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REPORTABLE

IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.__250_ OF 2020 ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL) NO. 5224 OF 2017

Arun Singh & Others                     ........            Appellant(s)

VERSUS

State of U.P. through its Secretary & Another        .....…           Respondent(s)

JUDGMENT

KRISHNA MURARI, J.

Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the impugned judgment and order dated

24.11.2016  passed by the  High Court1 dismissing the petition filed by the

appellants under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short ‘the

CrPC) challenging the charge sheet filed against them.  The High Court while

rejecting  Section  482  CrPC  petition  directed  the  accused  appellants  to

surrender before the Court concerned within 30 days from the date of order

and in case they do so within the stipulated period and apply for bail the same

was liable to  be considered and decided in view of law laid down by full

bench of High Court in case of  Amrawati & another versus State of U.P.2

affirmed by this court in Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh versus State of U.P.3

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1  High Court of Judicature at Allahabad 2  2004 (57) ALR 290 3  2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC)

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3. Shorn of unnecessary details the brief facts which led to the filling of

this appeal can be summarised as under:-

Respondent  No.  2  lodged  First  Information  Report  with  Police

Station  Izzat  Nagar,  District  Bareilly  under  Section  493 I.P.C.  read

with Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against the appellants

herein  which  was  registered  as  case  crime  No.  431 of  2014.   The

allegations made in the F.I.R. were that Respondent No.-2 approached

Appellants with the proposal of marriage of his daughter Jyoti with

Appellant No.-1.  On 30th June, 2013 the appellants visited the house

of Respondent No.-2 and after meeting his daughter the proposal was

finalised.  On 21.07.2013, ring ceremony was  performed and date of

marriage was scheduled for 19.11.2013.  Thereafter, Appellant No.-2

started visiting the house of complainant/respondent no.-2. frequently

and  misleading  his  daughter  Jyoti  that  now  since  the  marriage  is

finalised and only ceremony of ‘feras’ remains to be performed took

her for outings on various occasions.  On 16.08.2013 appellant No.-2

induced Jyoti to his room and established physical relationship with

her.   However,  subsequently  thereto  the  appellant  started  making

demand of dowry of Rs. 5 Lakh.  A complaint in this regard was made

before Mahila Thana but no action was taken.  On coming to know that

marriage of Appellant No.-2 was settled with some other  girl  for a

handsome amount of dowry, the First Information Report was being

lodged.

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4. The matter  was investigated by the  concerned Police  Station and a

charge sheet was filed against the appellants, which was challenged before the

High Court by way of petition under Section 482 CrPC.

5. The  case  set  up  by  the  appellants  before  the  High  Court  was  that

behaviour of the complainant and his family members changed after the date

of marriage was fixed and they refused to share the expenses of marriage,

which was settled between the parties to be shared equally.  Further, a demand

of Rs. 10 Lakhs was made from the appellants with a threat to implicate them

in a false case in case the demand was not fulfilled.  It was further pleaded that

Appellant No.-2 made an application under Section 156(3) CrPC before the

ACJM  against the complainant and his other family members.  During the

pendency of proceedings under Section 156(3) CrPC a complaint was made by

Respondent  No.-2  in  the  Mahila  Thana.  The inspector  incharge  of  Mahila

Thana  summoned  both  the  parties  where  the  dispute  between  them  was

compromised.  In view of the compromise arrived, the appellants did not press

the  application  under  Section  156  (3)  CrPC.  However,  the  Complainant-

Respondent No.-2 filed the First Information Report after about 10 months of

the compromise.

6. The High Court finding that there was no justification for quashing the

charge sheet  dismissed the petition.

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7. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that the High

Court has failed to appreciate and consider that the fresh criminal action can

not be launched on the basis of the same cause of action, which was already

settled 10 months back by way of compromise which was acted upon by both

the parties.

