairs of the branch. He had to ensure that all  

necessary precautions had been taken to prevent any  

loss being caused to the bank. The learned senior  

counsel pointed out that the appellant was in-charge  

of a small branch. Therefore, had he exercised due  

care and caution, such a massive fraud could not have  

taken place.  Therefore, there was no overlap between  

the criminal proceedings and the departmental  

proceedings. In the criminal trial, the prosecution had  

to prove that the appellant was guilty beyond  

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reasonable doubt that he had conspired with the other  

officials of the Bank to commit the offences with which  

he had been charged.  In the departmental  

proceedings, the enquiry was to investigate as to  

whether the appellant had performed his duties as a  

Branch Manager in strict adherence to the procedural  

rules/regulations of the Bank.  He, therefore, refutes  

the submission of Mr. Jain that there is any  

infringement of any principle underlying Article 20(2)  

of the Constitution of India.  In support of his  

submissions, Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi relied on the  

judgment of this Court in Divisional     Controller,    

Karnataka     State     Road     Transport     Corporation     Vs.  

M.G.Vittal     Rao.  12

31. Answering the objections raised by Mr. Jain with  

regard to the conduct of the departmental enquiry,  

Mr. Dwivedi pointed out that all documents were duly  

produced and proved during the enquiry proceedings.  

The prosecution had failed to produce the relevant  

documents during the criminal trial. During the  

12 (2012) 1 SCC 442

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Departmental Enquiry, the appellant was asked to  

verify about the authenticity of the documents.  At no  

stage, the appellant complained about their lack of  

authenticity. The appellant only made one statement  

during the departmental enquiry that his initials for  

purchase of the demand drafts had not been proved.  

Mr. Dwivedi pointed out to the procedural lapses  

committed by the appellant.   The authenticity of the  

documents produced in the enquiry not having been  

doubted by the appellant, the findings of the Inquiry  

Officer can not be said to be based on no evidence.  

The appellant was aware that his limit for purchase of  

a cheque was Rs.6 lacs. Any purchase above Rs.6 lacs  

could only be done with the prior approval of the  

higher authorities.  The appellant failed to take any  

prior approval from the higher authorities.       In fact,  

the appellant never informed the higher authorities  

even after the transactions had been completed. Mr.  

Dwivedi pointed out that the transactions involved  

were so heavy, the appellant could not have failed to  

notice the irregularities. This would lead to a clear  

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inference that either the appellant was acting in  

connivance with the account holders who were  

benefitted or he was grossly negligent in performance  

of his duties.  Mr. Dwivedi then pointed out that once  

the appellant knew that the whole fraud has been  

exposed, he rushed to make a complaint to the police.  

Since by that time the higher officials had suspicion  

with regard to the conduct of the appellant, the police  

was informed not to act upon the complaint made by  

him. The actions of the appellant were in violation of  

Rules 48(4), 48(9), 66 and 67.      

32. We have considered the submissions made by the  

learned counsel for the parties.  We are not at all  

impressed by the submissions made by Mr. Jain.  

33. We may, however, briefly notice the ratio of the  

judgments relied upon by the learned counsel.  

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34.In Roop Singh Negi’s case (supra), this Court has  

reiterated the well known principle of law that findings  

of the Enquiry Officer have to be based on some  

relevant evidence. It is further re-stated that the orders  

passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate  

authority, must also be supported by relevant reasons.  

The principles are stated thus :  

“23. Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary  authority as also the appellate authority are  not supported by any reason. As the orders  passed by them have severe civil  consequences, appropriate reasons should  have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had  relied upon the confession made by the  appellant, there was no reason as to why the  order of discharge passed by the criminal court  on the basis of selfsame evidence should not  have been taken into consideration. The  materials brought on record pointing out the  guilt are required to be proved. A decision  must be arrived at on some evidence, which is  legally admissible. The provisions of the  Evidence Act may not be applicable in a  departmental proceeding but the principles of  natural justice are. As the report of the  enquiry officer was based on merely ipse dixit  as also surmises and conjectures, the same  could not have been sustained. The inferences  drawn by the enquiry officer apparently were  not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as  is well known, however high may be, can  under no circumstances be held to be a  substitute for legal proof.”

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35.Similarly in Calcutta Dock Labour Board (supra) this  

Court has emphasised the principle that suspicion,  

however strong, cannot take the place of proof. The  

observations are as under:-

“We are, therefore, satisfied that the Court of  Appeal was right in taking the view that in a  departmental enquiry which the appellant held  against the respondents it was not open to the  appellant to act on suspicion, inasmuch as the  appellant’s decision is clearly based upon the  detention orders and nothing else, there can  be little doubt that, in substance, the said  conclusion is based on suspicion and nothing  more”.

