REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL  APPEAL No. 6295  OF 2019 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.3458 of 2015)

Asst. Provident Fund Commissioner EPFO, Bareilly ….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

M/s U.P. State Warehousing Corp. & Anr.     ….Respondent(s)

                 J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.  

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is filed against the final judgment

and order dated 27.08.2013  passed by the  High

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Court of Judicature at Allahabad in CMWP No.

49599 of 2011 whereby the High Court allowed the

writ  petition filed  by respondent  No.1  herein  and

quashed the awards dated 03.08.2010 and

02.12.2002 passed by the Employees’ Provident

Fund Appellate Tribunal and the Employees’

Provident Fund Organization, Sub­Regional Officer

respectively.   

3. In order to appreciate the short issue involved

in this appeal, a few facts need mention infra.

4. The appellant herein is respondent No. 1

whereas respondent No.1 herein is the writ

petitioner and respondent No. 2 herein is

respondent No. 2 in the writ petition before the High

Court out of which this appeal arises.

5. The appellant is the Assistant Provident Fund

Commissioner  of the  Employees’  Provident  Fund

under the Employees’ Provident Funds and

Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952   (hereinafter

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referred to  as “the  Act”).  Respondent  No.1 is the

statutory Corporation known as U.P. State

Warehousing Corporation for the State of U.P.

(hereinafter referred to as "Corporation") and

respondent No. 2 is the Union of workers.

6. The  Corporation is  inter  alia  engaged in the

business of stocking the grains and other

commodities in its Godown. The work of loading and

unloading of the commodities in the Godown is

done by the workers on regular basis. The business

of Corporation is governed by the provisions of

Warehousing Corporation Act, 1962 (for short

called, “The Act 1962”).  

7. It is the case of the Corporation that the

stocking, loading and unloading of the commodities

in its Godowns is done through Contractor, who, in

turn, employs the  workers for  doing the  work  of

loading and unloading for the Corporation in their

Godowns. These workers have  formed their Union

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called U.P. Rajya Bhandar Nigam Asthayi Handling

Mazdoor Union­ respondent No. 2 herein.

8. The question arose as to whether the workers

(total 159 at the relevant time), who were engaged in

the work of loading and unloading in the Godowns,

are entitled to claim the benefit of the Act and, if so,

whether the Corporation is liable to pay the

statutory contribution in relation to such workers in

accordance with the provisions of the Act so as to

entitle the workers to claim the benefits of the Act.  

9. The appellant with a view to decide this

question accordingly issued notice to the

Corporation under Section 7A of the Act and called

upon them to pay the arrears due towards provident

fund contribution of these workers (159) in

accordance with the provisions of the Act.

10. The Corporation contested the show cause

notice inter alia on the ground that since there was

no relationship of employer and employee between

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the Corporation and these workers, the Corporation

was not liable to pay any contribution of these

workers under the Act.  

11. The Corporation also pointed out that the

question as to whether these workers were the

employees  of the  Corporation  or  not  was  already

gone into between the parties before the Labour

Court in adjudication Case Nos. 89/2006 and

3/2009 and the same was decided by the Labour

Court in workers’ favour but later the award of the

Labour Court was set aside by the High Court by

order dated 15.05.2013 in W.P. No 72314 of 2010.

It is on this basis, the Corporation contended that

in the light of this finding having been recorded by

the High Court in their favour, the present

proceedings initiated under  Section 7A of the  Act

against the  Corporation  are  wholly  devoid of any

merit and hence the proceedings be withdrawn.    

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12.  By assessment order dated 02.12.2002, the

adjudicating authority did not accept the

contentions raised by the Corporation and held that

the Corporation was liable to pay the contribution of

these workers in accordance with the provisions of

the Act. The appellate authority constituted under

the Act upheld the order, which gave rise to filing of

the  writ petition  by the  Corporation in the  High

Court of Allahabad.  