8. Learned  counsel  further  submits  that  the  High  Court  has  failed  to

consider  and  appreciate  that  the  allegations  as  contained  in  the  First

Information Report even if taken on the face value and assumed to be correct

in entirety, do not prima-facie disclose commission of any offence, much less

a cognizable offence. It is also submitted on behalf of the appellants that the

High Court did not appreciate and consider the fact at all that the allegations in

the  F.I.R.,  prima-facie,  do  not  constitute  commission  of  any  offence  and

dismissed the 482 petition without adverting itself to this aspect of the matter.

9.  Learned counsel for the respondent refuting the arguments advanced on

behalf  of  appellants  submitted  that  the  First  Information  Report  was  filed

under Section 493 of the Indian Penal Code (in short the “I.P.C.”) read with

Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and both the aforesaid offences are

non-compoundable in nature and thus could not have been compromised.  The

allegations  made  in  the  First  Information  Report  were  found  to  be

substantiated on investigation and thus a charge sheet filed by the Police and

the High Court rightly dismissed the petition for quashing of the same.

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10. We have considered the rival  submissions  and perused the facts  on

record.

11. The offence under  Section 493 is  non-compoundable.  Similarly,  the

offence  under  Section  3/4  of  the  Dowry  Prohibition  Act  is  also  non-

compoundable, in view of Section 8(2) of the said Act, which provides that

every offence under this Act, shall be non-bailable and non-compoundable.

12. Though the offence in question are non-compoundable but the power

of  the  High  Court  under  Section  482  CrPC  of  the  Court  to  quash  the

proceedings in such offences is well recognised by various decision of this

court and the issue is no longer  res integra.  Reference may be made to the

observations of Three Judge Bench of this Court in Gian Singh versus State

of Punjab.4

“Quashing of offences  or  criminal  proceedings on the ground of

settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as

compounding of  the  offence.   They  are  different  and  not

interchangeable.  Strictly speaking the power of compounding of

offence given to a Court under Section 320 is materially different

from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in

exercise  of  the inherent jurisdiction.  In  compounding  of  offence,

power  of  a  criminal  court  is  circumscribed  by  the  provisions  

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4 (2012) 10 SCC 303

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contained  in  Section  320  and  the  Court  is  guided  solely  and

squarely thereby while, on the other hand,  the formation of opinion

by  the  High  Court  for  quashing  a  criminal  offence  or  criminal

proceedings  or  criminal  complaint  is  guided  by  the  material  on

record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise

of power although the ultimately consequence may be acquittal or

dismissal of indictment.

B.S. Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma and Shiji to illustrate

the principle that High Court may quash the criminal proceedings or

F.I.R. or complaint in exercise of its inherent power under Section

482 of the Code and Section 320 does not limit or effect the powers

of  the  High  Court  under  Section  482.   Can  it  be  said  that  by

quashing  criminal  proceedings  in  B.S.  Joshi,  Nikhil  Merchant,

Manoj  Sharma  and  Shiji  this  Court  has  compounded  the  non-

compoundable offences indirectly?  We do not think so.  There does

exists  the  distinction  between compounding  of  an  offence  under

Section 320 and quashing of a criminal case by  a  High  Court  in

exercise of inherent power under Section 482.  The two powers are

distinct and different although the ultimate consequence may be the

same viz. acquittal of the accused or dismissal of the indictment.

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13. Another Three Judge Bench of this Court in Parbatbhai Aahir &

Others  versus  State  of  Gujarat  &  Others.5  After  analysing  the

precedents on, the above issue has summarised the broad principles in

paragraph 15 of the reports as under:-

15.    “The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on  the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:-

(i) Section 482 preserves  the inherent  powers  of  the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any  court  or  to  secure  the  ends  of  justice.   The provision  does  not  confer  new  powers.   It  only recognises and preserves  powers  which inhere in the High Court;

(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding  on  the  ground  that  a  settlement  has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the  same as  the  invocation  of  jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding  an  offence. While  compounding an offence,  the power of  the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure,  1973.   The Power  to  quash  Under  Section  482  is  attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

(iii) In  forming  an  opinion  whether  a criminalproceeding  or  complaint  should  be quashed  in  exercise  of  its  jurisdiction  Under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;

(iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;

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5 (2017) 9 SCC 641

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(v) The decision  as  to  whether  a  complaint  or  First Information Report should  be  quashed  on  the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute,  revolves  ultimately  on  the  facts  and circumstances  of  each  case  and  no  exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;

(vi) In the exercise of the power Under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea  that  the  dispute  has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence.  Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or  offences  such  as  murder,  rape  and  dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of  the  victim  have  settled  the dispute.  Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society.  The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public  interest  in  punishing  persons  for  serious offences;

(vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute.  They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;

(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially  civil flavour  may  in  appropriate  situations  fall  for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;

(ix) In  such  a  case,  the  High  Court  may  quash  the criminal proceeding if in view  of  the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and

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(x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions  (viii)  and  (ix)  above.   Economic offences involving the financial and economic well being  of  the  state  have  implications  which  lie beyond the domain of a  mere  dispute  between private  disputants.   The  High  Court  would  be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity  akin  to  a  financial  or economic fraud misdemeanour. The consequences of  the  act  complained  of  upon  the  financial  or economic system will weigh in the balance.”

14. In another decision in the case of  Narinder Singh Vs. State of

Punjab6 it has been observed that in respect of offence against the society

it  is  the  duty  to  punish  the  offender.   Hence,  even  where  there  is  a

settlement  between the offender  and victim the same shall  not  prevail

since it  is  in  interests  of  the society that  offender  should be punished

which acts as deterrent for others from committing similar crime.  On the

other  hand,  there  may  be  offences  falling  in  the  category  where  the

correctional  objective  of  criminal  law  would  have  to  be  given  more

weightage than the theory of deterrent punishment.  In such cases, the

court may be of the opinion that a settlement between the parties would

lead  to  better  relations  between  them  and  would  resolve  a  festering

private dispute and thus may exercise power under Section 482 CrPC for

quashing the proceedings or the complaint or the FIR as the case may be.

15. Bearing in mind the above principles which have been laid down,

we  are  of  the  view  that  offences  for  which  the  appellants  have been

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6 (2014) 6 SCC 466

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charged are infact  offences  against  society and not  private  in nature.  Such

offences have serious impact upon society and continuance of trial of such

cases  is  founded on the overridding effect  of  public  interests  in  punishing

persons  for  such  serious  offences.  It  is  neither  an  offence  arising  out  of

commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or such similar transactions or

has any element of civil dispute thus it stands on a distinct footing.  In such

cases, settlement even if arrived at between the complainant and the accused,

the same cannot constitute a valid ground to quash the F.I.R. or the charge

sheet.

16. Thus the High Court cannot be said to be unjustified in refusing to

quash the charge sheet on the ground of compromise between the parties.

17. The next issue which arises for consideration is whether the allegations

made  in  the  F.I.R  constitute  commission  of  an  offence.  As  already  stated

hereinabove, the appellants have been charged with Section 493 of the Indian

Penal Code and Section 3 read with Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Section 493 reads as under:-

“Cohabitation caused by a man deceitfully inducing a belief of  lawful  marriage. -  Every  man who by  deceit  causes  any woman who is not lawfully married to him to believe that she is lawfully  married  to  him  and  to  cohabit  or  have  sexual intercourse  with  him  in  that  belief,  shall  be  punished  with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

18. A plain reading of the Section goes to show that in order to constitute

an  offence  under  this  Section,  it  has  to  be  demonstrated  that  a  man  has

deceitfully caused any woman, who is not lawfully married to him, to believe

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that she is  lawfully married wife and thereby co-habit  with him.   In other

words,  the accused must induce a woman,  not lawfully married to him,  to

believe that she is married to him and as a result of such mis-representation,

woman should believe that she was lawfully married to the man and thus there

should be co-habitation or sexual intercourse.

