ARUN KUMAR AGRAWAL Vs UNION OF INDIA .
Case number: W.P.(C) No.-000069-000069 / 2012
Diary number: 4951 / 2012
Advocates: PRASHANT BHUSHAN Vs
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 69 OF 2012
Arun Kumar Agrawal .. Petitioner
Versus
Union of India & Others .. Respondents
J U D G M E N T
K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.
1. Petitioner, through this Public Interest Litigation, has
challenged the approval granted by the Government of India
dated 24.1.2012 for the acquisition of majority stake in Cairn
India Limited (CIL) for US $8.48 billion and also for a direction to
the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation of India (ONGC) to exercise
its right of pre-emption over sale of shares of CIL on the same
terms without causing any loss or profit to the Cairn Energy,
and also for a direction to CBI to investigate the reasons for
ONGC, a Government of India Undertaking, in not exercising
their legal rights under the Right of First Refusal (RoFR) and
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giving clearance to the CAIRN – Vedanta Deal on the basis of
the existing right to share the royalty and cess on pro-rata
basis and also for the consequential reliefs.
FACTS
2. Government of India had, earlier, retained the exclusive
privilege for mining of hydrocarbons, which was carried out on
nomination basis through the statutory corporations like ONGC.
The need for maximising domestic exploration of production of
oil led to the Government of India encouraging private sector
participation in the exploration of oil and natural gas from the
year 1980. Rajasthan Block (RJ-ON-90/1) was one of the Pre-
New Energy Licensing Policy (Pre-NELP) exploration block
offered by a Competitive Building Mechanism. The said block
was offered in the 4th round of Pre-NELP regime to M/s. Shell
India in execution of a Production Sharing Contract (PSC) on
15.5.1995. Since the exploration licence for Rajasthan Block
was held by ONGC, the PSC had three parties, (a) Government
of India, (b) the bidder, M/s. Shell India Production Development
BV (Shell) and (c) the licensee ONGC. PSC was entered into for
the exploration and exploitation of crude oil and natural gas.
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As per the PSC, ONGC is holding 30% of the participating
interest (PI) in the development or within the contract area
since 13.1.2005.
3. Shell failed to make any commercial discovery even after
investing US$ 9 million and was contemplating to part with its
interest in the PSC. Consequently, Cairn Energy India Pvt. Ltd.
(CEIL) acquired 27.5% of Shell’s interest under the contract
with effect from 27.1.1999 and a further 22.5% with effect from
20.12.1999. Cairn Energy Hydrocarbons Ltd. (CEHL) acquired
Shell’s remaining 50% interest under the contract with effect
from 23.6.2003. CEIL and CEHL, subsidiary companies of
CAIRN, have accordingly succeeded Shell as parties to the
aforementioned contract and together became the holder of
the 70% of the PI.
4. CIL is a company incorporated under the laws of India and
listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange and the National Stock
Exchange. CAIRN Energy PLC UK (CAIRN) is incorporated
under the laws of UK, listed on London Stock Exchange and is a
majority shareholder in CIL having 62.4% equity stake in it
through its wholly owned subsidiary, CAIRN UK Holdings
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Limited. Upon its acquisition of 50%, Shell’s interest under the
contract, CEIL became the operator under the operating
agreement with effect from 1.1.2000.
5. CIL and its subsidiary have interests in the seven
exploratory blocks (out of which Block VN-ONN-2003/1 has
already been relinquished) and three producing fields in India
and another exploration block in Sri Lanka as per the following
details:
- 70% Participating Interest (PI) & operatorship in producing Development Areas of RJ-ON-90/1 (ONGC 30%),
- 22.50% PI in producing Ravva Field & Operatorship (ONGC 40%),
- 40% IP & Operatorship in producing fields of CB-OS/2 Block & (ONGC 50%); and
- PI in eight other Blocks in India and Sri Lanka where there is currently no production; out of these ONGC has PI in 5 Blocks.
6. CAIRN, vide its letter dated 16.8.2010, informed ONGC
that it had announced disposal of its substantial shareholding in
CIL to Vedanta. ONGC had a PI in number of blocks/fields
where CAIRN is operating through CIL (and/or its affiliates) and
it was felt that the proposed transaction might have
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implications on operations of these blocks/fields. ONGC was of
the view that its, inter alia, pre-emptive rights in relation to PI
of CAIRN and/or its affiliates under the various agreements with
the Government of India and ONGC, and that CAIRN and/or its
affiliates required consent of ONGC besides other governmental
approvals, to consummate the proposed transaction. ONGC,
later, by its letter dated 30.8.2010, requested CAIRN to provide
full details of the proposed transaction along with copies of the
agreements and other arrangements entered into between
CAIRN and/or its affiliates and the proposed buyer and/or its
affiliates. CAIRN on 10.9.2010 provided the details of the
proposed transaction to ONGC, the operative portion of which
reads as follows:
“.. the Transaction is a sale of shares in Cairn India Limited, rather than an assignment of any Participating Interest under the various Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) and Joint Operating Agreements (JOAs). We believe that the various pre-emption rights under each of the JOAs only apply when there is an assignment, by a party to that PSC, of part or all of that party’s Participating Interest.
However, in this case, as the contract with Vedanta Resources Plc is at shareholder level of Cairn India involving sale of shares – there is no change to the Participating Interest in any of the PSCs to which the Cairn India Group is party. Consequently, under the terms of the relevant PSCs and JOAs, no pre-emptive
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right or requirement for ONGC consent, as claimed in the Letter, is triggered by the Transaction”.
Consequently, CAIRN took up the stand that various pre-
emption rights under each of JOA will apply only when there is
an assignment, by a party to a PSC, of its PI in part or full.
According to CAIRN, under the proposed transaction, there will
be no change to the PI in any of the PSCs to which CIL groups is
party and, consequently, under the terms of the relevant PSCs
and JOAs, no pre-emptive right or requirement for ONGC’s
consent would be triggered by the transaction, as claimed by
ONGC.
7. ONGC again wrote a letter dated 21.10.2010 requesting
CAIRN to provide copies of all agreements and other
arrangements entered into between CAIRN and Vedanta in
relation to the proposed transaction, including, without
limitation, the value assigned to PI in each PSC, to enable ONGC
to decide on its future course of action.
