1

NOT REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1367  OF 2017 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.987 of 2015)

Athul Rao      …Appellant

:Versus:

State of Karnataka & Anr.     …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.

1. The  appellant  has  been  charge-sheeted  for  offences

punishable under Sections 417, 465, 468 and 471 of IPC. The

case against the appellant is that on or around 11th June, 2008,

the wife of respondent no.2, one Padmapriya, went missing from

her marital home in Udupi, Karnataka. That was reported to the

local police by Smt. Saraswathi (Mother of respondent no. 2), as

a result of which a case was registered as Crime No.109/2008 on

13th June 2008. The police finally traced Padmapriya to a flat in

2

Dwarka,  New Delhi  on or around 14th June, 2008. Thereafter,

respondent no.2, along with some family members went to New

Delhi  and, with the police in tow, visited the said flat  on 15th

June,  2008,  with  the  intention  of  bringing  Padmapriya  back

home. As the door of the flat was found to be locked, the same

was broken open, whence Padmapriya’s body was found hanging

inside.   After  investigation,  the  police  concluded  that  the

appellant  and  Padmapriya  had  grown  close  and  that  the

appellant  had  convinced  Padmapriya  to  leave  her  husband,

respondent  no.2,  and  live  with  him.  The  appellant  allegedly

concealed that he had taken Padmapriya from her marital home

and  shifted  her  to  New  Delhi,  where  he  had  rented  out  the

aforesaid flat at Dwarka in which Padmapriya was subsequently

found hanging. The investigation also revealed that the appellant

had  procured  several  official  documents,  including  the  rent

agreement for the aforesaid flat, based on fraudulent information

and  false  representations  that  Padmapriya  was  his  lawfully

wedded wife. In that regard, a charge-sheet and supplementary

charge-sheet came to be filed against the appellant  before  the

Trial  Court,  on  20th August,  2008  and  16th July,  2009,

respectively, for offence punishable under Sections 417, 465, 468

3

and 471 of IPC. Pursuant thereto charges have been framed by

the Trial  Court against the appellant.  However,  no charge has

been framed against the appellant for offence punishable under

Sections 497, 498 and 306 of IPC, in relation to the actual death

of Padmapriya.

2. Pending the aforementioned criminal trial, respondent no.2

filed  a  private  complaint  before  the  Principal  Civil  Judge  (Sr.

Dvn.) & JMFC at Udupi with regard to the same incident, being

PCR No. 21 of 2009, alleging that the appellant was liable to be

tried for offence punishable under Sections 497, 498 and 306 of

IPC. The Magistrate ordered an investigation by the local police

under  Section  156(3)  of  Cr.P.C.  in  respect  of  this  complaint.

Aggrieved,  the  appellant  moved  the  High  Court  of  Karnataka,

which  ultimately  quashed  the  private  complaint  filed  by

respondent no.2 vide its judgment dated 21st October, 2013, but

granted liberty to respondent no.2 to apply to the Trial Court in

the  already  instituted  criminal  case  against  the  appellant  in

relation  to  the  same  incident  (i.e.  Crime  No.109/2008),  for

further  investigation  and  for  framing  charges  under  Sections

497, 498 and 306 of IPC. The High Court relied on the decision of

4

this  Court  in  T.T.  Antony Vs.  State  of  Kerala and others1

which has expounded that, regardless of the sweeping power of

investigation vested in the police, it does not warrant subjecting a

citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of

the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences,

consequent  upon  filing  of  successive  FIRs,  whether  before  or

after filing the final report under Section 173(2) of Cr.P.C.  Such

an exercise would be clearly beyond the purview of Sections 154

and 156 of Cr.P.C. nay, a case of abuse of the statutory power of

the investigation in a given case.  The Court went on to observe

that  in  case  of  a  fresh  investigation  based  on  the  second  or

successive  FIRs,  not  being a  counter  case,  filed in connection

with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have

been committed in course of the same transaction and in respect

of  which  pursuant  to  the  first  FIR,  either  investigation  is

underway  or  final  report  under  Section  173(2)  has  been

forwarded to the Magistrate,  such case may be fit for exercise of

power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. or under Article 226/227 of