19.  A three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Chandra Bhagat

Vs. State of Jharkhand7 after analysing the provisions of Section 493 of I.P.C,

has observed as under:-

“Upon perusal  of  Section  493 IPC,  to  establish  that  a person has committed an offence under the said section, it must be established that a person had deceitfully induced a belief to a woman, who is not lawfully married to him, that she is a lawfully married wife of that person and thereupon she should cohabit or should have had sexual intercourse with that person. Looking at the aforestated section, it  is clear that the accused must induce a woman, who is not lawfully married to him, to believe that he is married to her and  as  a  result  of  the  aforestated  representation,  the woman should believe that she was lawfully married to him and there should be cohabitation or sexual intercourse as a result of the deception.”

“If a woman is induced to change her status from that of an unmarried to that of a married woman with all the duties and obligations pertaining to the changed relationship and that result is accomplished by deceit, such woman within the law can be said to have been deceived and the offence under Section 493 IPC is brought home. Inducement by a person deceitfully to a woman to change her status from unmarried  woman to  a  lawfully  married  woman and on that inducement making her cohabit with him in the belief that she is lawfully married to him is what constitutes an offence  under  Section  493.  The  victim  woman  has  been induced to do that which,  but for the false practice,  she would not have done and has been led to change her social

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7 (2013) 1 SCC 562

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and domestic status. The ingredients of Section 493 can be said  to  be  fully  satisfied  when  it  is  proved  –  (a)  deceit causing a false belief of existence of a lawful marriage, and (b)  cohabitation  or  sexual  intercourse  with  the  person causing  such  belief.  It  is  not  necessary  to  establish  the factum of marriage according to personal law but the proof of inducement by a man deceitfully to a woman to change her status from that of an unmarried to that of a lawfully married woman and then make that woman cohabit with him establishes an offence under Section 493 IPC.”  

20. The  essence  of  an  offence  under  Section  493  IPC  is,  therefore,

practice of deception by a man on a woman as a consequence of which the

woman is led to believe that she is lawfully married to him although she is not

and then make her cohabit with him.

21. Deceit can be said to be a false statement of fact made by a person

knowingly and recklessly with the intent that it shall be acted upon by another

who on believing the same after having acted thereupon suffers an injury. It is

an  attempt  to  deceive  and  includes  such  declaration  and  statement  that

misleads  others  or  causes  him  to  believe  which  otherwise  is  false  and

incorrect.

22. In other words, to constitute an offence under Section 493 I.P.C., the

allegations  in  the  FIR  must  demonstrate  that  appellant  had  practiced

deception  on  the  daughter  of  the  complainant  causing  a  false  belief  of

existence of lawful marriage and which led her to cohabit with him.

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23. From a perusal of the F.I.R.,  we do not find that allegations  made

therein can be said to constitute any offence under Section 493 IPC. There are

no allegation of any inducement or any deceit to make the victim believe that

she was lawfully married to the appellant, which mislead her to have sexual

intercourse with the accused appellant  no.1.   Only allegations  in  the First

Information Report in this regard are that “after the marriage was settled, the

appellant no.1 started visiting the house of the complainant frequently and

would mislead and instigate his daughter that relation is final and only ‘Feras’

remains to be performed. On the fateful day, i.e., 16.08.2013, the appellant

no.1 took leave and enticed and instigated his daughter took her to his room

and promising that she is being his wife established physical relations.”

24. A perusal  of  the  averments  would  go  to  show  that  ingredients  to

constitute  an  offence  under  Section  493  I.P.C.  are  missing  from  the

averments.  The allegations do not even prima-facie, cull out any inducement

of belief in the victim that she is lawfully married to the appellant no.1 and on

account of this deceitful misstatement, the victim co-habited with the accused.

Since  the  essential  ingredients  to  constitute  an  offence  under  Section  493

I.P.C. are missing from the allegations made in the F.I.R., offence under the

said Section can not be said to be made out against the appellants.

25.  It is also to be taken note that whatever the allegations, in this regard,

have been made only against the accused-appellant no. 1 which also do not

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constitute an offence and there are no allegations in this regard in respect of

other five accused-appellants.

26. The High Court having failed to advert itself to the aforesaid aspects

discussed hereinabove and to  that  extent,  the judgment is  not  liable  to  be

sustained.