8. CAIRN vide its letter dated 29.10.2010 provided a copy of
the share purchase deed for the proposed transaction and
reiterated its position that the provisions of the JOA do not
apply in respect of the proposed sale of shares in CIL.
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9. ONGC’s, later, sought the opinion of the Solicitor General
of India, who vide his letter dated 5.10.2010 opined that the
Government of India’s consent would be required as the
acquisition of majority stake and consequent change in control
of CIL would amount to an indirect transfer of the PI.
10. The Government of India, it may be noticed, had signed 28
PSCs in respect of pre-NELP exploratory blocks prior to the
implementation of NELP. Under the terms of such PSCs,
depending on the bargain amongst the parties, statutory levies
(royalty and/or cess) on the entire production of oil and gas,
including on the share of other partners, are to be borne by
National Oil Companies, who are sole licenses in respect of the
PEL/ML under those contracts. In view of the above
contractual provisions, ONGC has been paying royalty and/or
cess on the share of other partners in respect of above blocks
awarded under the regime for pre-NELP exploratory blocks.
Under the provisions of PSC of RJ-ON-90/1 Block, the cost
incurred for petroleum operation is recovered as per the
mechanism laid down in Article 14 of the PSC. Section 3.1.9 of
the Accounting Procedure stipulates that the royalty payments
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shall be allowable as ‘Cost Oil’ without further approval of the
Government. ONGC, then, vide its letter dated 14.7.2010
proposed to CEIL, the Operator of the Block, to include ‘Royalty’
as ‘Recoverable Cost’ in the calculations of entitlement interest
submitted by the Operator to the Operating Committee vide
letter dated 1.7.2010. CEIL, however, took up the stand that
the same was not cost recoverable.
11. ONGC Board in its 215th meeting held on 29.1.2011
considered the issue regarding treating royalty as cost
recoverable and the option of ONGC going for acquisition of the
stake in CIL. Board, after taking into account the offered rate
of Rs.405/- per share (including non-compete fee of Rs.50/- per
share), vis-à-vis internal assessed value of Rs.290/- per share,
decided that the following recommendation be forwarded to the
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (MoPNG) for their
consideration:
i. Acquisition cost offered by Vedanta to CAIRN for the proposed transaction of sale of the shares of CIL is much above the ONGC evaluated value of the proposed transaction. Therefore, ONGC does not find merit in the acquisition on commercial considerations.
ii. To request MoPNG for allowing the recovery of royalty being paid by ONGC for entire crude oil
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produced from RJ-ON-90/1 block as “Cost Oil” from the total revenue accrued from the block. ONGC may further request MOPNG to decide on the CAIRN Vedanta deal, only after reaching an agreement in this regard between the parties and
iii. ONGC, being the licensee and also a participant in the Block, has the right to ensure that the operator has the necessary credentials in carrying out E&P activities.
12. Apart from the above issue, there was a dispute between
CEIL and CEHL, parties to the Rajasthan Block and Union of
India and ONGC as to the liability of Cess under the PSC for the
Rajasthan Block, and CEIL and CEHL had initiated arbitration
proceedings in respect of the same. Consequently, CEIL and
CEHL were paying their part of the Cess under protest.
13. ONGC received a letter dated 16.8.2011 from CEIL in
which it was stated that the Government of India vide its letter
dated 26.7.2011 had granted a conditional consent for the
proposed sale of shareholding to the extent of 51% to 60% in
CAIRN India Ltd. by CAIRN Energy Plc to Vedanta Resources Plc
in respect of the NELP and pre-NELP blocks. The Government
of India, however, insisted that CIL and its affiliates shall
provide No Objection Certificate (NOC) obtained from their
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consortium partners. MoPNG granted the approval for the
proposed transaction on the following conditions:
a) Parent financial and Performance Guarantees furnished by CAIRN Energy Plc in pursuance of relevant applicable Article(s) of abovementioned 7 NELP PSCs and 3 pre-NELP PSCs, shall be substituted by Parent Financial and Performance Guarantees to be furnished by Vedanta Resources Plc. which needs to be acceptable to the Government and should be in a form and substance set out in the PSC.
b) Vedanta Resources Plc to guarantee that the technical capability of CAIRN India is and shall be kept undisturbed and ensure continued production of oil and gas as per approved Field Development Plan (FDP) from time to time. In case Vedanta Resources Plc. fails to perform as guaranteed then GOI shall be entitled to stipulate additional conditions, as deemed fit, including change in operatorship of blocks.
c) Vedanta Resources Plc. Also shall give an undertaking that they shall ensure adherence to the approved field development plans and work programs.
d) Cairn India and its affiliates shall provide the No objection certificate (NOC) obtained from their consortium partner(s) for each abovementioned blocks (except for Ravva (PKMG-1) and CB-OS/2 blocks) for the proposed transaction under the respective PSCs.
e) Necessary approval from other regulatory bodies such as SEBI, on the proposed transaction to be obtained and submitted by Vedanta Resources Plc.
f) Necessary Security Clearance from Ministry of Home Affairs in favour of the assignee i.e. Vedanta Resources
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Plc. to acquire the shareholding shall be obtained and submitted by the said assignee.
g) In respect to RJ-ON-90/1 block, the parties, CAIRN India Ltd., CAIRN Energy Pty Limited (CEIL), CAIRN Energy Hydrocarbon Ltd. (CEHL) and any other affiliate company of CIL and Vedanta Resources Plc. and any other affiliate company of Vedanta Resources Plc. shall agree and give an undertaking that Royalty paid by ONGC is cost recoverable by ONGC as contract costs, as per the provisions of PSC.
h) In respect to RJ-ON-90/1 block, CAIRN Energy Pty Limited and CAIRN Energy Hydrocarbon Ltd. shall withdraw the arbitration case relating to dispute raised by them on payment of Cess under the PSC.”
14. CIL, later, by its letter 15.9.2011 informed ONGC that
based on the result of postal ballot by their shareholders, the
Board of Directors of CIL has passed a Resolution for
acceptance of the conditions (g) to (h) mentioned earlier with
regard to cost recovery of royalty and dropping of arbitration
proceedings on Cess.