the  Constitution.   The  High  Court  also  relied  on  its  earlier

decision  in  the  case  of  Sri  Balaji  Vs.  State  of  Karnataka2

1  (2001) 6 SCC 181 2  ILR 2008 Kar. 3697

5

which restated the same legal position. Following these decisions,

the High Court was pleased to quash P.C.R No.21/2009 filed by

respondent no. 2, with liberty to make the necessary application

before the Trial Court in CC No.31/2008 for further investigation

and also for framing charges under Sections 497, 498 and 306 of

IPC.  The High Court made it clear that said request ought to be

considered by the Trial Court in accordance with law.

3. Accordingly, respondent no.2 moved an application before

the Trial Court in C.C. No.31/2008 for further investigation into

the  offences  under  Sections  497,  498  and  306  of  IPC.  This

application was however rejected by the Trial Court  vide order

dated 7th August, 2014. The Trial Court has observed that the

charge-sheet filed by the police indicated that statements of 76

witnesses had been recorded during the investigation and four

articles seized. The Trial Court also noted that the investigating

officer had investigated the case from all angles in the context of

the allegations in the complaint before filing the charge-sheet and

supplementary  charge-sheet.   The  Trial  Court,  therefore,  held

that there was no need for further investigation. The Trial Court

also made it clear that if, before conclusion of the trial, there was

any evidence which revealed the commission of an offence by the

6

appellant, then appropriate charges could be framed against him.

4. Respondent  no.2 challenged the  aforesaid decision of  the

Trial Court by preferring a petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.

before the High Court. The High Court vide impugned judgment

dated 16th September, 2014, allowed the said petition. The High

Court  nevertheless  posed  a  question  to  itself  as  to  how  the

complaint for offence punishable under Sections 417, 465, 468

and 471 of IPC could be consistent with the allegations of offence

punishable under Sections 306, 497 and 498 of IPC.  The High

Court, however, got swayed away by the singular fact that on the

earlier occasion,  while  quashing the private  complaint filed by

respondent No.2, he was granted liberty to apply before the Trial

Court in CC No.31/2008 for further investigation and also for

framing of charges under Sections 497, 498 and 306 of IPC.  The

High  Court  in  the  impugned  judgment  took  the  view  that

rejecting  the  application  of  respondent  no.2  for  further

investigation would run counter to the intent and object of the

liberty granted by the High Court on the earlier occasion.  This

appears to be the sole consideration which weighed with the High

Court to allow the petition filed by respondent no. 2 and to set

aside the order passed by the Trial Court dated 7th August, 2014,

7

with  the  observation  that  it  would  be  necessary  for  the  Trial

Court  to  direct  further  investigation  in  respect  of  allegations

made by respondent no. 2 referable to offence punishable under

Sections 306, 497 and 498 of IPC.

5. The appellant (accused) has questioned the justness of the

view taken by the High Court in the impugned judgment. Mr. Aljo

K. Joseph, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, contends

that the High Court has glossed over the factual position noticed

by  the  Trial  Court  for  rejecting  the  application  for  further

investigation  preferred  by  respondent  no.2.  Firstly,  the

investigation in CC No.31/2008 was complete in all respects after

recording statements of 76 witnesses and seizure of four articles.