36.In the case of Subhash Chand (supra), it is  

emphasised that in order to avoid any innocent  

individual being picked up and branded as a culprit,  

the conclusions ought not to be based on doubtful or  

dubious circumstances treating them as of “beyond  

doubt” evidentiary value.

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37.Similarly in Omar Salay Mohd Sait’s case (supra),  

this Court again emphasised that the conclusions  

ought to be recorded by the disciplinary authority on  

the basis of cogent evidence.

38.Mr. Jain then cited Union     of     India   Vs. H.C.     Goel    

(supra). Here again, the Constitution Bench of this  

Court emphasised that the suspicion, however, strong  

cannot be treated as proof against the accused in a  

criminal trial or a delinquent officer in domestic  

enquiry. Mr. Jain also relied upon the judgment in the  

case of Narinder     Mohan     Arya   Vs. United     India    

Insurance     Co.     Ltd.     &     Ors.  13    In paragraph 44 of this  

judgment, it is observed by this Court as under :-

“The evidence adduced on behalf of the  management must have nexus with the  charges. The enquiry officer cannot base his  findings on mere hypothesis. Mere ipse dixit on  his part cannot be a substitute of evidence.”

13 (2006) 4 SCC 713

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39.In G.M. Tank’s case (supra), this Court was  

considering the case of an appellant, who had been  

acquitted by the Criminal Court.  He had been  

prosecuted for having committed the offence under  

Section 5(1)(e) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention  

of Corruption Act, 1947.  Upon examination of the  

facts and the evidence, it was observed by this Court  

that there is not an iota of evidence against the  

appellant to hold that he is guilty of having committed  

the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act.  It  

was further observed that the departmental  

proceedings in the criminal case are based on identical  

and similar (verbatim), set of facts and evidence. It is  

further observed that in fact, respondents did not  

produce any evidence in support of and/or about the  

alleged charges involved against the appellant. The  

criminal proceedings were initiated against the  

appellant for the offences under the Prevention of  

Corruption Act on     the     same     set     of     facts     and     evidence  ,    

which was the basis of the departmental proceedings.  

The Court noticed the observations made in the case  

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of Ajit     Kumar     Nag   Vs. General     Manager     (PJ),     Indian    

Oil     Corpn.     Ltd.,     Haldia     &     Ors.  14  , which were as  

follows:-

“11. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a  criminal court is concerned, in our opinion,  the said order does not preclude the  Corporation from taking an action if it is  otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the  law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a  criminal court would not debar an employer  from exercising power in accordance with the  Rules and Regulations in force. The two  proceedings, criminal and departmental, are  entirely different. They operate in different  fields and have different objectives. Whereas  the object of criminal trial is to inflict  appropriate punishment on the offender, the  purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with  the delinquent departmentally and to impose  penalty in accordance with the service rules. In  a criminal trial, incriminating statement made  by the accused in certain circumstances or  before certain officers is totally inadmissible in  evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and  procedure would not apply to departmental  proceedings. The degree of proof which is  necessary to order a conviction is different  from the degree of proof necessary to record  the commission of delinquency. The rule  relating to appreciation of evidence in the two  proceedings is also not similar. In criminal  law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and  unless the prosecution is able to prove the  guilt of the accused “beyond reasonable  doubt”, he cannot be convicted by a court of  law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other  

14 (2005) 7 SCC 764

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hand, penalty can be imposed on the  delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the  basis of “preponderance of probability”.  Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial  Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto  absolve him from the liability under the  disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We  are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention  of the appellant that since he was acquitted by  a criminal court, the impugned order  dismissing him from service deserves to be  quashed and set aside.”