15. ONGC had, earlier, forwarded the entire details to SBI Caps
vide their letter dated 1.6.2011 for a detailed financial
valuation/analysis of the viability of ONGC entering into the said
transaction and SBI Caps validated the financial valuation
carried out by ONGC. SBI Caps valued Cairn India’s offer under
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various scenarios. Considering CIL’s valuation under the MC
approved production profile of 175 kbopd, its valuation worked
out to be US$ 6948 million and the share price if Rs.165.
Details of production capex, opex, crude oil reads as follows:
Case-I As per Approved JV case for Brent Crude Price of US$100/bbl and WACC o 12%, Cess Rs.2626.50/MT
MC Approved JV case – Peak Productio n 175 kbopd
PSC Term
Recoverabl e Reserves (MMBBLS)
Capex US$ Million
Opex US$ Million
NPV US$ Million
CAIRN INDIA Share Price – Rs/Share
2020 372 4625 2467 6414 153 2025 458 4625 3434 6768 161 2040 579 4625 6027 6948 165
16. SBI Caps also worked out valuation of CIL based on
futuristic estimated production profile keeping other
assumptions i.e. price, royalty rate, cess, WACC same as above.
It was opined, under the most likely case, i.e. production profile
of 228 kbopd which includes EOR also, the NPV of CIL valuation
till 2040 works out to be $10695 MM and the share price is
Rs.254. The details of Production, CAPEX, OPEX, Crude Price
considered are as under:
CIL-Likely Case
Case-IV As per 2P CIL Production cases for Brent Crude Price of US$100/bbl and WACC o 12%, Cess Rs.2626.50/MT
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CIL Profile – Peak Productio n 228 kbopd WF+EOR
PSC Term
Recoverabl e Reserves (MMBBLS)
Capex US$ Million
Opex US$ Million
NPV US$ Million
CAIRN INDIA Share Price – Rs/Share
2020 737 6055 5482 9820 234 2025 902 6055 7234 10483 249 2040 1037 6055 10550 10695 254
17. It was also noticed that, in the High Case, where
production profile of 257 kbopd was estimated considering 2P
profile with WF including EOR, Barmer Hill and estimated
production from 20 other small fields also, the economic
valuation of the CIL is $12239 MM and the share price is Rs.291.
The details of Production, CAPEX, OPEX, Crude Price etc.
considered are as under:
CIL-High Case
Case-IV As per 2P CIL Production cases for Brent Crude Price of US$100/bbl and WACC o 12%, Cess Rs.2626.50/MT
CIL Profile – Peak Productio n 228 kbopd WF+EOR + Bh+20 Small Fields
PSC Term
Recoverabl e Reserves (MMBBLS)
Capex US$ Million
Opex US$ Million
NPV US$ Million
CAIRN INDIA Share Price – Rs/Share
2020 811 7618 6664 11272 268 2025 998 7698 8818 11985 285 2040 1167 7698 12922 12223
9 291
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18. The Royalty paid on behalf of CEIL & CEHL which has been
recovered for the period since inception till September, 2011
and from 1.10.2011 to 30.6.2012 is as under:
RJ-ON-OP-1 100% 70% Royalty since inception till Sep’11
784,833,924 549,383,747
Royalty from Oct’ 11 to June’12
602,140,130 421,498,091
Total 1,386,974,054 970,881,838
19. SBI Caps, therefore, on the basis of the above given
statistics, opined that under the highest profile case with base
assumptions, the value of these shares works out to Rs.291/-
and even considering higher CAPEX (130% incremental) and
lower OPEX (-30% total) and increase in crude price from US$
100/bbl to US$ 110/bbl, the value of share increases to Rs.328.
Amongst the various scenarios, it was opined that the value of
shares is maximum at Rs.331, considering CAPEX at 100% and
OPEX at 70%, with crude price at $110 per bbl. In both the
scenarios, the value of share remained below the offered rate of
Rs.355.
20. We notice that the above report of the SBI Caps was
placed before the 109th Project Appraisal Committee meeting
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held on 27.9.2011, wherein after detailed deliberations, the PAC
resolved for consideration and approval of the ONGC Board that
ONGC might not exercise its pre-emptive rights with reference
to the offer made by CAIRN and its associates to Vedanta and
its associates, for the proposed transaction of sale of shares of
CIL at the rate of Rs.355/- per share as the same was more than
the value estimated by SBI Caps. It further resolved that the
NOC to the proposed transaction be granted to CAIRN with a
condition that CAIRN, Vedanta and their associates should enter
into an agreement with ONGC to protect ONGC’s interest so
that royalty and cess in respect of block RJ-ON-90/1 would be
binding on Cairn, Vedanta and their future assignees etc. in
alignment with MoPNG direction dated 26.7.2011.
21. ONGC Board then met on 27.9.2011 and, after due
consideration of the Agenda item, the recommendations of the
PAC as well as presentation made by M/s SBI Caps, approved
the proposal and passed the following resolutions:
”RESOLVED that ONGC may not exercise its pre- emptive rights with reference to the offer made by CAIRN and its associates to Vedanta and its associates, for the Proposed Transaction of sale of shares of CIL at the rates of Rs.355/- per share as the same is more than the value evaluated by SBI CAPs.
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RESOLVED FURTHER that NOC to the Proposed Transaction be granted to CAIRN and its associates for the five blocks as mentioned in Para 5 above with a condition that CAIRN, Vedanta and their associates should enter into an agreement with ONGC to protect ONGC’s interest so that royalty and Cess are binding on CAIRN, Vedanta and their future assignee etc.
RESOLVED FURTHER that CMD, ONGC be and is hereby authorized to finalize the draft agreement/letter and Company Secretary, ONGC be and is hereby authorized to sign the agreement/letter on behalf of ONGC.”
22. The Cabinet Committee of Economic Affairs (CCEA), as
already indicated, had on 30.6.2011 given its approval to CEIL
for selling its Indian unit to Vedanta subject to the new owner
agreeing to share royalty and pay oil cess on mainstay
Rajasthan oilfields. Union Cabinet also, on 24.1.2012, gave its
final approval to London-based mining group Vedanta
Resources Plc’s acquisition of a majority stake in Cairn India for
$8.48 billion. It was noticed that Cairn and Vedanta had
complied with all the pre-conditions stipulated by the
Government of India and ONGC and the transaction between
them stood concluded.