The investigating officer, before filing the charge-sheet and also

the supplementary charge-sheet, has investigated the allegations

made  in  the  complaint  filed  by  Smt.  Saraswathi  (mother  of

respondent no. 2) from all angles.  Further, the Trial Court has

already framed charges and has taken cognizance on the basis of

the  charge-sheets  (i.e.  first  charge-sheet  and  supplementary

charge-sheet)   filed by the investigating officer, as a consequence

of which the case has been set down for trial.  It is contended

that the High Court, while allowing the petition for quashing filed

8

by the  appellant,  had noticed in  paragraph 7 of  its  judgment

dated 21st October, 2013, that the claim of respondent no. 2 in

the private complaint was based on the confessional statement of

the accused and two witnesses recorded by COD police during

the course of the investigation in Crime No.109/2008, which has

already come on record in CC No.31/2008.  In this context, the

Trial Court has noted that it will be open to respondent no. 2 to

request  the  Court  to  frame  additional  charges  for  offence

punishable  under  Sections  497,  498  and  309  of  IPC  at  the

appropriate  stage.  It  is  thus  contended  that  the  High  Court

exceeded  its  jurisdiction  in  interfering  with  the  discretionary

order passed by the Trial Court refusing the prayer for further

investigation,  which was just and proper in the fact situation of

the present case.  According to the appellant, in the facts of the

present case, the question of directing further investigation was

completely ruled out by the Trial Court on analysing the relevant

material.  Therefore, the High Court, in exercise of supervisory

jurisdiction,  without overturning the  said satisfaction recorded

by the  Trial  Court  on the  basis  of  tangible  material  before  it,

could not have interdicted that decision merely because it had

granted liberty to respondent no.2 in the earlier proceeding to

9

move an application before the Trial  Court for such relief.   In

effect,  the  High  Court  has  mechanically  proceeded  on  the

assumption that in the earlier round of proceeding (instituted by

the appellant for quashing of the second complaint filed against

him in respect of the same incident), the High Court has directed

reinvestigation of the case.  This cannot be countenanced.  

6. Learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  respondents,  in

particular  respondent  no.2,  submits  that  the  High  Court  was

justified in issuing direction to the Trial Court to order further

investigation, considering the intent of  the liberty given in the

judgment  dated  21st  October,  2013.  He  submits  that  the

investigating officer  has bypassed the  allegations made by the

complainant  which  constituted  offence  punishable  under

Sections  306,  497  and  498  of  IPC.   Having  failed  to  file

charge-sheet for the said offence and keeping in mind the liberty

granted by the High Court on the earlier occasion, respondent

no. 2 was justified in moving the Trial Court to issue direction to

investigate the case from that angle and file further police report

before  the  trial  of  the  case  proceeded  any  further.  The

respondents  have  therefore,  supported the  direction issued by

the High Court in the impugned judgment.

10

7. The seminal  question that arises for  our consideration is

whether the High Court was justified in allowing the prayer of

respondent no.2 for further investigation under Section 173(8) of

Cr.P.C., in the fact situation of the present case?  

8. The question as to whether, after framing of charges and

taking cognizance, it is open to the Magistrate to direct further

investigation either  suo motu  or on an application filed by the

complainant/informant  is  no  more  res  integra. In  a  recent

decision of this Court (to which one of us, Justice Dipak Misra

was party) in the case of  Amrutbhai Shambhubhai Patel Vs.

Sumanbhai  Kantibhai  Patel  and  others3,  after  analysing

earlier decisions on the point, it has been held that neither the

Magistrate  suo  motu nor  on  an  application  filed  by  the

complainant/informant can direct further investigation.  Further

investigation in a given case may be ordered only on the request

of  the  investigating  agency  and  that  too,  in  circumstances

warranting  further  investigation  on  the  detection  of  material

evidence  only  to  secure  fair  investigation  and  trial,  the  life

purpose of the adjudication in hand. It will be apposite to advert

to the dictum in Paragraphs 48 to 51 of the said decision which

3  (2017) 4 SCC 177

11

read thus:-  

“48.  As  adverted  to  hereinabove,  whereas Section 311 of  the Code empowers a Court at any  stage  of  any  inquiry,  trial  or  other proceeding,  to  summon  any  person  as  a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness,  or  recall and re-examine any person already examined, if construed to be essential to be just decision of the  case,  Section  319  authorizes  a  Court  to proceed  against  any  person,  who  though  not made  an  accused  appears,  in  course  of  the inquiry or trial, to have committed the same and can be tried together.  These two provisions of the Code explicitly accoutre a Court to summon a material witness or examine a person present at  any  stage  of  any  inquiry,  trial  or  other proceeding, if  it considers it to be essential  to the just decision of the case and even proceed against any person, though not an accused in such  enquiry  or  trial,  if  it  appears  from  the evidence  available  that  he  had  committed  an offence and that he can be tried together with the other accused persons.