13. By  impugned  order,   the  High Court (Single

Judge) allowed the writ petition and set aside the

order of the adjudicating authority and the appellate

authority. The High Court simply placed reliance on

the finding recorded by the High Court in the earlier

proceedings and held that since there was no

relationship of master and servant between the

Corporation (as master) and the workers (as

servants) as  was held by the  High  Court in the

earlier writ proceedings, the proceedings in question

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are rendered bad in law and deserves to be

quashed.  

14. It is against this order, the Provident Fund

Authorities felt  aggrieved and  filed this  appeal  by

way of  special leave  in this  Court  questioning  its

legality and correctness.

15. So the short question, which arises for

consideration  in this  appeal, is  whether the  High

Court was justified in allowing the writ petition filed

by the Corporation and thereby was also justified in

setting aside the orders of the adjudicating

authority and the appellate authority.

16. Heard Mr. Keshav Mohan, learned counsel for

the appellant and  Mr.  P.S.  Misra, learned senior

counsel for respondent No.1 and Mr. R.R. Rajesh,

learned counsel for respondent No.2.

17. Having heard the learned counsel for the

parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we

are constrained to allow the appeal and while

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setting aside the impugned order remand the case

to the High Court (writ court) for deciding the writ

petition afresh on merits.

18. In our considered opinion, the need to remand

the case to the High Court has arisen for the reason

that the  High  Court failed to examine the issue

keeping in view the definition of “employee" as

defined under Section 2(f) of the Act which reads as

under:

“2(f)  “employee” means any person who is employed for wages in any kind of work, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work of an establishment, and who gets, his wages directly or indirectly from the employer, and includes any person,­

(i) employed by or through a contractor in or in connection with the work of the establishment;

(ii) engaged as an apprentice, not being an apprentice engaged under the Apprentices Act, 1961 (52 of 1961), or under the standing orders of the establishment;”           

    (emphasis supplied)

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19. In our view, the High Court should have seen

that the proceedings in question have arisen out of

the  Act in question and, therefore, the issue was

required to be decided in the light of  the relevant

provisions of the Act in question but not in the light

of the finding recorded  in the  proceedings arising

under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947(hereinafter

referred to as “the ID Act”).

20. The High Court also should have seen that in

order to decide the relationship of employer and

employee for the purpose of applicability of the Act

in question, the issue has to be decided in the light

of definition of  "employee" as defined under Section

2(f) of the Act.  

21. It should have been seen that firstly, the

definition  of   "employee"  under the ID Act is  not

identical to the definition of “employee” defined

under  Section 2(f)  of the  Act;  and  secondly, the

object of the ID Act and the Act in question is not

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the same. In other words, the definition of

“employee”  under  the  ID Act  and the one defined

under the  Act in  question are  not  similar.  Even

their objects are also not identical.  

22. It is for these two reasons, any finding

recorded  by the  Labour  Court  while  deciding the

dispute under the ID Act will be of no consequence

while deciding the question arising under the Act in

question.  The issue was,  therefore, required to be

decided independently and de hors  the proceedings

decided under the ID Act.  

23.   Since the High Court did not notice the

definition of "employee" defined under Section 2(f) of

the Act and proceeded to pass the impugned order

only in the light of finding recorded in the

proceedings arising under the ID Act  in the order

dated 15.05.2013 passed in W.P. No.72314 of 2010,

the impugned  order is rendered  bad in law  and,

therefore, calls for interference in this appeal.

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24. In the light of the foregoing discussion, the

appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The

impugned order is set aside. The case (writ petition)

is remanded to the High Court (writ court) for

deciding the  Corporation's  writ  petition  afresh  on

merits keeping in view the definition of "employee''

as defined under Section 2(f)  of the Act and then

decide as to whether the proceedings under section

7A of the Act are legal and proper or not.

25. We request the High Court to decide the writ

petition expeditiously.      

                                    .………...................................J.                                    [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]                                       

    …...……..................................J.              [R. SUBHASH REDDY]

New Delhi; August 14, 2019

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