ARGUMENTS
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23. Shri Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner, questioned the decision of the Government of India
in giving clearance to CAIRN-Vedanta deal, without ONGC
exercising the RoFR, but for which it was submitted that the
State Exchequer would have benefited to the tune of
Rs.1,00,000/- crore rupees. Learned counsel submitted that
petrol and natural gas is held by the State in public interest and
cannot be given away without due exercise of power and
discretion guided by clear and cogent policy, because the
natural resources should not be subject to private ownership or
private commercial exploitation. Reliance was placed on the
judgments of this Court in M. C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath &
Others (1997) 1 SCC 388, Meerut Development Authority
v. Association of Management Studies and Another
(2009) 6 SCC 171 and Centre for Public Interest Litigation
and Others v. Union of India and Others (2012) 3 SCC 1.
24. Shri Bhushan submitted that the Government has
unlawfully granted extension to Cairn India Limited for carrying
out exploration activities beyond the period framed by the
Rajasthan Block PSC, which has been commented upon by the
Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG).
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25. Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel appearing for
the respondent, assisted by Shri R. R. Sasiprabhu explained to
the Court in detail the main features of PSC dated 15.5.1995 as
well as the transaction entered into between Cairn and
Vedanta. Learned senior counsel pointed out that ONGC has,
inter alia, pre-emptive rights in relation to Cairn-UK’s PI under
various agreements with the Government of India and ONGC,
and that Cairn UK and/or its affiliates required consent of
ONGC, besides other governmental approval to consummate
the proposed transaction. Cairn UK took up the stand that the
transaction was only a sale of shares of CIL rather than
assignment of any PI under various PSCs and JOAs and that
there would be no change to PI in any of the PSCs in which
Cairn India group was a party. ONGC had two disputes in RJ-
ON-90-1 block, between ONGC and CEIL/CEHL which had huge
financial implications for ONGC with regard to royalty and cess.
Further, there was another dispute under the PSC on the issue
of liability of cess. CEIL and CEHL took the stand that they
were not liable for payment of cess and hence had initiated
arbitration proceedings in London against Union of India and
ONGC. All these issues were placed before the ONGC Board on
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29.1.2011 and also on 27.9.2011 and after due consideration of
the Agenda item and noticing the presentation made by SBI
caps, finally decided to go for the proposed transaction
between Cairn UK and Vedanta UK. Learned senior counsel
submitted that the above decision was taken by ONGC in public
interest and taking into consideration its financial implications
and on-going disputes between ONGC and CEIL/CEHL.
26. Learned senior counsel also submitted that the Courts
have consistently restrained from interfering with economic
decisions and that wisdom and advisabilities of economic
policies are ordinarily not amenable to Judicial Review.
Reference was made to the judgment of this Court in Balco
Employers’ Union (Regd.) v. Union of India and Others
(2002) 2 SCC 333, Bajaj Hindustan Limited v. Sir Shadi Lal
Enterprises Ltd. and Another (2011) 1 SCC 640 and Life
Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Limited and
Others (1986) 1 SCC 264.
27. Shri Siddharth Luthra, learned Additional Solicitor General
appearing for the Union of India, submitted that the ONGC
Board forwarded its request to MoPNG to ensure that royalty for
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Rajasthan Block be treated as cost recoverable. MoPNG on
26.3.2011 submitted the recommendations before the Cabinet
Committee for Economic Affairs (CCEA) for decision of the
Cabinet Committee on the issue of proposed transaction
between Cairn-Vedanta. CCEA referred the matter to the Group
of Ministers (GOM) and GOM on 25.11.2011 recommended
grant of approval based on certain conditions. Union of India
took the stand that there was no commercial viability for ONGC
to purchase CIL share at the value being offered by Vedanta.
Shri Luthra submitted that this decision was taken by ONGC in
public interest and after taking into consideration all
commercial and technical aspects of the matter and that this
Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India, shall not interfere with the economic
decision taken by the Union of India and ONGC.
28. Shri Ritin Rai, learned counsel appearing for the third
respondent, referring to the reply affidavit filed on 3.10.2012,
explained the circumstances under which the transaction was
entered into by it with Vedanta. Learned counsel submitted
that the third respondent is not a party to any of the PSCs and,
prior to the completion of the transaction, had taken all
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reasonable steps to ensure that CEIL and its subsidiaries
comply with all applicable laws and contractual obligations in
India.
29. Shri Harish Salve, learned senior counsel appearing for the
fourth respondent, submitted that it was up to the competitive
bidding operator who was granted the right to explore the oil
and natural gas making huge investment and that exploration
costs would be recoverable only if oil was discovered. Shri
Salve pointed out, initially, Shell had 100% IP in the PSC, but it
failed to make any commercial discovery even after investing
US$ 9 million and, then, CAIRN took up the challenge. Learned
counsel submitted that Cairn gave up two of its rights to secure
government permission, that is, it had agreed to make royalty
cost recoverable and withdrew its claim that the burden of cess
would be borne by the Government of India. Learned senior
counsel submitted that assigning of a PI is a well defined
concept and, referring to the judgment of this Court in
Vodafone International Holdings v. Union of India (2012)
6 SCC 613, learned senior counsel submitted that the transfer
of a share does not result in transfer of underlying assets.
Learned senior counsel submitted that various decisions taken
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in this case either from the side of Union of India, ONGC or by
respondent nos. 3 and 4, were commercial decisions based on
which the parties have acted and this Court, sitting in its
jurisdiction, shall not interfere with such commercial decisions.
Referring to the report of CAG, learned senior counsel
submitted that this Court shall not place any reliance on the
report of the CAG and grant any relief to the petitioner based
on the CAG report, since in case of any dispute between the
Ministry and CAG, that is to be resolved by the Parliament and
not this Court, sitting in this jurisdiction under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India.
DISCUSSION
30. The question that falls for consideration in this case is
whether this Court sitting in this jurisdiction is justified in
interfering with a complex economic decision taken by a State
or its instrumentalities in the absence of violation of any
statutory provision or proof of mala fide or on extraneous and
irrelevant considerations.