49.   On  an  overall  survey  of  the pronouncements of this Court on the scope and purport of  Section 173(8)  of  the Code and the consistent trend of  explication  thereof,  we are thus  disposed  to  hold  that  though  the investigating  agency  concerned  has  been invested  with  the  power  to  undertake  further investigation desirably after informing the Court thereof, before which it had submitted its report and  obtaining  its  approval,  no  such  power  is available therefor to the learned Magistrate after cognizance has been taken on the basis of the earlier  report,  process  has  been  issued  and accused  has  entered  appearance  in  response thereto.  At  that  stage,  neither  the  learned

12

Magistrate suo motu nor on an application filed by  the  complainant/informant  direct  further investigation. Such a course would be open only on the request of the investigating agency and that  too,  in  circumstances  warranting  further investigation  on  the  detection  of  material evidence  only  to  secure  fair  investigation  and trial,  the  life  purpose  of  the  adjudication  in hand.  

50.  The  unamended  and  the  amended sub-Section  (8)  of  Section  173  of  the  Code  if read  in  juxtaposition,  would  overwhelmingly attest  that  by  the  latter,  the  investigating agency/officer  alone  has  been  authorized  to conduct further investigation without limiting the stage of the proceedings relatable thereto. This power  qua  the  investigating  agency/officer  is thus legislatively intended to be available at any stage of  the proceedings. The recommendation of the Law Commission in its 41st Report which manifesting  heralded  the  amendment, significantly  had  limited  its  proposal  to  the empowerment of the investigating agency alone.

51.   In  contradistinction,  Sections  156,  190, 200, 202 and 204 of the Cr.P.C. clearly outline the powers of  the  Magistrate and the courses open for him to chart in the matter of directing investigation,  taking  of  cognizance,  framing of charge,  etc.  Though  the  Magistrate  has  the power  to  direct  investigation  under  Section 156(3) at the pre-cognizance stage even after a charge-sheet or  a closure  report  is  submitted, once  cognizance  is  taken  and  the  accused person appears pursuant thereto, he would be bereft  of  any  competence  to  direct  further investigation  either  suo  motu  or  acting  on  the request or prayer of the complainant/informant. The direction for investigation by the Magistrate under  Section  202,  while  dealing  with  a complaint, though is at a post-cognizance stage,

13

it  is  in  the  nature  of  an  inquiry  to  derive satisfaction  as  to  whether  the  proceedings initiated  ought to  be  furthered or  not.  Such a direction for investigation is not in the nature of further  investigation,  as  contemplated  under Section 173(8) of the Code. If  the power of the Magistrate, in such a scheme envisaged by the Cr.P.C. to order further investigation even after the  cognizance  is  taken,  accused  persons appear and charge is framed, is acknowledged or approved, the same would be discordant with the  state  of  law,  as  enunciated  by this  Court and  also  the  relevant  layout  of  the  Cr.P.C. adumbrated  hereinabove.  Additionally  had  it been  the  intention  of  the  legislature  to  invest such a power, in our estimate, Section 173(8) of the  Cr.P.C.  would  have  been  worded accordingly  to  accommodate  and  ordain  the same  having  regard  to  the  backdrop  of  the incorporation thereof. In a way, in view of  the three  options  open  to  the  Magistrate,  after  a report is submitted by the police on completion of  the  investigation,  as  has  been  amongst authoritatively enumerated in Bhagwant Singh (supra),  the  Magistrate,  in  both  the contingencies,  namely;  when  he  takes cognizance  of  the  offence  or  discharges  the accused,  would  be  committed  to  a  course, whereafter though the investigating agency may for  good  reasons  inform  him  and  seek  his permission to  conduct further  investigation,  he suo motu cannot embark upon such a step or take  that  initiative  on  the  request  or  prayer made by the  complainant/informant.  Not only such power to  the  Magistrate  to  direct further investigation  suo  motu  or  on  the  request  or prayer  of  the  complainant/informant  after cognizance  is  taken  and  the  accused  person appears, pursuant to the process, issued or is discharged  is  incompatible  with  the  statutory design  and  dispensation,  it  would  even otherwise render the provisions of Sections 311