The Court further noticed the observations of this  

Court in Depot     Manager,     A.P.     State     Road     Transport    

Corporation Vs. Mohd.     Yousuf     Miya     &     Ors.  15  , wherein  

this Court observed as follows:-

“8. ………………The purpose of departmental  enquiry and of prosecution are two different  and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution  is launched for an offence for violation of a  duty, the offender owes to the society or for  breach of which law has provided that the  offender shall make satisfaction to the public.  So crime is an act of commission in violation of  law or of omission of public duty. The  departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline  in the service and efficiency of public service. It  would, therefore, be expedient that the  disciplinary proceedings are conducted and  completed as expeditiously as possible. It is  not, therefore, desirable to lay down any  guidelines as inflexible rules in which the  departmental proceedings may or may not be  

15 (1997) 2 SCC 699

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stayed pending trial in criminal case against  the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be  considered in the backdrop of its own facts  and circumstances. There would be no bar to  proceed simultaneously with departmental  enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the  charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature  involving complicated questions of fact and  law. Offence generally implies infringement of  public (sic duty), as distinguished from mere  private rights punishable under criminal law.  When trial for criminal offence is conducted it  should be in accordance with proof of the  offence as per the evidence defined under the  provisions of the Evidence Act. Converse is the  case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry in a  departmental proceedings relates to conduct or  breach of duty of the delinquent officer to  punish him for his misconduct defined under  the relevant statutory rules or law. That the  strict standard of proof or applicability of the  Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal  position. The enquiry in the departmental  proceedings relates to the conduct of the  delinquent officer and proof in that behalf is  not as high as in an offence in criminal charge.  It is seen that invariably the departmental  enquiry has to be conducted expeditiously so  as to effectuate efficiency in public  administration and the criminal trial will take  its own course. The nature of evidence in  criminal trial is entirely different from the  departmental proceedings. In the former,  prosecution is to prove its case beyond  reasonable doubt on the touchstone of human  conduct. The standard of proof in the  departmental proceedings is not the same as of  the criminal trial. The evidence also is different  from the standard point of the Evidence Act.  The evidence required in the departmental  enquiry is not regulated by the Evidence Act.  

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Under these circumstances, what is required  to be seen is whether the departmental  enquiry would seriously prejudice the  delinquent in his defence at the trial in a  criminal case. It is always a question of fact to  be considered in each case depending on its  own facts and circumstances. In this case, we  have seen that the charge is failure to  anticipate the accident and prevention thereof.  It has nothing to do with the culpability of the  offence under Sections 304-A and 338, IPC.  Under these circumstances, the High Court  was not right in staying the proceedings.”

Having noticed the aforesaid observations, the  

Court proceeded to distinguish the same with the  

following observations:-

“The judgments relied on by the learned  counsel appearing for the respondents are  distinguishable on facts and on law. In this  case, the departmental proceedings and the  criminal case are based on identical and  similar set of facts and the charge in a  departmental case against the appellant and  the charge before the criminal court are one  and the same. It is true that the nature of  charge in the departmental proceedings and in  the criminal case is grave. The nature of the  case launched against the appellant on the  basis of evidence and material collected  against him during enquiry and investigation  and as reflected in the charge-sheet, factors  mentioned are one and the same. In other  words, charges, evidence, witnesses and  circumstances are one and the same.”

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These observations are of no assistance to the  

appellant as the charges against him in the criminal trial  

were with regard to the commission of offences under  

Section 120(B), 420, 467, 468, 471 and 201 of IPC. In the  

departmental proceedings, the appellant has been  

punished on the basis of the findings that he failed to  

discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty,  

devotion and diligence. It was found that he had violated  

Rule 50(4) of the 1992 Rules.  In our opinion, it would be  

the ratio of law laid down in the cases of Ajit Kumar Nag  

(supra) and Depot Manager, A.P. State Road Transport  

Corporation (supra) that would be applicable in the facts  

and circumstances of this case.

40.In the case of Union     of     India     &     Ors.   Vs. Naman     Singh    

Shekhawat     (supra)  , on facts, the whole departmental  

proceedings were held to be vitiated by bias.  It was a  

case where the offences of the disciplinary authority  

were held to be based on no evidence. It was also a  

case where no witness was examined to prove the  

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allegations against the respondent Shekhawat. It was  

a case in which the only witness examined on behalf of  

the disciplinary authority was the jeep driver, MS who  

at the material time was accompanying the  

respondent. Even this witness did not support the  

Department’s case yet the departmental authorities  

held the charges against the respondent as proved.  

Besides, it was also found that the respondent had not  

been allowed services of a defence assistant of his  

choice. He was also not allowed to produce defence  

witness J. In paragraph 27 of the judgment, this Court  

observed that “the bias on the part of the inquiry  

officer is explicit from the record. Why the inquiry  

officer cross-examined the respondent is beyond  

anybody’s comprehension. He was not the prosecutor.  

A presenting officer had been appointed. The inquiry  

officer could not have taken over the job of the  

presenting officer, particularly when he was a superior  

officer.”        

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In our opinion, there is no parallel in the facts and  

circumstances of the aforesaid case and the present case.