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31. The Government had initially the exclusive privilege of
exploration of mineral ore resources in India. The Parliament
felt the need to provide for the regulation of oil fields and for
the development of mineral resources and enacted The Oil
Fields (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948 (Act 53 of 1948)
and later The Petroleum and Natural Gas Rules, 1958 were
framed for the regulation of petroleum operations and the
grant of licenses and leases for exploration and development of
petroleum in India. The Rules provide for the grant of
exploration licenses and mining leases in respect of lands
vested in State Government by that State Government with the
previous approval of the Central Government, and ONGC had
been duly granted an exploration license to carry out
exploration operations in association with other companies in
the concerned area.
32. The Government of India, ONGC and Shell on 15.5.1995
entered into a PSC in respect of the Rajasthan Block RJ-ON-90/1
for the exploration and exploitation of crude oil and natural gas,
details of which have already been stated in the earlier part of
the Judgment. The Rajasthan Block, which is the subject matter
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of the present writ petition, was offered in the 4th round of pre
NELP (New Exploration Licensing Policy) by competitive bidding
mechanism which culminated in the execution of PSC Contract
on 15.5.1995. Shell was a party to the agreement to the PSC
dated 15.5.1995 and even after seven years of Contract Shell
could not make any commercial discovery, though large
amounts were invested between 1999 and 2003.
Consequently, it had to transfer its Participating Interest (PI) to
CEIL and CEHL. The following chart produced by ONGC would
give a broad picture of the share holding of the various
companies prior to transfer and after its transfer:
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RAJASTHAN BLOCK (PSC)
Shell 100%
Participating Interest (PI) Government of India ONGC
(Back in Right)
Cairn Energy India Pvt. Limited (CEIL)
50% PI
Cairn Energy Hydrocarbons Limited (“CEHL”) 50% PI
ONGC (30% Participating Interest)
(back in)
Cairn Energy India Pvt. Limited (CEIL)
(35% Participating Interest)
Cairn Energy Hydrocarbons Limited (CEHL)
(35% Participating Interest)
After the transfer if PI, Cairn made Commercial Discovery. Thus as per PSC the Participating Interest was distributed as under:
CAIRN India Limited (CIL) Listed in India – Promoted by
CAIRN UK Holdings Limited Listed in London & Wholly Owned
Subsidiary of CAIRN Energy PLC UK (CAIRN)
Listed in London
Vedanta Resource Ltd. Listed in London
Proposed to purchase 50-60% of CIL shares Directly from CAIRN Energy PLC UK
Thereafter Vedanta purchased:
10% from Cairns Plc. On 11.06.2011 10.4% from Petronas 8.1 % through open offer by Sesa Goa (subsidiary) Total 28.5%
Remaining 30% were sold after September, 2011
+ + Both companies are Wholly
Owned Subsidiaries of
15.05.19 95
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26
33. The above chart will indicate that CEIL and CEHL,
subsidiaries of Cairn, have succeeded Shell as parties to the
PSC and together they became holder of 70% of the PI and
later Vedanta Resource Ltd. purchased CIL’s shares through
CAIRN.
34. CEIL is a company incorporated under the laws of India
and listed at Bombay Stock Exchange and National Stock
Exchange. Cairn Energy is incorporated under the laws of (UK)
and listed in London Stock Exchange and the majority share-
holders in CEIL having a 64.2% equity stake in it through its
wholly owned subsidiary, Cairn UK Holdings Limited. Upon
acquisition of 50% of the Shell’s interest under the contract
CEIL became the operator under the operating agreement
w.e.f. 1.1.2000. Cairn later announced on 16.8.2010 a disposal
of its substantial shareholding in CEIL to Vedanta. ONGC had
reviewed the various agreements signed by Cairn and/or its
affiliates with the Government of India and inter se with ONGC
as one of the participating companies in various oil
blocks/fields. ONGC had pre-emptive rights in relation to
participating interest of Cairn and/or its affiliates. Under the
various agreements with the Government of India and ONGC
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and Cairn and/or its affiliates required consent of ONGC besides
other governmental approval to consummate the proposed
transaction. The various decisions taken by the ONGC and the
Government of India subsequently, as well as steps taken by
the ONGC referring to SBI Caps of its financial implications has
already been noticed in the earlier part of this Judgment.
35. The question whether the CEIL, the operator of the block
has to include Royalty “as recoverable cost” and whether it is
commercially viable for the ONGC to exercise its RoFR were
elaborately considered by the ONGC Board in its various
meetings held on 29.1.2011, 27.9.2011. The Board after due
deliberations and considering the offered right at Rs.405/- per
share vis-à-vis the internal assessed value of Rs.290/- per
share, noticed that acquisition stake offered by Vedanta Cairn
for the proposed transaction of sale of shares of CEIL was much
above the ONGC evaluated value of the proposed transaction,
and hence was not advisable for the ONGC to acquire shares.
Further there was an ongoing issue/dispute relating to cost
recovery of Royalty being paid by ONGC for the entire crude oil
producing field – RJ-0A-90/1 block pursuant to provisions of
accounting procedure of PSC. Further there was a dispute
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between CEIL and CEHL and ONGC as to the liability of cess
under the PSC for the Rajasthan Block. CEIL and CEHL had
initiated arbitration proceedings in respect of the same. It was
noticed that a large sum, running into several million US $
would have been payable by ONGC had CEIL and CEHL were
successful in the arbitration. Now due to the various
agreements/decisions taken by the Union of India and ONGC,
the arbitration against Union of India and ONGC in relation to
the cess was withdrawn since the Government of India and
ONGC had accorded their consent for the deal with Cairn and
Vedanta. Further CEIL and its affiliates had also agreed to treat
royalty paid as cost recoverable by ONGC as contract costs.
ONGC had already derived financial benefit to the tune of US
$970,881,838 towards royalty paid by it till June 2012 and
would continue to derive similar benefits during the currency of
the contract i.e. upto 2020.
36. We notice the decision taken by the ONGC not to exercise
its RoFR was taken after an elaborate and due deliberations.
The report of SBI Caps, after making a detailed financial
analysis also supported the decision taken by the ONGC. The
decision to grant no objection to the transfer of shares of CEIL
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29
from Cairn to Vedanta was also on the basis that the proposed
share price of share was at Rs.355 per share, was well in
excess of its intrinsic value as were evaluated by SBI Caps. SBI
Caps report evaluated each share of CEIL at Rs.291 with the
highest production profile under normal circumstances. It was
concluded that even considering various other scenario makes
possible value at Rs.331 per share.