27. The other charge against the appellants are under Section 3/4 of the

Dowry Prohibition Act.  The said sections read as under:-

“Section 3 -  Penalty for giving or taking dowry.— [1]  If any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be punishable [with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than [five years], and with fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount  of  the value of such dowry, whichever is more:  

Provided that  the Court may,  for adequate and special reasons  to  be  recorded  in  the  judgment,  impose  a sentence  of  imprisonment  for  a  term of  less  than [five years]. [(2)  Nothing  in  sub-section  (1)  shall  apply  to,  or  in relation to,—  (a) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bride (without any demand having been made in that behalf): Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with the rules made under this Act; (b) presents which are given at the time of marriage to the bridegroom (without any demand having been made in that behalf):

Provided  that  such  presents  are  entered  in  a  list maintained in accordance with the rules made under this Act: Provided further that where such presents are made by or on behalf of the bride or any person related to the bride, such presents are of  a customary nature and the value thereof  is  not  excessive  having  regard  to  the  financial

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status of the person by whom, or on whose behalf, such presents are given.]

Section 4- Penalty for demanding dowry—If any person demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives  or  guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case  may  be,  any  dowry,  he  shall  be  punishable  with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees:

Provided that  the  court  may,  for  adequate  and special reasons  to  be  mentioned  in  the  judgment,  impose  a sentence  of  imprisonment  for  a  term  of  less  than  six months.”

28. The allegations in the First Information Report in respect of Section

3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act are very specific. The relevant allegations

are being reproduced hereunder :-

“Not  only  this  applicant  also finalised  Barat  Ghar  OM

Lawn for marriage party and made advance payment of

Rs.20,000/- but Arun along with his parents and all the

opposite parties stick to their demand of Rs. 5 Lakhs cash.

Applicant is a poor employee. He showed his inability to

pay  such  a  huge  amount.  But  despite  a  very  humble

request  and  praying  opposite  parties  could  not  be

persuaded and they made demand for Rs.5 Lakh in full

Panchayat....”

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29.  A reading of the above provisions shows that essential ingredients of

the  offence  under  Section  3/4  of  the  Dowry  Prohibition  Act  are  that  the

persons accused should  have  made demand directly  or  indirectly  from the

parents or other relatives or guardians of a bride or a bridegroom as the case

may  be  any  dowry  and/or  abets  the  giving  and  taking  of  dowry.  The

allegations of the F.I.R. quoted hereinabove clearly go to show that a demand

of dowry of Rs.5 Lakhs was made by the appellants from the complainants

and thus it can not be said that no offence under the Dowry Prohibition Act are

made out against the appellants.  There being direct allegations of demand of

Dowry in the First Information Report, the allegations prima-facie constitute a

commission  of  an  offence  under  the  Dowry  Prohibition  Act  and  thus  the

charges leveled against the appellants under Section 3/4 of the said Act, are

not liable to be quashed.

30. In view of the above facts and discussions, we are of the considered

view that insofar as offence under Section 493 I.P.C. is concerned, since F.I.R.

does not disclose the commission of any offence under the said Section and

thus continuance of the criminal prosecution under said section would amount

to abuse of process of the Court and the order of the High Court to that extent

is liable to be set  aside. However, insofar as offence against the appellants

under  Section  3/4  of  the  Dowry  Prohibition  Act  is  concerned,  since  the

allegations disclose the commission of cognizable offence in the F.I.R., it is

not a fit case to exercise power under Section 482 Cr.PC and to quash criminal

proceedings against the appellants for the said offence.

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31. As a  result  of  our  aforesaid  discussion,  the  charge  sheet  insofar  as

Section 493 I.P.C is concerned stands quashed. However, in respect of charge

sheet  under  Section  3  read  with  Section  4  of  Dowry  Prohibition  Act,  the

Appeal stands dismissed.

.................................J. (NAVIN SINHA)

.................................J. (KRISHNA MURARI)

NEW DELHI; 10th FEBRUARY, 2020.