41.In Capt     M.Paul     Anthony  ’  s     case     (supra), this Court  

reiterated the well established principle of law that  

proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental  

proceedings can proceed simultaneously. It was  

emphasised that the basis for this proposition is that  

proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental  

proceedings operate in distinct and different  

jurisdictional areas. The observations made in  

paragraph 13 which are relevant in the facts of this  

case are as under:-  

“As we shall presently see, there is a  consensus of judicial opinion amongst the  High Courts whose decisions we do not intend  to refer to in this case, and the various  pronouncements of this Court, which shall be  copiously referred to, on the basic principle  that proceedings in a criminal case and the  departmental proceedings can proceed  simultaneously with a little exception. As we  understand, the basis for this proposition is  that proceedings in a criminal case and the  departmental proceedings operate in distinct  and different jurisdictional areas. Whereas in  

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the departmental proceedings, where a charge  relating to misconduct is being investigated,  the factors operating in the mind of the  disciplinary authority may be many such as  enforcement of discipline or to investigate the  level of integrity of the delinquent or the other  staff, the standard of proof required in those  proceedings is also different than that required  in a criminal case. While in the departmental  proceedings the standard of proof is one of  preponderance of the probabilities, in a  criminal case, the charge has to be proved by  the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. The  little exception may be where the departmental  proceedings and the criminal case are based  on the same set of facts and the evidence in  both the proceedings is common without there  being a variance.”

In our opinion, the facts of this case do not fall  

within the little exception culled out by this Court.  The  

departmental proceedings herein and the criminal case  

are not grounded upon the same set of facts and the  

evidence. As noticed by the disciplinary authority as well  

as the appellate authority, the departmental proceedings  

related to honesty, integrity and devotion of the appellant  

as a very high ranking bank officer. On the basis of the  

evidence led before the enquiry officer, it was held that  

the appellant had failed to maintain the utmost integrity  

which is required for a bank officer.    

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42.The judgment in Sawai     Singh  ’  s     case   (supra) examined  

three main submissions made by the counsel for the  

appellant, namely (i) the charges were not clear  (ii)  

there was no evidence to support the charges and on  

the contrary (iii) the evidence on record was contrary  

to the charges made. Upon examination of the  

evidence,     it was held that there was a total absence  

of any cogent and reliable evidence against the  

appellant. It was, therefore, held that the findings of  

the enquiry officer are based on no evidence. It was  

also found that the charges levelled against the  

appellant were vague making it impossible for him to  

answer the same. In Paragraph 14, this Court  

observed as follows :

“14. Quite apart from that fact, it appears to  us that the charges were vague and it was  difficult to meet the charges fairly by any  accused. Evidence adduced was perfunctory  and did not at all bring home the guilt of the  accused.”

In paragraph 16, this court further emphasised that  

the charges must be proved against the charge-sheeted  

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employee in accordance with rules of natural justice. The  

report of the inquiry officer must demonstrate that there  

had been fair play in action. This is a settled principle of  

law which has been duly respected by the inquiry officer,  

the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate  

authority in this case.  

43.The judgment in Pritam     Singh  ’  s     case   (supra), in our  

opinion, has absolutely no relevance to the issues  

raised by the learned counsel for the appellant.  

44.This Court recently reiterated the legal principle that  

departmental proceedings can be conducted  

simultaneously to the criminal trial in the case of  

Divisional     Controller,     Karnataka     State     Road    

Transport     Corporation   Vs. M.G.Vittal     Rao     (supra).    

In this case, making reference to almost all the  

previous precedents, this Court has reiterated the legal  

position as follows:-

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(a) There is no legal bar for both proceedings to go  

on simultaneously.

(b) The only valid ground for claiming that the  

disciplinary proceedings may be stayed would  

be to ensure that the defence of the employee  

in the criminal case may not be prejudiced.  

But even such grounds would be available only  

in cases involving complex questions of facts  

and law.

(c) Such defence ought not to be permitted to  

unnecessarily delay the departmental  

proceedings. The interest of the delinquent  

officer as well as the employer clearly lies in a  

prompt conclusion of the disciplinary  

proceedings.

(d) Departmental proceedings can go on  

simultaneously to the criminal trial, except  

where both the proceedings are based on the  

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same set of facts and the evidence in both the  

proceedings is common.

  In our opinion, the principles culled out by this  

Court would be a complete answer to all the submissions  

made by Mr. Jain.

45. In view of the aforesaid legal principles enunciated  

and reiterated by this Court, we cannot accept that  

because the appellant had been prosecuted, the  

departmental proceedings could not have been  

continued simultaneously.  As pointed out by Mr.  