37. The Union of India also endorsed the decision taken by the
ONGC after due deliberations. The matter was finally placed
before the Cabinet Committee of Economic Affairs, which
placed the matter before the Group of Ministers and Group of
Ministers on 27.5.2011 granted its approval, based on certain
conditions. The same was conveyed to the parties and the
Vedanta Resources conveyed its acceptance to the conditions
imposed by CCEA. Cairn also indicated to ONGC that CEIL
Board had also accepted the conditions imposed upon it and
that the cess arbitration, which had been initiated by Cairn
against ONGC was also withdrawn.
38. We notice that the ONGC and the Government of India
have considered various commercial and technical aspects
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30
flowing from the PSC and also its advantages that ONGC would
derive if the Cairn and Vedanta deal was approved. This Court
sitting in the jurisdiction cannot sit in judgment over the
commercial or business decision taken by parties to the
agreement, after evaluating and assessing its monetary and
financial implications, unless the decision is in clear violation of
any statutory provisions or perverse or for extraneous
considerations or improper motives. States and its
instrumentalities can enter into various contracts which may
involve complex economic factors. State or the State
undertaking being a party to a contract, have to make various
decisions which they deem just and proper. There is always an
element of risk in such decisions, ultimately it may turn out to
be a correct decision or a wrong one. But if the decision is
taken bona fide and in public interest, the mere fact that
decision has ultimately proved to be a wrong, that itself is not a
ground to hold that the decision was mala fide or done with
ulterior motives.
39. Matters relating to economic issues, have always an
element of trial and error, so long as a trial and error are bona
fide and with best intentions, such decisions cannot be
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31
questioned as arbitrary, capricious or illegal. This Court in
State of M.P. and others v. Nandlal Jaiswal and others
(1986) 4 SCC 566 referring to the Judgment of Frankfurter J. in
Morey vs. Dond 354 US 457 held that “we must not forget
that in complex economic matters every decision is necessarily
empiric and it is based on experimentation or what one may
call “trial and error method” and, therefore, its validity cannot
be tested on any rigid “a priori” considerations or on the
application of any straight jacket formula.” In Metropolis
Theatre Co. v. State of Chicago 57 L Ed 730 the Supreme
Court of the United States held as follows:
“The problem of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodation, illogical, if may be, and unscientific. But even such criticism should not be hastily expressed. What is best is not discernible, the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or condemned. Mere errors of government are not subject to our judicial review. It is only its palpably arbitrary exercises which can be declared void.”
In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd. and
others (1986) 1 SCC 264 this Court held
“that the Court will not debate academic matters or concern itself with intricacies or trade and commerce. The Court held that when the State or its
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32
instrumentalities of the State ventures into corporate world and purchases the shares of the company, it assumes to itself the ordinary role of shareholder, and dons the robes of a shareholder, with all the rights available to such a shareholders and there is no reason why the State as a shareholder should be expected to state its reasons when it seeks to change the management by a resolution of the company, like any other shareholder.”
In Liberty Oil Mills and others v. Union of India and
others (1984) 3 SCC 465, this Court held that expertise in
public and political, national and international economy is
necessary, when one may engages in the making or in the
criticism of an import policy. Obviously, courts do not possess
the expertise and are consequently, incompetent to pass
judgments on the appropriateness or the adequacy of a
particular import policy.
In Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India
(2009) 7 SCC 561, this Court held as follows:
“It is neither within the domain of the courts nor the scope of judicial review to embark upon an enquiry as to whether a particular public policy is wise or whether better public policy can be evolved. Nor are the courts inclined to strike down a policy at the behest of a petitioner merely because it has been urged that a different policy would have been fairer or wiser or more scientific or more logical. Wisdom and advisability of economic policy are ordinarily
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not amenable to judicial review. In matters relating to economic issues the Government has, while taking a decision, right to “trial and error” as long as both trial and error are bona fide and within the limits of the authority. For testing the correctness of a policy, the appropriate forum is Parliament and not the courts.”
In Bajaj Hindustan Limited v. Sir Shadi Lal Enterprises
Limited And Another (2011) 1 SCC 640, this Court held “that
economic and fiscal regulatory measures are a field where
Judges should encroach upon very wearily as Judges are not
expert in those matters”.
This Court in Bhavesh D. Parish and Others v. Union of
India and Another (2005) 5 SCC 471, took the view that, in
the context of the changed economic scenario, the expertise of
people dealing with the subject should not be lightly interfered
with. The consequences of such interdiction can have large-
scale ramifications and can put the clock back for a number of
years. The process of rationalisation of the infirmities in the
economy can be put in serious jeopardy and, therefore, it is
necessary that while dealing with economic legislations, this
Court, while not jettisoning its jurisdiction to curb arbitrary
action or unconstitutional legislation, should interfere only in
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those few cases where the view reflected in the legislation is
not possible to be taken at all. In Centre for Public Interest
Litigation and Another v. Union of India and Others
(2000) 8 SCC 606, this Court held as follows:
“20. It is clear from the above observations of this Court that it will be very difficult for the courts to visualise the various factors like commercial/technical aspects of the contract, prevailing market conditions, both national and international and immediate needs of the country etc. which will have to be taken note of while accepting the bid offer. In such a case, unless the court is satisfied that the allegations levelled are unassailable and there could be no doubt as to the unreasonableness, mala fide, collateral consideration alleged, it will not be possible for the courts to come to the conclusion that such a contract can be prima facie or otherwise held to be vitiated so as to call for an independent investigation, as prayed for by the appellants…….”