14

and 319 Cr.P.C., whereunder any witness can be summoned by a Court and a person can be issued notice to stand trial  at any stage,  in a way  redundant.  Axiomatically,  thus  the impugned decision annulling the direction of the learned  Magistrate  for  further  investigation  is unexceptional  and  does  not  merit  any interference.  Even  otherwise  on  facts,  having regard to the progression of the developments in the trial, and more particularly, the delay on the part of the informant in making the request for further  investigation,  it  was  otherwise  not entertainable  as has been rightly held  by the High Court.”

(emphasis supplied)   

9. The respondent No. 2 is not the complainant. The complaint

in question was instituted by the mother of  respondent no. 2.

She  was  not  the  applicant.  In  any  case,  at  the  instance  of

respondent no. 2, it was not open to the Court to direct further

investigation as the Trial Court had already framed charges and

taken cognizance of the case against the appellant who appeared

before  it  in  the  said  proceedings.  The  prayer  for  further

investigation was not at the instance of the investigating agency

nor on the ground of detection of material evidence.  

10. Be that as it may, assuming that the application filed by

respondent  no.2  was  maintainable,  from  the  chronology  of

events, it is indisputable that Crime No.109/2008 was registered

15

by the local police on the basis of the complaint made by Smt.

Saraswathi (mother of respondent no.2) on 13th June, 2008. After

investigation of the said complaint, charge-sheet was filed on 20th

August,  2008 for offence punishable under Sections 417, 465,

468  and  471  of  IPC.   The  investigating  officer  then  filed  a

supplementary charge-sheet on 16th July, 2009. The Trial Court

has  already  framed  charges  and  taken  cognizance  as  a

consequence of which the case is set down for trial, being CC No.

31/2008.  Respondent no. 2, however, filed a private complaint

in respect of the same incident only on 1st August, 2009, bearing

PCR No. 21/2009. That  complaint was finally  quashed by the

High Court vide judgment dated 21st October, 2013, whilst noting

that  the  complaint  by  respondent  no.  2  was  based  on  the

confessional  statement  of  the  accused  and  statements  of  two

witnesses  recorded  by  the  COD police  during  investigation  of

Crime  No.  109/2008,  which  material  was  already  part  of

charge-sheets  filed  by  the  investigating  officer  in  CC  No.

31/2008. The High Court, however, granted liberty to respondent

no. 2 to make application before the Trial Court in the following

terms:-  

“ORDER

16

i.  xxx xxx xxx

ii  xxx xxx xxx

iii. Liberty is reserved to respondent No. 2 to  make  necessary  application  before the trial court in C.C. No. 31/2008 for further investigation and also to frame charges  under  Section  497,  498  and 306  IPC.   In  such  an  event,  the jurisdictional Magistrate to consider the same in accordance with law.”

11. Taking a clue from the liberty given by the High Court in the

petition  for  quashing  instituted  by  the  appellant  (accused),

respondent no. 2 approached the Trial Court in CC No.31/2008

by way of application under Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C. for further

investigation  of  the  case.  The  Trial  Court  considered  all  the

relevant  aspects  of  the  matter  including  the  fact  that

charge-sheets  filed by  the  investigating  officer  are  founded on

statements  of  76  witnesses  and  four  articles.  The  same  were

already on record. Further, the allegations in the complaint were

investigated  from all  angles  and  charges  were  already  framed

against  the  appellant  (accused).  The  Trial  Court  has  taken

cognizance and the case has been set down for  trial.   In this

backdrop,  the  Trial  Court  opined  that  there  was  no  need  for

17

further investigation and in any case if the evidence on record

disclosed commission of  offence  under  Sections 497,  498 and

306 of  IPC, additional  charges in that behalf  could be framed

against the appellant at any stage of trial.