Dwivedi, the charges against the appellant in the  

criminal trial related to the commission of criminal  

offences under  Sections 120(B), 420, 467, 468, 471  

and 201 of Indian Penal Code. The proof of criminal  

charges was depended upon prosecution producing  

proof beyond reasonable doubt relating to the  

culpability of the appellant alongwith other persons. In  

the departmental proceedings, the basic charge was  

that appellant whilst posted as a Branch Manager of  

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Washi Turbhe Branch, failed to discharge his duties  

with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence  

to ensure and protect the interest of the Bank and  

acted in a manner unbecoming of a Bank Officer. The  

aforesaid charge clearly related to the manner in  

which the appellant performed the duties as the  

Manager of the Branch of the Bank.  It had nothing to  

do with any criminal liability attaching to such  

conduct. It must be emphasised that Bank officials act  

as trustees of funds deposited by the public with the  

Bank. They have an obligation to earn the trust and  

confidence of not only the account holders but also the  

general public. The standard of integrity required of  

the Bank officials, particularly the cashiers,  

accountants, auditors and the Management at all  

levels, is like the Caesar’s wife, they must be above  

suspicion. Mr.Bhosale failed to maintain such high  

standards of integrity. He therefore, acted in violation  

of Rule 50(4) of the 1992 Rules. We, therefore, do not  

find any merit in the aforesaid submissions of Mr.  

Jain.

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46. Mr. Dwivedi, in our opinion, has rightly pointed out  

that the conduct of the criminal trial was in the hands  

of the prosecuting agency. Having registered the First  

Information Report, the Bank had little or no role to  

play, apart from rendering assistance to the  

prosecuting agencies.  In our opinion, the failure of the  

prosecution in producing the necessary evidence  

before the trial court can not have any adverse impact  

on the evidentiary value of the material produced by  

the Bank before the Inquiry Officer in the  

departmental proceedings.  Before the Inquiry Officer,  

the Bank had placed on the record all the relevant  

documents which clearly establish that the appellant  

had exceeded his discretionary powers in purchasing  

the cheques and issuing demand drafts to show undue  

favour to the three construction companies named in  

the charge sheet.  In view of the above, the findings  

recorded by the Inquiry Officer can not be said to be  

based on no evidence.  It is a settled proposition of law  

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that the findings of Inquiry Officer cannot be nullified  

so long as there is some relevant evidence in support  

of the conclusions recorded by the Inquiry Officer.  In  

the present case, all the relevant documents were  

produced in the Inquiry to establish the charges  

levelled against the appellant. It is a matter of record  

that the appellant did not doubt the authenticity of the  

documents produced by the Bank. He merely stated  

that the signature on the documents were not his.  

The aforesaid statement of the appellant was nullified  

by  Mr. S.M. Mahadik, who appeared as a witness for  

the Bank. He clearly stated that he recognized the  

signature of the appellant as he had been working as  

his subordinate.

47. The findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer cannot  

be said to be based on no evidence. In such  

circumstances, the appellant cannot take any  

advantage of the findings of innocence recorded by the  

criminal court. The ‘clean chit’  given by the learned  

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Magistrate was influenced by the failure of the  

prosecution to lead the necessary evidence. No  

advantage of the same can be taken by the appellant  

in the departmental proceedings.

48. We also do not find any merit in the submissions  

made by Mr. Jain that the order by the Disciplinary  

Authority is vitiated by non-application of mind.  The  

extracts reproduced above would clearly indicate that  

the Disciplinary Authority was alive to all the  

submissions made by the appellant.  The Disciplinary  

Authority had taken into consideration all the relevant  

material and only then concluded that the charges  

have been duly proved against the appellant.  

Furthermore, it is a matter of record that the appellant  

was duly supplied a copy of the Inquiry Report and he  

had submitted detailed objections to the same.  These  

objections were placed before the Disciplinary  

Authority together with the Inquiry Report.  Therefore,  

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the appellant can not possibly claim that there has  

been a breach of rule of natural justice.

49. Similarly, the Appellate Authority has also given  

cogent reasons in support of its conclusion.  This is  

also apparent from the extract of the order of the  

Appellate Authority reproduced above.

50. In view of the aforesaid, we find no merit in this  

appeal and the same is hereby dismissed.   

...………………….….….J.  [Surinder Singh Nijjar]

………………………….J. [H.L.Gokhale]

New Delhi; September 25, 2012.

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