40. The MoPNG on 26.7.2011 conveyed to Cairns UK and its
affiliates and Vedanta UK that the Government of India was
pleased to grant its consent for the Cairn -Vedanta -- subject to
fulfilment of the certain conditions i.e. they had to give an
undertaking that in the royalty paid in the ONGC was cost
recoverable by ONGC as contract cost and to withdraw the
arbitration case relating to cess. The dispute on royalty and
cess was bothering ONGC for quite some time and ONGC was
facing a claim running into several million US Dollars in an
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35
arbitration proceeding in London. Union of India and ONGC, in
their wisdom could make Cairn agree to those conditions, it
gave an undertaking that in the royalty paid in the ONGC would
cost recoverable by ONGC as contract cost and to withdraw the
arbitration case relating to cess. Union of India and ONGC, in
their wisdom could make Cairn agree to those conditions which
was clearly a business commercial decision taken with good
intention, since the fate of the arbitration proceedings could not
be predicted. ONGC also in its business prudence decided not
to go for shares in CEIL, first of all it was equated at a very high
premium, secondly it guaranteed no return either in the way of
dividend or any other profits. Further, it might lead to huge
liability of investment and with a minimum work programme
and the remaining PSC’s help by CEIL which involved
exploitation operations with no guarantee of any commercial
discovery. The result of CEIL and its affiliates agreeing to treat
royalty paid by ONGC as cost recoverable by ONGC as contract
cost, and ONGC has derived benefits to the tune of US $
970,881,838 towards royalty paid by till June 2012 and would
continue to derive similar benefits till the currency of the
contract i.e. till June 2020.
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36
41. Consequent to the agreement dated 30.11.2011, ONGC
received Rs.5000 crores approximately towards CEIL and
CEHL’s share of royalty for the period from 29.8.2009 to
30.7.2012 besides CAIRN and Vedanta agreeing to pay their
share of royalty and cess in future involving huge financial
implications.
42. ONGC in its wisdom decided not to acquire any shares of
CEIL at a high premium of Rs.335 per share plus Rs.50 per
share as not to compete fee, which would have come to ONGC
at a hefty cost of 4.44 billion US $ about Rs.6,20,600 crores
rupees, i.e. even if ONGC had exercised its ROFR it would be a
30% share holder of CEIL and the control of CEIL would have, in
any event, remained with Cairn and Vedanta which would have
then altogether 50% in CEIL , in other words, with the
acquisition of 30% shares in CEIL, State of Rajasthan Block
would remain unchanged and hence ONGC could not have got
any increase in shares in the profits much-less any increase in
profits by 40%.
43. We are of the view that on facts, as well as on law, the
ONGC and the Government of India have taken a prudent
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commercial and economic decision in public interest. We are
not prepared to say that the decision is mala fide or actuated
by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations or improper
motive.
C A G Report
44. The petitioner has placed considerable reliance on the
Comptroller and Auditor General (“CAG”) Report. Some of the
comments in the CAG Report were highlighted by counsel
appearing for the petitioner to contend that the declaration of
fresh discoveries during the appraisal/development phases
within delineated discovery/development areas amounted to
irregular extension of exploration activities, which is not in
consonance with the terms of the PSC.
45. The petitioner has also sought a direction to
CAG/Government of India to calculate the alleged losses from
payment of 100% royalty and cess by ONGC before the Cairn-
Vedanta deal and for a direction to ONGC/Government to
recover the excess royalty paid by ONGC from Cairn India.
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38
46. CAG may be right in pointing out that public monies are to
be applied for the purposes prescribed by Parliament and that
extravagance and waste are minimized and that sound
financial practices are encouraged in estimating and
contracting, and in administration generally.
47. We have come across several instances where
considerable reliance has been placed on the CAG Report and
projecting it as gospel truth. Let us examine the role of the
CAG under our Constitutional scheme.
48. The Comptroller and Auditor General (“CAG”) is appointed
under the provisions of Chapter 5 of the Constitution of India.
Article 149 provides thus:
“Article 149. Duties and powers of the Comptroller and Auditor General – The Comptroller and Auditor General shall perform such duties and exercise such powers in relation to the accounts of the Union and of the States and of any other authority or body as may be prescribed by or under any law made by the Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, shall perform such duties and exercise such powers in relation to the accounts of the Union and of the States as were conferred on or excisable by the Auditor General of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution in relation to the accounts of the Dominion of India and of the Provinces respectively.”
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49. The CAG earlier functioned under the Government of India
(Audit and Accounts) Order, 1936 as adopted by the India
(Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, which was repealed by
Section 26 of the Act of 1971. The Comptroller and Auditor
General’s (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act, 1971
was enacted by the Parliament in the year 1971. Section 10 of
the Act states that in relation to the Government, the CAG shall
compile the accounts of the Union and the States. The CAG on
the basis of these accounts, prepares the annual accounts
which are submitted to the President of India or the Governor of
the State or the Administrator of the Union Territory. The audit
of the Union and the States is under Section 13 of the Act. The
scope of the audit extends to the audit of all expenditure so as
to ascertain whether the monies shown in the accounts as
having been disbursed were legally available for such
disbursement and whether the expenditure conforms to the
authority which governs it. The CAG has to satisfy himself that
the rules and procedures designed to secure an effective check
on the assessment, collection and proper allocation of revenue
are being duly observed under Section 16. The CAG also has to
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40
examine decisions which have financial implications including
the propriety of the decision making.
50. The Reports of the CAG are required to be submitted to
the President, who shall cause them to be laid before each
House of Parliament, as provided under Article 151(1). In
relation to the States, reports are submitted to the Governor,
who shall cause them to be laid before the Legislature of the
State, as per Article 151(2) of the Constitution. When reports
are received in the Parliament, they are scrutinized by the
Public Accounts Committee (“PAC”). The PAC is established in
accordance with Rule 308 of the Rules of Procedure and
Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha. The function of the PAC is to
examine the accounts of the Union and the report of the CAG.
The PAC shall be principally concerned whether the policy is
carried out efficiently, effectively and economically, rather than
with the merits of government policy. Its main functions are to
see that public monies are applied for the purposes prescribed
by the Parliament, that extravagance and waste are minimized
and that sound financial practices are encouraged in estimating
and contracting, and in administration generally. The PAC also
has the power to receive evidence, the power to send for
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41
persons, papers and record and can receive oral evidence on
solemn affirmation. Once the report is prepared, the report of
the PAC is presented to the House.
51. Durga Das Basu in Commentary on the Constitution of
India 8th Edition 2009 at page 6058 says:
“that the Public Accounts Committee is to examine the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General, in order to satisfy itself on certain points:
Firstly, it has to verify that the moneys shown in the accounts as spent have actually been spent for the purpose for which Parliament granted them.
Secondly, it has to satisfy itself that the moneys granted by Parliament have been spent by the Government ’within the scope of the demands’. This means that no expenditure should exceed the amount granted without fresh parliamentary approval, nor should the grant be appropriated for a new service not contemplated in the demand. Even if there is a surplus of a grant under one vote, it cannot be appropriated to another vote without sanction of Parliament.