12. It is this well considered decision of the Trial Court, made

subject matter of challenge before the High Court in the petition

filed by  respondent no.2.  On a bare  perusal  of  the  impugned

judgment of the High Court, we find that the High Court, on the

one hand, noted its reservation as to how a complaint for the

offence punishable under Sections 417, 465, 468 and 471 of IPC

would  be  consistent  with  the  allegations  for  the  offence

punishable  under  Sections  306,  497,  498  of  IPC,  yet,  it

proceeded  to  direct  further  investigation  on  the  sole

consideration that in the earlier round of proceeding instituted

by  the  appellant  for  quashing  of  the  private  complaint  filed

against him by respondent no. 2 in respect of the same incident,

liberty was given to respondent no. 2 to approach the Trial Court

for  issuing  direction  to  the  investigating  officer  for  further

investigation under Section 173(8).  The High Court was of the

view that rejection of the application preferred by respondent no.

2 for further investigation, therefore, would run counter to the

18

liberty so granted and, on that consideration, directed the Trial

Court  to  issue direction to  the  investigating  officer  for  further

investigation in respect of allegation made by the respondent no.

2 in his complaint.

13. Notably, the second complaint filed by respondent no. 2 was

quashed by the High Court  vide judgment dated 21st October,

2013, relying on the decision in T. T. Antony (supra). Be that as

it may, what is significant to note is that the High Court has not

overturned the satisfaction recorded by the Trial Court that the

two charge-sheets filed by the investigating agency in connection

with  the  same  incident  were  founded  on  statements  of  76

witnesses  and  seizure  of  four  articles.  The  statements  of  the

accused and two witnesses so recorded were already on record in

CC. No.31/2008.  Further,  charge-sheets have been filed after

thorough  investigation  of  the  allegations  made  by  the

complainant from all angles and charges have also been framed.

The case has been set down for trial. Considering all these, it was

not just and proper to direct further investigation.  This opinion

reached by the Trial Court was not in conflict with the liberty

given by the High Court to respondent no. 2 in the earlier round

of  proceeding  instituted  by  the  appellant.   That  liberty  was

19

hedged with the observation that the Trial Court was expected to

consider  the  application  in  accordance  with  law.   It  was,

therefore, inapposite for the High Court to conclude that in view

of the liberty given to respondent no. 2 on the earlier occasion, it

was necessary to issue direction for further investigation.

14. Suffice it to observe that merely because liberty was given to

respondent no.2 by the High Court in the judgment dated 21st

October,  2013,  it  would  not  follow  that  the  Trial  Court  was

obliged  to  issue  directions  for  further  investigation  at  the

instance of respondent no. 2 and sans recording satisfaction that

further investigation was necessary in the fact situation of the

case.   On the  other  hand,  the  Trial  Court  has  given tangible

reasons why further investigation was not necessary, which have

not  been  analysed  by  the  High  Court  at  all,  much  less

overturned.

15. Considering all aspects of the matter, therefore, we are of

the  view  that  the  High  Court  committed  manifest  error  in

interfering with the discretionary order passed by the Trial Court

in the fact situation of the present case.  In other words, the Trial

Court  had  rightly  rejected  the  prayer  of  respondent  no.  2  for

20

further investigation, for the reasons noted in its order dated 7th

August, 2014.  

16. Accordingly, this appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment

dated 16th September, 2014, in Criminal Petition No. 5491/2014,

of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore is quashed and set

aside  and  instead,  the  judgment  of  the  Trial  Court  dated  7th

August, 2014 is restored.  As the criminal case is pending since

2008,  we  direct  the  Trial  Court  to  conclude  the  trial

expeditiously,  preferably within six months from receipt of  the

copy of this judgment.

………………………………….J. (Dipak Misra)

………………………………….J. (A.M. Khanwilkar)

New Delhi, Dated: August 18, 2017.