The exercise of this function gives the Committee a comprehensive power of survey over the entire scheme of expenditure of the government as well as the administration. Though the Committee has nothing to question the policies of the government, it has to scrutinise the implementation of the policies through its review of the expenditure. Both in England …………… as well as in India, it has been acknowledged that the present function includes a criticism of extravagant or wasteful expenditure of public money, in general, and in this connection, it is entitled to point out the weak points in the
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administration of the departments concerned, and also to ensure that proper action has been taken against delinquents guilty of irregularity or breach of the rules, though it has no power to enforce its comments by any direct administrative action.
Thirdly, the audit of the accounts of the State corporations is another important function entrusted to the Public Accounts Committee. Its importance is increasing with the ever-expanding State activity in the sphere of industry and enterprise.”
52. In this connection is useful to refer to the practice of the
PAC, as set out in a note found in the website of the Lok Sabha
which states as follows:
“Selection of Subject for Examination:
As the work of the Committee is normally confined to the various matters referred to in the Audit Reports, and Appropriation Accounts, its work normally starts after the Reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General on the accounts of the Government are laid on the Table of the House. As soon as the Committee for a year is constituted, it selects paragraphs from the reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General that were presented after the last selection of subjects by the Committee for in-depth examination during its term of office.
Assistance by Comptroller and Auditor General
The Committee is assisted by the Comptroller and Auditor General in the examination of Accounts and Audit Reports.
……
Calling for Information from Government
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The Committee calls for, in the first instance, background note and advance information from the Ministries/Departments concerned in regard to subjects selected by it for examination.
…….
Evidence of Officials
The Committee later takes oral evidence of the representatives of the Ministries/Departments concerned with the subjects under examination.
……
Report and Minutes
The conclusions of the Committee on a subject are contained in its Report which, after its adoption by the Committee, is presented by the Chairman to the Lok Sabha. Minutes of the sittings of the Committee form Part II of the Report. A copy of the Report is also laid on the Table of Rajya Sabha. The Reports of the Committee are adopted by consensus among members. Accordingly, there is no system of appending minute of dissent to the Report.”
53. Action Taken Reports (ATRs) are then required to be made
out by the ministries. Speaker has the power to issue
directions under the rule and procedure. Direction 102 requires
the Government to, as early as possible, furnish the PAC with a
statement showing the action taken on the recommendations
of the PAC report. The Parliament has before it not only the
report of the CAG, the report of the PAC in the first instance
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drawn up after hearing the view of the ministries, the Action
Taken Report including the replies of the Government and the
further comments of the PAC on the replies of the Government.
54. We have referred to the report of the CAG, the role of the
PAC and the procedure followed in the House, only to indicate
that the CAG report is always subject to scrutiny by the
Parliament and the Government can always offer its views on
the report of the CAG.
55. The question that is germane for consideration in this case
is whether this Court can grant reliefs merely placing reliance
on the CAG’s report. The CAG’s report is always subject to
parliamentary debates and it is possible that PAC can accept
the ministry’s objection to the CAG report or reject the report of
the CAG. The CAG, indisputably is an independent
constitutional functionary, however, it is for the Parliament to
decide whether after receiving the report i.e. PAC to make its
comments on the CAG’s report.
56. We may, however, point out that since the report is from a
constitutional functionary, it commands respect and cannot be
brushed aside as such, but it is equally important to examine
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the comments what respective ministries have to offer on the
CAG’s report. The ministry can always point out, if there is any
mistake in the CAG’s report or the CAG has inappropriately
appreciated the various issues. For instance, we cannot as
such accept the CAG report in the instance case.
57. Article 2.6 of PSC permits extension of the exploration
period for three years from the end of the seven year period
prescribed in Article 2.2. The period extended in pursuance to
Article 2.6 expired on 14.5.2005. The CAG, it is seen, has
assumed that any exploration carried out beyond the period
was beyond the provision of PSC. Article 2.6 specifically
contemplates extension of the exploration phase pursuant to
the terms of the PSC. The last part of Article 2.6 to Article 2.9,
however, permits further extension of the exploration period for
a period of 30 months, therefore, it is factually and legally
incorrect to suggest that any exploration carried out beyond
14.5.2005 was beyond the provision of PSC. CAG views on that
aspect cannot be accepted.
58. In such circumstances, we find no merits in the writ
petition which was filed without appreciating or understanding
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the scope of the decision or the making process concerning
economic and commercial matters which gives liberty to States
and its instrumentalities to take appropriate decision after
weighing advantages and disadvantages of the same and this
Court sitting in this jurisdiction, as already indicated, is not
justified in interfering with those decisions, especially when
there is nothing to show that those decisions are contrary to
law or actuated to mala fide or irrelevant considerations. The
writ petition, therefore, lacks merits. Hence, the same is
dismissed.
………………………………..J. (K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN)
………………………………..J. (Dipak Misra)
New Delhi, May 09, 2013
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ITEM NO.1A COURT NO.9 SECTION PIL
(For Judgment)
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO(s). 69 OF 2012
ARUN KUMAR AGRAWAL Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. Respondent(s)
Date: 09/05/2013 This Petition was called on for pronouncement of judgment.
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Prashant Bhushan,AOR
Mr. Pranav Sachdeva,Adv.
For Respondent(s) Ms. Sushma Suri,Adv.
Mr. Rahul Sharma,Adv.
Ms. Supriya Juneja,Adv.
Mr. G. Singh Bedi,Adv.
Mr. Arjun Dewan,Adv.
Mr. B. Krishna Prasad,AOR
Mr. Pradeep Misra,AOR
Ms. Niti Dixit,Adv.
Mr. Ritin Rai,Adv.
Ms. Samiksha Godiyal,Adv.
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48
Mr. K.R. Sasiprabhu,AOR
Mr. E.C. Agrawala,AOR
Ms. B. Vijayalakshmi Menon,AOR
Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.S.
Radhakrishnan pronounced the judgment of
the Bench comprising His Lordship and
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dipak Misra.
The writ petition is dismissed in
terms of the signed judgment.
(NARENDRA PRASAD)
COURT MASTER
(RENUKA SADANA)
COURT MASTER
(Signed "Reportable" Judgment is placed on the file)